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Abstract 
 
Only recently have declassified government documents on the United States 
sale of Trident nuclear missiles to the United Kingdom become available. As 
such, the Trident agreements of 1980 and 1982 have received little scholarly 
attention. This thesis provides the first focused study of the negotiations on 
the supply of Trident C4 and D5 missiles. It does this by drawing upon material 
from the British National Archives, the Jimmy Carter Library and the Ronald 
Reagan Library.  
Specifically, the research focuses on the ways in which the interests of 
the United States influenced the Trident negotiations and British decision-
making on the successor to Polaris. This approach eschews the Anglo-centric 
framework that dominates research on the US-UK nuclear relationship. This 
US-centred approach demonstrates the contingency of the Trident 
negotiations. Both the Reagan and Carter administrations were hard-headed 
in their discussions with the British over the supply of Trident, and only 
consented to do so when it suited Washington. Furthermore, both 
administrations drove a hard bargain over the terms of sale, and sought to 
derive the greatest possible benefit from the deal. US geostrategic interests, 
economic realities and domestic politics influenced the actions of White House 
officials throughout. The sale of Trident only brought modest benefits. As such, 
both US administrations viewed it as helpful to assist the British when it 
coalesced with their overall interests. However, if a Polaris replacement 
clashed with the priorities of the administration, they disregarded British 
interests. As such, the Trident agreements were not a ‘foregone conclusion’ 
due to the logic of Cold War ‘deterrence’, or long-standing US-UK nuclear co-
operation, but negotiations heavily influenced by the context of the time. As 
such, the study reveals the ways in which the broader political concerns of the 
United States interacted with the US-UK nuclear relationship and nuclear 
decision-making.  
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Introduction 
 
“Unless you were quite senior in the government, you knew 
nothing about these things at all. You talk about Parliament being 
ignorant… We were all ignorant about it.” 
 
- Lord Peter Carrington.1 
 
Over the course of a rather timid United Kingdom general election campaign, 
the events of 9 April 2015 stood out. On that day, Michael Fallon, the 
Conservative Defence Secretary, claimed that, in order to do a deal with the 
anti-Trident Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) and secure power in 
Westminster, Ed Miliband would “stab the United Kingdom in the back” over 
renewing the UK’s Trident nuclear weapons system just as he had “stabbed his 
own brother in the back” to lead the Labour party.2 Notwithstanding the 
absurdity of comparing relations with a brother to one’s policy on nuclear 
weapons, the ensuing media circus highlighted the peculiarities of British elite 
thinking on the country’s nuclear force. David Cameron, leader of the 
Conservative party, pressed for an absolute Labour commitment to Trident, 
stating: 
We need an answer from Labour. Are you really committed to the 
Trident deterrent? Are you really going to have four submarines 
and can you rule out any arrangement where the SNP put you into 
power knowing they want… less secure defences without a Trident 
replacement.3  
Vernon Coaker, Labour’s Shadow Defence Secretary, replied to the 
Conservative accusations: “Labour is committed to maintain a minimum, 
                                                     
1 Lord Carrington quoted in Peter Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), viii.  
2 Michael Fallon, “This unholy alliance would put Britain’s security in jeopardy,” The Times, 9 
April 2015, accessed 29 May 2015, 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/thunderer/article4405666.ece. 
3 David Cameron quoted in Patrick Wintour “Trident row: Cameron defends Fallon’s attack 
on Miliband,” The Guardian, 9 April 2015, accessed 29 May 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/apr/09/trident-row-cameron-defends-
fallons-attack-on-miliband. 
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credible, independent nuclear deterrent, delivered through a continuous-at-
sea deterrent.”4 This essential agreement across the two main political parties 
reflected the belief that Britain must possess nuclear weapons, and to do 
otherwise was to shed great power status and the international influence that 
accompanies that. But, of course, while politicians from both political parties 
spoke of the independence of Britain’s ‘deterrent’, the system is highly reliant 
upon the support of the United States.5 
 The UK’s nuclear force currently consists of four Vanguard-class 
submarines each capable of carrying up to 16 Trident D5 (II) ballistic nuclear 
missiles.6 The UK is dependent upon the US for the supply of these missiles. 
The US produces and services the missiles. The US provide the software used 
for targeting and firing the Trident missiles. Indeed, the UK does not actually 
own any individual missiles but leases them under the terms of the 1963 
Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA). This arrangement is the latest chapter in the 
US-UK nuclear relationship. The PSA originally allowed Britain to acquire the 
Polaris Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system in the 1960s. In 
1980, the agreement was amended to allow the purchase of the Trident C4 (I) 
system, and was further amended in 1982 to authorise the purchase of the 
more advanced Trident D5 in place of the C4.7 This arrangement means that 
Britain’s ‘independent’ deterrent is a misnomer. The submarine-based 
replacement to Trident advocated by Britain’s main parties will also be 
technically dependent upon the US. In this way the future of Britain’s nuclear 
programme, just like its past, is intimately linked to the United States. 
                                                     
4 Vernon Coaker quoted in Nicholas Watt “Ed Miliband would ‘barter away’ Trident to win 
election, say Tories,” The Guardian, 9 April 2015, accessed 29 May 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/apr/09/ed-miliband-trident-election-labour-
snp-nuclear. 
5 Michael Fallon, “This unholy alliance would put Britain’s security in jeopardy,” The Times, 9 
April 2015; Vernon Coaker quoted in Nicholas Watt “Ed Miliband would ‘barter away’ Trident 
to win election, say Tories,” The Guardian, 9 April 2015. 
6 A brief note on terminology. In this study, I will refer to the two different Trident missiles 
systems as the C4 and D5, rather than I and II. I have made this choice because the former are 
the most commonly used terms, they clearly distinguish the two missiles making it easier for 
the writer and reader, and they better demonstrate the marked differences between the two 
missiles. 
7 Nick Ritchie, "The US-UK Special Relationship," September 2009, Parliamentary Foreign 
Affairs Committee Publications & records, accessed 7 June 2015, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfaff/114/114we12.htm
l. 
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 The role played by the US in sustaining Britain’s nuclear programme is 
generally elided in popular political discourse because dependency is not a 
happy thing for a supposedly great power to admit. For over thirty years, the 
British government has poured money into its Trident SLBM system. Yet the 
story of how the British government came to an agreement with the US to 
purchase the Trident missiles has not received the attention it deserves. Most 
scholars suggest that the American decision to supply Trident was more or less 
foreordained; that notions of relational “specialness” (particularly in nuclear 
matters) means there is no real story to tell. For example, Kristan Stoddart 
asserts, “For well-established reasons Trident was always the most likely 
successor system.”8 Similarly, Ian Clark observes, “The Atomic Energy 
Agreement established a pattern of nuclear exchanges that has essentially 
persisted ever since.”9 This perspective contains more than a grain of truth, 
but it also leads sometimes to tendentious analysis that underplays the role 
played by agency and contingency – few things in history, if any, are inevitable. 
This thesis queries the notion that the process of supplying the UK with 
Trident was a ‘foregone conclusion.’ It does so through a detailed archival 
study of the UK’s negotiations with the US over the Trident C4 and D5 
agreements.  
 Only recently has it become possible to write an account of the Trident 
negotiations based upon archival material. As such, the Trident agreements 
have received relatively little scholarly attention. Much of the existing 
discussion of the Trident agreements is contained within general works on the 
US-UK relationship or British foreign policy, and discussion is limited to, at 
most, a few pages. Moreover, these works are largely reliant upon memoirs, 
interviews and public government documents.10 Within these accounts, 
                                                     
8 Kristan Stoddart, Facing Down the Soviet Union: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear 
Weapons, 1976-1983 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 230. 
9 Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and America, 
1957-1962 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 428. In 1958, the UK and US governments signed the 
Atomic Energy Agreement, also known as the Mutual Defence Agreement, which enabled the 
exchange of nuclear information and materials between the two countries. In 1959, this 
agreement was amended to authorise the transfer of nuclear technology.  
10 See Alan Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of friendship, conflict 
and the rise and decline of superpowers (London: Routledge, 1995), 146-147, 150-152; John 
Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006),18-183; John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence 
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discussion of the US role is understandably limited to a sentence or two. When 
this research commenced, the longest study of the Trident agreements was a 
chapter by Kristan Stoddart on the Trident C4 decision. This study used some 
archival documents but was, again, mostly reliant upon memoirs, interviews 
and public documents, and the chapter did not discuss the Trident D5 
agreement.11  
 Recently, accounts that make use of some of the available British 
archival material have been published. Most of these accounts are only a few 
paragraphs in length.12 However, in October 2014, Kristan Stoddart published 
Facing Down the Soviet Union: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 
1976 – 1983, which dedicates four chapters to Britain’s decision to replace 
Polaris and the Trident agreements, as well as chapters on other elements of 
British nuclear policy during this time. These chapters provide a thorough and 
detailed, but largely narrative-led account, of British decision-making.13 The 
chapters make use of much of the available British archival material, as well as 
a few documents from the US archives. However, the primary focus of the 
chapters is the British government’s decision to purchase the Trident C4 and 
then D5 system from the US, with much less discussion of the negotiations 
themselves. Moreover, there is little reflection on the influence of the United 
States domestic and international concerns upon the negotiations.14 In 
addition, in 2015 John Baylis and Stoddart published The British Nuclear 
Experience, which contains two chapters on ‘The Polaris replacement debate’ 
and ‘The adoption of Trident.’ However, the chapters do not draw upon 
American archival material and their focus is on British decision-making with 
                                                     
Relations 1939-1984 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1984), 181-185; Ernest May and Gregory 
Treverton, “Defence Relationships: American Perspectives” in The ‘Special Relationship’: 
Anglo-American Relations Since 1945, ed. WM. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), 174-177; Peter Malone, The British Nuclear Deterrent (New York: St 
Martin’s Press, 1984), 117; Geoffrey Smith, Reagan and Thatcher (London: Bodley Head, 
1990), 68-71; Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb, 323-324. 
11 See Kristan Stoddart, “The Special Nuclear Relationship and the 1980 Trident Decision,” in 
U.S.-UK Nuclear Cooperation after 50 Years, ed. Jenifer Mackby and Paul Cornish (Washington 
DC: The CSIS Press, 2008), 89-97. 
12 See for example Richard Aldous, Reagan & Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship (London: 
Random House, 2013), 56-58; Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography 
(London: Allen Lane, 2013), 571-573. 
13 Stoddart, Facing Down the Soviet Union, 34-75, 112-202. 
14 See Ibid., 132-143, 193-195. 
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much less discussion of the negotiations and the US perspective.15 Moreover, 
as will be discussed in the relevant chapters, much of the discussion on the 
American perspective within the existing literature provides mono-causal 
explanations to explain the role of the Reagan and Carter administrations, 
which are insufficiently nuanced and largely overlook the uncertainty the UK 
faced in their efforts to secure the Trident agreements. As such, there currently 
exists no discrete study of the Trident negotiations nor detailed analysis of the 
US role in these negotiations.  
  This thesis aims to fill this lacuna in the historiography by providing 
the first focused study of the Trident C4 and D5 negotiations, using material 
from both the British and US archives. In particular, my research focuses on 
the influence of the successive US administration’s wider domestic and 
international interests in the negotiations. However, this study is not a story 
of whether the United Kingdom’s nuclear force is independent or dependent, 
or Britain subservient or not subservient to the US. I believe the US-UK nuclear 
relationship is more complex than such binaries and that power is not a zero 
sum game. Nevertheless, the current neglect of the US role in the formulation 
of the Trident agreements is problematic and limits understanding. It 
implicitly suggests that the United States will provide nuclear assistance to 
Britain when requested to do so, on the terms that the British government 
wish, and as such presents the former, ironically, almost as a vassal state. 
However, the US provision of Trident was not indelibly written in the stars. 
Detailed analysis of the US-UK nuclear relationship demonstrates that the US 
has, as one would expect, never played a neutral role in its continuation. The 
US is the ‘senior’ partner in US-UK nuclear co-operation and therefore its aims 
and interests have heavily shaped the relationship. As such, through analysing 
the Trident negotiations, whilst being attentive to the influence of wider 
American concerns upon the US government’s approach, I hope to deepen our 
understanding of the Trident agreements.  
 The central theme in this thesis is the role that the interests of the 
Reagan and Carter administration – which did not necessarily dovetail with 
                                                     
15 John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart, The British Nuclear Experience: The Role of Beliefs, 
Culture, and Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 133-151. 
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those of the counterpart UK governments – played in influencing and shaping 
the Trident negotiations and agreements. The second, interrelated, theme is 
the ways in which the UK’s technical dependence on the US influenced British 
decision-making. From these points of departure, this study demonstrates the 
nuances and complexity of the Trident negotiations. It tells a tale of 
contingency, uncertainty, tough negotiations, and secret deals, where 
discussions were influenced by the dynamics of US geostrategic interests, 
economic realities, and domestic politics, and the eventual agreements formed 
part of a US-UK transactional defence relationship. Thus, the study reveals the 
ways in which the broader political concerns of the US interacted with nuclear 
decision-making.  
 
Whilst the Trident agreements have yet to be the focus of close scholarly 
analysis, there is a substantial literature on the US-UK nuclear relationship, 
with the post-war period in particular having attracted considerable 
attention.16 Recent years have also seen the publication of many studies 
considering the relationship in the 1960s, and there is now a steady trickle of 
archival studies on the 1970s.17 There is also a considerable literature that 
                                                     
16 See Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations; Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British 
Origins of Nuclear Strategy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); Barton Bernstein, “The Uneasy 
Alliance: Roosevelt, Churchill and the Atomic Bomb, 1940 – 1945,” The Western Political 
Quarterly 29:2 (1976); Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic 
Energy, 1945-52. Vol.1 Policy Making (London: Macmillan, 1974); Matthew Jones, “Great 
Britain, the United States and Consultation over Use of the Atomic Bomb, 1950-1954,” The 
Historical Journal 54:3 (2011); Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Politics: the British Experience with 
an Independent Strategic Force, 1939 – 1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); John 
Baylis, “The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement: The Search for Nuclear 
Independence,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 31: 3 (2008), 456-457. 
17 Works on the 1960s include: Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy; David Gill, Britain and the Bomb: 
Nuclear Diplomacy, 1964-1970 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014); Kristan Stoddart, 
Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964-
1970 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Donette Murray, Kennedy, Macmillan and 
Nuclear Weapons (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2000); Andrew Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and 
NATO: Britain, America and the  dynamics of alliance, 1962-68 (Oxon: Routledge, 2006); 
Richard Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain the United States and Nuclear 
Weapons, 1958-64 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Works on the 1970s & 1980s 
include: Kristan Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield, Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear 
Weapons 1970-1976 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Stoddart, Facing Down the 
Soviet Union; Helen Parr, “The British Decision to Upgrade Polaris, 1970-4,” Contemporary 
European History 22:2 (2013); John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart, “Britain and the Chevaline 
Project: The Hidden Nuclear Programme, 1967-82,” Journal of Strategic Studies 26:4 (2003); 
Thomas Robb, “Antelope, Poseidon or a Hybrid: The upgrading of the British Strategic Nuclear 
Deterrent,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 33:6 (2010). 
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analyses US-UK nuclear co-operation as part of the wider US-UK alliance.18 As 
well as helping to move understanding of the US-UK nuclear relationship 
chronologically forward, this thesis makes three contributions to the existing 
literature. 
 First, this study demonstrates the ways in which the broader political 
interests of the US influenced the Trident negotiations and thereby the 
concurrent renegotiation of the US-UK nuclear relationship. This insight builds 
upon the existing understanding of the nature of US-UK nuclear co-operation. 
Over the years, there has been some debate over the primary reason for the 
particular closeness of the US-UK relationship.19 In the mid-1960s, Raymond 
Dawson and Richard Rosecrance published an influential article, which argued 
‘sentiment’, that is history, cultural affinity and tradition, explains the Anglo-
American alliance after 1945.20 They observed, “according to conventional 
alliance theory, world powers should not endow lesser states with the 
attributes of strategic independence.”21 For this, and other reasons, they 
argued that a theory based on national interests “cannot explain the Anglo-
American alliance.”22 However, such claims of the centrality of sentiment do 
not stand up to close scrutiny. In matters of geostrategic salience – and the 
provision of nuclear weapons is clearly one of those – the concept lacks 
explanatory utility. As Rod Lyon highlights, “Nuclear weapons are not the sort 
of thing that A gives to B merely to make B feel special.”23 As this study 
demonstrates, shared mutual interests led to the Trident agreements. This 
finding reinforces the arguments of much of the existing literature on the US-
UK nuclear relationship that also argues that mutual interests rather than 
                                                     
18 Robb, A Strained Partnership; Dobson, Anglo-American Relations; Dumbrell, A Special 
Relationship; Louis and Bull, The ‘Special Relationship’; John Baylis, Anglo-American Relations 
since 1939: the Enduring Alliance (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); Ritchie 
Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1998). 
19 For a history of this debate, see Alex Danchev, “On Specialness,” International Affairs 72: 4 
(1996). 
20 Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosecrance, “Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American 
Alliance,” World Politics 19:1 (1966), 50-51. 
21 Ibid., 50-51. 
22 Ibid., 21.  
23 Rod Lyon “The challenges confronting US extended nuclear assurance in Asia,” International 
Affairs 89:4 (2013), 933. 
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sentiment are its defining feature.24 The closeness or otherwise of the Anglo-
American nuclear relationship at any given point of time rests principally on 
whether each nation’s interests are aligned. Subsequently, historians like John 
Baylis and Andrew Priest have highlighted the frequent renegotiation of the 
relationship, in accordance with the dynamics of mutual interests.25 This thesis 
builds upon these arguments by demonstrating that this process of 
renegotiation continued through the Trident discussions.  
Some historians have adopted a ‘rational’ approach to defining the 
interests that draw the US and UK together.26 These ‘rational’ interpretations 
of US-UK nuclear co-operation tend to stress the ‘Soviet threat’ and the logic of 
deterrence in explaining its maintenance.27 However, the pervading Cold War 
environment did not predispose the US government to agree to the sale of 
Trident; values and politics also shaped interests. As Andrew Pierre observes 
there is, “no clear dividing line between the ‘rational’ requirements of national 
security policy and the political, economic, scientific and bureaucratic 
interests and pressures which help shape defence policy.”28 Moreover, it is 
clear that whilst sentiment alone is not the primary factor that undergirds the 
US-UK nuclear relationship, shared culture, norms and identities do play a role 
in drawing the two sides together. Subsequently, the thesis focuses upon the 
ways in which each administration’s perceived international and domestic 
political concerns shaped their nuclear decision-making; an area often 
conceived as the epitome of rational decision-making due to the supposed 
underlying logic of deterrence. The study also emphasises the role of agency 
in the formulation of the Trident agreements, through analysis of the ways in 
which the Carter and Reagan administration’s perception of their interests 
shaped the Trident negotiations. 
                                                     
24 See Baylis, “Exchanging Nuclear Secrets”; Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State; Thomas 
Robb, A strained partnership?, 13; Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO, 4; Clark, Nuclear 
Diplomacy, 2. 
25 See Baylis, “Exchanging Nuclear Secrets,” 34; Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO, 4-5; 
Dobson, Anglo-American Relations, 124–164.  
26 See Robb, A Strained Partnership?, 13; Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO, 4. 
27 See Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO, 4; Stoddart, Facing Down the Soviet Union, 11. 
28 Pierre, Nuclear Politics, 3. 
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 A second original contribution is the research’s insights on the role of 
nuclear co-operation within the wider US-UK defence partnership. Nuclear co-
operation is often seen as the “heart” of the US-UK relationship and as such a 
key factor in the maintenance of close relations in other areas.29 However, the 
study suggests that the nuclear relationship does not exist on a separate and 
distinctive plane. Indeed, US policy-makers utilised the Trident negotiations as 
a means to influence wider British defence policy. Both the Reagan and Carter 
administrations expected British commitments in other key areas of shared 
defence policy in exchange for Trident. The Carter administration demanded 
that the UK government agree to their plans for the extension of the US base 
on the British-controlled island of Diego Garcia. Whilst the Reagan 
administration sought a British commitment to maintain naval deployment. In 
this way, the US viewed US-UK nuclear co-operation as inseparable from the 
wider defence relationship. 
 This study’s final contribution is that it does not adopt an Anglo-centric 
viewpoint. Much of the existing literature on US-UK nuclear co-operation 
focuses upon British decision-making.30 Few studies have drawn upon 
material deposited in the US archives or considered, in any great depth, the 
American perspective.31 However, recent literature on the wider US-UK 
relationship has demonstrated the utility of a focus upon the US viewpoint, and 
the insights offered by such an approach.32 This thesis brings the oft-neglected 
US perspective back into the study of US-UK nuclear co-operation. In 
particular, the study demonstrates the ways in which US relations with the 
Soviet Union and NATO influenced the US-UK nuclear relationship. This 
                                                     
29 See for example Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations, 216; Pierre, Nuclear Politics, 
316; Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, 160. 
30 See Pierre, Nuclear Politics; Clark and Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy; 
Gowing, Independence and Deterrence; Baylis, “The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence 
Agreement,” 456-457; Stoddart, Losing an Empire; Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield; 
Stoddart, Facing Down the Soviet Union. 
31 See Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO; Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy; Parr, “The British 
Decision to Upgrade Polaris”; Robb, “Antelope, Poseidon or a Hybrid”; Bernstein, “The Uneasy 
Alliance.” 
32 See Jeffrey Engel, Cold War at 30,000 Feet: The Anglo-American Fight for Aviation 
Supremacy (London: Harvard University Press, 2007); Robb, A Strained Partnership?; Andrew 
Scott, Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011); Niklas Rossbach, Heath, Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship: 
Britain, the US and the EC, 1969-74 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
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interconnection did not necessarily lead the US to support Britain’s nuclear 
programme, due to a prevailing need to strengthen western deterrence, as 
some would presume. Throughout the Trident agreements, US consideration 
of NATO interests and US-USSR relations both benefited and hindered Britain’s 
efforts to secure a replacement to Polaris. As such, this study concurs with 
many recent works in nuclear history, which highlight that nuclear decision-
making does not take place in a political vacuum, directed only by the 
reductive logic of rational deterrence theory.33 
 
Necessarily, this study has clearly defined parameters. It considers the ways in 
which the interests of subsequent US administrations influenced and shaped 
British decision-making on the replacement of Polaris and the Trident 
negotiations. Constrained to an extent by time, space and resources, the thesis 
does not analyse in detail Britain’s decision to opt for the Trident system. As 
discussed, the purchase of Trident from the British perspective has already 
been the subject of an archival study.34 Moreover, given the historical trend in 
the scholarship of Anglo-American nuclear relations it can be expected that 
there will be many more studies of the British rationale in the coming years. 
Originally, I also wished to analyse in more detail the specific reasons of the 
respective US administrations for the supply of Trident. However, whilst this 
study does provide insight, such a detailed analysis proved impossible at the 
time. This is because the minutes of many of the meetings are still classified. 
Given my belief that shared interests rather than sentiment forms the core of 
US-UK nuclear co-operation, the study also does not focus upon the 
relationships between US and UK officials. In addition, as the themes of this 
thesis suggest, the political-level forms the focus of this study rather than the 
underlying institutional relationship. The institutional layer provides an 
under-current of continuation and support. However, without decisions at the 
political-level, co-operation cannot continue. Moreover, it is at the political-
                                                     
33 See Francis Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2012); David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (London: Yale 
University Press, 1994); Leopoldo Nuti et al., The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold 
War (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2015). 
34 Stoddart, Facing Down the Soviet Union. 
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level where wider US interests influence the relationship and create 
contingency.   
 The study also purposefully avoids discussion of whether the Trident 
agreements prove or disprove the existence of a ‘special relationship’, or 
indeed what they say about the state of this supposed ‘special relationship’ 
during the era under consideration. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the use of 
the term brings a number of problems. It is a highly subjective term, having 
originated for political purposes, and is used more in Britain than in the US. 
Moreover, whilst the term is widely used within the literature on the US-UK 
relationship, their is no agreed definition. This leaves individual scholars to 
determine its meaning, and whether there particular area of focus is or is not 
part of a ‘special relationship’. Secondly, use of the term invariably leads too 
comparison with other eras. However, as Thomas Robb argues such 
comparison obscures as much as it reveals:  
Whether this era is less special in comparison to another is largely 
immaterial for understanding the relationship during its 
timeframe. Comparing the ‘specialness’ in one era with another 
provides only a superficial assessment of the period under 
question.35  
As such rather than focusing upon whether the Trident negotiations were 
‘special’ or not, and whether they demonstrate an increase or decrease in the 
‘specialness’ of the relationship, the thesis  seeks to provide in-depth analysis 
of the nature of the US-UK nuclear co-operation at that point in time. 
 
This thesis utilises source materials from the National Archives in London 
released under the thirty-year rule. The study also uses material from the 
Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta and the Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library in Simi Valley. This archival material forms the primary 
basis of the research’s argument and analysis. Where relevant, these archival 
sources are supplemented by memoirs, published interviews and the 
collection of US documents found in the Foreign Relations of the United States 
series produced by the US State Department’s Office of the Historian. This 
                                                     
35 Robb, A Strained Partnership?, 13. 
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study also draws upon secondary sources. In particular, the thesis utilises 
secondary literature on the domestic and foreign policy of the Carter and 
Reagan administrations. This allows the study to place the archival material in 
context, and consider the formulation of US policy on Trident in light of 
domestic and international events. 
 Despite attempts to utilise as wide range of sources as possible, my 
analysis and conclusions are inevitably provisional. As the Trident system is 
still in operation, a sizable amount of material is still classified. In addition, the 
limited budgets of the US archives means that a notable amount of the material 
on the Trident agreements remains unprocessed. This is a particular problem 
in the Ronald Reagan Library. However, by utilising archives on both sides of 
the Atlantic, it has proved possible to write a nuanced and coherent, if 
incomplete, account of the Trident negotiations.  
 There are certain, frustrating, gaps in the archival material. In 
particular, continued classification meant that it was largely impossible to 
pinpoint the exact viewpoint of individual members of the Reagan and Carter 
administrations towards assisting with the replacement of Polaris. Instead, the 
available material only allowed me to gain an overall impression of each 
administration’s attitude. Interviews may have overcome this problem. 
However, given the absence of any detailed archival study when this research 
began, and that a reliance upon interview tends to reproduce the narrative of 
the political elites, the research resources were better employed elsewhere. 
With the knowledge accrued during this project, I would now conduct 
interviews in the future. Of course, some of these gaps in knowledge about the 
Trident agreements may never be filled. Nuclear diplomacy usually takes place 
in complete secrecy and often without the usual protocols of government. The 
Trident negotiations are a case in point. Only a small elite in each country knew 
about proceedings. Moreover, some of the discussions operated outside of 
normal recording procedures. As Robert Wade-Gery, a lead UK official in the 
Trident negotiations later recounted, “Nothing could ever be put down in 
writing. I used to have to write my own brief and clear it with the Prime 
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Minister and the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary, and then go off 
to Washington and talk.”36 
 
This thesis contains six chapters. Taken together, they explore US and UK 
discussions over the replacement to Polaris. The six chapters place these US-
UK discussions within the context of the respective US administration’s aims 
and interests, in order to gain a deeper understanding of the timing and shape 
of the Trident agreements.   
Chapter One, ‘ Frequently Renegotiated’, analyses key events in the US-
UK nuclear relationship from its beginnings during World War II (WWII) to 
the election of President Jimmy Carter in 1977. It demonstrates that the 
Trident agreements were not a ‘foregone conclusion’ due to long-standing US-
UK nuclear co-operation. Since its beginnings, the relationship has fluctuated 
in its degree of closeness in accordance with the alignment of US-UK interests. 
As such, the chapter makes clear that the appropriate lesson to be drawn from 
the history of Anglo-American nuclear relations is that the Trident agreements 
were far from inevitable. 
 Chapter Two, ‘Securing the Options’, explores the initial uncertainty the 
British government faced over their options to replace Polaris. Upon Carter’s 
election, the new President endeavoured to achieve significant progress in 
arms-control, a move that, if successful, would have severely restricted US-UK 
nuclear co-operation. Carter’s hopes of achieving ‘deep cuts’ were quickly 
curtailed by the Soviet reaction. However, British officials continued to fear 
that Carter’s enduring commitment to the arms-control process might limit 
their options to replace Polaris. A combination of NATO internal politics and 
the beginning of Carter’s ‘hardening’ of policy towards the Soviet Union 
nullified the administration’s aim of nuclear reductions, and subsequently 
tempered British official’s concerns about their options for the successor to 
Polaris. As such, with the completion of the Duff-Mason report in December 
1978, the likelihood of the British securing Carter’s agreement to supply the 
                                                     
36 Transcript of interview with Robert Wade-Gery, Interview conducted by Malcolm McBain, 
13 February 2000, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, 
https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Wade-Gery.pdf, 88. 
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recommended system, Trident C4, had increased. However, these 
developments only made a US agreement to the supply of Trident C4 more 
probable, and certainly not definite.  
Chapter Three, ‘SALT in the Wounds’, explores the preliminary 
negotiations on the supply of Trident C4. In January 1979, Carter assured the 
British Prime Minister Jim Callaghan that he would consider the supply of 
Trident C4. However, despite this assurance, throughout the spring and 
summer of 1979, the British government continued to face uncertainty that 
the US would sell the system because of the problems such a deal could cause 
for arms-control negotiations and subsequently Carter’s domestic position. In 
October 1979, the Carter administration gave the British government a firm 
assurance that they would supply Trident C4 with Multiple Independently 
Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) capability. However, alongside this 
promise, Carter requested the delay of a formal agreement until after the 
NATO ‘dual-track’ decision. Then in December 1979, Margaret Thatcher met 
Jimmy Carter to discuss the Polaris replacement; instead of Thatcher making 
a formal request for the Trident C4 system, as the British had originally 
planned, Carter told her that finalisation of the sale would have to wait until 
after the ratification of SALT II at a date as yet unknown.  
Chapter Four, ‘A Transactional Relationship’, discusses the Carter 
administration’s continued hesitation to finalise the Trident C4 sale after the 
withdrawal of SALT from Senate ratification, and the eventual negotiations on 
the terms of supply. In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. 
In response, the Carter administration hardened their approach on the Soviet 
Union and, as part of this, withdrew SALT from Senate ratification. However, 
alongside this the Carter administration’s political problems increased. 
Accordingly, so did the White House’s concern about any potential criticism 
they could face from the sale of Trident C4. Then in March 1980, concern over 
the political damage the potential British reaction could cause if there was any 
further delay, largely motivated the Carter administration’s decision to finalise 
the Trident sale. In this way, the Carter administration was consistently 
obstinate about supplying Trident to the UK, and only consented to do so at a 
time of their choosing. The Carter administration’s hard-headed approach 
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continued throughout the Trident C4 negotiations. The Carter administration’s 
overall foreign policy interests and aims influenced the terms they sought in 
return for Trident. US officials drove a hard bargain to derive the greatest 
possible benefit from the Trident C4 agreement, and indeed treated the US-UK 
nuclear relationship as transactional not special in nature.  
Chapter Five, ‘The Wait for a D5 Decision’, explores the difficult period 
of unease the British faced upon Reagan’s election as they waited for the 
administration to make a decision on whether to upgrade to the Trident D5 
system. In August 1981, the British Government received a formal 
confirmation that the US would upgrade to the D5 and that the Reagan 
administration would be prepared to sell the system to the UK. The British 
government was fortunate that the Reagan administration made this strategic 
modernisation decision earlier than originally expected. However, even with 
this commitment, the British remained uncertain about the replacement to 
Polaris; the US guarantee to sell the D5 did not come with a reassurance that 
they would sell it at a reduced price. Moreover, the British could not begin 
negotiations on the price of D5, or make a decision on whether to upgrade, 
until Reagan announced his strategic modernisation programme in October 
1981. Subsequently, throughout most of 1981, US actions (or in this case 
inaction) left British decision-making on the Polaris replacement at a 
standstill.  
Chapter Six, ‘Red Threat’, discusses the ways in which the Thatcher 
government’s uncertainty about the cost of the D5 system impeded their 
decision-making on whether to upgrade, and the eventual negotiations on the 
terms of supply. Even though a deal favourable to the British was in the 
interests of the US government, US officials still drove a hard bargain to derive 
the greatest possible benefit from the Trident D5 agreement. This meant that 
British concerns about the terms of sale were only resolved on the final day of 
formal negotiations in February 1982 – when the British offered a 
commitment on their naval deployments in return for a reduction of the 
research and development levy. Despite this, the eventual Trident D5 
agreement was extremely favourable to the British. However, the Reagan 
administration offered to sell the D5 at a substantially reduced price because 
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it was in their interests. The sale strengthened western nuclear and 
conventional forces; a key area of concern for the Reagan administration. The 
favourable terms also helped negate some leftist criticism of the Trident D5 
sale; another key priority for the Reagan administration given their concern 
over the Labour party’s disarmament policy and the increase in anti-nuclear 
sentiment in Europe. As such, the eventual Trident D5 agreement was a 
reflection of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy aims. 
These six chapters reveal the influence that America’s wider 
geostrategic interests, and its fractious domestic politics, played upon the 
Trident negotiations. The analysis reveals that the Trident agreements were 
not a foregone conclusion nor a ‘renewal’ of the US-UK nuclear relationship, 
but rather a continuation of the friendly, but not spousal, nature of US-UK 
nuclear relations, that has been renegotiated, according to the varying 
interests of both parties, throughout its existence.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Frequently Renegotiated: The US-UK Nuclear Relationship, 1940 – 
1976 
 
“The salad is heaped in a bowl permanently smeared with the garlic of 
suspicion.” 
 
- British Embassy report, 29 January 1945.1 
 
 
I 
 
In July 1980, the United Kingdom and United States governments signed the 
Trident C4 agreement, which agreed the sale of US Trident C4 missiles to the 
UK. Following President Ronald Reagan’s decision to replace the Trident C4 
missile with the Trident D5 missile, in March 1982 the UK and US governments 
signed the Trident D5 agreement. The Trident agreements appeared to be an 
example of the unique nature of the US-UK nuclear relationship, and fostered 
its continuation. Indeed, the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement, wherein the 
Kennedy administration agreed to supply Polaris missiles to the UK, was used 
as the basis for the terms of the Trident agreements. As such, some historians 
have stressed the history of US-UK nuclear relations, in particular the 
precedent of two earlier inter-governmental agreements agreed between the 
US and UK, the Mutual Defence Agreement, 1958 (MDA) and PSA, as a means 
to understanding the Trident agreements.2 However, these arguments are 
insufficiently nuanced. Firstly, hindsight mires such analysis. Whilst the 
history of US-UK nuclear relations helped facilitate the Trident agreements, 
there was a great deal of uncertainty throughout the negotiations. As will be 
discussed, the negotiations for Trident were protracted and, throughout, the 
                                                     
1 British Embassy report quoted in Margaret Gowing, “Nuclear Weapons and the ‘Special 
Relationship’,” in The ‘Special Relationship’, ed. Louis and Bull, 120. 
2 See for example David Sanders, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy since 
1945 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), 190; Stoddart, “The Special Nuclear Relationship”, 33; 
Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy, 428; Brian Jamison, “Completing the Transatlantic Nuclear Bridge: 
A UK View,” in US-UK Nuclear Cooperation, 57. 
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British government was not certain of a final agreement, particularly on 
mutually agreeable terms. Indeed, ease was the main reason the US and UK 
governments used the PSA as the foundation for the Trident agreements. 
Secondly, invoking ‘specialness’ to explain harmonious Anglo-American 
nuclear relations does not accord with the historical reality.  
 This chapter provides context to the Trident agreements, but also 
demonstrates that they were not a ‘foregone conclusion’. As is widely agreed 
amongst historians in the field, the core of the US-UK nuclear relationship is 
mutual interests.3 Due to a broad commonality in strategic interests, 
particularly due to the Cold War environment, there was a good deal of 
continuity in the US-UK nuclear relationship. However, at the same time, there 
were also moments of acute tension and dispute. As this chapter demonstrates, 
this was due to changes in the aims and interests of both the US and UK, which 
have shaped the relationship since its beginnings and led to its frequent 
renegotiation. These interests reflected domestic, economic and political 
priorities, as much as international strategic factors.  
The existing secondary literature on the US-UK nuclear relationship is 
the basis for this chapter’s analysis. Through analysing the secondary 
literature, the chapter demonstrates the ways in which this study on Trident 
builds upon previous research in the field. However, the sole use of secondary 
literature in this chapter does create some limitations in the analysis. As 
discussed, whilst there exists a considerable literature on the 1940s to mid-
1960s, there is less work on the later period, particularly on Chevaline.4 This 
means, inevitably, that there are fewer detailed archival studies to utilise in 
examining the relationship from the mid-1960s, than the first decades of the 
relationship.  
  
  
                                                     
3 See for example Baylis, “Exchanging Nuclear Secrets”; Simpson, The Independent Nuclear 
State; Robb, A strained partnership?, 13; Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO, 4; Clark, 
Nuclear Diplomacy, 2. 
4 An official history on Chevaline by Professor Matthew Jones is forthcoming.  
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II  
 
The roots of US-UK nuclear co-operation lay in the race to build the first atomic 
bomb in WWII. However, these ‘roots’ were not firmly established. Whilst, 
some authors claim that the foundations of the US-UK ‘special relationship’ lay 
in collaboration between the wartime allies, at least with nuclear co-operation, 
these claims need to be qualified.5 Wartime collaboration did provide a 
precedent for later co-operation; however, the partnership was an “uneasy 
alliance.”6  
In July 1940, after the German invasion of France had left Britain 
isolated in Europe, the British offered the United States, “with no strings 
attached,” full information of their research on weapons development.7 Part of 
this bold offer included information on atomic energy; an area currently of 
little interest to the US government. However, in the summer of 1941, US 
officials received a secret British report that argued it was possible to build a 
uranium bomb within two years. The prospect of obtaining such a powerful 
weapon before the end of the war altered US priorities.8 
In October 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt suggested to the British 
Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, a joint and largely integrated project to 
pursue the atomic bomb. However, at this point, the British government was 
reluctant to collaborate with the US. As the US had yet to start their own formal 
project, the British had a head start in the atomic race. As such, senior scientific 
advisors urged the British government to pursue an independent project.9 
Winston Churchill was similarly reluctant to form a formal partnership. His 
tardy reply to Roosevelt committed Britain to nothing beyond a vague 
assurance of a willingness to co-operate.10 However, unbeknown to the British, 
this reply to Roosevelt’s suggestion meant that they had allowed their only 
opportunity for a potentially equal partnership to slip away. 
                                                     
5 See Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, 4; Baylis, Anglo-American Relations since 1939, 18.  
6 Bernstein, “The Uneasy Alliance”, 202.  
7 Ibid., 204. 
8 Ibid., 205. 
9 Alan Carr, “How it All Began: The Atomic Bomb and the British Mission,” in US-UK Nuclear 
Cooperation, 25.  
10 Clark and Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 36. 
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Subsequently, the US poured their considerable resources into their 
own research and development project on the atomic bomb, named the 
‘Manhattan Project’. Meanwhile, the war was taking its toll on Britain, and their 
‘Tube Alloys’ project was dogged by scarce resources, shortages of man power 
and the constant bombardment of air raids.11 By mid-1942, the US project had 
overtaken its British counterpart.12 Given the disparity in each side’s 
resources, it was clear that the British project would not recover this lost 
ground. As such, Churchill attempted to establish the close partnership that he 
had previously snubbed. His attempts proved futile. Those involved with the 
US project now saw little reason for information exchange with the British. The 
expertise of their scientists as well as their superior resources meant that a US 
atomic bomb was quickly becoming a reality. US officials saw the potential for 
an atomic monopoly, and as such were reluctant to co-operate with the British. 
Subsequently, in December 1942 Roosevelt’s Military Policy Committee placed 
restrictions upon the exchange of information on the atomic bomb. There 
could now only be an exchange of information in areas that the British were 
working on, and could therefore contribute to the US project.13 
The British were unhappy with this exclusion from the project. 
Churchill lobbied Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins, the President’s chief 
diplomatic advisor, for a return to unrestricted exchange of scientific 
information and unlimited co-operation. However, for seven months, 
Churchill’s requests went unheeded, until the US decided that some co-
operation would be useful to them.   
In August 1943, Churchill and Roosevelt signed the Quebec Agreement, 
which agreed to pool US-UK efforts on the atomic bomb. The US decision to 
collaborate was for purely pragmatic reasons. The British ‘Tube Alloys’ project 
contained a number of highly skilled scientists due, in part, to the exodus of 
many intellectuals from continental Europe. These scientists would aid the 
progress of the ‘Manhattan Project’. General Leslie Groves, the director of the 
US project, concluded, “it was better to risk giving Britain  somewhat  too  much  
                                                     
11 Andrew Brown, “Historic Barriers to Anglo-American Nuclear Cooperation,” in US-UK 
Nuclear Cooperation, 37. 
12 Pierre, Nuclear Politics, 30-31.  
13 Bernstein, “The Uneasy Alliance”, 210. 
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information  than  to  be  too  cautious  and  not  build  the bomb  in  time.”14 
Moreover, the British would be the junior partner in co-operation. At Quebec, 
Roosevelt agreed to Churchill’s request for full interchange in scientific 
research and development, but only in common areas of research. In this way, 
Britain would supplement US efforts to build a bomb, and not threaten the 
likelihood they would hold a monopoly.15 
Close analysis of wartime collaboration undermines the arguments of 
those who place emphasis on sentiment in the formulation of the US-UK 
relationship. For example, John Dickie argues that the strong personal bond 
between Churchill and Roosevelt was instrumental in the forging of a ‘special’ 
nuclear relationship.16 However, such viewpoints overlook the competing 
interests and power struggles that marked wartime nuclear collaboration. 
Indeed, the minister at the British embassy at the end of the war commented 
that because the US desired a post-war atomic monopoly, wartime co-
operation was “smeared with the garlic of suspicion.”17 In this way, US-UK 
nuclear collaboration in WWII did not lay firm foundations for later US-UK 
nuclear co-operation but rather a relationship based upon mutual interests, in 
which contingency would be innate. Moreover, Britain’s position as a junior 
partner laid the foundations for Britain’s later technical dependency. 
 
In 1944, Roosevelt and Churched signed the Hyde Park agreement, where they 
agreed to the continuation of US-UK atomic collaboration in peacetime. Barton 
Bernstein argues that Roosevelt made this agreement to entrench the British 
programme within the US project rather than help Britain develop their own 
‘independent’ nuclear programme. This would make Britain’s nuclear 
programme “not a threat to American autonomy but a supplement to 
American power.”18 Given that the US had ensured Britain’s participation in 
wartime collaboration was as a junior partner, Bernstein’s argument is 
                                                     
14 Ibid., 222. 
15 Ibid., 219-223. 
16 John Dickie, ‘Special’ No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), 131-132.  
17 British Embassy report quoted in Gowing, “Nuclear Weapons and the ‘Special Relationship’”, 
120. 
18 Bernstein, “The Uneasy Alliance”, 226. 
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convincing. However, historians will never know the truth of what Roosevelt 
envisioned as post-war atomic collaboration because it did not come to 
fruition.  
Given the Hyde Park agreement and Britain’s contribution to the 
‘Manhattan Project’, the British government expected the post-war 
continuation of US-UK nuclear collaboration. However, almost immediately 
after the war’s end, the exchange of information on atomic energy slowed. 
Then in 1946 Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act, more commonly known 
as the McMahon Act. This prohibited the exchange of atomic information from 
the US to any other country, including Britain.19   
Some historians have argued that part of the reason for Britain’s 
exclusion was that few US officials knew about US-UK wartime collaboration 
and only Vannevar Bush knew of Roosevelt’s agreement to post-war atomic 
collaboration.20 However, whilst analysis in this area strays into supposition, 
it seems doubtful that wider knowledge of US-UK wartime co-operation and 
the Hyde Park aide-mémoire would have changed the US government’s policy 
towards US-UK atomic collaboration. As Matthew Jones notes, in the “post-war 
context of American policymaking” US-UK nuclear co-operation was unlikely 
to survive.21 The majority of US decision-makers saw a monopoly on the 
atomic bomb as a means to guarantee US strength and strategic advantage 
over the Soviet Union.22 Continued atomic exchange with the British did not fit 
with this vision of the post-war world. However, some nuclear co-operation 
did continue in areas of utility for the US. In particular, due to limited supplies, 
the US sought British assistance to obtain uranium. The US and UK continued 
to collaborate on advanced conventional weapons, including potential nuclear 
delivery systems, and advanced submarine designs. In addition, with the start 
of the Cold War, US strategic bombers returned to bases in the UK.23 These 
                                                     
19 Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations, 30. 
20 Ibid., 19; Peter Hennessy, Muddling Through: Power, Politics and the Quality of Government 
in Post-war Britain (London: Gollancz, 1996), 102; Sabine Lee, “In No Sense Vital and Actually 
Not Even Important? Reality and Perception of Britain’s Contribution to the Development of 
Nuclear Weapons,” Contemporary British History 20:2 (2006), 172. 
21 Jones, “Great Britain, the United States and Consultation”, 802. 
22 Gerard DeGroot, The Bomb: A History of Hell on Earth (London: Pimlico, 2005), 122-123; 
Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, 110. 
23 Lee, “In No Sense Vital”, 178. 
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areas of mutual interest kept open vital avenues of collaboration for the future 
‘restoration’ of US-UK nuclear co-operation. 
Indeed, some historians view the McMahon Act as an anomaly in the 
US-UK nuclear relationship. For example, Alan Carr argues, “The McMahon Act 
and the Fuchs affair, as it turns out, were only aberrations in an otherwise 
cordial and productive relationship.”24 However, such thinking is problematic. 
Hindsight mars such arguments as they omit the fact that the McMahon Act led 
to a twelve-year hiatus in the US-UK nuclear relationship. Moreover, it neglects 
the continued conflict and co-operation that marked US-UK nuclear relations 
after the signing of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement. Instead, it is more 
accurate to see the McMahon Act as another stage in a US-UK nuclear 
relationship based upon mutual interests.  
Following the breakdown in US-UK nuclear co-operation, in 1947 the 
British government began their own independent programme to produce 
nuclear weapons.25 As Ian Clark and Nicholas Wheeler highlight, reflection 
upon US-UK relations best facilitates understanding of this decision because it 
“was in the context of this relationship that the early British decisions were 
taken.”26 In the 1940s, British policy-makers still viewed their country as a 
‘great power,’ and they did not wish to be reliant upon the US for its security. 
As such, the decision to make an atomic weapon emerged almost instinctively, 
as they believed the necessity of a British bomb as axiomatic.27 In this way, the 
British decision was not merely a response to the end of US-UK collaboration; 
the desire for a British atomic bomb was pre-existent. Concurrently, British 
policy-makers believed that an atomic weapon would provide a level of 
influence over the US. This was crucial due to uncertainty over US 
commitments to Europe and related fears that America could return to a policy 
of isolationism. Through the development of their own nuclear capabilities, 
British decision-makers hoped that the US would take them more seriously as 
                                                     
24 Carr, “How it All Began”, 32. 
25 For more detailed analysis of this decision see Clark and Wheeler, The British Origins of 
Nuclear Strategy; Gowing, Independence and Deterrence; Pierre, Nuclear Politics; Baylis, 
Anglo-American Defence Relations. 
26 Clark and Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 2-3. 
27 Ibid., 43; Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, 184; Baylis, Anglo-American Defence 
Relations, 32-33. 
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an ally and consult them on “crucial issues of war and peace.”28 However, a 
desire to restore US-UK nuclear collaboration also motivated the decision.29 
US technical expertise would reduce British costs and aid progress. 
Furthermore, British decision-makers reasoned that the only way to restore 
US-UK nuclear co-operation was to achieve indigenous success and thereby 
convince the US that they had something to gain from collaboration with the 
British.30 In this way, the British decision to build an atomic bomb centred on 
its relationship with the US.   
However, despite British efforts, it would take ten years for the 
restoration of US-UK nuclear co-operation. This was despite the emerging 
demarcation between the East and West and the loss of the American atomic 
weapons monopoly with the first Soviet nuclear test in 1949. Part of the 
problem was the exposure of several spies from within the British mission to 
the ‘Manhattan Project’ who had passed information to the Soviets.31 However, 
the main issue was that US policy-makers did not believe that the restoration 
of collaboration was in their interests. Slowly, over the next ten years, US 
geostrategic interests and domestic politics shifted towards the restoration of 
US-UK nuclear co-operation.  
 
III 
 
In August 1953, shortly after the Presidential election of Dwight Eisenhower, 
the USSR announced that it had successfully tested “one of the types of the 
hydrogen bomb.”32 This Soviet test came less than a year after the United 
States first test of a thermonuclear device in November 1952. The Soviet 
Union’s Sloika, was not a ‘true’ hydrogen bomb, with a yield about 25 times 
smaller than that of the United States Mike test.33 However, it’s ‘layer cake’ 
                                                     
28 Jones, “Great Britain, the United States and Consultation”, 814. 
29 Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations, 33. 
30 Clark and Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 133. 
31 Eric Ridge, “Completing the Transatlantic Nuclear Bridge: A U.S. View” in US-UK Nuclear 
Cooperation, 68. 
32 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 307. 
33 Ibid, 307. 
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design was original, rather than the first Soviet atomic bomb that was based 
upon US designs. The US government was shocked at how quickly, and 
independently, the Soviet Union had advanced towards thermonuclear 
technology and the US monopoly over the H-bomb had been shattered.34 This 
development, as well as Chinese intervention in the Korean War and continued 
escalation of the Cold War in Europe, led to an increase in Cold War tensions. 
The Eisenhower administration had a number of key considerations in 
determining how to respond to this growth in perceived threat. Firstly, the US 
government needed to strengthen its alliances in order to negate domestic 
fears that the country was fighting the Cold War alone. Secondly, the 
Eisenhower administration wished to strengthen the nation’s defence without 
jeopardising US economic stability.35 Thirdly, the President believed that the 
US could not afford to meet every threat to US national interests through 
conventional means. Finally, Eisenhower was determined to avoid another 
conflict like the Korean War, which had generated considerable US domestic 
opposition to sending troops to fight in a protracted conventional war.36    
In response to these considerations, the Eisenhower administration 
developed the ‘New Look’ strategy. This policy placed a reliance on nuclear 
weapons in US defence strategy, and emphasised the need for “secure, massive 
retaliatory forces.”37 Such a policy was now possible due to the technological 
breakthroughs that had built up the nuclear stockpile and given greater 
flexibility in the use of nuclear weapons.38 ‘New Look’ enabled reductions in 
conventional forces and thereby created savings in the defence budget. The 
strategy also appeased public opposition to sending US troops abroad. ‘New 
Look’ also emphasised the need for the US to maintain and strengthen its 
alliances. Eisenhower believed that Western Europe should become “a third 
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great power bloc,” aligned with the US but capable of defending itself.39 This 
would allow the US to gradually withdraw its conventional troops from Europe 
and thereby reduce the US defence burden. It would also allay US domestic 
fears that the US was fighting the Cold War alone.40 
In Europe, the ‘New Look’ seemed to offer a cheap and politically viable 
solution to the USSR’s conventional force superiority in Europe. As such, in 
March 1954, NATO also adopted a policy that placed emphasis on nuclear 
weapons in its defence strategy.41 Subsequently, the US began to place its 
nuclear weapons in NATO countries. Concurrently, in order to ease the 
economic burden on the US and at the same time strengthen NATO, the White 
House requested that Congress amend the McMahon Act to allow for the 
resumption of nuclear co-operation with its allies. The result was the 1954 
Atomic Energy Act, which, while specifically forbidding disclosure of 
information concerning the design and fabrication of US weapons, did permit 
the US to share data with its NATO allies on the military characteristics and 
yields of US nuclear weapons. As such, the act enabled allies to carry US nuclear 
weapons on their own delivery systems. In light of these changes, and as part 
of efforts to restore trust in the US-UK relationship following the Suez crisis, in 
March 1957 Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan agreed for the 
basing of sixty US Thor missiles in Britain. Eisenhower also agreed with 
Macmillan that the US would provide the British Royal Air Force with nuclear 
weapons in time of war, and that for this purpose such weapons be stored 
under US custody in Britain.42  
These developments in US strategy and the subsequent “nuclearization 
of NATO” laid important foundations for the re-establishment of US-UK 
nuclear co-operation.43 However, whilst Eisenhower and many in his 
administration saw the utility in an increased nuclear collaboration with 
Britain, there still existed Congressional opposition to the restart of US-UK 
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nuclear co-operation.44 However, further developments in US geostrategic 
interests and domestic politics soon reduced this opposition.  
In October 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the world’s first 
artificial satellite. The Sputnik launch shattered the illusion of American 
technological superiority and the US public feared that the USSR would storm 
ahead in the nuclear arms-race. Sputnik provoked, as Jenifer Mackby and John 
Simpson highlight, “a transforming effect akin to that of September 11, 2001 
on US public and Congressional opinion.”45   
The public hysteria helped to erode Congressional opposition to 
nuclear co-operation. The US government needed to reassure the public that 
they were not fighting the Cold War alone and that the US was winning the 
nuclear arms-race. Co-operation with Britain would help with this. It was the 
only US ally with nuclear capability, having successfully tested its first atomic 
bomb in 1952. More recently, between 1957 and 1958, the British also 
successfully tested thermonuclear weapons.46 As such, the British had 
demonstrated to the US public and congress alike their potential ability to 
contribute to the American project and thereby assist with a US ‘victory’ in the 
nuclear arms-race.47 
In this environment, Eisenhower sought to restore the nuclear 
relationship with Britain. Subsequently, in 1958 the UK and US governments 
signed the Mutual Defence Agreement, which enabled the exchange of nuclear 
information and materials. In 1959, this agreement was amended to authorise 
the transfer of nuclear technology.48 The MDA created a unique nuclear 
partnership that enabled the unprecedented exchange of nuclear secrets. 
Moreover, it meant the ‘restoration’ of US-UK nuclear co-operation after a 
twelve-year hiatus, with Britain once again the junior partner.  
 Some historians have emphasised the role of Eisenhower in 
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consolidating US support for the MDA. For example, Baylis argues that 
Eisenhower’s leadership was decisive in overcoming the domestic obstacles to 
increased nuclear co-operation.49 However, only through the development in 
US geostrategic interests and domestic politics was Eisenhower able to 
convince Congress and the public of the need to restore US-UK nuclear co-
operation. It is clear, that despite shared values and close personal 
relationships, the restoration of US-UK nuclear collaboration was due to 
shared mutual interests. Developments in international affairs, and the 
associated shift in the attitude of the US government and public, meant that the 
US saw utility in co-operation – it was in the nation’s interest. 
 At the same time, the restoration of co-operation was extremely 
beneficial to the British government; the British could not keep pace with the 
technological advances in nuclear systems throughout the 1950s, and the costs 
of these new weapon systems.50 However, British difficulties to keep up with 
the superpowers also revealed another underlying reason for the US to restore 
co-operation in the nuclear field. The move represented an American effort to 
save the British money so that they would increase their defence spending in 
other key strategic areas. As Sabine Lee observes, US-UK nuclear co-operation 
would ensure limited British expenditure on nuclear weapons “so that the 
British could deploy more useful forms of military power.”51 Subsequently, 
John Baylis notes that the US sought “with some success, to link cooperation in 
the nuclear field with broader British support for US foreign policy 
objectives.”52 As such, whilst for the British government the achievement of 
the MDA was a great success, as it would allow them to access advanced 
nuclear technology at a reduced cost, it is important to note the benefits for the 
US as well. US-UK nuclear co-operation strengthened the NATO alliance, 
maintained Britain’s conventional force commitment and consolidated 
Britain’s position as a junior partner that contributed to US national interests.  
Some historians have suggested that the MDA laid the foundations for 
the rest of the US-UK nuclear relationship. For example, Brian Jamison argues, 
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“From July 1958 onward, Anglo-American nuclear defence policies became so 
intertwined by the development of the transformed nuclear relationship that 
they proved capable of withstanding the vicissitudes of the next 50 years of 
international history.”53 John Baylis offers a more nuanced understanding of 
the MDA arguing it “established a framework for an Anglo-American nuclear 
partnership that remained in force throughout the Cold War period and 
continues in the late 1990s.”54 However, even greater clarification is required. 
The MDA did not stop the pattern of conflict and co-operation that had existed 
in the US-UK nuclear relationship since its beginnings. Moreover, it did not 
guarantee US support for further nuclear co-operation. Following the MDA, 
fears remained among high-level US officials that nuclear co-operation could 
encourage proliferation and damage US-European relations. This pervading 
tension was a primary factor in the Skybolt crisis that threatened to bring the 
US-UK nuclear relationship to a shuddering stop within just three years of the 
MDA. As such, the MDA laid the groundwork for future nuclear co-operation, 
but its continuation relied on contemporary policy-makers believing that 
collaboration remained in the mutual interests of the US and UK.  
 
IV 
 
In 1960, the British government cancelled development of the country’s last 
indigenous missile, Blue Streak. Escalating costs and the missile’s vulnerability 
led to this cancellation; the British could not keep up with the technological 
advances of the Soviets, and the shift from bombers to missile delivery 
systems.55 The solution was to use US technology to deliver British bombs. 
Indeed, the British government finally decided to cancel Blue Streak due to the 
US offer of such technology. In March 1960, Eisenhower offered Harold 
Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, a delivery system – the Skybolt missile 
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– currently under development for the United States Air Force.56 The missile 
would extend the life of the British V-bomber forces. Before the cancellation of 
Blue Streak, the Macmillan government had made the ‘independent deterrent’ 
a high-profile policy. With the cancellation of the British missile, and the 
agreement to purchase Skybolt, the media machine of the British government 
went to work to stress the continued independence of its nuclear 
programme.57 However, the acceptance of Skybolt meant that Britain entered 
a “new paradoxical phase” in its nuclear policy; British technical dependence 
upon the US would preserve Britain’s ‘independent deterrent’.58  
On the 9 November 1962, Robert McNamara, the US Defense Secretary, 
informed Peter Thorneycroft, the British Defence Secretary, about the 
cancellation of Skybolt due to high costs and test failures.59 The US decision to 
cancel the highly complex and technically ambitious project sent shockwaves 
through the so-called ‘special relationship’ and caused accusations of betrayal 
in the corridors of Whitehall. The cancellation led to a veritable political 
eruption in London, and at the official level the greatest crisis between the US 
and Britain since the Suez affair in 1956.60 British ministers claimed the 
cancellation was a “bolt out of the blue.”61 The Skybolt crisis was the first 
symptom of Britain’s new found technical dependence upon the US. However, 
the resulting Nassau agreement was a key example of the renegotiation of the 
nuclear relationship when it was in US interests. 
The political eruption that occurred defied ‘rational’ logic; the Skybolt 
missile was technically flawed. By 1961, the USSR had acquired a significant 
nuclear capability and some believed (erroneously) that it had surpassed the 
US in terms of nuclear power.62 In this environment, the American’s decision 
to cancel the missile on simple calculations of ‘cost-efficiency’ made strategic 
sense. Despite having spent $500 million on the Skybolt programme, the 
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missile had failed all five of its flight tests. Cancellation of the project would 
save two to three billion dollars to spend on other defence systems.63   
Given the technical problems of Skybolt, the Kennedy administration 
was puzzled by the British reaction to the missile’s cancellation. Indeed, 
President Kennedy commissioned a report to explain why the cancellation had 
led to such a breakdown in US-UK relations. The author of this report, Richard 
Neustadt, concluded that it was a failure of communication.64 However, later 
released archival material makes clear that Washington regularly and fully 
informed London about Skybolt’s progress. As such, Ian Clark argues, “there is 
little to support the notion that the threat of cancellation came ‘out of the blue’ 
to the British.”65 Subsequently, John Baylis suggested that British incredulity 
was a British ploy to bring about the eventual US supply of Polaris through 
obligation.66 However, as Ken Young suggests, this is “too far-fetched an 
interpretation.”67 The US promise of Skybolt had always been conditional, and 
as such, the British could have no certainty on its supply, particularly after a 
change of administration. Instead, to understand the Skybolt crisis we must 
analyse the political context of the Macmillan and Kennedy governments at 
this time.  
For the British government, Skybolt was a political loss rather than a 
military one. The cancellation undermined the fabricated image of an 
‘independent British deterrent’ and with it Britain’s inward projection of itself 
as a ‘great power’. As Ken Young contends, “Skybolt was important to the 
British for what it represented, rather than for what it might have been able to 
do.”68 The cancellation threatened the domestic credibility of the Macmillan 
government. There were three major pillars in Macmillan’s foreign policy: the 
‘independent deterrent’; the repair of US-UK relations following the Suez 
crisis; and to change public perception following the Cuban missile crisis that 
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Britain was impotent on the world stage.69 The cancellation of Skybolt 
undermined all three pillars. This was particularly damaging for the Macmillan 
government given their domestic woes; their economic policy was under fire, 
unemployment was at a post-war record high of 800,000 and Macmillan’s 
axing of a third of his Cabinet had left the Prime Minister with a tarnished, 
desperate image.70 In conjunction with Macmillan’s other domestic problems, 
the cancellation of Skybolt threatened his government’s very survival.   
The British government also feared that the cancellation of Skybolt 
might be utilised by the Kennedy administration to force the British to give up 
its nuclear force. A catalyst for these suspicions was Robert McNamara’s 
speech at Ann Arbor in June 1962. He stated that small national deterrents 
were “dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence and lacking in 
credibility.”71 Whilst McNamara insisted that the French nuclear force was the 
target of his comments, it was unsurprising that London interpreted them as 
an attack on its own nuclear programme.72 Also of concern was a powerful 
lobby within the State Department, the so-called ‘theologians’, such as George 
Ball and Walt Rostow, who believed that Britain should not be a nuclear power 
and that the US should not provide the capability. They reasoned that such 
provision would encourage nuclear proliferation and threaten the stability of 
Soviet-US mutual deterrence. They also feared that it would lead to an increase 
in the Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) calls for their own nuclear 
weapons. The ‘theologians’ also believed that the existence of a British 
‘deterrent’ might weaken the resolve of NATO to strengthen its conventional 
forces, which was necessary for the US-favoured NATO ‘Flexible Response’ 
strategy, and this in turn would increase the risk of nuclear confrontation.73   
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Instead the ‘theologians’ proposed a Multilateral Force (MLF); a naval 
force crewed by members of all NATO countries and carrying nuclear 
weapons.74 Indeed, the ‘theologians’ were named as such due to their “quasi-
religious devotion” to the MLF.75 The Eisenhower administration had 
originally proposed the MLF as a means to reconcile West European demands 
for collective alliance control with the United States’ non-proliferation policy. 
A recurring issue throughout the Cold War was the credibility of the US nuclear 
umbrella to ‘protect’ Europe. These concerns were particularly acute by the 
mid-1950s. West European governments questioned whether the US would 
use nuclear weapons, and thereby sacrifice itself, if the Soviets advanced into 
Western Europe.76 Rhetorically, the US made clear to the USSR that in such an 
event it would regard its own national security interests as being at stake along 
with its allies. However, such rhetoric did not ease European anxiety. As such, 
some US officials feared that at some point the FRG would demand national 
access to nuclear weapons. By 1960, these fears were more acute due to the 
development of Soviet Medium-range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) that 
threatened the FRG.77 As such, the Eisenhower administration proposed the 
MLF. 
 Following Kennedy’s election, the administration placed emphasis on 
NATO increasing its conventional forces as part of ‘Flexible Response’. 
However, the State Department was still a strong advocate of the MLF and did 
not wish to see a British ‘independent deterrent’. Immediately following the 
cancellation of Skybolt, British officials feared that this thinking influenced the 
US response. On 9 December, Solly Zuckerman, chief scientific advisor to the 
Ministry of Defence (MOD), met with McNamara. During their conversation, 
McNamara outlined four possible alternatives to Skybolt: a British Skybolt 
programme, Minuteman, Hound Dog or Polaris. However, when Thorneycroft 
and McNamara met on 11 December, the US Defence Secretary presented a fait 
accompli on US cancellation of Skybolt, as well as only three alternatives: 
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British development of Skybolt; US supply of Hound dog; or that “the United 
Kingdom might participate in a seaborne MRBM force under multilateral 
manning and ownership.”78 With the technical difficulties of the first two 
options, and any potential supply of Polaris tied up with ideas of MLF, British 
officials feared that State Department thinking on the UK nuclear force had 
won out. When Thorneycroft mentioned the possibility of Polaris, McNamara 
agreed to consider it but stressed there were “legal difficulties.”79 In this way, 
the meeting ended with the future of the British ‘independent deterrent’ in 
limbo; the US had cancelled Skybolt and not yet offered the British government 
a satisfactory solution. 
 
A week after McNamara informed the British of Skybolt’s cancellation, Harold 
Macmillan and John F. Kennedy met in Nassau in the Bahamas. Henry Brandon, 
a correspondent for The Sunday Times with close links to both Kennedy and 
Macmillan, later commented, “The British arrived at Nassau in the angriest 
frame of mind of any delegation at an Anglo-American summit since the war.”80 
At this summit, Kennedy agreed to supply the British with Polaris missiles, 
minus the warheads, as a replacement for Skybolt, and crucially for the British 
did not insist on the supply only as part of an MLF. 
 It is difficult to understand at first sight why Kennedy agreed to supply 
Polaris missiles without a concurrent agreement on an MLF. The Polaris 
agreement perturbed NATO allies, particularly France and the FRG, and the 
President faced pressure from within his own administration not to further 
enable Britain’s ‘independent deterrent’.81 As such, some scholars have viewed 
the Nassau agreement as a personal coup by Macmillan, arguing that he 
utilised his personal relationship with Kennedy and his political skill to 
persuade the President to supply Polaris and reverse his non-proliferation 
policies.82 However, the subsequent declassification of archival material has 
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undermined these interpretations. Despite the internal wrangling within the 
Kennedy administration over Britain’s ‘independent deterrent’, three days 
before the Nassau conference the White House decided that they would offer 
Polaris. On 16 December, in a meeting between Kennedy and his key advisors, 
the President overruled the objections of the State Department. Kennedy felt 
that the cancellation of Skybolt left the US with some kind of obligation to 
supply a replacement. Subsequently, the participants decided that the US 
would “offer components of Polaris missiles to the British…” although “it 
would be a condition of this offer that the British would commit their eventual 
Polaris force to a multilateral or multinational force in NATO.”83 In addition, 
the UK would have to commit to strengthening their conventional forces. In 
Nassau, despite the decision to supply Polaris, Kennedy’s first offer was for the 
US to continue the production of Skybolt solely for the British, with Britain 
paying fifty percent of the production costs. Given the recent public espousals 
of Skybolt’s failings, Macmillan resolutely refused this offer. The President 
then offered Polaris but as part of the MLF. This again was unsatisfactory to 
Macmillan; he wanted something on the same terms of Skybolt, which 
Eisenhower had offered without strings. Eventually, Kennedy and Macmillan 
agreed upon the supply of Polaris, with the system “assigned to NATO.”84 The 
meaning of ‘assignment’ remained vague. Kennedy recognised the need to 
satisfy Macmillan’s political need for an ‘independent deterrent’.85 
 In this way, it is clear to see that Kennedy’s friendship with Macmillan 
did play a role in defining the terms of the Nassau agreement. However, it is 
important to note the convergence of interests that led to Kennedy being so 
forthcoming and indeed making a decision to supply Polaris before Nassau. 
The British government placed great emphasis on maintaining its nuclear 
force. At the same time, British development of a delivery system would come 
at a high financial cost, which in turn would damage NATO, Britain’s 
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conventional forces, and Kennedy’s ‘flexible response’ strategy. This in turn 
would create more of a defence burden for the US. Moreover, the supply of 
Polaris followed (somewhat paradoxically) Kennedy’s views on non-
proliferation. Kennedy was sceptical about MLF, in part because he did not 
want the US to relinquish control over NATO’s nuclear weapons.86 The supply 
of Polaris, secured British technical dependence on the US, and thereby 
enabled the US to maintain a great deal of control over Britain’s ‘independent 
deterrent’. In addition, the presentation of Britain’s new system as committed 
to NATO helped deal with West European concerns about the US nuclear 
umbrella. In this way, the role of sentiment played a role in the finer details of 
the Nassau agreement but not in the Polaris decision per se. Moreover, due to 
the convergence of mutual interests, the Skybolt ‘crisis’ was resolved relatively 
quickly and to the satisfaction of both parties. As such, Priest convincingly 
argues, “the entire episode should be seen as part of the Anglo-American 
negotiation in nuclear affairs that had been ongoing since 1946.”87 
 
Given the generously demonstrative nature of the Nassau agreement, some 
historians have argued that it resolved US doubts about the British 
‘independent deterrent’ and marked a new stage of intimacy in the US-UK 
nuclear relationship.88 However, such arguments are problematic. They 
overlook the continued existence of doubts within the US government over the 
supply of Polaris and the subsequent debate over MLF. If, as Michael Middeke 
highlights, the MLF proposed in the Nassau agreement had ever materialised 
“an independent British deterrent would have ceased to exist.”89 Moreover, 
they overlook that alongside this apparent intimacy came firmer British 
technical dependence upon the US, which made the British nuclear force more 
vulnerable to fluctuations in US nuclear and non-proliferation strategy as well 
as intra-NATO politics.  
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 The Nassau communiqué was open to interpretation, as it did not specify 
what assignment to NATO would mean in practice. In particular, it did not rule 
out the commitment of Polaris to the MLF. Following the Nassau agreement, 
the State Department continued to lobby for the MLF over the next few years. 
Due to the ambiguity of the wording of the Nassau communiqué, the State 
Department did not see Kennedy’s decision to supply the British with Polaris 
as a hindrance to their aims. Indeed, the wording of the communiqué 
reassured officials in the State Department that the US had not supplied Britain 
with an ‘independent deterrent’ for the coming decades, and that 
multilateralism would triumph.90  
 The State Department was particularly hopeful because the events of 
Nassau had increased support for MLF within the Kennedy administration. 
Following the election of Kennedy, the administration had prioritised an 
increase in NATO’s conventional forces and as such, it looked like the MLF 
would fall off the agenda. However, the Nassau agreement and the signing of 
the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in January 1963 
increased the policy’s popularity within the administration. The Nassau 
agreement, and its public expression of an Anglo-American partnership at the 
expense of NATO, created tensions in the Western alliance. As such, some in 
Washington feared that the Franco-German entente could result in nuclear 
collaboration.91 The Kennedy administration saw the MLF as a possible 
solution to these tensions. Kennedy’s interest in the policy faded in 1963 
following a lukewarm reaction from his European allies. However, upon his 
assumption of the Presidency, Lyndon Johnson was unaware of Kennedy’s 
retreat from MLF, and believed that he should honour Kennedy’s public 
commitment to the policy. The State Department did not dissuade him from 
this view.92  
The MLF proposal was unpopular with the British government. Not 
only could it lead to the demise of Britain’s ‘independent deterrent’, but the 
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British also feared, as did the French, that the proposal would lead to a nuclear-
armed West Germany.93 As such, Michael Middeke argues that, “the Macmillan 
government wanted the MLF to fail.”94 Such views suggest acute conflict 
between the US and UK over the MLF. However, there was more nuance to 
British policy than these arguments suggest. As John Young notes, the British 
were in a bind regarding their response to MLF:  
The British recognised that, if the MLF absorbed their national 
deterrent, it would reduce Britain’s level of importance in the 
Western alliance, but they were reluctant to offend Washington, 
especially after Kennedy agreed, at the Nassau summit, to supply 
them with Polaris missiles.95  
As such, the newly elected British Labour government, led by Harold Wilson, 
proposed the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). Whilst the MLF would involve a 
‘mixed-manned’ NATO force on Polaris-equipped ships, the ANF would consist 
of primarily national components, with British V-bombers and Polaris 
submarines, alongside contributions from the US and potentially France, as 
well as some mixed-manned components. Wilson’s proposal as such excluded 
Britain’s Polaris submarines from any ‘mixed-manned’ element, whilst also 
honoured Britain’s promise at Nassau to commit its nuclear force to NATO.96  
Some historians have claimed that the British dislike of MLF, alongside 
their alternative proposal of the ANF, led to the US finally rejecting the idea in 
December 1964.97 However, such accounts overplay the role of the British 
government in changing US policy. The ANF did not kill the MLF. As John Young 
highlights, whilst the ANF did have a role in dissuading the US administration, 
as it offered an alternative, this only had the effect it did because the MLF 
lacked firm US support; Wilson “had been pushing at an open door in 
Washington.”98 Moreover, as David Gill observes, “claims of the MLF’s death 
[in December 1964] are… exaggerated.”99 At the December summit, Johnson 
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decided to leave it to the British and FRG governments to discuss the ANF and 
other proposals. In addition, the FRG and US continued to discuss nuclear 
sharing solutions over the course of 1965-66.100 
These clarifications on the MLF highlight that, instead of the issue 
causing conflict in the US-UK nuclear relationship, both sides endeavored to 
find a resolution that suited their mutual interests. However, that the US did 
not pursue MLF and thereby render Britain’s ‘independent deterrent’ as part 
of the new NATO force, was because in the end Washington did not view MLF 
as a priority. Wilson’s memoirs stress the pressure George Ball, David Bruce 
and Richard Neustadt applied on him to agree to the MLF ahead of his meeting 
with Johnson at the December 1964 summit.101 However, that the Johnson 
administration did not react badly when Wilson expressed apprehension 
about the MLF was because many within the administration themselves held 
doubts.102 As Andrew Priest contends, “The NATO nuclear sharing issue 
undoubtedly caused tension in US-UK relations, but, outside of the State 
Department, many in Washington understood the British attitude of resistance 
including both Kennedy and Johnson.”103 In addition, the MLF was no longer a 
high priority for the US administration due to more pressing foreign policy 
issues such as Vietnam. The Johnson administration did not want to push a 
policy upon their allies that they were only moderately interested in, but nor 
would they be forced to act against their interests by Britain. As such, the MLF 
debate formed part of on-going negotiations over the configuration of the US-
UK nuclear relationship. However, the MLF debate also highlighted the 
increasing importance of intra-NATO relations to the configuration of the US-
UK nuclear relationship.  As other major powers, in particular the FRG, grew 
in economic strength and diplomatic power the US increasingly had to balance 
the “continued prominence of Anglo-American understanding” with the 
demands of other US allies.104 As such, the MLF debate reflected the changing 
configuration of the US-UK nuclear relationship alongside NATO politics.  
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VII  
 
In the mid-1960s, rapid advances in Soviet Anti-Ballistic-Missile (ABM) 
defence capability led the British government to question whether Polaris 
would be able to reach its targets in the USSR.105 To meet any Soviet advances, 
the US began to develop the Poseidon missile, which would have MIRV 
capability. The US also began a programme, called Antelope, which considered 
improving the front-ends of the existing Polaris missiles.106 Upon Labour’s re-
election in 1966, the British government began to consider how and if to 
update their Polaris missiles. One possible option was to purchase Poseidon. 
The Polaris Sales agreement kept open the possibility of Britain receiving 
“future development relating to the Polaris Weapons System, including all 
modifications made thereto.”107 Given this vague wording, there was some 
uncertainty over whether the sale of Poseidon would require a new 
Presidential Determination and Congressional approval. However, in June 
1967 Harold Wilson announced that the British would not purchase Poseidon. 
Instead, utilising information supplied to them under the terms of the PSA on 
the US Antelope programme, the British government delayed a decision to 
improve Polaris by re-directing work at Aldermaston to a Super Antelope 
project, which investigated the possibility of designing a new warhead capable 
of improving the penetrability of Polaris. This programme would receive 
continued but limited support from the US.108 Throughout Wilson’s term in 
office, his government made no firm decision on Polaris improvement, and 
instead funded the Super Antelope project on a six-month rolling basis.109  
 To understand the Wilson government’s decision it is necessary to 
analyse the political context. When Wilson announced to Parliament that the 
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government would not be purchasing Poseidon, he acknowledged the 1964 
Labour manifesto commitment not to move to a new generation of nuclear 
weapons to replace Polaris.110 Subsequently, Kristan Stoddart argues that this 
commitment was “the main reason why the Super Antelope upgrade 
programme was initiated in 1967 and why British nuclear policy took the 
course it did in Wilson’s first government.”111 However, this claim overlooks 
the complicated political environment that Wilson faced, and the combination 
of factors that led to his decision.  
 A public decision to purchase Poseidon would have created domestic 
difficulties for the Wilson government and potentially damaged their wider 
policy goals. In 1967, Britain’s economic troubles were acute. Concurrently, 
British defence policy was undergoing radical change following the 1966 
defence review. Within this context, the potential cost of $400 million for 
fitting British submarines with Poseidon, around the same amount as the 
entire Polaris programme, would have provoked dissent within the 
government as well as the British public.112 In addition, a decision to purchase 
Poseidon would have also caused difficulties for Britain’s second attempt to 
join the European Economic Community (EEC). In January 1963, the French 
President Charles de Gaulle had rejected Britain’s first application to the EEC. 
This was partly because of perceptions of the British as a “Trojan Horse” for 
US influence.113 As such, in 1967, the British did not wish to further such 
conceptions. Indeed, Harold Wilson records in his memoir that he informed 
President de Gaulle of his “Nassau in reverse” to persuade him that Britain was 
reducing its dependence on the United States.114   
 However, it is important to note that Wilson’s decision also stemmed 
from strategic uncertainty. By the late 1960s, both the US and USSR were 
concerned about the nuclear arms-race, and indeed neither side saw benefit in 
its unfettered continuation. Subsequently, throughout the late 1960s and 
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1970s the two superpowers partook in bilateral negotiations to limit the scale 
of their nuclear build-ups through formal treaties. The new US priority of 
arms-control created uncertainty for the British government. In November 
1969, the US and USSR commenced the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. It 
brought a future ban on ABM systems into consideration. Such a ban would 
reduce the need for improvements to Polaris. However, until the signing of 
SALT I in May 1972, it was unclear whether ABM systems would be restricted 
or whether the Soviet Union would continue to deploy them. This strategic 
uncertainty about the arms-control process led to hesitancy in the Wilson 
government over the Polaris improvement programme.115  
 The Wilson government’s decision is interesting because it clearly 
demonstrated the influence of the surrounding political context on nuclear 
decision-making. Moreover, it displays that just as the US can decide ‘renewal’ 
of the US-UK nuclear relationship is not in their interests, the same applies for 
Britain. Subsequently, Wilson’s decision (or perhaps more accurately 
indecision) led to a reduction in US-UK nuclear co-operation. Peter Jones, the 
chief designer of the Chevaline warhead, later recalled that US nuclear 
assistance, in the form of information about research, all but ended for a period 
in the late 1960s, mostly because of the Wilson government’s decision not to 
improve Polaris: “the Nixon administration had reiterated that nuclear 
collaboration should be a two-way street and that if Britain was not going to 
the next generation beyond Polaris, the street was closed.”116 Information 
from the latest US work only began to flow again once the British began work 
in the early 1970s on the Chevaline system.117   
  
In May 1972, the ABM treaty was signed. The treaty allowed each superpower 
two ABM sites; one around their capital and one to defend an Inter-Continental 
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) site. The signing of the treaty removed British 
uncertainty about future Soviet ABM deployments but meant that Polaris 
would be incapable of meeting the ‘Moscow Criterion’: a guiding principle in 
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British nuclear strategy that the UK’s nuclear force should be capable of 
attacking the Soviet capital.118 In 1973, Edward Heath, Harold Wilson’s 
successor as Prime Minister, decided not to purchase the US Poseidon, either 
MIRVed or with its MIRV capability removed, but instead improve Polaris 
through the Super Antelope programme. In 1974, this programme was 
renamed Chevaline and its existence was finally revealed to the public in 
1980.119 David Reynolds has argued that the Chevaline project “renewed the 
nuclear axis between Britain and America, especially in testing, data exchange 
and fissile materials.”120 Indeed, Chevaline did facilitate continued US-UK 
nuclear co-operation. As such, the British decision not to purchase Poseidon 
was not a break in the US-UK nuclear relationship. However, at the same time, 
Chevaline was not a ‘renewal’ of the relationship; the British decided not to 
closely tie themselves to the US by purchasing one of their systems, and 
instead took a more independent path.  
 Again, to understand the Heath government’s decision it is necessary to 
comprehend the political context in which it was made.  As with the Wilson 
government, a public decision to purchase Poseidon would have created 
domestic difficulties for the Heath government and potentially damage Heath’s 
desire for Britain to become a leader within the EEC. Like the Wilson 
government, Heath was concerned about the price of Poseidon. Poseidon was 
more expensive than Super Antelope in the short term. This was problematic 
because Britain’s economic difficulties had made expenditure cuts essential.121 
In addition, Britain had finally been successful in its efforts to join the EEC. 
Given the two French vetoes and fears of the British as a US ‘Trojan Horse,’ 
1973 was not the time for a purchase of Poseidon, which would again publicly 
highlight US-UK links.122 Moreover, Heath wished to create a more equal 
relationship between the US and EEC, and did not want another display of the 
unique UK-US connection to undermine this.123 There was also a reluctance 
                                                     
118 Robb, “Antelope, Poseidon or a Hybrid”, 801-802. 
119 Parr, “The British Decision”, 253-254. 
120 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and the World Power in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Longman, 1991), 251.  
121 Parr, “Saving the Community”, 263, 266. 
122 Baylis and Stoddart, “Britain and the Chevaline project”, 135. 
123 Parr, “The British Decision”, 264-265. 
Frequently Renegotiated? 
51 
 
within the British government to once more illustrate British dependency 
upon the US and in the process reduce Britain’s independent research.124 
 However, to a greater extent than with Wilson’s decision, 
developments in US geostrategic interests and domestic politics interplayed 
with the Heath government’s decision – mainly because Heath considered 
more the purchase of Poseidon and made enquiries to the Nixon 
administration. This influence was not primarily, as Thomas Robb has 
suggested, because of “wider US-UK political differences.”125 Robb argues that 
“US-UK political differences emanating from the ‘Year of Europe’ were… 
prevalent in the final decision to opt for Super Antelope.”126 However, these 
claims are exaggerated. Robb partly bases this claim on the assertion that 
Kissinger cancelled for a short period US-UK discussions on upgrading Polaris 
in order to “force British policy to be more amenable to Kissinger’s ‘Year of 
Europe’ programme.”127 Robb argues that the “cancellation of US-UK nuclear… 
co-operation… reminded British officials about the danger of increasing their 
reliance upon the United States for nuclear assistance.”128 Given other 
continued elements in the US-UK nuclear relationship, such as nuclear testing 
and information exchange, Kissinger’s decision to, briefly, refuse to discuss 
Polaris improvement does not equate to the “cancellation” of US-UK nuclear 
co-operation. Moreover, recent archive research by Helen Parr has found that 
Anglo-American discussions on Polaris improvement continued and even 
increased as “diplomacy connected with the Year of Europe was beginning to 
get acrimonious.”129 However, these clarifications do not mean that difficulties 
in US-UK relations over the ‘Year of Europe’ did not play a role in Heath’s 
decision. As Parr highlights the fact that Kissinger wanted to use “nuclear 
blackmail,” if only briefly, to force British co-operation meant that it made 
sense for the British “not to stride into Kissinger’s line of fire by repeated 
requests for nuclear hardware.”130 
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The primary way that the US influenced British decision-making was 
inadvertent and because of US domestic politics. In November 1972, President 
Nixon supported the sale of Poseidon to Britain but there was a concern that 
given the SALT process, Congress would refuse. During negotiations on SALT 
I, the Soviets argued that British and French nuclear systems should be 
included as they reinforced the US nuclear arsenal in any major war between 
NATO and the Warsaw pact.131 The US refused these requests. However, the 
successful conclusion of SALT I had improved relations between the 
superpowers, and negotiations had now begun on SALT II, with plans to limit 
MIRV technology. Given Soviet sensitivity over the British nuclear force, the 
sale of Poseidon, particularly with an advanced capability such as MIRV, could 
hamper these relations and as such the beginning of SALT II discussions.132 As 
such, there was no guarantee of Congressional support for a Poseidon sale, 
particularly with MIRV. In addition, the British were also anxious that in future 
SALT negotiations the US would accept clauses limiting its freedom to 
exchange whole weapons systems or relevant technologies with its allies. 
Indeed, Senator McGovern expressed such sentiments in his 1972 Presidential 
campaign. Whilst Richard Nixon defeated McGovern, anxiety remained that 
the victor of the 1976 Presidential campaign may not be so amenable.133 This 
uncertainty over the US ability to sell Poseidon played into British decision-
making.  
 Following Nixon’s decisive Presidential victory, in February 1973 
Defense Secretary James Schlesinger told the British that he would not 
approve the sale of Poseidon with MIRV.134 Instead, Schlesinger offered Option 
M: a de-MIRVed version of the Poseidon missile, which would include the Mark 
III re-entry system, and involve British manufacture of a new warhead.135 
However, in the summer of 1973 the Soviet Union announced that it would 
MIRV its ICBMs. This led US defence officials to inform their British counter-
parts that this had changed US thinking on the provision of MIRV technology. 
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As such, the British began to consider anew the possibility that the Nixon 
administration would sell the fully MIRVed Poseidon. This would avoid the 
technical risks of de-MIRVing Poseidon for the sale of Option M.136 However, 
just as hope of this option emerged the Nixon administration became 
embroiled in the Watergate scandal. As such, the British determined that the 
President would be “mighty relieved” if the British did not request Poseidon 
due to his politically weak position and the certainty of “Congressional uproar” 
over such a supply.137 Subsequently, on 30 October, British ministers decided 
to reject Option M and agreed to continue to pursue Super Antelope. Financial 
considerations were paramount to this decision, but concern that Watergate 
meant Nixon would be unable to secure Congressional agreement for the sale 
of the de-MIRVed Poseidon also played a role.138 
The Heath government’s decision to proceed with Chevaline highlights 
the contingency that is innate within US-UK nuclear co-operation. Due to the 
geostrategic interests and domestic politics of the US, the British could not 
guarantee the support of the US government in their efforts to improve Polaris. 
Whilst, also due to overriding geostrategic and domestic interests, the British 
government decided not to buy another US system. However, the Chevaline 
decision did make a British decision to seek US support more likely in the 
future. The cost of losing commonality with the US was astronomical, and, as 
will be discussed, this played a considerable role in the British decision to 
purchase Trident.  
 
The Chevaline period was another example of the fluctuations in the degree of 
closeness in the nuclear relationship since its foundation, due to changes in the 
aims and interests of both the US and UK. As such, it is clear that the Trident 
agreements that came later were not a ‘foregone conclusion’. How could they 
be, when the decisions that preceded them had been so fraught with 
uncertainty?  
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Chapter 2 
 
Securing the Options: The Carter administration and the US-UK 
nuclear relationship, January 1977 – December 1978 
 
“The main limiting factors on US assistance… would be a SALT 
noncircumvention provision and the more indirect political effects of 
the SALT process.” 
 
- Duff-Mason Report.1 
 
I 
 
In December 1977, a British Cabinet committee met to discuss the replacement of 
the Polaris nuclear system. Polaris would remain operative until about 1993. 
However, a successor system could take up to 15 years to develop.2 As such, in the 
coming years the British government needed to decide on a replacement for 
Polaris. The present Labour government, led by Prime Minister Jim Callaghan, 
could not make such a decision. Labour’s 1974 election manifesto stated 
unequivocally that the Party “renounced any intention of moving towards a new 
generation of strategic nuclear weapons.”3 Fortunately, for the Callaghan 
government a decision on the successor to Polaris was not necessary until the end 
of 1978 or early 1979, even if the British government opted for the most unlikely 
and time-consuming option, the development of a British ballistic missile.4 If the 
British government chose one of the other options for Polaris replacement, 
namely acquisition of a US missile system or Anglo-French co-operation, the 
shorter lead-times would mean they could further delay the policy decision.  
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However, to make a decision on the successor to Polaris in a few years’ 
time, the British government obviously needed an in-depth evaluation of Britain’s 
possible options beforehand. As such, in December 1977, Callaghan’s Cabinet 
committee decided to commission a study that would assess Britain’s nuclear 
future.5 Such a report contradicted the spirit of Labour’s 1974 manifesto pledge, 
which “renounced any intention of moving towards a new generation of strategic 
nuclear weapons.”6 Nevertheless, the committee decided to take this step in order 
to: 
Enable the next government to reach decisions about whether a 
successor system should be developed, and if so, what system should 
be adopted… The object [sic] of the study would be to put the next 
Government in a position to take timely decisions, one way or the 
other.7  
Justifying the decision, the Cabinet Committee stressed that they wished to enable 
the next government to make an informed decision on whether or not to replace 
Polaris. However, in reality, given the mind-set of British officials on the necessity 
of a British nuclear ‘deterrent’, it was highly unlikely that the commissioned 
report would not strongly suggest the replacement of Polaris, or that British 
ministers reading the report would decide not to do so.8 As such, in December 
1977, the Labour Cabinet committee set in motion the replacement of the Polaris 
nuclear system.  
In February 1978, the British government requested that Anthony Duff, 
Deputy under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, and Ronald Mason, Chief 
Scientific Adviser at the MOD, produce a “study of factors relating to further 
consideration of the future of the United Kingdom deterrent.”9 The study would 
consider the “principal options” for the replacement of Polaris.10 In December 
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1978, the so-called Duff-Mason report was completed. The report concluded that 
the US Trident C4 system would be the best replacement. Thus in January 1979, 
on the island of Guadeloupe, Jim Callaghan asked President Jimmy Carter if he 
would be willing to consider the supply of Trident C4 missiles to the British. Carter 
confirmed that he would. After consideration, the incoming Conservative 
government led by Margaret Thatcher made clear to the Carter administration its 
wish to purchase Trident C4 missiles. The Carter administration agreed to supply 
the missiles on terms similar to the sale of Polaris. In July 1980, the Thatcher 
government publicly announced that the Trident C4 system would replace 
Polaris.   
Given that archival material has only recently become available, there is 
currently no detailed analysis of the Carter administration’s role in the 
formulation of the Trident C4 agreement. In overview accounts of the US-UK 
nuclear relationship, discussion of the Carter administration’s role is 
understandably limited to a sentence or two.11 Even the more detailed accounts 
on the Trident C4 agreement contain very little discussion on the Carter 
administration’s role in its formulation.12 This is understandable as even these 
more detailed accounts only comprise at most two chapters within books on the 
British nuclear programme, and their primary purpose is to provide a broad 
understanding of UK decision-making. Nevertheless, this omission of the US 
perspective limits our understanding of the Trident C4 agreement.  
Moreover, much of the existing literature does not fully capture the 
attitude of the Carter administration towards the supply of Trident C4. For 
example, writing in 1984, Peter Malone asserted: “there was a striking unanimity 
among the President's senior advisors on the desirability of assisting Britain's 
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nuclear efforts.”13 Newly released documents reveal a situation quite removed 
from ‘striking unanimity’. 
 Accounts that are more recent have also overlooked much of the uncertainty 
and variety of perspective on both sides of the Atlantic. This has been primarily 
due to historians’ reliance on Callaghan’s memoir as a key source before the 
declassification of British archive material on the subject after 30 years. In his 
memoir, Callaghan asserted that, at the Guadeloupe Summit in January 1979, he 
secured Jimmy Carter’s informal agreement to supply Trident C4 with MIRV.14 As 
such, much of the historiography has viewed the Carter administration as largely 
supportive of helping Britain to replace Polaris from the very start of 
negotiations.15 Even with the release of archival material, this narrative has been 
largely unquestioned. This is primarily because within recently released British 
documents there is an account of Callaghan’s conversation with Carter at 
Guadeloupe.16 This account supports Callaghan’s memoir that at Guadeloupe 
Carter expressed he could see “no objection at all” to the supply of Trident C4 with 
MIRV.17 As such, within the accounts that have utilised the newly available British 
archival material, President Carter is portrayed as unhesitant in his support for 
US supply of Trident C4.18 For example, in reference to the election of Margaret 
Thatcher, Kristan Stoddart asserts that: 
With Carter already having provided assurances that they would fully 
support any decision the UK made on the choice of a successor system, 
it was for MISC 7, the key inner-Cabinet committee tasked by Mrs 
Thatcher, to take a successor decision.19  
However, as will be discussed, detailed archival analysis suggests that at 
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Guadeloupe Carter only provided an assurance that he would consider the supply 
of Trident C4 to the British.  
 Nevertheless, even without assertions regarding the “true” substance of 
Carter and Callaghan’s conversation at Guadeloupe, much of the existing 
literature would still portray the supply of Trident C4 as a near certainty. In 
general accounts of the US-UK nuclear relationship, analysis of the US role is 
limited to discussion of Carter’s relationship with Callaghan, Carter’s inclination 
to assist the UK owing to prior successes in US-UK nuclear collaboration, and the 
‘hardening’ of Carter’s foreign policy. They infer that the aforementioned 
contrived reasoning provides enough explanatory value to understand the US role 
in the Trident C4 agreement. For example, John Dumbrell, in referring to how 
Callaghan gained assurance on the supply of Trident at Guadeloupe, asserts that, 
“As well as his good personal relationship with Carter, Callaghan was able to 
exploit the growing anti-Sovietism in Washington, associated with the 
bureaucratic rise of National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.”20 Conversely, 
within the more detailed archival accounts on the Trident C4 agreement there is 
even less analysis of why Carter agreed to supply Trident.21 Moreover, whilst 
these more detailed accounts briefly discuss the Carter administration’s request 
to delay the Trident agreement, there is no detailed analysis of the reasons for 
this.22 
 The absence of a multi-faceted analysis of the Carter administration’s role 
limits understanding of the Trident C4 agreement. The following three chapters 
address this lacuna in the historiography, and will demonstrate that there was 
much greater complexity regarding to the Carter administration’s views on 
supplying Trident C4 than the present literature suggests. These chapters will 
examine preliminary discussions between the British government and the Carter 
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administration about replacing Polaris and the subsequent Trident C4 
negotiations. They also place these US-UK discussions within the context of the 
Carter administration’s aims and interests, in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the timing and shape of the Trident C4 agreement. Together, the 
three chapters highlight that the Carter administration clearly vacillated on 
whether to assist Britain with the replacement of Polaris.  
Following Carter’s election, British officials feared that their options for the 
Polaris successor might be limited by Carter’s continued commitment to the arms-
control process. These concerns were largely resolved through a combination of 
NATO internal politics and the beginning of Carter’s ‘hardening’ towards the 
Soviet Union. By the completion of the Duff-Mason report in December 1978 the 
likelihood of the British securing Carter’s agreement to supply the recommended 
system, Trident C4, had increased. This period of ‘Securing the Options’ will be 
discussed in this chapter.  
 
II 
 
Only a few weeks before the Callaghan government’s decision to commission a 
report to study possible successor systems to Polaris, the British received a clear 
indication, albeit through an indirect channel, that President Carter supported the 
continuation of their nuclear programme. On 18 November 1977, Kingman 
Brewster, US ambassador to Britain, told Callaghan that, following the Prime 
Minister’s earlier enquiries about the “administration’s attitude towards the 
continued maintenance of an independent UK nuclear deterrent,” he had spoken 
to Cyrus Vance, US Secretary of State, who in turn spoke to President Carter about 
the issue. In response, Carter had “directed that… Brewster should be instructed 
to re-emphasise to the Prime Minister the continuing self-interest of the United 
States in the maintenance of the United Kingdom's independent nuclear 
capacity.”23 
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The President’s commitment to the maintenance of Britain’s nuclear 
programme was crucial. Whilst the Polaris system was nominally independent, 
meaning that the British Prime Minister could decide to fire at will, Britain’s 
nuclear programme was technically dependent on US support. The maintenance 
of the Polaris force, even after its conversion to Chevaline, depended upon the 
continued “availability of US assistance.”24 This support included technical advice, 
equipment support for the Polaris system, facilities for missile-firing trials, supply 
of nuclear materials for warheads, and underground nuclear test facilities. If, 
hypothetically, the US cut off support “there would… be extremely serious 
problems in maintaining the weapon system in serviceable condition.”25  
US support would also be essential for Britain to replace the Polaris 
system. In their December 1977 meeting, the Cabinet committee on Nuclear 
Defence Policy concluded that they should “probably… rule out the idea of a 
wholly British ballistic missile on grounds both of capability and cost.”26 
Subsequently, Duff and Mason were told not to consider a British ballistic missile 
system as an option.27 This left Britain with, primarily, three remaining options, 
which were all, to a greater or lesser extent, reliant upon US co-operation. The 
first option was the acquisition of a system from the US, as had occurred with the 
purchase of Polaris missiles in 1963. This in practice would mean the purchase of 
Trident C4 missiles. However, this option was dependent upon “whether the 
Americans were prepared to make it available to us [Britain] and whether we 
could afford the cost.”28 Nevertheless, despite this uncertainty, in November 1977, 
the British Cabinet Secretary John Hunt advised Callaghan that this option would 
“probably be the cheapest and safest from the technical standpoint.”29 A second 
option would be to replace Polaris with cruise missiles. The British could 
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purchase cruise missiles from the US, or develop their own. Again though, both 
options would be dependent upon the US. In order to purchase cruise missiles 
from the US, its government would obviously have to agree to such a sale, and be 
willing to provide the missiles at a price the British could afford. Moreover, there 
could be “political inhibitions” against Britain’s development of its own cruise 
missiles if the US agreed to restrictions on the missiles in the ongoing SALT talks.30 
Britain’s third option was to develop a successor to Polaris in co-operation with 
the French. However, again, the attitude of the US would determine if this was a 
possibility. Under the terms of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement, the British 
could not make “classified information, materials and equipment made available 
to the UK by the USA… available to third parties except with US agreement.”31 
However, Britain’s weapon and propulsion technology was “so inextricably mixed 
with technology of US origin that some degree of transfer… to the French would 
be involved under any form of Anglo/French nuclear collaboration.”32 As such, the 
US attitude towards Anglo-French co-operation would be “crucial.”33 In this way, 
the United States loomed large over all the viable Polaris-replacement options. 
Carter’s expression of support for the maintenance of Britain’s nuclear 
programme did not guarantee that the US would do so on terms amenable to the 
UK. As John Hunt told Callaghan:  
While it is encouraging that the United States have just given orally a 
clear affirmation of their support for the continued maintenance of the 
United Kingdom's independent nuclear capability, this is not the same 
thing as a commitment to provide a specific next-generation weapons 
system in a particular timescale on acceptable terms.34  
The British government could not presently resolve this uncertainty about US 
assistance. The Callaghan government could not seek a guarantee from the US due 
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to the Labour party’s manifesto commitment. At the same time, the Carter 
administration was also unable to give such a guarantee due to various factors, 
domestic and international. As Hunt told Callaghan, the White House “could 
hardly give firm assurances about their response to an undefined request years 
ahead when the administration and the international setting might have 
changed.”35  
In the autumn of 1977, it was apparent to the British government that 
certain factors could undermine the Carter administration’s support for Polaris 
replacement. In September 1977, Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State to Richard 
Nixon and Gerald Ford, warned David Owen, British Foreign Secretary, that 
influential people within the Carter administration wanted Britain to cease being 
a nuclear power.36 Moreover, Carter’s arms-control efforts did not appear 
necessarily conducive to the supply of Trident to the British. Subsequently, David 
Owen remarked in October 1977, that he viewed it “unlikely” that the Carter 
administration would agree to supply Trident. But it is important to note that 
Owen’s opposition to acquisition of the “sophisticated and expensive” system may 
have influenced this assessment.37 This uncertainty on the US government’s 
future support for Polaris replacement led Hunt, in November 1977, to advise 
Callaghan to commence study of the “fullest range of options” for the Polaris 
successor. The study was necessary given the “longer timescale for ‘non-United 
States’ options” and thus the government needed to avoid “closing off the other 
options without certainty that acceptable United States ones would materialise.”38 
This led to the Callaghan government’s decision to commission the Duff-Mason 
report. 
 
Nevertheless, by November 1977 the likelihood that Carter would support Polaris 
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replacement had increased. On entering the White House in January 1977, 
Carter’s early nuclear policy aims were incompatible with the US supply of a next-
generation weapons system to Britain. Carter had pledged to work towards the 
elimination of nuclear weapons both in his campaign autobiography Why Not the 
Best? and his inaugural address.39 This bold vision on nuclear reductions was 
partly the result of Carter’s own firmly embedded values and morality. As John 
Dumbrell observes, Carter’s worldview reflected, “his personal temperament, his 
regional background, and his religious inheritance.”40 As a born-again Baptist, 
who still teaches Sunday school in his home town of Plains, Georgia, Carter’s deep 
religious convictions instilled within him a deep desire to do what was ‘right’. 
However, Carter’s desire for arms-reductions also came from a more practical 
outlook. He believed that Nixon and Ford’s approach to détente would not resolve 
the threat of the current arms-race. Carter called for “a new and genuine 
détente.”41 By this, Carter meant that he did not want to see controversial issues 
left out of negotiations because Moscow did not want to discuss them. In addition, 
he thought that détente needed to be reciprocal, unlike the present situation 
where he perceived the US government had been “giving up too much and asking 
for too little.”42 
 Subsequently, during the Presidential campaign of 1976, Carter expressed 
strong criticism of the Vladivostok accord, which President Gerald Ford and 
Leonid Brezhnev, USSR General Secretary of the Communist Party, had agreed to 
in November 1974. At the summit, Ford and Brezhnev signed an aide-mémoire, a 
statement of intentions for a future SALT II treaty. This agreement set an equal 
limit that each side could deploy 2400 strategic launchers each, made up of ICBMs, 
SLBMs and long-range bombers. Although several substantial issues remained to 
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be resolved before the two sides signed the treaty, the Soviets believed that they 
had agreed the main terms of SALT II.43 However, Carter claimed that the agreed 
limits would permit continuation of the nuclear arms-race. Carter saw that the 
ceilings, in the various categories of strategic delivery systems, had been set so 
high that the treaty would continue to allow the two superpowers to increase 
their number of launchers.44 As such, President Carter wished to push the Soviets 
to agree to a lower level of strategic arms in SALT II.    
Carter’s promise to work towards nuclear reductions was not 
electioneering. Upon entering office, Carter wished to achieve quick and 
significant progress on arms-control. As Nancy Mitchell observes “Carter was not 
interested in arms control as therapy. He wanted deep cuts.”45 In a Special 
Coordination Committee meeting (SCC) on 3 February 1977, Carter requested “an 
analysis of an ultimate relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which 
would include profound and mutual reductions in overall strategic nuclear 
capability.” The President wanted “to go as low as possible while still retaining an 
adequate deterrent capability.”46 Carter also “suggested the possibility of 
including later France and the PRC in mutual program reductions.”47 It is 
reasonable to presume that Carter would also wish to see Britain involved in these 
cuts.  
 Reflecting Carter’s ambitions for nuclear reductions in March 1977, Vance 
travelled to Moscow with revised SALT II proposals. The Carter administration 
sought ‘deep cuts’ in existing weapons systems and a ban on the testing and 
deployment of several future systems.48 The proposals included sharp reductions 
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in aggregate strategic force levels, down from 2400 launchers on each side in the 
Vladivostok accord to something in the range of 1800-2000. Within this total, 
there would be two sub-ceilings of 550 MIRVed ICBMs, and 550-650 MIRVed 
SLBMs.49 These proposals, as Odd Arne Westad observes, represented a 
“completely new approach to nuclear weapons, based on deep cuts.”50 Carter 
believed that the proposal would create a more rational and stable deterrence as 
well as one that was less costly.51  
The proposal though was not just Carter’s personal project. Other parts of 
the US government shared Carter’s desire for ‘deep cuts’. Defense Secretary 
Harold Brown was the strongest proponent within Carter’s Cabinet. Brown 
worried that the technological improvement and expansion of the Soviet nuclear 
arsenal threatened the US nuclear ‘deterrent’. As such, he wanted reductions in 
the USSR arsenal. Soviet acceptance of ‘deep cuts’ would have meant them 
scrapping over half their heavy missiles, a move that would have considerably 
reduced the first-strike capability of USSR strategic forces.52 Therefore, not 
surprisingly, the Pentagon also supported the proposal, as well as segments of the 
national security bureaucracy, and the conservative arms-control lobby. For the 
same reason, Senator Henry Jackson also supported the proposal. As a member of 
the Senate since 1953, and an active participant in various committees on national 
security and arms-control, Jackson’s opinion mattered. Much to the chagrin of 
Nixon and Kissinger, Jackson had been a vociferous and influential critic of the 
SALT I agreement and its supposedly unequal provisions.53 His reputation as an 
expert on national defence made his endorsement of any SALT II agreement 
essential. Cyrus Vance saw that, “Jackson would be a major asset in a future 
ratification debate if he supported the treaty, and a formidable opponent if he 
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opposed it.”54 
If the ‘deep cuts’ proposal had been successful, it is difficult to see how 
Carter, at least in the immediate future, could have helped Britain replace Polaris. 
In particular, it would have been difficult for the White House to agree to supply 
the Trident C4 system. On a political level, it would be problematic to agree to 
‘deep cuts’ in strategic launchers, whilst at the same time providing Britain with 
an advanced next-generation system. In addition, Moscow would not have looked 
favourably on the supply to Britain of a Polaris replacement, after the US and USSR 
had agreed to such reductions. The United States had resisted USSR pressure for 
the inclusion of British and French nuclear forces in SALT I, and the Vladivostok 
accord. As such, the Soviets would have reacted strongly to the supply of a 
successor system to the British at the same time as an agreement on ‘deep cuts’, 
perhaps even withdrawing from the treaty. Such a Soviet reaction would have 
been politically costly to the President given the widespread political support in 
the US government for ‘deep cuts’ and Carter’s own electoral stake in the success 
of SALT. As such, it is reasonable to presume that had the ‘deep cuts’ proposal 
succeeded, Carter would have been, at the very least, very reluctant to assist with 
the Polaris successor.  
 From the outset though, the ‘deep cuts’ proposal was “doomed to fail.”55 
Indeed, two weeks after the President’s inauguration, Brezhnev wrote to Carter 
and informed him that he would reject any proposal that deviated from the 1974 
accord.56 The Soviet leadership liked the Vladivostok formula. It would not 
require the USSR to destroy many of its missiles. On the other hand, ‘deep cuts’ 
would force Moscow to give up many of its land based ICBMs, which were a central 
component in the Soviet nuclear arsenal, whilst leaving the US force, more reliant 
on bombers, largely untouched.57 Subsequently, the Soviets flatly rejected the 
‘deep cut’ proposals that Vance presented to them in March. Brezhnev balked at 
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discarding the hard-fought Vladivostok package. They saw the proposals as unfair 
and as the US reneging on the promises made at Vladivostok. Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Andrei Gromyko, denounced the US proposal in a press conference as “a 
cheap and shoddy manoeuvre.”58 Vance’s trip to Moscow was the Carter 
administration’s first high-level contact with the Soviet Union – and it was a 
disaster.   
 In light of the recriminations issued by both sides in the aftermath of 
Vance’s trip to Moscow, Carter’s enthusiastic initial push for nuclear reductions 
came to a shuddering stop. With Vance due to meet Gromyko in two months, the 
White House re-examined its position. Subsequently, in May, Vance put forward 
the administration’s ‘three-tier proposal’. The first tier would meet the Soviet’s 
desire to incorporate Vladivostok into any new agreement, albeit with a 
somewhat lower ceiling. The second tier would be an “Interim Agreement” for two 
or three years regulating those weapons systems not covered by the Vladivostok 
accord, including cruise missiles and new types of weapons. The third tier would 
be a “Declaration of Principles,” stating the long-term goals to which the 
superpowers would give their attention after the expiration of the SALT II treaty 
in 1985.59 In May, Gromyko accepted the new approach. These proposals 
eventually became the SALT II treaty, a three-year protocol to SALT, and a set of 
principles to establish the foundations of SALT III.60 The Carter administration 
had switched to an approach on SALT II that looked remarkably similar to their 
predecessors.  
By May 1977, Carter’s hopes of achieving ‘real’ arms reductions, at least in 
this Presidential term, were largely in tatters. His initial vision of nuclear 
reductions was to go even more awry by the end of his Presidency. By 1980, the 
signing of the Trident C4 agreement with Britain, SALT was in limbo; the USSR 
and the US continued to develop even more destructive nuclear systems; and 
Carter had signed the controversial Presidential Directive-59, which was 
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designed to give the US the ability to utilise a range of nuclear options in war.61 
The Carter administration embraced, as CIA director Stansfield Turner later 
noted, “A series of policies on nuclear weapons that laid the whole foundation for 
Reagan’s expansion of nuclear weapons.”62 In this way by 1980, the Carter 
administration’s move towards confrontation had created a more conducive 
environment for the supply of a next-generation nuclear system to the British 
than had existed in early 1977.  
 
In 1977, though, Carter’s ‘hardening’ of attitude towards the Soviet Union was not 
apparent. Even with the failure of ‘deep cuts’, the Carter administration remained 
committed to the arms-control process. As they began to think about Polaris 
replacement in November 1977, John Hunt and Callaghan recognised the 
interrelation between US arms-control efforts and Polaris replacement. When 
Kennedy had agreed to supply Polaris to Britain in 1962 at Nassau, considerations 
of how the sale would influence arms-control negotiations were “scarcely a 
factor.”63 However in November 1977, with the development of détente as well as 
the Carter administration’s commitment to nuclear reductions, Hunt informed 
Callaghan that arms-control negotiations “could have implications for each” of the 
Polaris successor options, and “could be especially significant for United States co-
operation.”64 John Hunt foresaw that three areas of the SALT process could 
potentially influence Britain’s Polaris successor options: a non-circumvention 
clause and restrictions on cruise missiles in SALT II, as well as possible future 
SALT III talks. 
British officials were concerned about the effect the planned non-
circumvention clause in the SALT II treaty could have on US-UK nuclear co-
operation. In spring 1977, the Soviets told their US counterparts, that they wanted 
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SALT II to contain a provision whereby both sides would agree not to circumvent 
the treaty through a third state or in any other manner. The Soviets also wished 
for a non-transfer clause, which would mean “a commitment not to transfer 
strategic weapons or to assist in their development by third countries.”65 The 
inclusion of a non-transfer clause would have placed severe restrictions on US-UK 
nuclear co-operation. A specific non-transfer provision could have prevented 
maintenance assistance for the Polaris system, nuclear test support for the 
Chevaline project, and any future MIRV transfers, such as the Trident C4.66  
Fortunately, for the British, from the outset it was extremely unlikely that 
the Carter administration would agree to Soviet demands for a non-transfer 
clause. Such a clause would have placed severe restrictions on defence co-
operation within NATO.67 However, in June 1977 the chief US SALT negotiator, 
Paul Warnke, told an SCC meeting that he believed the US needed to agree to some 
kind of non-circumvention provision if they wanted to secure the SALT II treaty. 
The SCC agreed.68 After consultations with their NATO allies, the US proposed a 
“very general non-circumvention formulation,” which did not refer to the 
possibility of circumvention through third countries. In the summer of 1977, the 
Soviet Union rejected this general formulation and “reaffirmed their demands for 
specific commitments.”69 The Carter administration now decided that they would 
propose their fallback clause, which would specify that the US and USSR agreed 
not to circumvent the provisions of the agreement "through any other state.”70 
NATO had already approved the US use of this fallback clause at an appropriate 
time in the future. Nevertheless, with the issue unresolved Carter’s European 
allies remained “nervous.”71 They feared that the Soviets could use any non-
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circumvention clause to argue that US defence co-operation with its NATO allies 
broke the spirit of the agreement. In particular, British officials were concerned 
about the impact of any non-circumvention clause on their efforts to replace 
Polaris. The Carter administration thought the planned clause “would permit new 
forms of assistance which might be agreed by the US and the UK in the future.”72 
However, Hunt saw that there was “no absolute legal assurance of this,” 
particularly as the Soviet Union had not agreed to the clause, and they still wanted 
“a more restrictive formulation.”73 Moreover, British officials were concerned that 
any non-circumvention provision was “liable to give the Russians a peg on which 
they can hang claims, however unjustified, that the agreement is being 
infringed.”74 
British officials were also concerned that the planned restrictions on cruise 
missiles in SALT could limit their options for the Polaris successor. In September 
1978, David Owen and Callaghan privately discussed Britain’s options for Polaris 
replacement whilst on a plane to Nigeria. During this conversation, Callaghan told 
Owen that he favoured a ballistic system but worried it would be too costly. If this 
proved to be the case, Callaghan favoured the option of targeting half a dozen 
cities in the USSR with cruise missiles.75 However, British officials were concerned 
that such an option might be restricted under the SALT II treaty. At the beginning 
of negotiations, the Soviets requested a ban on all cruise missiles with a range of 
more than 600 km. They also argued that under the Vladivostok formula, the 
ceiling of 2400 delivery systems was to include cruise air-to-surface missiles, as 
well as ballistic missiles.76 Whilst the Carter administration had resisted these 
demands, as part of its three-tier proposal in May 1977 they had suggested a 
temporary ban on certain types of cruise missiles. By November 1977, it seemed 
likely that the planned three-year protocol would ban the deployment of cruise 
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missiles with ranges beyond 600km, except missiles launched from heavy 
bombers. However, Hunt expected the USSR “to press for the ban to be 
perpetuated.”77 Such an extension would limit Britain’s options for the successor 
to Polaris.  
Even if the SALT agreement did not contain a highly restrictive non-
circumvention provision, “the Americans would still be inhibited on political 
grounds, from making available to their Allies a capability which was prohibited 
under the agreement.”78 If the US and USSR agreed to extend the restrictions on 
cruise missiles, the US would be, “effectively unable to help us [Britain] with 
successor systems based on either sea-launched or air-launched CMs [cruise 
missiles].”79 Moreover, if certain cruise missiles were restricted under SALT, it 
could create “political inhibitions” against the development of a British system.80 
As such, throughout the winter of 1977, British officials lobbied the US to keep 
limitations on cruise missiles temporary, and thereby not close off one of Britain’s 
options for its Polaris successor.81  
British officials were also concerned that the country’s strategic system 
could be included in a future SALT III treaty, about which the Carter 
administration was keen to commence negotiations after the signing of SALT II. 
The USSR had previously informed the US, that “non-central systems,” including 
the UK and French strategic systems, “must eventually be considered in SALT.”82 
Non-central systems were a key point of contention throughout the SALT process. 
The US defined “strategic” nuclear systems by their technical capability. They 
wished to negotiate limits on ‘central systems,’ meaning those of the US and USSR, 
with intercontinental ranges; the systems that directly threatened the United 
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States. On the other hand, the Soviets defined “strategic” systems, as those that 
threatened the Soviet Union, no matter where they were deployed. As such, the 
Soviet negotiators wished to see the inclusion in SALT of US inter-continental 
missiles, British and French systems, and US Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF).83 The 
US had resisted such pressure throughout SALT I, and early SALT II negotiations.  
  In 1977, British officials foresaw that Moscow would push for the inclusion 
of non-central systems when negotiations began on SALT III. Such inclusion 
would be problematic for the British nuclear programme. It could result in the 
reduction in size of the Polaris force, something that British officials saw “would 
make it ineffective in its national role.”84 It could place restrictions on British and 
NATO short-range ballistic and cruise missiles. It could also restrict which system 
the British could acquire to replace Polaris. However, the US had always argued 
that the inclusion of British and French systems was not in their interests. Pitting 
Soviet nuclear forces against all Western allied forces, and Soviet superiority over 
any other power, would undercut the US ‘deterrent’ and raise allied doubts in the 
nuclear umbrella. Moreover, the NATO alliance had always strongly supported the 
United States long-standing rejection of Soviet pressure to include non-central 
systems. Subsequently, in November 1977, when discussions began on principles 
for SALT III, the White House believed that the Soviets would not accept their 
proposals unless the US agreed to deal with forward-based and allied systems in 
SALT III. Despite this, US officials believed they “should hold firm” on not including 
these areas.85 
However, British officials doubted that the US would continue to maintain 
such a robust line on the inclusion of British and French systems, given the USSR’s 
repeated demands about their inclusion and Carter’s desire to make ‘real’ 
progress on arms-control. Indeed, as discussed, in an SCC meeting in March, 
Carter had already expressed his desire to see the inclusion of French systems, 
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and thus presumably the British too. As such, Hunt foresaw that by the time 
preliminary talks on SALT III began, which could be as early as summer 1978, the 
British would “need a more exact notion of which options, in terms of force size 
and characteristics, it is really important to keep open.”86 
John Hunt’s concern about the impact of the SALT process on Polaris 
replacement was part of the reason that he urged Callaghan, in November 1977, 
to order the commencement of studies on possible successor options. Hunt 
thought that such analysis was necessary so that the British could more effectively 
lobby the US not to close off their preferred options.87 Hunt believed that the 
British could “legitimately assume that the United States will attach importance, 
in the resolution of these unsettled questions, to protecting our ‘successor’ 
interests.” However, he concurrently warned, “The line of keeping all options 
open indefinitely is… likely to be increasingly difficult; and the United States… will 
expect us… to narrow so far as possible the range of options which we ask them, 
at potential negotiating cost, to keep open.”88 Nevertheless, by the time of 
completion of the Duff-Mason report in December 1978, circumstances, largely 
beyond Britain’s control, meant that the impact of SALT on Britain’s options for 
the successor to Polaris was limited.  
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III 
 
 
Cartoon of Jimmy Carter.89 
 
In the winter of 1977, many of Britain’s NATO allies were also concerned about 
the proposed non-circumvention clause and restrictions on cruise missiles. They 
feared that such restrictions could prevent the US transfer of cruise missiles or 
other systems to Europe; transfers they foresaw as potentially necessary to 
counter-balance the Soviet modernisation of TNF.90  
 In the 1960s, Washington deployed more than 7000 nuclear weapons 
across Europe. Through this, the US aimed to strengthen the FRG’s belief in the US 
                                                     
89Nicholas Garland, Sunday Telegraph, circa 1977, British Cartoon archive, accessed 17 May 2015, 
https://www.cartoons.ac.uk/browse/cartoon_item/anytext=neutron%20bomb?page=17.  
90 To SALT working group, ‘Background Paper on non-Circumvention/non-transfer’, 5 May 
1977, NLC-132-85-9-2-0, JCL. 
Securing the Options 
76 
nuclear umbrella. Therefore, as William Burr argues, US nuclear deployments in 
Europe “acquired a symbolic value that made them difficult to change without 
stimulating adverse reactions from Bonn.”91 In the mid-1970s, the Pentagon 
developed plans to upgrade US TNF by removing thousands of vulnerable 
weapons and replacing them with more up-to-date versions. However, the 
modernisation would have resulted in quantitative nuclear reductions. As such, 
the plans stimulated allied, particularly German, fears that the United States was 
beginning a ‘decoupling’ process, whereby a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in 
Central Europe might not trigger a US nuclear retaliation.92 Although German 
opposition stalled the Pentagon’s plans, US proposals to withdraw F-4 bombers 
piqued the interests of some Bonn defence officials in successor weapons systems, 
including cruise missiles.93 
 This interest in cruise missiles emerged concurrently with apprehensions 
in Bonn and NATO over the prospective deployment of the Soviet SS-20, a new 
generation of more mobile and accurate Soviet Intermediate-Range Ballistic 
Missiles (IRBM). European governments, particularly in Bonn, feared this 
deployment would create an imbalance in TNF. There were no NATO missiles in 
Western Europe comparable to the SS-20. Moreover, the SS-20 raised questions 
about the US nuclear umbrella. The growing Soviet retaliatory capability, 
alongside approaching strategic parity, made any US nuclear use in Europe 
potentially suicidal. This raised questions amongst West European governments 
over whether the US would risk its annihilation because of, for example, a Soviet 
attack on Berlin, and concurrently whether the US would seek to decouple itself 
from NATO Europe. Subsequently, Defence ministers in NATO’s Nuclear Planning 
Group (NPG) viewed the deployment of the SS-20 as an unacceptable build-up, 
and that the increases in Soviet TNF were too large to be ‘defensive.’ In 1976, they 
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vowed to “improve the effectiveness of NATO’s theater nuclear forces.”94  
 The election of Carter brought a temporary pause in transatlantic debate 
over TNF. The new administration thought their European allies should 
strengthen NATO conventional forces, rather than modernise NATO’s nuclear 
arsenal. However, the Carter administration’s pursuit of arms-control talks raised 
European, and particularly Bonn’s, concerns about the SS-20. Under the proposals 
of SALT II made to the USSR in June 1977, it looked likely that the SS-20s would 
remain off the table, whilst the Carter administration looked willing to make 
concessions to Moscow on restrictions on cruise missiles and non-circumvention. 
This left the SS-20 as part of a ‘grey area’, because they were not on the negotiating 
table at either the SALT II or Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) 
talks.95 This created, as Kristina Spohr Readman observes, a: 
central dilemma… that whilst the United States was seeking to limit the 
arms race and arrive at a stable nuclear balance with the USSR… the 
security of Western Europe… could not be guaranteed by any means 
other than an implied American superiority via TNFs.96  
 The FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s personal dislike of the new 
President and his policies towards the Soviet Union heightened Bonn’s distrust of 
Carter’s attitude towards NATO nuclear forces. Carter’s moralist human rights 
agenda alongside his desire for arms-reductions led Schmidt to fear that “a 
maverick American president” could pursue unilateral disarmament at the FRG’s 
expense.97 Other European leaders shared these fears, although not to the same 
extent. At the same time, the Europeans feared US-USSR strategic parity due to 
the questions it raised over the US nuclear umbrella. Therefore, the election of 
Carter heightened European unease about NATO nuclear policy. As Leopoldo Nuti 
argues:  
                                                     
94 Stephanie Freeman, “The Making of an Accidental Crisis: The United States and the NATO 
Dual-Track Decision of 1979,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 25:2 (2014), 334. 
95 Ibid., 334. 
96 Kristina Spohr Readman, “Germany and the Politics of the Neutron Bomb, 1975-1979,” 
Diplomacy & Statecraft 21:2 (2010), 264. 
97 Ibid., 267. 
Securing the Options 
78 
On the one hand, the Western Europeans began to fear that the Carter 
administration might be too vacillating in its transatlantic policies and, 
perhaps, was even capable of reaching a compromise with the Soviets 
at their expense. On the other, the Europeans showed increasing 
uneasiness about the superpowers’ strategic parity, the consequence 
of which might be the much feared decoupling between American 
security and their own.98 
 Subsequently, during a June 1977 bilateral meeting over SALT II, FRG 
officials told their US counterparts that they did not want any restrictions on 
cruise missiles due to their potential to act as a counter to the SS-20s. However, 
the Carter administration replied that they saw no ‘grey area’ problem.99 In 
October 1977 during consultations on SALT II, a number of European allies told 
US officials of their concerns about prolonged restrictions on cruise missiles. 
Again, US officials told their NATO allies that they did “not see a military need for 
CMs in the long range theatre nuclear role in Europe because in their view the 
targets in Western Russia and Eastern Europe… [were] adequately covered by 
existing systems.”100 The general response of the Europeans was that they needed 
“time to decide” whether cruise missiles would “have a useful role in Europe.” 
Their “preliminary view” was that, as the existing theatre systems became “more 
vulnerable to Soviet defences, CMs could be a valuable replacement.”101 
Subsequently, Harold Brown informed Carter that whilst the discussions had 
allowed the US to clarify their position and this reassured the allies “to some 
degree,” they remained “concerned - especially as they see SALT tending to deal 
with the US-USSR part of the nuclear problem at a time when the theater problem 
looms larger in their perceptions.”102  
 Helmut Schmidt was particularly troubled. On 28 October 1977, Schmidt 
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went public with his concerns over a TNF imbalance in Europe in a speech to the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. Schmidt told his audience, that the 
Soviet’s superiority of TNF in Europe, alongside their achievement of strategic 
parity with the West, could make the US less likely to respond to Warsaw Pact 
aggression against NATO countries. This would lead to the US ‘decoupling’ from 
Western Europe, and thus enable the Soviets to use their SS-20s as political 
blackmail against NATO.103 
 
Relations between Western Europe and the US in general, and between Schmidt 
and Carter in particular, deteriorated further over the ‘neutron bomb affair’. 
Conversely the incident also moved the US and Europeans closer to a resolution 
on the TNF issue. In June 1977, the US administration asked Congress to allocate 
funds for the production of the so-called neutron bomb, a reduced-blast Enhanced 
Radiation Warhead (ERW), planned as part of US TNF modernisation. This was a 
routine intra-governmental process, and did not mean that the Carter 
administration had decided to develop the weapon, let alone deploy it. The 
decision though leaked to the press, and on 6 June 1977, The Washington Post 
reported the funding of this shorter-range nuclear weapon, that could kill people 
whilst leaving buildings intact. This news provoked political outrage in the US and 
Europe.  
In the FRG, Egon Bahr, the executive party secretary of the governing West 
German Social Democratic Party, condemned production of “an unethical weapon 
that would lower the nuclear threshold.”104 Moreover, the FRG had already been 
named as the ideal territory for ERW deployment due to geostrategic reasons. 
Quite understandably, the German public feared that the deployment of the 
neutron bomb would result in the loss of their lives, whilst their home survived. 
Whilst Schmidt supported deployment, he was in an awkward position. Bahr’s 
outbursts as well as German public feeling meant the Chancellor had to adopt a 
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position that would not damage him politically, whilst maintaining the FRG’s firm 
position as a Western ally.  
Carter also “found himself in a catch-22”105; if he refused to approve the 
new weapon, he would anger the US military and members of Congress, who 
viewed the ERW as an important ‘deterrent’ against Soviet conventional attack. In 
addition, given his cancellation of the B-1 bomber, such a decision would fuel the 
calls of his critics that he was weak vis-à-vis the Soviets. However, Carter had 
campaigned on the platform of nuclear reductions and human rights, so he did not 
now wish to be viewed as a public proponent of such a controversial weapon. It 
was for these reasons that in July 1977 Carter announced that he would wait to 
make a decision on the development of the neutron bomb.106 
 On 23 November 1977, Carter informed Schmidt that the United States 
would only develop the neutron bomb if the governments of Western Europe, and 
particularly the FRG, first agreed to deploy the weapon on their soil. Schmidt 
completely disagreed with Carter’s decision. He saw that the production decision 
lay solely with the US government, and that Carter could not offload this 
responsibility because of controversy. Other European leaders felt the same and 
were unwilling to make a public commitment on deployment before any 
production decision. In the face of these arguments, Carter continued to refuse to 
make a decision on development without European agreement to deploy.107 
Subsequently, over the winter of 1977, “a major transatlantic impasse was 
threatening to tear NATO apart.”108 
By February 1978, Schmidt had finally managed to persuade the Carter 
administration to agree to a three-step compromise solution on the neutron bomb 
dilemma. This compromise was also a possible solution to the SS-20 problem and 
TNF imbalances. Carter would announce his decision to begin ERW production. 
NATO would then offer the Soviets an arms-control proposal whereby the US 
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would agree not to deploy ERW in return for the USSR stopping deployment of the 
SS-20. If these negotiations failed, NATO would make a decision on whether to 
deploy ERW.109  
 In April 1978, just before the finalisation of the three-step plan in NATO, 
Carter announced that he would not authorise the production of the neutron 
bomb. Carter’s announcement was a surprise to European leaders, as well as his 
own advisers. The decision brought criticism of Carter both at home and abroad, 
especially after news leaked that his advisers had wished him to develop the 
weapon. The Soviets crowed that they had forced Carter to change his mind. US 
Senators decried another perceived example of Carter’s weakness in the face of 
the Soviet threat. Carter’s U-turn left European leaders irritated and distrustful of 
the seemingly erratic President. In particular, the decision infuriated the German 
Chancellor. He had invested significant political capital in order to obtain 
agreement on the three-step solution that Carter shelved without consultation, as 
well as in standing up to influential members in his own political party who were 
opponents of the ERW. Schmidt believed Carter had submitted to the Soviet anti-
ERW campaign waged by the Soviet Union and western pacifists, and in the 
process made NATO look impotent.110  
In this context of European animosity towards Carter, the ‘grey area’ 
problem remained unresolved. The US administration could not afford another 
rupture in US-European relations. As Spohr Readman observes, “Now, more than 
before, NATO’s success in ensuring a credible deterrence and defense posture 
became a political necessity to overcome the public image of an alliance in 
disarray.”111 However, in the immediate aftermath of the neutron bomb affair the 
Carter administration did not provide the leadership nor the solution to the ‘grey 
area’ problem that the Europeans wanted. In February 1978, in a NATO High-
Level Group (HLG) meeting, the allies reached a vague consensus that 
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modernisation of Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) should be 
prioritised over simultaneous improvements in battlefield weapons, such as 
conventional forces and the ERW. Then at a NATO NPG meeting in April 1978, the 
Allies agreed that there was a need to upgrade US TNF systems in Europe, with a 
range of more than 1000 km. Despite this apparent consensus, the Carter 
administration still vacillated on their commitment to the modernisation of 
LRTNF. In May 1978, at a NATO council meeting, Carter vaguely called for the 
general modernisation of nuclear weapons alongside the strengthening of NATO’s 
conventional forces, and declared that his administration would not discuss the 
SS-20 problem.112 
In the summer of 1978, faced with an unsatisfied NATO HLG who wished 
for an increase in NATO’s LRTNF and transatlantic relations still reeling from the 
aftermath of the neutron bomb affair, the Carter administration finally committed 
to finding a resolution to the ‘grey area’ problem. Carter issued a directive, PRM-
38, to the SCC to study possible LRTNF modernisation. After discussions on the 
results of the PRM-38 report, on 23 August the SCC agreed that the United States 
should pursue a “twin strategy” of LRTNF modernisation and arms-control.113 
How these two strands were to be integrated remained undecided. Nevertheless, 
the Carter administration had taken a firm step towards a ‘grey area’ solution. 
Political motivations primarily motivated this move by the Carter administration. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Adviser, later recalled that he 
“was doubtful that a military response based on Europe was needed, but I was 
convinced by my staff, notably [David] Aaron and Jim Thomson, of the political 
necessity to deploy a European-based nuclear counter [emphasis added].”114  
 
These developments in NATO internal politics eradicated many of the British 
government’s concerns over the impact of SALT on their options to replace 
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Polaris. By the summer of 1978, it was unlikely that, due to the moves towards 
modernisation of LRTNF, the Carter administration would agree to a further 
extension on the three-year restriction on cruise missiles. Concurrently, it was 
clear that the administration needed to address allied concerns that the non-
circumvention clause could prevent the transfer of US systems to Europe. 
Subsequently, in March 1978, the White House decided that they would release 
an interpretive statement on the consequences of a non-circumvention clause for 
US co-operation with allies, at the same time as the signing of SALT II.115 In late 
March, FRG officials told the White House that, whilst they would prefer no non-
circumvention provision, they agreed to the US ‘fallback’ clause alongside the 
release of an interpretive statement when the treaty was signed. “Having obtained 
FRG acquiescence,” US officials then held talks with France, UK, and Belgium.116 
The Belgian, French and UK governments also agreed to the fallback clause and 
the interpretative statement. On April 20, Gromyko also agreed to the fallback 
clause. At the same time, Vance resisted Gromyko’s arguments that they must 
agree on what the language of the clause meant, arguing that “the language speaks 
for itself and that we [the US] will not circumvent the agreement.”117 This left the 
way open for the US to release their interpretive statement at the same time as 
the signing of the treaty. These developments mostly resolved British concerns 
about the impact of a non-circumvention clause on Polaris replacement - although 
some latent concerns remained which will be explored in the next chapter. It is 
important to note though, that this resolution came because of shared allied 
concern over non-circumvention, with the worries of Bonn particularly influential 
on US officials’ efforts to find a resolution, not because of a US desire to placate 
British concerns over Polaris replacement per se.  
 
By the spring of 1978, the British could be increasingly confident that, alongside 
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the resolution of their concerns over the impact of SALT on the Polaris 
replacement, the Carter administration would not in the future make ‘radical’ 
arms-control proposals, which would reopen these issues. Alongside 
developments in NATO politics, the Carter administration’s policy towards the 
Soviet Union had already hardened.118 This in-turn created a more conducive 
environment for Polaris replacement. As such, it was clear to the administration 
that their initial expectations of SALT were unrealistic. As British Diplomat Paul 
Lever reported in June 1978:  
There is general agreement both inside and outside the administration 
that SALT had been oversold… It seems to be recognised that the 
problems of handling the Russians need to be tackled individually as 
they arise… and that the continuing SALT dialogue, important though 
it is, will henceforth be but one strand among many.119  
 Nevertheless, the British still faced some uncertainty about the prospects 
of definitely securing US assistance in the replacement of Polaris. As US officials 
made clear to the British during the March 1978 consultations over SALT, no 
restrictions on the transfer of a system under SALT did not mean that the US 
would definitely agree to such an exchange. In the March bilateral meeting, British 
officials enquired about how the terms of SALT could impact their options for the 
Polaris successor. To begin, the British asked if there were “any flat prohibitions” 
on what the US could do. State Department officials replied that they could not 
transfer a system prohibited in the agreement to a third state.120 The British then 
spelt out several areas in which they specifically wanted to retain the right of 
transfer, including “anything related to a possible successor to Polaris.” The US 
officials responded:  
That specific requests in this area would have to be looked at case by 
case, that existing agreements would not be affected, and that we 
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would not be precluded from assisting in the modernization of this 
force, although policy considerations and the circumstances existing at 
the time would have to be taken into account.121  
British officials then asked if the US would be “precluded from transferring 
Trident I [C4] missiles.”122 US officials replied: 
That although not necessarily precluded, this would obviously be a 
major question entailing a wide range of policy considerations which 
could only be looked at in the circumstances of the time, and which 
would have to consider inter alia, the possible relationship to SALT, 
with or without an explicit non-circumvention provision. 
In this way, US officials made clear that, as long as the agreement did not prohibit 
the system, SALT would not prevent the transfer of a Polaris successor system. 
However, US officials stressed that a request would be assessed on a case by case 
basis, dependent on the circumstances of the time. Concurrently, even though 
long-term restrictions on cruise missiles looked unlikely, this did not guarantee 
that the US would supply them to the British. Indeed, in October 1978, Brzezinski 
told Carter that in US-UK discussion on grey areas, US officials “ducked a 
response” to British enquires about whether they “could sell them long-range 
ALCMs [Air-Launched Cruise Missiles] or transfer their technology under the non-
transfer clause in SALT.”123 
The political circumstances of the time were not necessarily conducive to 
US assistance on Polaris replacement. Whilst NATO politics helped to ensure that 
Britain’s options for the successor to Polaris remained open, NATO’s concern over 
grey areas also heightened the risk of the inclusion of British systems in SALT III. 
In October 1979, the US remained determined “about the need to resist Russian 
pressure for the inclusion of British weapons.”124 The NATO alliance had always 
strongly supported the United States long-standing rejection of the Soviet 
pressure to include non-central systems. European allies had hitherto taken the 
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view that the inclusion of non-central systems “would limit the effectiveness of 
their contribution to the deterrent and defensive strategy of the Alliance.”125 
However, for SALT III, the interests of the western alliance was less clear-cut. The 
successful completion of the SALT II agreement would result in the ‘regulation’ of 
the US and Soviet strategic balance. The successful completion of MBFR would 
result in the ‘regulation’ of the conventional balance in Europe. This left the 
question of “whether an attempt should be made to constrain the nuclear forces 
in Europe.”126 NATO was presently very concerned with this issue because of 
Soviet deployment of the SS-20 and the subsequent risk of a TNF imbalance. As 
such, British officials foresaw that there could be a “political requirement to 
extend arms control negotiations to non-central systems.”127  
Such a decision to include non-central systems in SALT III could lead to the 
inclusion of British and French systems. Subsequently, when US consulted with 
their European allies over principles for SALT III in February 1978, FRG officials 
expressed their wishes for Soviet theatre systems, and thereby US TNF, to be 
included in SALT III. French officials stated that they did not want to see the 
inclusion of grey area systems “out of concern that their own forces might be 
dragged in.”128 The British were “torn on the subject.” They wanted to keep their 
own forces out of SALT III, yet they also saw political benefit to addressing the 
TNF imbalance in Europe within the next SALT round.129 Subsequently, in October 
1979, David Aaron informed British officials that if US TNF were included in SALT 
III it would be difficult not to include British grey area weapons, because “the de 
minimis argument would be much weaker, since our [British] share of the grey 
area total would not in fact be insignificant.”130 If French fears were true, this 
could then result in British strategic systems “being dragged in.”131 This 
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uncertainty over the possible inclusion of British systems in SALT III would take 
time to resolve and would be partly dependent upon how NATO decided to 
resolve the grey area problem. 
 Moreover, alongside his toughening of approach towards the Soviet Union, 
Carter continued to prevaricate on his foreign policy choices. Within the academic 
literature on Jimmy Carter, there is still much debate about why this vacillation 
took place, alongside the related arguments on Carter’s diplomatic record.132 
Some scholars, such as Betty Glad, stress the intra-government squabbles that 
dogged the administration as the most important factor.133 The key rivalry was 
between Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Vance wished to downplay the 
Soviet threat and thought that the US and USSR could co-operate in areas of 
shared interests, such as arms-control. Brzezinski took a more hawkish view 
towards the Soviets, and saw the USSR “as a megalomaniac state bent on world 
domination.”134 Eventually, Brzezinski won the struggle for influence, and this 
resulted in a hardening of US policy towards the Soviet Union. In the meantime, 
Carter struggled to reconcile the differences between two of his key advisers, and 
the result was confused foreign policy.  
Other scholars, such as Odd Arne Westad, offer a more sympathetic view 
of Carter, and argue that the President was the victim of forces beyond his 
control.135 Domestically, Carter faced the remarkable growth of the 
neoconservative movement, divisions within a Democratic party and embedded 
bureaucratic and corporate interests that fought many of his policies. 
Internationally, Carter faced difficulties in Iran and Nicaragua, over which he had 
little control, and a Soviet Union, who many in the US saw as utilising détente as a 
means to increase strength. Again, Carter’s attempts to navigate this conflicted 
environment led to a confused foreign policy.   
Other scholars, such as Scott Kaufman, observe that all Presidents face 
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external and internal constraints as well as governmental in-fighting, and as such 
view that blame for the confused foreign policy lies with Carter.136 Certainly, 
Carter’s lack of overall vision and strategy compounded the external and internal 
constraints he faced. Indeed, his approach to nuclear weapons was contradictory 
even during his election campaign. In June 1976, Carter told The New York Times 
that he opposed the idea “of a limited nuclear war,” yet a month later, he said that 
he would launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack “if I was convinced that the 
existence or the security of our nation was threatened.”137 As such, Nancy Mitchell 
rightly argues that the real problem was not that “Carter was torn between Vance 
and Brzezinski, but… [that] he held both their views simultaneously… He believed 
in patient diplomacy and in the dramatic gesture; he saw beyond the Cold War 
and he was a firm Cold Warrior.”138  
However, no matter which of the debated factors was the most important 
in creating Carter’s foreign policy, it is clear that they all contributed, to a greater 
or lesser extent, to the same result: Carter’s foreign policy was often confused and 
contradictory. This in turn influenced the British government’s efforts to 
modernise Polaris. In the long-term, Carter’s hesitation, created, as the next two 
chapters will discuss, uncertainty for the British government in their efforts to 
secure an agreement on the sale of the Trident C4 system.  
 
IV 
 
In December 1978, the Duff-Mason report was ready for ministerial 
consideration. In the report, Duff and Mason were sceptical about the feasibility 
of David Owen’s preferred Polaris successor; cruise missiles. Instead, they 
favoured the Trident C4 system with MIRV. This system would meet the ‘Moscow 
criterion’: “the ability to deter the Soviet Union through maintaining an ability to 
threaten, and therefore potentially to kill, millions of people in the Soviet 
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capital.”139 This criterion had been central to British nuclear doctrine since the 
deployment of Polaris.140 In light of the lessons of Chevaline, Duff and Mason also 
thought that there were “great technical, operational and logistic advantages” to 
the Trident C4 as it was “a system in service with the US Navy.”141  
Duff and Mason were relatively optimistic that the US would agree to assist 
with Britain’s efforts to replace Polaris. They thought that the continuation of 
“Anglo-American cooperation would involve least risk to the US commitment to 
the defence of Europe.”142 Such a consideration was particularly important to the 
Carter administration given the resurrection of doubts in the US nuclear umbrella 
amongst some Western governments. In addition, the Carter administration, 
through Kingman Brewster, had “re-emphasised, at the highest level, the 
continuing self-interest of the United States in the maintenance of the United 
Kingdom's nuclear capacity.”143 Duff and Mason also believed that it was unlikely 
that any succeeding US administration would adopt a different attitude to US-UK 
nuclear co-operation, or that Congress would dissent to US assistance. Duff and 
Mason also noted that many of Britain’s fears about the impact of a non-
circumvention clause on the Polaris successor question had now been resolved. 
Indeed, they noted that Harold Brown, US Secretary of Defense, had specially said 
in a Senate ratification meeting that "the US was allowed under the interpretive 
statement to provide the Allies with modernised forces along the lines of the 
Cruise Missile and Trident submarines.”144 
  Nevertheless, Duff and Mason stressed that, even without specific 
restrictions in the treaty, the SALT process could still influence Britain’s efforts to 
modernise Polaris. As the report highlighted the “nature of US assistance will be 
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constrained by the need to take account of the political implications for SALT.”145 
One of these areas could be SALT III. With the Carter administration still 
committed to the continuation of SALT, consideration of the political impact on 
future arms-talks would likely influence the Carter administration’s assistance 
with Polaris replacement. In these negotiations, Duff and Mason expected the US 
to continue to resist Soviet pressure for the inclusion of British and French 
systems. However, the US and Soviet Union had committed in the declaration of 
principles for SALT III to “seeking… significant and substantial reductions in 
strategic system numbers.”146 As such, to resist Soviet pressure the US “may have 
to argue that the UK deployment is insignificant numerically compared with US 
and Soviet systems.”147 Such an argument could “inhibit any significant 
strengthening of a future British deterrent in comparison with the present 
force.”148 
 Duff and Mason emphasised that another area of political consideration for 
the Carter administration could be the supply of a MIRV system. Duff and Mason 
viewed it “difficult to judge whether the US would offer their MIRV capability.”149 
With MIRVed systems “subject to special constraints in SALT… this could seem 
still too sensitive an area.”150 However, Duff and Mason highlighted that, MIRVs 
no longer represented the “technological lead possessed by the US” and the 
Soviets had begun to deploy their own MIRVed SS-20 “against European targets, 
including Britain.”151  
If the US refused to sell Britain a MIRV system this would create difficulties 
for the replacement of Polaris. Duff and Mason deemed that Britain’s “fall back 
option” to the Trident C4 with Multiple Re-entry Vehicles (MRV) was “inferior and 
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less certain.”152 The MIRV capability was integral to the design of the Trident C4. 
The removal of this capability and replacement with MRV “would entail a major 
re-design and re-testing programme, leading to a missile degraded in 
performance and unique to Britain.”153 Such a re-design would increase the 
missile costs by “at least double those of Trident.”154 As such, a US refusal would 
require the British to conduct “further study and exploration to say which would 
be best… between A4, C4 with MRV, and the French M4.”155 The UK’s own 
development of a MIRV system was “virtually out of the question. The technical 
task would be formidable - exceeding even the complexity, cost and demands on 
scarce manpower resources of Chevaline.”156 The report made clear that 
enquiries to the Carter administration over their willingness to supply Trident C4 
with MIRV was essential to progress on Polaris replacement. As such, when a 
Cabinet committee discussed the report on 21 December 1978, Callaghan decided 
that he would utilise the opportunity of his upcoming summit with Carter on the 
island of Guadeloupe, to enquire about the President’s attitude to the supply of 
Trident C4 with MIRV.157 
 
On his way to Guadeloupe, Callaghan could be hopeful of a positive reply to his 
enquiry. Events over the last two years, due to shared allied concerns and a 
hardening of the White House’s approach to the Soviet Union, had led to the 
nullifying of the Carter administration’s aims in nuclear reductions. This, in turn, 
created an environment that looked more hospitable to a US-UK Polaris 
replacement deal. Moreover, the Carter administration had already expressed 
their support for US-UK nuclear co-operation, and demonstrated this in a concrete 
way: the administration had continued to support British warhead testing in 
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Nevada. By the time of Margaret Thatcher’s election in May 1979, British warhead 
testing of a successor system had already begun, with tests taking place in 1978 
and 1979. All these nuclear tests required the President's consent.158  
 Nevertheless, these developments, as the Duff-Mason report highlighted, 
only made a US agreement to the supply of Trident C4 with MIRV more probable, 
not definite. Even if the administration supported Polaris replacement, any deal 
would only be of modest advantage to the administration. In the first few years of 
their term in office, the administration prioritised arms-control and human rights, 
not the strengthening of nuclear forces. As such, they did not view the 
replacement of Polaris as a central component in their efforts to change the 
dynamic of the Cold War, nor would it build the administration’s legacy, resolve 
relations with allies, or win votes. Subsequently, if modernisation in any way was 
going to hinder any such ‘priority’ policies, the British could not rely on the 
support of Carter. Two policy priority areas that clearly had the potential to 
intervene with Polaris replacement were the political implications of SALT, and 
concern over grey areas within NATO. As Leopoldo Nuti observes, European 
unease about TNF alongside the arms-control process led to the development of 
“a complex relationship between Soviet strategic choices, the SALT II negotiations 
and NATO internal debate.”159 Polaris replacement was entwined within these 
relationships. Moreover, Carter had a tendency to vacillate, as the neutron bomb 
fiasco had demonstrated, on potentially controversial nuclear issues. Put 
together, all of this meant that, despite knowing that the Carter administration 
supported Polaris replacement, the British could not be sure that the US would be 
willing to supply Trident C4 with MIRV. 
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Chapter 3  
 
SALT in the Wounds: The Preliminary Negotiations, 1979 
 
“I regard it as modestly advantageous – with the emphasis on the 
adverb.” 
- Harold Brown.1 
 
I 
 
On 5-6 January 1979, Jimmy Carter, James Callaghan, Helmut Schmidt and 
French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing met on the Caribbean island of 
Guadeloupe. The four men assembled for top-secret, informal deliberations on 
global politics and in particular Western security issues. Despite the 
seriousness of the topics under discussion, the summit had a relaxed 
atmosphere. ‘Formal’ discussions took place round a small, white table in an 
open thatched hut with no set agenda, no position papers and no note-taker. 
Each leader came with only a modest number of staff, an advisor or two, to 
ensure maximum discretion and frankness during the deliberations. Outside 
of these discussions, the summit had a more sociable atmosphere. The leaders 
and their wives stayed in bungalow-style accommodation next to the beach. 
During their free time they jogged, sailed, played tennis, snorkelled, 
sunbathed, and scuba-dived.2 
As Kristina Spohr notes, the summit was an “important moment in 
1970s Cold-War politics.”3 It played a pivotal role in laying the foundations for 
NATO’s highly contentious ‘dual-track’ decision on TNF modernisation and 
arms-control efforts with the Soviet Union. The Guadeloupe summit is also 
known, by those interested in British nuclear history, as the location where 
important foundations were laid for the Trident C4 agreement. As discussed in 
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the previous chapter, the Duff-Mason report made clear that the US Trident C4 
with MIRV was the most desirable Polaris successor option. Subsequent to 
reading the report, Callaghan decided that the Guadeloupe summit provided 
an opportune moment to enquire about the President’s attitude to assisting 
Britain with Polaris replacement.4   
In Callaghan’s memoir, he notes that Carter’s response to these 
enquiries was very positive and forthcoming, with the President informally 
agreeing to transfer the Trident C4 system. Callaghan paints a picturesque, if 
slightly surreal, scene of the President taking an afternoon rest in his hut, only 
to be interrupted by the Prime Minister  wishing to discuss Britain’s nuclear 
‘deterrent’. After a general conversation about the surrounding nuclear 
context, Callaghan enquired about the possibility of acquiring the Trident C4 
system. According to Callaghan’s account, “The President said that he could see 
no objection to transferring this technology to the UK.”5 
Given that archival material has only recently become available, much 
of the historiography has been largely reliant on Callaghan’s account as a basis 
for understanding the origins of the Trident C4 agreement.6 Furthermore, 
given that only the Prime Minister and the President took part in the 
conversation at Guadeloupe, some of this literature has overemphasised the 
role of personal relationships in securing US agreement to assist with Polaris 
replacement. Referring to Carter’s compliance to Callaghan’s enquiries, John 
Dumbrell reflects, “Memories of Jack and Mac in 1962 were stirred.”7 Whilst 
Alan Dobson, also referring to the conversation at Guadeloupe, similarly states, 
“The nuclear special relationship was about to get a new lease of life… 
Callaghan got on well with Carter.”8 These evaluations of the importance of the 
dynamic between Carter and Callaghan, and the similarities with Nassau, are 
collaborated by Foreign Secretary David Owen’s account: “Jim used his 
friendship with Jimmy Carter over Trident in much the same way that Harold 
Macmillan had used his personal relationship with President Kennedy over 
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Polaris.”9 Such accounts suggest that the Guadeloupe summit could be 
considered the ‘Trident Nassau’. 
However, just as archival documents revealed that discussions in 
Nassau were not as friendly or congenial as once thought, the same is true of 
the Trident negotiations. As this chapter will discuss, despite Carter’s 
forthcoming attitude in Guadeloupe, the British faced uncertainty in their 
efforts to gain US assistance for Polaris replacement. This remained the case 
when Margaret Thatcher met with President Carter to discuss the matter in 
December 1979, shortly before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Within recently released British documents is an account of Callaghan’s 
conversation with Carter at Guadeloupe.10 It is reasonable to presume that the 
former Prime Minister used this account to inform his memoirs many years 
later. Callaghan describes the discussion with clarity. He portrays a President 
who responds positively to the Prime Minister’s enquires about Polaris 
replacement. Callaghan explains that after waking the President he explained 
that Britain had begun to consider their “next generation of nuclear weapons” 
and that he wanted to know what Carter’s reaction would be. Reflecting US 
acceptance of Britain and France as nuclear powers in contrast to some 
opposition during the Polaris negotiations, the President expressed his 
appreciation for Britain being in the nuclear field. He “hoped strongly” that 
Britain and France continued to be so, “He [Carter] did not wish the United 
States to be the only country that confronted the Soviet Union.”11  
Consequently, the President then asked which system the British 
preferred. Callaghan replied that as they had ruled out Ground-Launched 
Cruise Missiles (GLCM) for the time being, “at this stage” they were “basically 
attracted to a submarine launched missile.” Callaghan reflected that, for his 
“part if the cost could be properly apportioned what I thought would be best 
would be the Trident C4,” then enquired “did he [Carter] see any objection?” 
According to Callaghan’s account, Carter said, “that there was no objection at 
all.” The British Prime Minister pointed out that the system was MIRVed, which 
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the British did not presently have. To which Carter replied, and the record 
quotes, “Well, so is the SS-20 MIRVed.”12 It is reasonable to presume that 
Carter’s positive response about the supply of a MIRV system would have been 
both a surprise and delight to the Prime Minister. Indeed, Callaghan’s reminder 
to the President that Britain did not have such technology suggests this be the 
case.  
A multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle, more commonly 
referred to as its acronym MIRV, is a ballistic missile with a payload that 
contains several warheads with each one able to strike separate pre-
determined targets. Such a system would enhance Britain’s first-strike 
proficiency, provide greater damage per missile payload, and reduce the 
effectiveness of anti-ballistic missile systems. For these reasons the authors of 
the Duff-Mason report felt that a MIRV system, such as the Trident C4, better 
fulfilled the ‘Moscow criterion’: UK policy-makers believed that Britain’s 
nuclear ‘deterrent’ should be able to defeat ballistic missile defences around 
Moscow. However, as discussed in chapter one, the British development of 
Chevaline was motivated, in part, by concerns that the US would not agree to 
sell an alternative MIRV system: Poseidon. Indeed, the US feared that 
supplying such a system, which would vastly improve Britain’s first strike 
capability, would undermine on-going SALT I negotiations. The Soviet Union 
had previously demanded that the British and French systems be included in 
the agreed limits, and that there should be a non-transfer clause, which 
Washington rejected. Given the on-going SALT II negotiations, during which 
US officials had again rejected Soviet arguments to include ‘third-party 
systems’ and a non-transfer clause, British officials had been concerned that 
the Carter administration would have similar reservations about the supply of 
Trident C4 with MIRV.  
After a short exchange that resolved Callaghan’s confusion over the 
myriad names of different Trident systems, Carter said “the United States had 
always got the greatest benefits out of co-operation with Britain, that if they 
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could transfer some of their technology to us it helped them on unit costs in 
production.”13 With Britain’s struggling economy and thus subsequent 
declining defence budget, Callaghan seized this opportunity to talk about costs. 
He explained that estimates of $10 billion were beyond British capacity, and 
given Carter’s belief that it was valuable to have Britain present in the nuclear 
field, Callaghan expressed his hope that the US would be willing to help Britain 
“very substantially financially.” Carter replied that he “thought they could, and 
said that when it came to production it would lower their unit cost of 
production if we [Britain] were in the field.”14 Again, Carter’s response 
delighted British officials. Both of Britain’s main concerns – the supply of a 
MIRV system and the prohibitive cost – had been calmed by the US response.  
Finally, Callaghan suggested that he would like to send a couple of 
officials over to Washington to discuss systems and costs, to which Carter 
“agreed immediately.” Callaghan in his account hence surmises that Carter’s 
“whole attitude was extremely forthcoming and co-operative.”15 Certainly, this 
is what Callaghan’s record of the conversation suggests. Before Guadeloupe, 
British officials feared the White House would be unwilling to provide Trident 
C4 with MIRV at an affordable cost. Callaghan’s account of his conversation 
with the President at Guadeloupe suggests that these doubts were 
unnecessary. 
In the most detailed study of the Trident C4 agreement to date, Kristan 
Stoddart accepts Callaghan’s archival account without question.16 However, 
despite the clarity of Callaghan’s account, questions remain about its accuracy. 
No US record has been declassified to verify the British account and Carter did 
not write in his personal diary about this private conversation with 
Callaghan.17 Nor did Carter mention the conversation in his personal notes to 
Cyrus Vance briefing him on the Summit.18 This absence of a US record is 
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particularly important because Callaghan and Carter’s accounts of the 
conversation to their respective officials differed. Robert Wade-Gery, a lead 
British official during the Trident C4 negotiations, later recalled that there was:  
Despair of officials on both sides because this was a rare example 
of a meeting which only Callaghan, in his pyjamas, and Carter, 
presumably also in his pyjamas, were present at. So none of us 
actually knew what had happened. Callaghan wrote down a few 
notes on a half sheet of paper when he got back to his cabin, and 
Carter similarly made some rough notes. These two sets of notes, 
which of course we compared, didn’t really square with each other, 
so there was a good deal of uncertainty as to what had or hadn’t 
been agreed.19  
Subsequently, when Wade-Gery began working on Polaris replacement for the 
Cabinet Office in mid-1979 “the sort of foundation document for everything 
were these two rather inarticulate notes by the great men who weren’t used 
to writing their own records.”20  
 Certainly, Callaghan’s account of the President does not correlate with 
Carter’s known personality and attitude. Callaghan portrays Carter as very 
compliant and agreeable yet this was entirely atypical of the President. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski later described the President as having a “somewhat 
reticent personality” and that “in personal relations he is… somewhat cold.”21 
The account also does not concur with the accounts of two lead officials in the 
Trident C4 negotiations regarding Carter’s attitude towards Polaris 
replacement. US Deputy National Security Advisor David Aaron later recalled 
that Carter was “allergic to a lot of nuclear things” and viewed the idea of 
supplying missiles to Britain “rather sceptically.”22 Similarly, Robert Wade-
Gery, with whom Aaron privately scrutinised much of the detail of the Trident 
deal, later recalled:  
The real problem with the Carter White House was the moral issue; 
was it really right for Carter, who was a man who believed in 
peace… to help even a close ally like Britain to acquire another 
generation of these terrible weapons, and was it compatible with 
the goal of non-proliferation and so on? Carter agonised over this a 
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great deal. My task was to get his advisers to make up their minds 
that they ought to help us, and then to help them to persuade him.23  
Therefore, there are clear anomalies between Carter’s purported later attitude 
towards Polaris replacement and Callaghan’s account of the conversation with 
him at Guadeloupe. 
 These differences can be accounted for because Callaghan in fact only 
asked Carter if he would consider the supply of Trident C4. Following the 
Guadeloupe summit John Hunt wrote to Callaghan reflecting on the 
ramifications. He noted that any decision on Trident C4 would need Cabinet 
endorsement and “we are a long way from that yet.” Callaghan scribbled 
alongside, “Yes we are. I put the question to him [Carter] to see what are our 
range of options.”24 Subsequently, Callaghan reported to key Cabinet ministers 
privy to discussions on Polaris replacement that: “Carter reaffirmed his 
support for the maintenance of an independent British deterrent… and said he 
was very ready to consider letting us have the Mirved [sic] C4 [emphasis 
added].”25  
Moreover, there is a distinct possibility that no-one briefed Carter on 
Polaris replacement before attending Guadeloupe. There is no briefing on the 
issue within the materials prepared for Carter prior to the summit.26 
Furthermore, shortly before Guadeloupe, Brzezinski received an incorrect 
brief from an official in Western Europe about Britain’s attitudes, which 
recalled that:  
I had lunch with John Weston of the UK Embassy, who does PM 
[Prime Minister] issues. He indicated that they have little sense of 
what Callaghan wishes to discuss at Guadeloupe… Weston does not 
expect the follow-on UK deterrent question to come up, even 
bilaterally, since UK thinking (at least at the Ministerial level) has 
hardly begun.27  
Of course, someone may have briefed Carter orally, with perhaps Brzezinski 
informing the President as a contingency, but there also exists a real possibility 
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that Carter replied to Callaghan’s enquiries without being informed in detail 
about any possible ramifications of a system transfer to the British. 
Despite the uncertainty about what was said regards Polaris 
replacement in Guadeloupe, it is clear Carter leaned towards assisting the 
British, had a good working relationship with Callaghan, and was inclined to 
assist the UK owing to prior successes in US-UK nuclear collaboration. Many of 
the existing accounts on the Trident C4 agreement determine that these three 
factors provide enough explanatory value to understand the sale of Trident. 
However, a multi-faceted approach demonstrates that this does not explain 
the formulation of the agreement, especially its timing and shape. Even if the 
administration supported Polaris replacement, any deal would only be of 
modest advantage to the administration. Hence, if modernisation in any way 
was going to hinder the administration’s ‘priority’ policies it would obviously 
be delayed, or shaped to try to limit such impact. The Carter administration 
faced a myriad of political dilemmas during 1979, including maintaining 
working US-Soviet relations, SALT II ratification, achieving NATO consensus 
on a ‘dual-track’ approach, the rise of the political  right in the US, and Carter’s 
declining public support. These problems created uncertainty for the British 
that the US would supply their preferred system Trident C4, and indeed 
whether any Polaris replacement agreement would be achievable with the 
presiding administration. Subsequently, nearly a year after the Guadeloupe 
summit, despite concerted British efforts, their quest to replace Polaris was at 
a standstill.  
In December 1979, UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met Jimmy 
Carter to discuss Polaris replacement; instead of Thatcher making a formal 
request for the Trident C4 system, as the British had originally planned, she 
was told that any deal would be delayed until after the ratification of SALT II, 
whenever that may be. Therefore, no matter what was said on the island of 
Guadeloupe, any agreement was contingent on further negotiations. 
Moreover, Britain still faced a significant amount of uncertainty about the 
prospects of securing the Trident system because of the surrounding political 
circumstances: in particular other discussions occurring on the island of 
Guadeloupe.        
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II 
 
 
Solving Western security dilemmas in a thatched hut.28 
 
The Guadeloupe summit played a pivotal role in laying the foundations for 
what would become NATO’s highly contentious ‘dual-track’ decision on TNF 
modernisation and arms-control efforts with the Soviet Union. This provided 
justification for a Polaris successor deal. Nevertheless, these developments 
also created a problematic environment for the announcement of any US-UK 
nuclear technology transfer.  
Arriving in Guadeloupe, Carter faced the difficult dilemma of how to 
resolve European concerns over nuclear parity, and in particular Soviet 
development of SS-20s. Helmut Schmidt came to the summit intending to 
discuss the problems he saw with NATO strategy, and in particular its nuclear 
dimension. Schmidt had widely expressed his conviction that US-Soviet 
strategic parity diminished the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent and 
amplified the effects of developments in the European theatre such as the 
deployment of new Soviet systems like the SS-20s. Whilst Schmidt “sat in the 
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driving seat”, pushing for the resolution of these problems, his fears were 
shared amongst his fellow European leaders.29 The NATO High-Level Group 
was already considering the different options for LRTNF modernisation, after 
a meeting in February 1978 agreed new NATO weapons deployment 
necessary. 
 However, there were differences in opinion between the Europeans 
and Americans, and the summit provided an opportunity to resolve these. 
Carter had reconciled himself to the idea of deploying modernised LRTNF 
across Europe. On the other hand, the Europeans gave higher priority to arms-
control. Callaghan supported arms-control negotiations with the Soviets, but 
was willing to go along with the US proposal. Giscard suggested a combined 
approach of deployment and negotiations, whilst Schmidt was reluctant to 
support the idea of deployment.30 Clearly these differences needed to be 
resolved because they undermined confidence in NATO and the US nuclear 
umbrella. As Kristina Spohr observes, officials on both sides of the Atlantic 
understood, “anything that might undermine alliance cohesion in the face of a 
blustering Soviet Union had to be avoided at all costs.”31    
The Carter administration needed to ensure the resolution of these 
concerns. Indeed, the administration was struggling to repair the damage done 
to US-European relations during the Nixon era and discontent was deepening. 
Many European governments felt the Carter administration lacked a solid, 
consistent and thought-out nuclear policy and subsequently had offered little 
lead on the security problems faced by the ‘West.’ In turn, the Carter 
administration saw the dilemmas over LRTNF as an important opportunity to 
eradicate these criticisms and strengthen US-European relations. On the eve of 
the meeting, Brzezinski spelt out to the President the importance of the 
summit in alleviating these concerns: 
One of the major concerns of the other leaders present at 
Guadeloupe will be to obtain from you a sense of your strategic 
direction. In part, this is due to some anxiety that this 
Administration does not have any overall scheme, and that the US 
is no longer prepared to use its power to protect its interests or to 
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impose its will on the flow of history. It is therefore quite critical 
you use the meeting in order to share with your colleagues your 
thinking.32    
The administration also wished to find a solution to the LRTNF 
question because of SALT. Facing a difficult ratification battle in the Senate, 
Carter was desperate to secure European backing for the treaty, which would 
garner support domestically. Likewise, any allied animosity about the treaty 
would provide ammunition to its US critics. Thus, Carter went to Guadeloupe 
with “a primary US objective” of obtaining the “strongest possible support for 
a SALT II agreement.”33 To do this Carter needed to reassure his allies about 
“the implications of the non-circumvention provision for transfer of systems 
and technology, Protocol cruise missile limits, [and] the absence of limits on 
the SS-20.”34 Looking forward the administration also needed to nullify 
European, and in particular Schmidt’s, fears that SALT II established 
precedents for SALT III that were contrary to their respective interests. Carter 
needed to offer “personal confirmation” that European concerns would be 
taken into account in any decision relating to the inclusion of theatre nuclear 
systems in SALT III.35 Carter flew to Guadeloupe knowing that his domestic 
and foreign policy goals required him to strengthen US-European relations. 
The afternoon’s discussions on the first day were entirely devoted to 
the inextricable SALT and LRTNF conundrum. The exchange lasted well over 
three hours and reconvened the following morning. Schmidt did not get the 
support he needed for his favoured arms-control and disarmament approach 
to deal with the SS-20 threat. However, under pressure from Callaghan and 
Schmidt, Carter conceded that the US needed to deal with the ‘grey area’ 
problem.36 Accordingly, they reached a compromise: the four men agreed that 
NATO should deploy GLCM and Pershing IIs in Europe, and that Washington 
should propose to open arms-control negotiations with Moscow. The US 
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President, partly to gain allied approval of SALT II, emphasised his willingness 
to offer his European allies new US LRTNF and their desired arms-control 
talks, in the form of SALT III. Helmut Schmidt in return accepted that in order 
to secure arms-control talks, “he had to voice open support both for the SALT 
II agreement he so disliked and to come round to Washington's drive for 
enhanced LRTNF.”37 The ‘big four’ informally agreed on a ‘dual-track’ 
approach: modernising LRTNF in Europe, alongside arms-control talks.  
After Guadeloupe, officials of the ‘big four’ began to intensify allied 
consultations as they tried to fine-tune the informal agreement and gain 
support from other NATO governments. In early February, David Aaron 
travelled to Europe for follow-up discussions. During these, it became clear 
that as well as the problems of getting other governments to agree to a ‘dual-
track’ approach, there were still troublesome differences between the 
stakeholders in the Guadeloupe decision. Aaron reported on his return that 
Germany was ambivalent, France would acquire a cruise or ballistic missile 
outside of the NATO framework, and “the British were mainly interested in 
modernizing their own deterrent.”38 
The ‘dual-track’ decision provided implicit justification for Carter to 
agree the provision of the Trident C4 system. The US was motivated primarily 
to support new LRTNF deployments for political rather than military reasons. 
The administration did not believe “a new LRTNF deployment was necessary 
to match the SS-20s or for deterrence against the Soviet Union. Rather, it was 
needed to reassure the NATO allies.”39 They hoped that LRTNF modernisation 
would restore Western confidence in US leadership of the alliance following 
the neutron bomb fiasco, and shore up confidence in the viability of NATO’s 
spectrum of deterrence.40 The administration believed that deploying new 
LRTNF would “maintain a perception of a firm US commitment to the defense 
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of Europe, forge Alliance unity, and strengthen deterrence by providing 
credible escalation options.”41 These political reasons for LRTNF 
modernisation concurrently provided a rationale for the modernisation of 
Polaris. Within this political thinking, it would have been difficult for the US to 
refuse Britain a nuclear weapons system that they would in turn commit to 
NATO.  
The decision also provided an opportunity for the British to 
demonstrate their steadfast support for the US and NATO. Robert Wade-Gery 
later remarked that Polaris replacement:  
Coincided, rather happily, with the American wish to deploy Cruise 
missiles around Europe, and the problem which that caused some 
European governments. I remember at least one European 
government, from memory I think it was the Belgian government, 
which had said it would take some Cruise missiles then reneged on 
the undertaking. The Thatcher government was asked, in its very 
early days, whether they would be prepared to make up the 
deficiency and take rather more than our share… Again, Mrs 
Thatcher was extremely good about that and said yes if that’s what 
President Carter wants to do, that’s what we’re going to do and 
never mind if there are internal objections to it.42 
 On the other hand, the ‘dual-track’ decision meant that any talk of 
Polaris replacement at this time would be too much for US-Soviet relations to 
bear. Discussion of LRTNF deployment inevitably further damaged the already 
strained state of superpower relations. Indeed, evidence from the Soviet 
archives suggests that the ‘dual-track’ decision was the “last drop tipping the 
scales” prompting Leonid Brezhnev to approve the invasion of Afghanistan.43 
A decision to deploy LRTNF would also heighten Soviet sensitivities about the 
British and French systems. The United States resisted Soviet Union pressure 
for the inclusion of British and French nuclear forces in the negotiations 
leading to the Interim Agreement of 1972. The Soviet Union pressed again for 
                                                     
41 Vance and Brown to Carter, ‘TNF Modernization -- US Diplomacy, Your Role and the Schmidt 
visit,’ 9 May 1979, Alpha Channel (Miscellaneous) -- [4/78 - 4/79], Box 20, Brzezinski 
Collection, JCL. 
42 Transcript of interview with Robert Wade-Gery, 87. 
43 Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy, “Inside the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the 
Seizure of Kabul, December 1979,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper 
#51 (January 2007), 20, accessed 24 June 2015, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/inside-the-soviet-invasion-afghanistan-and-the-
seizure-kabul-december-1979. 
SALT in the Wounds 
106 
 
their inclusion in the preliminary talks on SALT II, but the United States again 
refused. When Brezhnev met with Gerald Ford in Vladivostok, in November 
1974, he agreed to defer consideration of those systems to a later round of 
negotiations. Soviet Defence Minister Marshal A. A. Grechko was furious, and 
according to one account, accused Brezhnev in a Politburo meeting of 
betraying the country. Brezhnev nonetheless signed the Vladivostok Accord, 
which provided a framework for SALT II but did not cover British and French 
systems. Therefore, David Holloway successfully argues that Brezhnev “may 
have felt that the SS-20 was needed not only to counterbalance British and 
French nuclear forces and U.S. forward-based systems but also to placate the 
military.”44 Modernisation of LRTNF would obviously concern the Soviets. 
However, given the background and some of the subsequent reasoning for 
developing SS-20s, any talk of replacing Polaris alongside this had the 
potential to cause serious disagreement.    
In this way, LRTNF deployment was a politically risky move for the US. 
However, the administration saw greater ramifications if they sat idly by. 
Vance and Brown informed Carter:  
The alternatives for the US, of standing aside and hoping the issue 
subsided… would not answer the military challenge posed by 
Soviet deployments but would also not resolve the political 
problem… Nor would they ease European doubts about US political 
will and commitment to European security; on the contrary, these 
doubts could even increase. The ultimate outcome could be a 
weakened NATO and a Western Europe more independent of the 
United States. More immediately, should it become known that the 
US was attempting to side-step the issue of new long-range TNF 
deployments, chances for SALT ratification would clearly be 
harmed.45   
Carter’s reaction to Callaghan’s enquiries about Trident C4 in Guadeloupe 
delighted and surprised British officials in equal measures. As John Hunt 
reminded the Prime Minister upon his return, “President Carter’s reaction… 
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was more positive than had been expected.”46 British officials naturally 
wanted the conversation on–the-record. British representatives, including 
Callaghan himself, were concerned that Carter may not have informed his own 
people or made a record of the conversation.47 Callaghan asked British officials 
to draft a letter from himself to Carter in order to confirm their conversation.48 
This letter needed to “mention the C4 specifically in case the President has not 
debriefed to his own people.”49 
 By mid-February, however, Callaghan was reluctant to send such a 
letter.50 He feared the possibility of a leak in Washington and the political 
damage this would cause him domestically.51 Seeing the assurances Carter had 
given in Guadeloupe as crucial to Britain’s hopes for Trident, John Hunt wrote 
to the Prime Minister urging him to reconsider. Hunt felt that the longer they 
delayed follow-up to the conversation in Guadeloupe, “the more difficult it may 
become to resurrect and make progress on the Trident question.”52 He also 
believed it: 
Important that we should put down a firm marker such as this 
letter, with the Americans during the lifetime of this Government. 
If there were to be a change of Government, it would be difficult for 
your successor to follow-up effectively a personal conversation of 
yours with President Carter which may or may not have been 
adequately recorded on the American side. It would be a very 
considerable setback if the value of this exceptionally important 
conversation were to go by default in this way.53  
Hunt believed that Callaghan had gained important assurances from Carter, 
which needed immediate attention, lest the progress slip away; Hunt won the 
Prime Minister’s support. In late March, just before the beginning of an election 
campaign in Britain, British official Peter Jay delivered a letter to the White 
House detailing that it was “for the President’s eyes only.”54 Callaghan began 
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this letter by referring to the difficult situation he faced politically with a vote 
of confidence on his leadership imminent, and his concurrent desire to get 
their Guadeloupe conversation on the record. Callaghan then recapped their 
conversation in Guadeloupe. He reminded Carter that the British government 
had begun thinking about Polaris replacement, but their studies could not be 
furthered without technical and financial discussions with the US. Reflecting 
British officials desire to get Carter’s assurances about Trident on the record, 
Callaghan finally detailed this part of the conversation:  
I mentioned that if the Government decided to go on, the option 
which at present seemed to me most likely to meet British 
requirements was the Trident C4 MIRVed missile. You said you 
would be willing in principle to consider the possibility of making 
this available to Britain if it turned out to be what was wanted and 
that you hoped it would be possible to work out satisfactory 
financial terms. You kindly agreed that we could send over to 
Washington two people who could talk about this, and perhaps 
other possible system options at the same time.55   
 Carter’s reply indicated the closeness he felt to Callaghan, and even 
hinted at his preference for a Labour win: “I will refrain (with some difficulty) 
from commenting on the election context, except to say that we have 
confidence in the sound judgement of the British people.”56 However, even 
within this warm and friendly relationship, the President took a cautionary 
approach. Carter assured Callaghan that he was willing “to talk to your people 
as suggested” but he made no mention of Trident C4, and stressed that there 
should be no presumption about the outcome of the talks.57 The US 
administration felt it necessary, in drafting this reply, for Carter to take a 
positive but non-committed stance to Polaris replacement. Even so, the 
Callaghan government deemed the President’s agreement to preliminary talks 
so important they decided that if Thatcher won the election, she would be 
informed about Callaghan’s exchanges with Carter. 
 The Callaghan government’s surprise and delight at Carter’s 
forthcoming response derived, in part, from the uncertainty they still felt that 
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the terms of the SALT II agreement would allow technology transfers. In early 
1979, UK officials lobbied the Carter administration to drop “necessarily” out 
of the reference in the non-circumvention interpretive statement to systems 
numerically limited. They wished to ensure that the wording of the statement 
left no room for interpretation that US assistance with Polaris replacement 
broke the terms of the treaty. After US state officials refused British requests, 
Callaghan sent a personal letter of appeal to the President.58 Carter refused this 
request, but once again offered the British Prime Minister reassurances that 
SALT II did not prevent transfers of systems: “I want to assure you that the 
agreement will not preclude established forms of cooperation and that 
requests for transfers of systems numerically limited in the agreement will be 
dealt with on a case by case basis.”59 Despite the refusal to change the wording, 
Carter’s reply was a concerted effort to try to temper British worries. 
Brzezinski later told John Hunt that he did not see how the President could 
have given “a more forthcoming reply.”60 Carter’s letter had “deliberately used 
the precise wording” that the British had in explaining their anxieties.61   
FRG officials also requested a change of wording of the non-
circumvention statement. The Carter administration refused this request as 
well.62 Despite US efforts to reassure, British and German officials remained 
uncertain that SALT II would protect their interests. This uncertainty partly 
arose from long-running grievances: namely that the Carter administration’s 
consultations with its allies on arms-talks had been inadequate. However, 
European governments also correctly viewed that, for as long as the 
administration saw SALT as its highest priority, they could not guarantee the 
protection of their interests. Given this environment, Carter’s agreement to 
preliminary talks was extremely important, yet this context also precluded its 
assistance with Polaris replacement until political circumstances allowed. 
                                                     
58 USSR/Eastern Europe to Brzezinski, ‘Evening Report’, NLC-10-19-4-3-3, JCL; Bartholomew 
to Brzezinski, ‘VBB Item, UK and Non-circumvention,’ 24 April 1979, Meetings -- 
Vance/Brown/Brzezinski: 3/80 - 9/80, Box 34, Brzezinski Collection, JCL. 
59 Carter to Callaghan, 27 April 1979, Meetings - Vance/Brown/Brzezinski: 3/80 - 9/80, 
Subject File, Brzezinski Collection, Box 34, JCL. 
60 Hunt to Thatcher, ‘Talk with Dr Brzezinski’, 21 May 1979, PREM 19/14, TNA. 
61 Ibid. 
62 ‘Consultations with FRG on SALT II unfinished business with NATO’, 23 March 1979, NLC-
16-115-3-31-0, JCL. 
SALT in the Wounds 
110 
 
 
III 
 
On 4 May 1979, Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative party won the British 
general election. The warmth of recent years at the highest level of the US-UK 
relationship looked likely to end. Upon Thatcher’s election, the US ambassador 
to the UK felt it necessary to reassure the President that she was:  
A cooler, wiser, more pragmatic person today that [sic] the 
opposition leader you met… in May of 77 or even the dogmatic lady 
who visited you in Washington that fall…. While still given to strong 
feelings, doctrinaire oversimplification and a somewhat lecturing-
hectoring style, she has learned from the tensions within her own 
party and from the pressures of campaign.63  
If friendship between the President and Prime Minister were of central 
importance to the US-UK nuclear relationship, the prospect of Britain securing 
US assistance now appeared gloomy. However, as previously noted, shared 
mutual interests have always been more important than the friendship of 
leaders in the continuation of the US-UK nuclear relationship. Here the 
administration did not believe that the change of government would lead to 
any serious disagreements. Brzezinski reported to Carter that: 
Thatcher is… pro-US., pro-European, anti-Soviet, and distrustful of 
change in the Third world… The Thatcher government's broad 
approach to major international issues will differ from labor [sic] 
primarily in tone and style and in only one area – – Southern 
Africa.64  
On nuclear issues, the new Conservative government supported the principles 
of SALT II and MBFR but were “far less convinced than Labor [sic] that detente 
works to the West’s advantage.”65 Brzezinski also believed the Thatcher 
government would show “active support” for NATO’s TNF decision, “provided 
the UK was dealt with as an ‘equal partner’ in these enterprises (read close 
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consultation with the U.S.)”66 Overall, the Carter administration had reason to 
be optimistic about the continuation of a beneficial US-UK relationship, 
including in nuclear issues, even if the prospects of friendship between the 
President and Prime Minister were doubtful. Building on Callaghan’s earlier 
exchanges, these continued mutual interests helped the new government 
secure, within just over a month of their election, the Carter administration's 
formal agreement to preliminary talks. However, just as with Callaghan’s post-
Guadeloupe exchanges with the President, the US continued to stress that they 
had made no decision to provide assistance, and it would be dependent on the 
political circumstances of the time.  
 On entering office, Margaret Thatcher had no detailed opinion on 
Polaris replacement. In May 1979, a US official informed David Aaron that, 
“Thatcher Government generally in favour but hasn't looked at specifics yet, 
Staffs thinking of GLCM's plus modernization of Polaris. Both would be UK 
systems. Uniformed side MOD not yet heard from so this could change.”67 This 
situation was short-lived. Thatcher had not even spent her first night in 
Downing Street before John Hunt began filling her in on progress to date. On 4 
May, John Hunt wrote to Thatcher informing her that a decision had to be made 
forth-with on whether to send a party to the US for preliminary talks, and that 
their agreement on this was likely given Callaghan’s secret exchanges with 
Carter: “I have Mr. Callaghan's agreement that I should tell you that he had 
already opened up this possibility with President Carter and that the latter had 
been very forthcoming, although nothing has yet been arranged.”68 
Subsequent to Hunt’s briefing, Thatcher requested a small Cabinet committee 
to be set-up. This committee, named MISC 7, would discuss the issue of Polaris 
replacement, as well as related nuclear issues. It consisted of Margaret 
Thatcher and the three Department Ministers concerned with the decision, the 
Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
No other ministers would attend the meetings, although a select number of 
civil servants would do so when relevant.69 As had occurred repeatedly in the 
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history of Britain’s nuclear programme, decision-making would be limited to 
a small, elite circle.70   
The first MISC 7 meeting began with a discussion about the 
replacement to Polaris. They did not discuss whether to replace the Polaris 
missile system, but launched straight into what “system should be the 
successor.” Thatcher informed the group that to make this decision, “they 
needed more information about the costs and other implications of the 
alternative options.”71 As only the US could provide much of this information, 
Thatcher proposed that she send a request to Carter asking for a small team of 
UK officials to visit Washington for discussions. As the Prime Minister, 
Thatcher was the only member of the new government briefed on Carter’s 
agreement with Callaghan for preliminary talks. She therefore spoke in vague 
terms that, “There were good reasons for thinking that President Carter would 
agree to such a visit.”72 The meeting then turned to discussing system options. 
They “noted that Trident C4 came out clearly in the officials' study as the 
preferred solution. But this would be a very expensive option and we would 
need to look very carefully at the possibility of going for something cheaper.” 
They therefore felt it was essential that their British team should head to 
Washington “without any implied Ministerial backing for the C4 so that all 
factors, including cost, could be taken into account when the decision was 
reached.”73 The US response, particularly on costings, would be central in this 
decision-making process. MISC 7 requested that a small delegation visit 
Washington to discuss options. This delegation would seek information “about 
the cost, availability and other aspects, including technical factors of e.g. 
Trident C4, SLCM [Submarine Launched Cruise Missile], and a modernised and 
re motored Polaris A3.” Without this early consultation with the US, as Hunt 
told Thatcher, it would, “be difficult to make further progress with the detailed 
examination of successor options and their implications.”74 The British could 
not opt for their preferred system, Trident C4, until they knew that the US 
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would agree to provide it on favourable terms.  
Like the Callaghan government before them, the new residents of 
Downing Street were concerned that the non-circumvention clause of SALT II 
could preclude the transfer of technology to the UK and Europe. During a 
meeting in May with Brzezinski, Hunt informed him “frankly and on a personal 
basis” that whilst the Prime Minister “would do nothing to weaken” the 
President, and had hence publicly stated her hope for ratification, privately, 
she “remained to be convinced whether SALT II was a good agreement or 
not.”75 The Thatcher government also faced continued unease amongst 
backbenchers about SALT II, particularly over the non-circumvention 
provision; US critics of SALT heightened the concerns of their British 
counterparts.  
Subsequently during a private discussion, UK Foreign Secretary Lord 
Carrington asked Cyrus Vance whether “SALT II Treaty would inhibit the US in 
any way from helping the UK with the development of any replacement to our 
present deterrent.”76 Vance replied, “with great emphasis,” that “in no 
eventuality would the terms of the SALT II agreement stand in the way of US 
aid to the UK over a Polaris replacement, though the provision of such aid 
would of course be a political decision.”77 As in Carter’s April letter to 
Callaghan, Carrington had received reassurance that the SALT agreement did 
not preclude Polaris replacement. However, once again this reassurance came 
with the caveat that there could be no guarantee that the administration would 
provide such assistance, and that this decision would be dependent on the 
political context. 
 The reassurances provided by the Carter administration were largely 
successful at stemming the new government’s doubts that the SALT process 
would prevent US assistance. Thatcher expressed her belief, at the first MISC 7 
meeting, that the assurances contained in the message of 27 April 1979 from 
Carter to Callaghan “was a very good one.”78 Subsequently those present 
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agreed that they would not pursue further the deletion of the word 
“necessarily” from the interpretive statement that the US intended to publish 
after the signing of the SALT II treaty, which would explain the parameters of 
the non-circumvention clause. The meeting also discussed Vance’s assurances 
to the Secretary of State. At this point Thatcher declared:  
We should place complete trust in the readiness of the United 
States Government to let us have whatever help we might seek 
from them, subject only to the political considerations which they 
would need to take into account whether there was a SALT Treaty 
or not.79  
In contrast to Callaghan, Thatcher was seemingly prepared to accept the Carter 
administration's reassurances on non-circumvention but remained well 
aware that there could be political hurdles ahead.      
In late May, Thatcher sent a letter to Carter formally requesting 
preliminary talks. Thatcher began by stressing that whilst the British had 
conducted some preliminary studies of alternative options for a successor 
system, they could not get any further in their considerations without US input. 
The Prime Minister then asked to “renew” her predecessor’s request and to 
send “a small team of senior officials… to talk to some of your people, on a very 
confidential basis, about certain aspects, including technical implications, cost 
and likely availability, of systems we are considering.”80 The last section of the 
letter contained what appears to be a rather innocuous sentence on SALT:  
I understand of course that the decision to supply any of these 
systems would be a political one, though I assume from what Mr. 
Vance told us that there is nothing in the SALT II Treaty itself that 
would inhibit the United States from reaching a favourable decision 
with respect to any of the systems I have mentioned.81  
However, John Hunt had advised that such a sentence be included in order that 
the British receive another “specific assurance” that nothing in the SALT II 
agreement would inhibit the US from providing any of the systems that they 
wished to discuss with the Americans. Clearly, despite the many reassurances 
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the administration had given the British, and Thatcher’s earlier professions in 
the first MISC 7 meeting, there remained within Downing Street some latent 
uncertainty about the SALT II agreement.  
In June 1979, Carter replied to Thatcher agreeing to hold preliminary 
talks. In his reply, Carter stressed the importance the US placed in the “viability 
and effectiveness of the British deterrent.” Noting the British desire for more 
reassurances about non-circumvention, Carter also assured Thatcher that all 
the successor options she had mentioned remained, “open under the SALT II 
treaty." However, the President also emphasised that for both sides the talks 
were only of an exploratory nature: “we will both wish to consider the results 
of these talks and further exchanges before reaching any decisions.”82 He 
would give no firm assurances of US willingness to assist.  
 Thatcher’s request brought a flurry of activity in Washington. In order 
to prepare for the preliminary talks Brzezinski asked the Pentagon to produce 
two reports. The first was a succinct review of US-UK nuclear co-operation. 
This report provided a description of current US assistance to Britain and the 
projected status of the UK deterrent, and an assessment of US commitments 
resulting from the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement and 1958 Mutual Defence 
Agreement that might affect the Polaris successor system. The second report 
would provide an analysis of the modernization alternatives cited in the 
Thatcher letter, and their relationship with issues, “including, inter alia: US-UK 
relations; relationship to our TNF modernization/arms control track; SALT 
implications; relationship to US-French nuclear cooperation and possible 
Anglo-French cooperation.”83 These papers would then be sent to a small 
working group, made up of David Aaron, Reginald Bartholomew from the State 
Department, and William Perry and Walter Slocombe from the Department of 
Defense. This group would then prepare an “issues and alternatives” paper and 
draft guidance for the preliminary talks by 18 July for Steering Group 
consideration and recommendations to the President.84  
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The scope of these commissioned reports demonstrate that the 
administration’s decision on whether to assist with Polaris replacement would 
not be based solely on whether they wished to continue the ‘special 
relationship,’ or if they thought it important for Britain to have their own 
‘deterrent’,  but also the interrelation between Polaris replacement and the 
administration’s wider foreign policy. The White House would be considering 
whether overall, at this time, a deal on Polaris replacement was advantageous. 
This was the first time the Carter White House had considered in-depth 
assisting the British. This would mean that any previous assurances give to the 
British, including those in Guadeloupe, had been given without due 
consideration to these inter-linking factors. This included the relationship 
between Polaris replacement and US-French co-operation.  
In recent years, archival research has shown that the UK has not been 
the only recipient of US direct assistance for its nuclear programme: beginning 
with the Nixon administration, the US provided nuclear assistance to France.85 
This obviously undermines the notion of a ‘special nuclear relationship’, 
because the US provided assistance, albeit to a much lesser degree, elsewhere. 
Unfortunately, however understanding of the US-French nuclear relationship 
is still in its formative stages. Even less is known about the US-French 
partnership during the Carter years, due to extensive classification in the 
French and US archives.86 However, Brzezinski’s comments highlight that the 
administration did see its nuclear relationship with France as a key 
consideration in its decisions on the Polaris successor. 
  By the beginning of June 1979, the Carter administration had formally 
agreed to preliminary talks on Polaris replacement. This demonstrates that the 
White House was generally in favour of Britain modernising its nuclear 
weapons. At the same time, despite many reassurances, Downing Street was 
still slightly concerned that the US may be unable to assist them under the 
terms of the SALT II treaty. However, as the White House had repeatedly 
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mentioned in their post-Guadeloupe exchanges with the British, the real 
uncertainty Downing Street faced was whether political circumstances would 
allow the administration to make a positive decision to assist them. 
 
IV 
 
 
Signing SALT II 
 
On 18 June 1979, at a summit held in Vienna, Carter and Brezhnev met for the 
first and only time to sign the SALT II accord. Despite the conclusion of 
negotiations between the two Cold War adversaries, the US President had not 
secured his prized SALT II agreement. The US Senate still needed to ratify the 
treaty. In the summer of 1979, the Senate hearings took place. Despite 
vociferous criticism from several quarters, it appeared that the Senate would 
ratify the treaty.87 However, the Carter administration would face an uphill 
battle in maintaining this narrow majority, due to declining support for the 
SALT process and increased mistrust of Moscow. Until Carter’s election in 
1976, roughly three-quarters of US citizens favoured the conclusion of a SALT 
II treaty. However, by the summer of 1978 opinion polls showed backing for 
SALT was decreasing, with increased support for the US taking a tougher 
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stance towards the Soviet Union.88 This change was due in large part to the 
remarkable rise of conservatism in US society during the mid and late 1970s.  
Since Carter’s election, public attitudes on arms-control had evolved. 
During his election campaign, Carter had argued against Nixon and Kissinger’s 
policy of linking progress in arms-control with Soviet restraint in other areas. 
Carter deplored such an approach, partly because he thought it would not 
work, and partly because he thought arms-control was too important to be 
held hostage by the resolution of other issues. After his election, Carter 
received support for this approach. There was no public or congressional 
outcry when Carter made clear, in his first few weeks in office, that there would 
be no linkages between progress in SALT and other issues such as human 
rights or Soviet behaviour in the ‘third world’. However, the deterioration in 
US-Soviet relations in the late 1970s led many to believe that détente and SALT 
I had not achieved a more stable and peaceful international environment.  
Concurrently there was a widespread perception of a deteriorating 
military balance and eroding US global position. With the strategic arms-
control regime appearing to work to the benefit of the USSR there was reduced 
public support for arms-control. Subsequently, there was a “renaissance of 
linkage.”89 Increasingly members of the public agreed with the ideas of 
conservative-minded internationalists who argued that the SALT negotiations 
be used as means to moderate and challenge Soviet behaviour in other policy 
areas. Many conservatives also made their support of SALT dependent upon 
the Carter administration proving that the treaty increased the relative 
military strength of the US.  
These developments made it much more difficult for the Carter 
administration to sell the SALT II treaty at home. As Olav Njølstad observes, 
the rise of conservatism put Carter in a “Catch 22 situation.”90 On the one hand, 
to win Congressional and public support for SALT he needed to be ‘tough’ with 
the Soviets; on the other, such an approach could provoke a reaction from the 
USSR that would make the population even more distrustful of Moscow as a 
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reliable partner on arms-control. Such was the domestic environment, that any 
perceived aggression from the Soviet Union had the potential to terminate 
Senate ratification of SALT II. Whilst the swing to the right reaffirmed the need 
for the US government to assist Britain with Polaris replacement; amongst the 
US public, there was increasing support for increased spending on defence, 
more expressions of support for NATO, and clear signs that the public was 
becoming more distrustful of the Soviet Union.91 This move to the right also 
created problems for securing SALT ratification, which in turn would create 
deep uncertainty for Polaris replacement.  
 Following the signing of the SALT II agreement, US officials began to 
publicly espouse their interpretation of the non-circumvention clause. In a 
statement to NATO on 29 June 1979, Cyrus Vance stated that, “the non-
circumvention provisions will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and 
cooperation with its Allies, nor will it preclude cooperation in 
modernization.”92 Concurrently, on 27 June, the British government issued a 
statement expressing their support for the SALT II agreement and their hope 
that the Senate would ratify the treaty. The statement also expressed the 
government’s belief that the agreement “would not interfere with continued 
nuclear and conventional cooperation between the US and its allies, and that 
the essential security interests of the Alliance are safeguarded.”93 The US allies 
publicly declaring their support for the White House interpretation was vital 
to securing ratification in Congress. The effect the clause could have on the 
transfer of arms and technology to allies concerned some Senators. The Soviets 
rejected the US interpretation. They argued that any transfer was a clear 
breach of article XII of the treaty, providing that “each Party undertakes not to 
circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, through any other state or states, or 
in any other manner.”94 Given the wording of the clause, these arguments 
would clearly gain a sympathetic audience in some quarters. 
 Subsequently, during the second MISC 7 meeting, participants discussed 
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whether the text of the SALT II agreement could “sustain” the interpretation of 
non-circumvention that had been the basis of previous US assurances to 
Britain. In response, an unnamed attendee highlighted there would always be 
doubts about such assurances because, “the availability of American 
technology would depend in the last resort on a future United States political 
decision.”95 Whilst long-running concerns about the non-circumvention clause 
had now largely been resolved, this did not mean that the US would definitely 
assist with Polaris replacement. The British no longer needed to worry about 
whether the US would have to address Soviet concerns about nuclear 
assistance to NATO allies, in order to keep them at the negotiating table. The 
administration's priority was now ensuring ratification at home. 
Subsequently, with the Carter administration still to make the political 
decision of whether to assist with Polaris replacement, the British now had to 
worry about whether the inevitable Soviet reaction would affect decision-
making in the White House.  
 The British had this political contingency impressed upon them when, in 
late July, Harold Brown met with his British equivalent Francis Pym. With the 
US yet to complete their review on Polaris replacement and no Presidential 
approval given on co-operation, Brzezinski briefed Brown to be “generally 
positive regarding the British desire for cooperation in their strategic 
modernization programs but to make no specific promises until our review 
had been completed and your [the President’s] approval has been obtained.”96 
Subsequently, given that the British were unable to progress without US input, 
when the two men met both stressed that their respective governments’ had 
made no policy decision on Polaris replacement. Pym opened the discussion 
on the matter by referring to the forthcoming visit to Washington of a small 
group of UK experts to investigate the options. He stressed that the British 
government had not taken a decision on their preferred option, but that they 
had “not ruled out the possibility” that their “national strategic deterrent” and 
their “contribution to the Long Range Theatre Nuclear Force might be most 
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economically made by the same system.”97 Brown replied that the 
administration was “ready to welcome the group of experts and would provide 
them with full details about all… [British] options, in order to explore their 
characteristics and costs” and that all the systems being considered by the 
British “could be transferred without infringing SALT II treaty.”98 However, 
Brown also stressed that, “the US Government still had to make the policy 
decision.” He also highlighted the importance that TNF deployment and the 
maintenance of conventional forces would play in decision-making:  
Strategic and long range theatre systems served different political 
functions, and that was why the TNF question was the more urgent. 
But he [Brown] would like to encourage us [the British] to consider 
both systems together in terms of their military functions, since it 
would be wrong to spend too much on nuclear weapons at the 
expense of conventional forces.99 
White House concerns about the possible reaction of the Soviet Union 
impeding SALT ratification, LRTNF deployment and the maintenance of British 
spending on conventional forces emerged during the visit of British officials to 
Washington for preliminary talks in mid-August 1979. A small team of officials 
from the Pentagon, State Department and the White House led by David Aaron, 
received the British delegation. Robert Wade-Gery led the British party, 
accompanied by Ron Mason, the Chief Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of 
Defence, and Michael Quinlan also from the MOD, and Patrick Moberly from 
the Foreign Office. The British team wished to discuss the four system options 
for a successor system to Polaris under consideration by the UK government: 
a submarine force carrying the Trident C4 ballistic missile; a modernised 
version of the Polaris A3 missile (known as A4); SLCMs; and ALCMs.100 Guided 
by MISC 7’s worries concerning cost, the team professed that they arrived in 
Washington “without either commitment of policy or order of likely 
preference” on these systems, instead they sought information from the US so 
that the British government could make a policy decision. 101  
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 The British found their counter-parts very co-operative, with US 
officials expressing support for Polaris replacement from-the-off. At the 
beginning of the discussions, David Aaron emphasised “the importance which 
the US Government attached to the British deterrent and made clear that they 
have taken a firm decision to co-operate with us on its future.”102 Throughout 
the discussions, the US team implied that this co-operation:  
Should be on the same basis as now; ie [sic] we [Britain] would have 
full independence as regards operational control while remaining 
dependent on the Americans for some key elements of logistic 
support. The Americans seemed content that (as we [Britain] 
would wish) a regime comparable to the present Polaris Sales 
Agreement would continue, although they may want to revise some 
of the details.103  
However, the US team again stressed that, “no decisions had been taken 
beyond the main point of principle, and that the talks accordingly could carry 
no policy commitment on their side, any more than on ours.”104 Overall, the 
British were pleased with the helpfulness of their US colleagues and John Hunt 
summarised to the MISC 7 committee that, “They were helpfully received and 
given much technical and financial information. No major surprises emerged 
in either the technical or the resource fields.”105   
In talking through the different options, the US team did not explicitly 
attempt to direct the British towards a certain one, expressing that “there was 
at present no particular US policy preference among the four options.”106 
However, the British team felt that some signs of a US preference were tacit. 
The US representatives expressed the belief that, in military terms, the C4 
missile would be the most effective, whilst ALCMs would “be a poor choice” 
because of Britain’s “vulnerable geography.” US officials also suggested that, 
although “not strongly put”, the cruise missile option “might give logistic 
savings through a degree of commonality with a CM theatre force (which they 
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are for other reasons eager to see us acquire.)”107 Although the US clearly 
thought that some of the systems would be of greater strategic utility, the 
choice would remain at the British government’s discretion. The White House 
saw no over-riding need, for the sake of ‘deterrence’, to direct Britain’s choice.  
However, the US team did highlight two points the British needed to 
satisfy before the Carter administration could make a firm policy decision to 
transfer a system. Firstly, as the discussions progressed the British “leaned 
even more strongly toward the Trident I (C-4) as their preferred 
modernization option.”108 Subsequently, David Aaron emphasised that the 
administration had made no decision yet on whether they would be willing to 
transfer MIRV.109 Such a “major step” required “careful thought.”110 Aaron’s 
caution is in marked contrast to the apparent assurances Carter gave 
Callaghan at Guadeloupe about the provision of a MIRV system.  
In-depth consideration of the issue had clearly made it apparent to the 
administration that the provision of a MIRV system could provoke a Soviet 
reaction that could seriously disrupt securing SALT ratification, and hamper 
Carter’s hopes for deep cuts in SALT III. The key provision of the final SALT II 
agreement was an aggregate ceiling for strategic launchers of 2250 for each 
side, with a 1320 MIRV sub-limit consisting of no more than 820 MIRVed 
ICBMs and no more than 120 strategic bombers equipped with cruise missiles. 
During the negotiations, the Soviets had argued that the national nuclear 
forces of Britain and France, as well as forward-based nuclear forces in 
Western Europe, should be included in the limits on central strategic systems. 
They argued all these systems were capable of destroying targets on Soviet 
soil, and subsequently their non-inclusion would tilt the overall strategic 
balance towards the West.111 Moscow refused to consider ‘deep cuts’ in 
isolation from these other issues. Whilst, the Carter administration resisted 
these demands for the inclusion of British and French systems the Soviet’s 
would inevitably raise the problem again during SALT III negotiations. The 
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Soviet’s had also feared that the US would circumvent the qualitative 
restrictions in the SALT II treaty by secretly transferring forbidden weapons 
systems or military technologies to its NATO allies. To alleviate these concerns 
the final treaty included a non-circumvention clause. Subsequently the supply 
of Trident C4 with MIRV to the British could disrupt US-Soviet arms-control 
efforts.  
Despite privately knowing that it was highly probable that the US would 
agree to sell Britain a new missile system in the near future, the Soviets would 
likely publicly argue that the supply of a MIRV system at least went against the 
spirit of the non-circumvention treaty. Consequently there was the possibility 
that the Soviets would react in such a way that would heighten feelings in the 
Senate that Moscow could not be trusted, undermining support to ratify the 
SALT II treaty. In addition, the supply of a MIRV system, given the sharp 
increase in British capability it would provide, would only intensify feelings in 
Moscow that British and French systems should be included in SALT III. 
Reflecting the dilemmas the Carter administration faced in the supply of MIRV, 
the British team believed that their reservations arose from the “possible 
impact of a sharp increase in UK strategic warhead numbers upon the Soviet 
attitude, especially on deep cuts within SALT III.”112 The US administration 
needed to make a political decision on whether the supply of a MIRV system to 
the British would be more politically detrimental than beneficial. 
Secondly, US officials indicated concern that the “resource burden of a 
successor system” might imperil UK conventional contributions to NATO.113 
This reflected the Carter administration’s belief that the Europeans were not 
living up to their defence obligations. They felt that a key problem in the 
Atlantic alliance was that the Europeans wanted the US to take the initiative 
on defence matters in order to minimise their domestic political losses. When 
Carter met with Giscard, Schmidt and Callaghan on the island of Guadeloupe, 
he urged the Europeans take more responsibility for their own defence.114 
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Even with the new Thatcher government, elected on a platform of higher 
defence spending, the administration was not seeing the spending increases 
they wanted:  
A close look at the Thatcher Government's maiden budget reveals 
that all the noise about an extra 100 million pounds for defence is 
more than a little misleading: in fact, none of the extra funds will be 
for new programs or additional equipment and will be used to 
cover increases for existing items. Still, better than nothing. And it 
is true that defence is virtually the only government activity which 
has been allocated any kind of increase.115  
Knowing the economic difficulties that Britain faced, the US was concerned 
that the cost of Polaris replacement would leave them unable to make the 
conventional contributions to NATO they, and Congress, valued so highly. As 
such, US officials made clear that the White House would require some kind of 
reassurance on British conventional force spending. Moreover, US officials 
indicated their inclination to utilise Polaris replacement as a means to gain UK 
assistance in other areas. During the meeting, US officials talked in “general 
terms about the possibility of extending into other fields the close Anglo-
American co-operation so successfully practised over strategic nuclear 
weapons.”116 John Hunt later remarked “It is not clear whether this is the first 
hint of a political price-tag.” It was.117   
 The meeting ended with the two sides discussing their plans going 
forward. Given the lessons of Nassau, an important element would be how to 
present the decision to allies. The US contingent was particularly concerned 
with the reaction of the French.118 Subsequently, at the meeting both teams 
agreed that the “eventual decision on a successor to Polaris should be carefully 
presented to the other Allies.” 119 US officials also requested that they would 
like a further round of discussion on the same basis in October, before the 
British Cabinet discussed the decision. This was, in the words of Aaron, “So 
that we can get a better sense of what they might want and they can get a better 
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idea of what we are willing to provide, especially MIRV.”120  
 Following the preliminary talks, John Hunt wrote a briefing for 
Thatcher that displays the British reaction to the talks. Despite British officials 
viewing a MIRV system as essential to filling their deterrent criteria, their 
reaction to Aaron’s non-committal on its provision was measured:  
It would in the Steering Group’s view be wrong to interpret this 
message as a preliminary to intended refusal. But it puts us on 
notice that if we want MIRVs we must make a good case to help the 
Administration meet domestic or Soviet criticism. This can 
certainly be done, and contingent preparation is in hand.121  
Likewise, Hunt also felt that they could mollify US concerns that Polaris 
replacement might reduce British spending on conventional forces: “It is not 
possible to assuage this concern in detail, since the size of the Defence Budget 
in the relevant years cannot be known now. But we can make a good case in 
present circumstances that no major distortion need be feared.”122 
Furthermore, Hunt was concerned about the surrounding political 
circumstances, and advised Thatcher that a decision on Polaris replacement 
should take place earlier than originally planned. The public position of the 
British government was that they needed to make a decision within the next 
year and a half. Hunt now advised that there was “much merit” in shortening 
the timetable as it would mean a decision: 
Before the US Presidential primaries are under way and also before 
the SALT process has moved to a point where the Administration 
focus more on their relations with the USSR over SALT III than on 
those with Congress and their allies over SALT II.123  
Hunt clearly did not foresee the problems SALT ratification could cause for 
British plans, but was concerned that Carter’s desire for ‘deep cuts’  in SALT III 
would preclude US assistance, as the President’s attention once more shifted 
to US-Soviet relations.  
 MISC 7 met again in September to discuss, amongst other matters, the 
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outcomes of the August preliminary talks. The Committee agreed that there 
“were strong grounds for the shortened timetable now proposed.”124 
Demonstrating awareness of the political contingency of the deal on the US 
side, MISC 7 now wished that: 
If possible agreement should be reached with the Americans before 
the end of the year, before President Carter's Administration 
became too pre-occupied with the 1980 elections, and if possible 
before the date (now slipping) on which the SALT II Treaty might 
be ratified by the Senate.125  
Drawing lessons from the previous government’s concerns that the Carter 
administration had ignored their interests during SALT II negotiations, and 
that this could be repeated with SALT III, the Thatcher government now felt it 
necessary to secure the deal.  
 With the decision now being fast-tracked, the planned timetable 
necessitated a report on the remaining options, based on information gained 
in the preliminary talks, by the end of October. This report would form the 
basis of a MISC 7 decision on which system to adopt. Thereafter, the British 
would inform the President of the decision in November, with follow-up 
discussions by the Prime Minister during her proposed visit to Washington in 
December. 126   
The meeting’s participants also discussed Aaron’s statement that the 
administration had made no decision on MIRV. In reflection of the view that a 
MIRV system was necessary to maintain the ‘Moscow criterion’, ministers 
expressed that if they decided in favour of the Trident C4 system it would “Be 
important to secure access to American technology on multiple 
independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV), which it would be very 
expensive to develop on our own; failing that, we might have to be content with 
a C4 carrying only multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV) or with the A4 option.”127 
In addition, as one of her summary points, the Prime Minister stated that, “If 
we decided in favour of the C4 option it would be necessary to press hard for 
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access to MIRV technology.”128 The committee also saw the development of 
SLBM’s as a way of stemming US pressure to make other commitments to 
NATO nuclear defence: “If we decided in favour of five new submarines in place 
of our present four, the fifth might usefully be presented as a replacement for 
our Vulcan bombers; this should make it easier to resist American pressure to 
replace the Vulcans with our own GLCM.”129 Overall, it is clear that, at this 
point, the British were relatively optimistic of securing US assistance for 
Polaris replacement. They felt they had a good chance of obtaining a necessary 
early agreement with the White House and that they would be able to temper 
the administration's desire for further defence contributions. The only real 
doubt they faced was whether the US would be willing to supply a MIRV 
system.  
 Soon the British received assurances that stemmed their worry over US 
supply of MIRV. On 28 September, Cyrus Vance told Carrington, “He would 
recommend very strongly to the President that the Americans should make 
available to the UK the Trident C4 system, including the associated MIRVED 
technology.”130 Carrington was “struck by the firmness of Mr Vance’s 
assurances, though he recognises of course that the final decision will depend 
on the President.”131 By the end of September, British hopes for Polaris 
replacement, from their perspective, were looking relatively optimistic.  
 
V 
 
Unfortunately for the British, at the same time that their concerns about the 
US being willing to supply Trident C4 decreased, Carter’s political situation 
became even more problematic. At the end of August, US intelligence agencies 
‘discovered’ a Soviet ground force brigade of some 2,600 men and weapons in 
Cuba. In fact, there had been small Soviet military units stationed on Cuba since 
well before the 1962 missile crisis. The unit clearly posed no threat to the 
United States. The Kennedy administration had agreed to its presence in 1962, 
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and the brigade performed training rather than combat functions. However, 
due to a combination of bureaucratic inefficiency and political sensitivity to 
the right, the ‘discovery’ created a domestic furore in the United States.132 The 
belief that the Soviets had recently introduced new military units into Cuba 
reaffirmed pre-existing doubts that Moscow could not be trusted. This 
significantly damaged the prospects of Senate ratification for SALT II. It 
prompted some senators to shift from support to opposition of the treaty, as 
they argued the presence of the brigade demonstrated Soviet deceitfulness 
and the difficulty of verifying their compliance with agreements.133 In addition, 
as Vance later reflected, the “political storm” also delayed Senate 
consideration of the treaty “long enough for it to be overtaken and shelved as 
a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.”134   
 The controversy also had a negative impact on the Soviet leadership’s 
views of the Carter administration. Faced with a President who was suddenly 
expressing strong objections to a small, longstanding, and non-threatening 
military brigade in an allied country, Soviet leaders were naturally puzzled, 
suspicious and angry. Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin 
reportedly told Vance that if US intelligence was so incompetent that it had 
failed to spot the brigade in seventeen years, or so inefficient that it had failed 
to inform government leaders, that was not a problem for Moscow.135 The 
Soviets refused to remove the brigade from Cuba, and Carter had to settle for 
a promise that it would not be turned into a combat unit. Further disenchanted 
and mistrustful of Washington, the incident raised Soviet suspicions about the 
desire, and ability, of the Carter administration to resume détente.136 This 
consequently increased the risk that the Soviets would act in a way Senators 
would perceive as ‘mistrustful’, and hence endanger SALT ratification. 
 The President attempted to put an end to the issue on 1 October. In a 
televised address to the nation, he declared that the Soviet brigade in Cuba 
“was a matter of serious concern to the United States, but posed no direct 
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threat.”137 Deeply worried that he might lose SALT, Carter concluded the 
address by highlighting that the real danger was the threat of nuclear 
destruction and urged its ratification.138 However, by this point the incident 
had already damaged the standing of the Carter administration and, as 
Raymond Garthoff argues, “seriously damaged-perhaps critically” ratification 
hopes for the SALT II treaty.139       
On the same day Carter unilaterally settled the issue of the Cuba 
brigade, Brezhnev issued a warning against NATO’s proposal to deploy new 
LRTNF. On 6 October, he expanded his warning and issued a proposal to 
discuss arms-control, conditioned on NATO not making a decision to deploy 
new missiles.140 The Soviet Union had begun its campaign to mobilise public 
opinion in Europe against the NATO proposals. 
 This could be fatal to the process of achieving alliance consensus on the 
‘dual-track’ approach by December. The key actors in NATO felt it necessary 
that the alliance demonstrate cohesion through a collective decision. This 
would provide NATO with a much-needed boost of confidence. The ‘West’ felt 
vulnerable: dogged by international energy and financial challenges beyond 
their control, and facing a seemingly ascendant Soviet Union posing a strategic 
challenge to NATO through conventional and nuclear rearmament in 
Europe.141 Any public disagreement would only embolden the Soviets. 
Consensus was also necessary in order to ensure West German support. As Jim 
Thomson, a National Security Council (NSC) staffer primarily responsible for 
defence and arms-control matters related to Europe, told David Aaron in 
February 1979, “FRG leadership feels a special need to urge an Alliance 
approach to TNF arms control, at the very least to secure domestic support for 
TNF modernization.”142 
 Trying to gain such a consensus on a ‘dual-track’ approach had been a 
                                                     
137 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 351. 
138 Ibid., 350-351. 
139 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 829. 
140 Ibid., 745. 
141 Kristina Spohr Readman, “Conflict and Cooperation in Intra-Alliance Nuclear Politics: 
Western Europe, the United States, and the Genesis of NATO’s Dual-Track Decision, 1977–
1979,” Journal of Cold War Studies 13:2 (2011), 40-43. 
142 Thomson to Aaron, ‘Mini-SCC mtg on TNF 15 Feb 1979 - Rationale and Strategy for the 
Arms Control Bilaterals’, 15 February 1979, NLC-132-119-11-2-9, JCL. 
SALT in the Wounds 
131 
 
difficult task for NATO officials over the course of 1979. The Danish, Dutch, 
Belgian and Norwegian governments had been deeply hesitant about their 
states participation in future deployments of LRTNF, and subsequently more 
committed to “arms control above all else.”143 In addition, these NATO 
governments, alongside Italy and the FRG, were reluctant to support a decision 
that was likely to be extremely unpopular with large sections of their 
electorate. As Vance and Brown told Carter in May 1979, it would “not be easy” 
to achieve consensus because nuclear issues provoked strong reactions 
amongst European publics, there was a popular interest in protecting détente, 
and because Soviet propaganda campaigns against deployments would find 
resonance in many countries.144 Getting full NATO agreement on the ‘dual-
track’ approach was “a tightrope walk for the alliance.”145 
 By October 1979, there had been a lot of progress towards gaining such 
a consensus. The senior working level of NATO had agreed on both the LRTNF 
deployment plan and the arms-control approach. Italy’s new coalition 
government had privately agreed to vote in favour of NATO’s decision and 
accept LRTNF deployments on Italian soil. This assured Chancellor Schmidt 
that there would be another non-nuclear continental European state 
deploying the missiles, and it quelled his anxieties about the reaction of the 
West German public. Italy’s promise was important because deployment in 
Belgium and the Netherlands remained tentative, due to certain reservations 
and political uncertainty, especially in the Netherlands.146 Despite this 
progress, political uneasiness remained as the alliance moved towards a 
formal and public decision.  
Gaining full agreement on a ‘dual-track’ approach was a key priority for 
the Carter administration. Throughout the Euromissile crisis, Soviet leaders 
and peace campaigners claimed the Carter administration pushed the decision 
to modernise LRTNF on its European partners.147 However, recent studies of 
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the ‘dual-track’ decision have demonstrated that both European and US 
officials played key roles in the formulation of the ‘dual-track’ decision, and 
seeking full NATO consensus.148 ‘Dual-track’ was the first time NATO as a 
whole took a nuclear procurement decision.149 This was a reflection of the 
importance now placed on inter-allied solidarity in nuclear decision-making. 
However, the US administration had an essential role in leading NATO towards 
this consensus, and derived many benefits from doing so. As Vance and Brown 
had told Carter in May 1979:  
The Europeans will not come independently to a consensus within 
the Alliance, nor should we expect them to: the US bears the 
ultimate responsibility for the nuclear affairs of the Alliance and 
reaps substantial benefits (political leverage, non-proliferation, 
internal European stability, etc.)150         
 As such, the administration was deeply interested in allied reaction to 
Brezhnev’s October pronouncements. They were relieved to find that 
Brezhnev’s efforts to undermine NATO consensus on LRTNF largely failed. 
Overall, NATO governments saw the speech as a “skillful piece of propaganda” 
and discounted Brezhnev’s denial that the USSR had built up its TNF.151 
However, many NATO governments remained concerned that “significant 
political forces in Western Europe” might be responsive to Moscow’s 
suggestion that arms-control talks proceed without agreement among NATO 
to modernise LRTNF. This in turn created a worry that there would be an 
                                                     
148 Early studies of the dual-track decision tend to give the United States the lead role in intra-
alliance discussions in 1977-1979 on LRTNF. These studies include Raymond Garthoff, “The 
NATO Decision on Theater Nuclear Forces,” Political Science Quarterly 98:2 (1983); James 
Thomson, “The LRTNF Decision: Evolution of U.S. Theater Nuclear Policy, 1975–9,” 
International Affairs 60:4 (1984). The opening of some key government and private papers 
has enabled scholars to re-examine the decision. Recent scholarship has coalesced around the 
idea that the West European, particularly the West Germans, were the driving force behind 
the decision. See Spohr Readman, “Conflict and Cooperation”, 42-43; Renouard and Vigil, “The 
Quest for Leadership”, 311-312; Scholtyseck “The United States, Europe, and the Dual-Track 
Decision”, 333-352. However, the most nuanced and persuasive accounts demonstrate that 
both US and European officials played indispensable roles. See Nuti, “The Origins of the 1979 
Dual Track Decision”, 60–6; Freeman, “The Making of an Accidental Crisis”, 331, who, utilising 
recently released US archival material, argues that European governments did not force the 
arms-control component of ‘dual-track’ on Carter. 
149 Spohr Readman, “Conflict and Cooperation”, 40. 
150 Vance and Brown to Carter, ‘TNF Modernization -- US Diplomacy, Your Role and the 
Schmidt visit’, 9 May 1979, Alpha Channel (Miscellaneous) -- [4/78 - 4/79], Box 20, Subject 
File, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, JCL.  
151 Special Analysis, ‘West European Division, Office of Political Analysis: Further West 
European Reactions to Brezhnev's speech’, 11 October 1979, NLC-7-47-6-4-3, JCL. 
SALT in the Wounds 
133 
 
intensification of public debate in the Netherlands, which could then spill over 
into West Germany, Belgium, and Italy. Such developments would threaten, 
“To upset the delicate process of building an Alliance consensus on Theater 
Nuclear Force modernization by December.”152   
 Brezhnev’s speech marked the beginning of a concerted Soviet 
propaganda campaign. For much of 1979 the Soviets had exercised restraint 
in criticising the proposed LRTNF modernisation track. As Stephanie Freeman 
argues, this is “likely attributable to a desire not to jeopardise the long-awaited 
signing of the SALT II treaty.”153 It also seems plausible that Soviet  willingness 
to speak out increased following the ‘crisis’ over the combat brigade in Cuba 
and subsequent signs from Congress that SALT II would not be ratified. 
Whatever the cause, in October 1979 the Soviets began a concerted 
propaganda campaign against NATO LRTNF deployments. Soviet media 
broadcasts asserted TNF modernisation would be a circumvention of SALT II, 
a hardening of their previous line that it would complicate SALT III.154 As part 
of these arguments, Soviet officials also became increasingly vocal that they 
saw their LRTNF as a counter-balance to British and French systems:  
In discussions with Shulman and Barry, Soviet minister-Counsellor 
Bessmertnykh has gone out of his way to assert that TNF 
modernization would violate principle of equal security central to 
SALT II. He says that Soviets have made a close study of the 
numbers of weapons capable of reaching Soviet Union including UK 
and French strategic forces, US FBS [Forward-Based Systems] and 
US central systems. It is clear from their calculations that a balance 
exists between these forces and Soviet/Warsaw pact forces capable 
of reaching the US and Europe. An effort to add 600 new launchers 
to the Western side of the equation would amount to a 
circumvention of SALT II.155 
 At this delicate time, any public talk of Polaris replacement could 
seriously upset the Soviets and reaffirm the message of their propaganda 
efforts. Talk of modernising Polaris in addition to LRTNF would invariably stir 
further anti-nuclear feeling with the public. Distinctions between ‘strategic’ 
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and ‘tactical’ weapons, and the need to modernise both, could very easily 
appear academic and nonsensical in public debates. As such, any rumours of a 
Trident deal would heighten many NATO governments concerns about 
domestic reaction to ‘dual-track’. 
The Carter administration could not guarantee at this point that the 
British would not attempt to achieve a deal on Polaris replacement at the same 
time as the ‘dual-track’ agreement. Britain was a firm supporter of LRTNF 
modernisation, and UK-FRG co-operation had been crucial in shaping and 
achieving the agreement. However, despite the contradictions with LRTNF 
deployment, the British remained determined to push forward with Polaris 
replacement. In response to the Brezhnev speech Francis Pym told US officials 
“NATO must not allow the Brezhnev initiative to halt Alliance weapons 
development.”156 At the same time, Pym “reaffirmed that Britain will upgrade 
its own strategic deterrent.”157 Indeed, as previously noted, at the end of 
September MISC 7 decided they wanted to push for a decision by December.  
The raised doubts about prospects for SALT ratification and on-going 
efforts to achieve a NATO decision on ‘dual-track’ affected US thinking on 
Polaris replacement. In early October, Brzezinski, Brown, and Vance met for 
one of their regular luncheons. They decided to recommend to the President 
that the US should “Indicate to the British that we would respond affirmatively 
to a request for assistance in modernising their Polaris force - - including the 
C-4 Trident I missile system which the British clearly want.”158 However, they 
also suggested the British be told to delay any formal request “until after an 
alliance decision on TNF and SALT ratification.”159 The three feared that 
“Otherwise, some of our Allies would have an excuse for not participating in 
TNF and the Soviets might have further incentive to scuttle SALT.”160 In this 
way, the US pre-empted any formal decision by the British. The three men 
were aware that the British “were now approaching a decision point.”161 Given 
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the uncertainty over SALT and TNF and the administration’s support for 
Polaris replacement, the US officials decided they could not afford the political 
ramifications of an imminent request, and so felt it necessary to pre-empt any 
British Cabinet discussion with a definite offer. The decision clearly displays 
the manner in which SALT, TNF modernisation, and Polaris replacement were 
interconnected. Trident was not a priority in this hierarchy. The exchange also 
suggests limited presidential involvement in the decision. This again brings 
into sharp focus the place that presidential favour has in the US-UK nuclear 
relationship.  
The President agreed to the recommendation and sent a letter to 
Thatcher informing her of the administration’s decision. The opening sentence 
stressed the priority the administration placed in TNF modernisation, “As we 
go forward in the North Atlantic Alliance towards a decision on Theater 
Nuclear Forces, I want to share with you my views on the decisions which you 
and I will make concerning cooperation in the future modernization of the 
British nuclear deterrent.”162 Carter then went on to “assure” the Prime 
Minister that his response, “to the question of modernizing your strategic 
forces -- including the option of the C-4 Missile system -- will be affirmative 
and fully in keeping with our traditional relationship of close cooperation in 
the strategic nuclear field.”163 The ‘special relationship’ was apparently alive 
and well.  
 The President, however, then turned to the “delicate question of 
timing.”164 The President laid out the administration’s concerns about the 
decision being confused with TNF modernisation and SALT ratification:  
I believe it is extremely important to avoid providing any pretext 
which either the Soviets or some of our more reluctant friends 
could seize upon to damage the prospects of an Alliance consensus 
on long-range theater nuclear deployments by the end of the year. 
I believe that too early an exposure of our plans regarding the 
British deterrent would provide an excuse for some of our friends 
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not to assume their fair share of both LRTNF deployments and of 
the responsibility for the corresponding decisions.165  
The President then dampened Thatcher’s hopes of finalising an agreement 
during her visit to Washington in December by suggesting they discuss the 
issue, “including the timing of any British request and American response,” 
during this meeting. Concerned by the political damage that a leak would 
cause, the President finally proposed that in order to limit the chance of 
“inadvertent disclosure” both sides “keep to a minimum discussions between 
our respective officials, civilian and military.”166    
On 17 October, David Aaron, during his visit to London, delivered the 
President’s letter directly into the hands of John Hunt, lest anyone intercept 
it.167 Upon reading it, both John Hunt and Robert Wade-Gery expressed to 
David Aaron “considerable gratitude for the affirmative approach.” They also 
told Aaron that they understood the administration’s desire for delay in the 
decision-making process, and would work to accommodate this.168 This 
expressed gratitude mostly reflected the private feelings of those British 
officials aware of the letter and its contents. For the most part the British were 
pleased with the decision made by the US and supported its rationale. Officials 
were relieved that the US would supply MIRV. John Hunt told Thatcher that it 
was “very good news that the President is willing to let us have whichever 
Polaris replacement we want, including a MIRV'd C4.”169 Similarly, Hunt told 
Thatcher that the President’s fears about timing in relation to the alliance’s 
‘dual-track’ decision were “reasonable” and that the British “should clearly do 
what we can to meet them.” Indeed, Hunt felt that the President’s decision over 
timings changed little because the British government “would probably not be 
ready for an announcement about Polaris replacement until early January 
anyway.”170 
 That the administration’s desire to delay was not problematic was 
reliant on the TNF decision and SALT ratification going ahead in December as 
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planned. Hunt told Thatcher, “If the TNF decision were to start slipping things 
could be much more awkward.” He then went on to say:  
Although the President's message does not say so, Dr. Aaron made 
clear that Mr. Carter is also concerned about timing in relation to 
Senate ratification of SALT II. This is now expected (fairly 
confidently, despite Cuba) in mid-December. Here too there will be 
no problem if the timetable sticks. But it has slipped already and 
could well slip further.171  
A timely agreement on the replacement of Polaris was now dependent upon 
events beyond British control. The Carter administration was pleased that 
their pre-emptive move had secured British co-operation but were aware of 
the difficulties they may have created for British plans on modernisation. 
Aaron remarked to Brzezinski:  
In sum, I believe the President's letter had a good effect and they 
will cooperate with us to avoid having this issue come to a peak 
with the Allies or the Soviets in the next few months, however, the 
British have substantial difficulties should the formal decision slip 
beyond February.172  
The British reacted calmly because they continued to believe that they 
could still gain Carter’s formal agreement in his December meeting with 
Thatcher, ready for a public announcement in January. British officials were 
concerned with the letter’s suggestion that Thatcher and Carter discuss “the 
timing of the British request” during their meeting on 17 December.173 This 
implied that at a later date they should make the formal request. Such delay, 
as they had discussed in the September MISC 7 meeting, would be problematic 
for the British and as such they had decided to push forward the timetable. As 
John Hunt explained to David Aaron after his delivery of the President’s letter, 
they had planned for Cabinet to decide on Polaris replacement in early 
November. This decision would be relayed to the US, “but without [the British] 
requesting a response.”174 Thatcher would then make a formal request during 
her December meeting with the President.175   
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Upon hearing this, Aaron urged British officials to delay their decision 
due to the possibility of a leak expressing, “concern that a decision taken in 
early November would not keep until mid-December.” Aaron went on to state 
that whilst the US could “not prescribe the British decision process… [he] 
urged that they consider delaying their own decision as long as possible.”176 
He also reconfirmed that Carter wished too “discuss the timing of a formal 
request” and the administration’s response during his meeting with Thatcher 
in December. Aaron’s reply, whilst trying to delay the decision and confirming 
that Carter wished to discuss the timing of the issue, importantly did not rule 
out that issues of substance might be dealt with during the December meeting. 
By Thatcher and Carter’s meeting on 17 December, ‘dual-track’ would 
probably have been agreed, and SALT II may have been, or near to, ratified. 
Wade-Gery subsequently made a non-committal response that the British 
would consider adapting their timetable, stating that he “understood that they 
should not count on making a request at the Thatcher/Carter meeting but he 
said that the Prime Minister might need to take at least an initial decision 
amongst her *inner cabinet* prior to her visit to Washington.”177  
The Carter administration’s concern about any possible inadvertent 
disclosure also meant that Aaron urged British officials to make changes to 
Thatcher’s planned speech on European security in Luxembourg. Originally, it 
was planned that Thatcher would say the British would take the “necessary 
decisions” on Polaris replacement “by the end of the year.”178 In response to 
the President's letter, the British modified the text to read “within the next few 
months.”179 David Aaron “urged them to water this sentence down further.”180 
During this discussion, Aaron attempted to utilise the pre-emptive offer by the 
President to influence Britain’s timetable for a decision and communications 
about Polaris replacement. Aaron’s efforts were representative of the 
administration’s desire, set out in the President’s letter to Thatcher, to limit 
the possibility of ‘inadvertent disclosure.’ Such a leak would be politically 
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damaging to the President and would undermine any benefits gained from the 
agreement. These concerns drove much of the administration’s responses to 
the question of Polaris replacement in the coming months.   
Even after the President’s letter and Aaron’s comments, the British still 
pushed for Carter’s formal agreement to provide their choice of successor 
system by the end of the year. Thatcher’s reply to Carter “warmly” welcomed 
the President’s “affirmative approach to the modernisation of the British 
strategic deterrent.”181 Thatcher expressed her gratitude that any of the 
systems the British were considering would be made available, including the 
C4 missile system with MIRV capability.182 Thatcher also thanked the 
President for his “frank explanation” of his concerns about the “delicate issue 
of timing involved in the interaction” between Polaris replacement and 
NATO’s ‘dual-track’ decision. She told Carter that she understood the point, 
and would be “glad to co-operate... in seeking to avert the dangers you 
identify.”183 Aaron’s pleas seemingly had some effect, with Thatcher telling 
Carter that no British request would be made to him before their meeting in 
December and that they would discuss the timing then. However, Hunt had 
drafted the letter to “deliberately” indicate that the Prime Minister would want 
to “deal with substance as well as timing” in her December meeting with the 
President. He believed that “Our clear impression from Dr. Aaron is that the 
White House will not in practice jib at that.”184 Subsequently Thatcher’s letter 
went on to state:  
To avoid any misunderstanding, and in the same spirit of frankness, 
I should make clear that at that meeting I shall need to discuss the 
substance of the strategic modernisation issue, as well as 
procedure and timing. I am confident that we shall then be able to 
settle both the substantive question and the problem of the timing 
of any announcement. The latter will clearly depend on how other 
matters, including LFTNF decision taking, have progressed in the 
interval.185 
On the other hand, the British were extremely obliging in response to 
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US concerns over secrecy. They had similar concerns, although not to the same 
degree. Thatcher would face some political trouble if it became apparent there 
would be no imminent decision, whilst Carter would face severe difficulties if 
it became apparent that there was to be a decision in the near future. Thus, 
Thatcher informed Carter that knowledge of the President’s message would 
remain “confined to a very narrow circle indeed,” telling only Carrington and 
Francis Pym. She assured the President that no one would see the documents 
outside No. 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office. Thatcher also suggested 
that they keep communications on the subject confined to the direct White 
House/Cabinet Office link.186 
 
The need for secrecy was a key area of discussion during the second round of 
preliminary talks, which took place on 18 October. It even influenced the scope 
of discussion. As there were people present at the talks who did not know 
about the President’s October letter to the Prime Minister agreeing to supply 
whichever system the British chose, no mention was made of it.187 
Subsequently, much of the second round of preliminary discussion focused on 
the need to manage disclosure of the agreement to avoid problems in two 
areas: allied relations and US domestic politics. 
 A key concern for the US administration was how and when the French 
government should be informed. Aaron told the meeting’s participants that, 
“the Americans would want to explain the position to the French before any 
announcement.”188 After reading a report on the meeting, Thatcher asked for 
an explanation of why Aaron had said this. Robert Armstrong’s explanation 
provides a good insight into US thinking at the time and the administration’s 
desire to avoid any political controversy over the Polaris deal with key allies:  
The Americans seem understandably anxious that their decision to 
help us over the replacement of Polaris should not be divisive of the 
Western Allies including France. In the French case they have not 
of course forgotten the violent reaction of General de Gaulle's 
government to the news of the Macmillan-Kennedy 1962 Nassau 
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Agreement under which we got Polaris. They accept that today's 
circumstances are very different, and that nothing similar need be 
anticipated this time. The Gaullists will try to make the most of the 
decision, to the disadvantage of the Americans as well of us. This 
will add to the French President's domestic problems. He is likely 
to take a more balanced and sympathetic view; but the French 
government might well be annoyed, both with the Americans and 
with ourselves, if they first heard about the decision from the 
newspapers, and we should do well to avoid that.189  
The administration was clearly concerned that division amongst allies over the 
decision could undermine the advantages they derived from assisting in 
Polaris replacement and subsequently appearing to reinforce the US nuclear 
umbrella.   
On the domestic front, Congressional approval of a Polaris replacement 
deal would be required. The level of approval depended on which system the 
British opted for, and Aaron assured the British that even if some aspects 
required formal approval, he believed it would be “fairly automatic.” However, 
Aaron also made it clear “that on such a sensitive subject, it would be essential 
to consult the Senate leadership and the key Senate committees.”190 In 
addition, part of the administration’s fear of the effect of an announcement was 
because they expected vigorous debate in Parliament and in Congress as to 
why the British needed a ballistic force when theatre nuclear forces were being 
improved:  
If Mrs. Thatcher and her ministers do endorse the Trident plan next 
week, its public debate is likely to be vigorous both in Parliament… 
and in the US Congress. The government is bound to be challenged 
as to why Britain still needs an ‘independent’ nuclear deterrent, 
why the Polaris system cannot be modernized and above all, why 
the deterrent force should not consist of much cheaper nuclear-
armed cruise missiles of the kind we are in any case proposing to 
have based in this country -- owned and operated by the Americans 
-- as part of the collective plan to modernize NATO's so-called 
theater nuclear weapons.191  
The US clearly did not want such vigorous debate to start early, before NATO 
had even agreed on LRTNF deployment, due to ‘inadvertent disclosure’. 
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 Overall, US officials were once again co-operative. Wade-Gery reflected 
on the meeting: “The general atmosphere was good, despite occasional sticky 
patches… On balance, a useful and reassuring meeting.”192 These ‘sticky 
patches’ occurred when the US turned to what they might receive in return; 
British conventional force contributions and US-UK co-operation in other 
areas.   
On conventional force contributions, Aaron told the meeting that it 
would be extremely important “vis-à-vis Congress for the United States 
government to be able to say that we had reconfirmed our intention to fulfil 
the agreed NATO programme of annual Defence Budget increments.”193 Robert 
Wade-Gery later told John Hunt that Aaron “seemed if anything even more 
worried than in August about the danger that the cost of replacing Polaris 
would erode our conventional defence effort.”194 Aaron’s concern about 
conventional forces was reflective of the administration’s desire to ensure 
European contributions to their own defence. In addition, without such a 
commitment by the British, NATO support of Polaris replacement would be in 
doubt. As Carrington later told Thatcher:  
The views of our other European Allies are ambivalent. In private, 
at least they approve of our decision to maintain an effective 
nuclear deterrent. But they would have second thoughts if this 
could be done only at the price of reducing our conventional 
contribution to NATO. This would be particularly serious if the 
Germans felt than an extra boat would in any way increase the risk 
of further thinning out in British Forces Germany [sic] or that these 
forces would be starved of adequate equipment.195  
NATO support of Polaris replacement was crucial to the Carter administration, 
without it their justification to Congress and the public that it contributed to 
European defence would be clearly undermined. As such, Aaron was “clearly 
pleased” with British assurances that the Polaris successor system would 
continue to be assigned to SACEUR on the same basis as the Polaris system.196     
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The second ‘sticky’ area, US-UK co-operation in other areas, saw the 
administration seemingly utilising the discussions as an opportunity to vent 
about any disagreement in US-UK relations over recent years. Aaron, 
according to Wade-Gery:  
Produced a curious ragbag of pleas for a more forthcoming British 
attitude as regards joint action in various defence fields (eg [sic] the 
air defence of the United States bases here); and as regards a 
number of political problems, eg [sic] security co-operation in the 
Caribbean and restraint over East-West technology transfers. He 
deplored the harm done to the West’s security interests by our 
providing credits for Cuba or making cuts in the BBC external 
services. And he urged us not to exclude the idea of acquiring some 
ground-launched cruise missiles of our own in the context of the 
Theatre Nuclear Force modernisation programme.197 
Aaron was “careful to make clear that in none of these cases” was the US trying 
to place conditions on their help with Polaris replacement. 198  
Nonetheless, the outburst provoked greater concern amongst British 
officials that the US would place a political price tag on any agreement. 
Following the talks, Robert Wade-Gery commented to John Hunt, “The 
Americans no doubt feel that they should do what they can to exploit the 
strong position in bilateral relations which our nuclear military dependence 
gives them.”199 In particular, Carrington in his considerations on whether 
Britain should have a four or five-boat nuclear force, expressed concern about 
British dependence giving the US ability to exert political advantage:  
Either option will entail dependence on the Americans over the 
next thirty or so years - a period in which relations between Europe 
and the US are bound to change in ways which we cannot now 
foresee. Our dependence will give the Americans scope to exert 
political leverage on us. They may feel that the more significant the 
system they now give us, both in quality and in warhead numbers, 
the more we should do for them in return. There are signs that the 
Americans too are aware that the larger our nuclear force, the more 
problems it will present for them in the SALT process and the 
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heavier the price they will have to pay for its continued 
exclusion.200 
 Britain’s dependence on the US meant that the Carter administration 
was already exerting considerable influence on their internal decision-making 
process. As discussed, secrecy about the deal was of crucial importance to the 
administration. On the US side, only Brzezinski, Brown, Vance, Aaron, 
Bartholomew and the US ambassador to Britain, knew about the President’s 
October letter. The British were willing accomplices in this, as leaks would 
cause problems for them as well. However, they took their efforts to minimise 
disclosure even further because of US wishes.201 British gratitude, in part, 
drove this. John Hunt told Margaret Thatcher that, “given the extremely 
forthcoming nature of the second paragraph to the President's letter, we 
should clearly fall in with his wish to confine knowledge of the present 
correspondence to a very tight circle indeed.”202 Subsequently, and worryingly 
for British democracy, two of the five ministers on the MISC7 were not privy 
to all developments on Polaris replacement. Following her promises to the 
President of keeping the information to a “tight circle,” Thatcher could not 
reveal details of the President’s October letter, or even its existence to the 
Home Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer; two of the five 
government ministers in attendance.203 Due to national security precautions 
meaning that wider and transparent debate was not deemed possible, this 
committee was meant to be the forum where an informed decision on a 
successor system was made. Instead, the US desire for absolute secrecy made 
it impossible to discuss the issue in an open fashion even amongst the ‘elite 
circle’. In addition, the British also delayed the third MISC 7 discussion, 
wherein they planned to make a decision on which system to opt for, from 
November to early December. This formed part of officials’ efforts to respond 
to US requests for delay, and, as Wade-Gery told David Aaron, “stage manage 
                                                     
200 Carrington to Thatcher, ‘The Strategic Deterrent’, 29 November 1979, PREM 19/14, TNA. 
201 Hunt to Thatcher, ‘Nuclear Defence Matters’, 19 October 1979, PREM 19/14, TNA. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Armstrong to Thatcher, ‘Future of the Strategic Deterrent (MISC 7)’, 4 December 1979, 
PREM 19/159, TNA. 
SALT in the Wounds 
145 
 
the internal British decision progress until that time so as not to create any 
problems for TNF and  SALT.”204 
 The main purpose of David Aaron’s trip to Europe in October was 
further TNF negotiations with NATO governments. He returned more 
optimistic about the prospect of a NATO consensus on a ‘dual-track’ approach 
by December. Reporting on Aaron’s trip, Brzezinski told Carter: “We are much 
closer to a firm consensus on our proposed TNF program than anyone would 
have anticipated only a few weeks ago.”205 Britain, Italy and the FRG had “all 
taken firm internal government decisions to support the NATO program.”206 
Although, whilst both the Italian and FRG government firmly supported the 
decision, they wished to avoid “firm public commitments to the NATO TNF 
program for as long as possible in order to avoid provoking public 
opposition.”207 Prospects of Belgium support were promising, with the Prime 
Minister, Foreign Minister and Defence Minister all supporting Belgium 
participation, and preparing for a vote on the issue in Parliament. However, 
doubts remained about Dutch support, and the administration worried that 
their absence “could unravel the support of other countries.”208 Overall, 
though, prospects looked promising for the resolution of one hurdle to Polaris 
replacement. 
 
VI 
 
No sooner had the controversy about the Soviet brigade in Cuba died down 
than the Carter administration faced another, even more damaging, foreign 
policy crisis. On 4 November 1979, Iranian militants stormed the US embassy 
in Tehran, taking sixty-six Americans hostage. The subsequent crisis 
dominated Carter’s foreign policy agenda until the end of his term, and 
seriously damaged his already eroding domestic position. The plight of the 
hostages dominated US new cycles. ABC initiated a new nightly programme, 
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Nightline, to review developments on a daily basis.209 These updates reported 
very little in the way of progress: the hostages were still captive 444 days later. 
The Carter administration appeared impotent. As Nancy Mitchell argues, 
Carter’s inability to secure the hostages release made it “impossible to free 
himself from the aura of weakness that had come to define him.”210 By the 
winter of 1979, the administration’s apparent mishandling of foreign affairs 
was undermining Carter’s presidency and threatening his re-election hopes in 
the coming year. Even his flagship foreign policy looked set to fail. The Senate 
had not ratified the SALT II agreement, with most observers believing that it 
needed further amendments to pass.211 This would be a further blow for 
Carter: he had invested great political capital in the agreement. Carter 
desperately needed some kind of foreign policy success.   
 In mid-November 1979, Harold Brown and Charles Duncan, Jr., US 
Secretary of Energy, wrote to the President recommending the extension of 
the MDA for another five years.212 The matter required Carter’s quick 
approval. British officials were anxious that the US government proceed 
promptly since key provisions of the existing agreement expired at the end of 
the year, and Congress still needed to approve the amendment.213 In seeking 
the President’s approval, Harold and Brown stressed the “substantial and 
material contributions” the arrangement made to “mutual defence and 
security.”214 As well as that, “The United Kingdom’s nuclear forces are virtually 
all committed to NATO.” These benefits came, “without adverse effect on our 
defence programs.”215 On 28 November, Carter approved Brown and Duncan’s 
recommendation, expressing his belief that the proposed amendment “will 
permit cooperation which will further improve our mutual defence posture 
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and be in support of NATO.”216 Carter reaffirmed this in his subsequent letter 
to Congress, recommending the renewal of the agreement: “In light of our 
previous close cooperation and the fact that the United Kingdom has 
committed its nuclear forces to NATO, I have concluded that it is in our security 
interest to continue to assist them in maintaining a credible nuclear force.”217 
The discussion, surrounding the extension of the MDA, demonstrates the 
importance the US placed in Britain’s contribution to NATO. It was the central 
tenet of their justification for the relationship. US assistance to the UK 
promoted mutual defence, which was in the interests of the US during the Cold 
War. However, assistance also helped negate many of the economic and 
political problems that mutual defence created for the US. The relationship 
increased confidence in the US nuclear umbrella by providing ‘a second centre 
of decision-making.’ This in turn helped limit the financial contribution that 
the US had to make to European defence. Assistance also helped domestically 
by negating the image that it was just the US spending and contributing to the 
Cold War. It achieved all this relatively cheaply, and indeed perhaps even 
benefited the US economically: the US had already developed these systems. 
However, despite the benefits the US derived from the relationship and thus 
their support for it, as it was not a priority policy, and as it inevitably would be 
politicised, the British could not guarantee that US support meant the 
relationship’s continuation.     
 A few weeks after the administration’s demonstration of support for 
the US-UK nuclear relationship, they made it apparent to the British that 
Polaris replacement was not a priority and therefore, due to their political 
difficulties, they were delaying an announcement indefinitely. In a private 
conversation with Robert Wade-Gery, it became apparent to David Aaron that 
the British had not listened to the administration’s previous warnings about a 
delay. The planned timeline that Wade-Gery outlined was very similar to the 
one Aaron had objected too in October: The key ministers would meet the 
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following week, and would probably choose Trident C4 as their preferred 
system, Cabinet would then be informed, and this would leave Thatcher “as 
her message in October foreshadowed” free to seek Carter’s agreement on 17 
December.218 With the administration now in an even more difficult political 
situation, Aaron now had to get the message through: their worries about the 
ramifications of a Trident deal meant there would be no announcement on a 
Polaris successor until after SALT II ratification, whenever that may be.  
To convey this point, Aaron at first took a cautious approach. Aaron 
reminded Wade-Gery that, given the “major problems” in timing due to the 
‘dual-track’ decision and “above all” SALT II ratification, it might be necessary 
to postpone the release date of the Trident agreement. Aaron hence hoped that 
Thatcher would not come to Washington “with a formal request in her 
pocket… it would be dangerous if the Prime Minister arrived on the crest of a 
wave of public expectation that the decision was about to be made.”219 From 
his reply, it is clear that Wade-Gery did not appreciate this attempt to persuade 
the British to delay their decision-making. He detailed the pressures the Prime 
Minister was under to reach a formal agreement stating: 
The government had been elected on a platform which included the 
replacement of Polaris. That was eight months ago. Mrs Thatcher 
was now about to pay her first visit to Washington as Prime 
Minister. It would be ludicrous to suggest either to her Cabinet 
colleagues or to the President that we still could not make up our 
minds what we wanted.220  
 Concurrently, Wade-Gery tried to convince Aaron that they should 
make an announcement in the next couple of months. Commenting on the 
press guidance for the December meeting Wade-Gery told Aaron that such 
“fend-off language… would only serve for a limited period.” He believed that 
Thatcher would come under increasingly strong pressure to announce a 
Polaris replacement deal once Parliament reassembled after the Christmas 
break, and he speculated that, “there would no doubt be similar problems at 
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the United States end.”221 Aaron’s cautious approach clearly had not worked. 
Aaron subsequently resorted to a frank discussion about the 
administration’s political problems relating to Polaris replacement. Aaron 
agreed that there would be strong pressures from Congress when it 
reassembled early in January; given the speculation in the press and 
Thatcher’s election promises, members of Congress knew that a US-UK deal 
was in the offing. There was a distinct possibility that the Senate anti-SALT 
lobby would make trouble if they got wind of any temporising or apparent 
weakness by the administration in helping allies.222 However, Aaron explained 
that the administration saw that “the dangers on the other side would be even 
greater.” Wade-Gery recounted in his briefing:   
It became clear that the real American worry centres on SALT II. It 
was the ‘mainspring’ of Mr Carter’s Presidency; without it the 
Presidency would ‘be destroyed.’ It was clear that the Senate would 
attach to ratification some riders which the Russians would much 
dislike. If the Americans had at that stage just announced a Polaris-
replacement deal with us, the Russians might well attach a counter-
rider insisting that the British deal be abandoned. The President 
could not survive if SALT II was lost because (as it seemed) he had 
made the wrong deal with us at the wrong moment.223  
Adding to British worries, Aaron then, “refused to be drawn on just how long 
a period delay he saw as likely or possible. But he was quite clear that ‘timing 
is going to be our one big problem.’”224 With events of the last few weeks 
making the President’s domestic position even more problematic, the 
administration was clearly even more determined to delay the Trident deal.  
The conversation then turned to US worries about the reaction of allies. 
At this point, the extent of the administration’s paranoia about the political 
ramifications of a Trident deal became even more apparent. Wade-Gery 
informed David Aaron that the British had the previous week indicated to 
President Giscard “in general terms” that they intended to replace Polaris 
through continued collaboration with the US. In response, Giscard “appeared 
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to welcome” the replacement, and understood the continued collaboration 
with the US. However, the mild response of President Giscard did not lessen 
Aaron’s worries about the reaction of their European allies. Aaron noted that 
the EEC could be “entering a period of crisis… until the budget problem was 
settled.” Accordingly:  
The Americans would need to walk all the more warily. They would 
not want to be accused of trying to widen a split within the 
Community by a move which could be represented as a dramatic 
resuscitation of the Special Relationship between Washington and 
London.225  
At the end of the meeting, Aaron felt it necessary to reaffirm the indefinite 
delay of any Trident deal. Aaron “repeated the President’s problem about 
timing with great emphasis. SALT II was vital to this. Everything else had to 
take second place.”226 As such, Aaron left Wade-Gery in no doubt that their 
priority of SALT meant the administration desired an indefinite delay on the 
Trident deal. The conversation was a severe blow to British officials’ hopes of 
being able to make a formal request in December ready for a public 
announcement in January.  
     David Aaron’s strong words provoked concern amongst British 
officials, who even after Carter’s October letter had held on to the hope that 
they would be able to make substantial progress during Thatcher’s meeting 
with Carter, ready for an announcement shortly thereafter. The 
administration’s definite wish to postpone an announcement “to an unsettled 
date possibly some months in the future” created serious problems for the 
British.227 Thatcher faced “strong pressure for an announceable decision by 
end [sic] January.”228 Informing Thatcher of the news that the US were clearly 
even more determined to wait until after the ratification of SALT II for a formal 
agreement on a Polaris replacement, Robert Armstrong  expressed his 
dissatisfaction and concern:  
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From our point of view this is disappointing and unsatisfactory. We 
want a definite decision and agreement as soon as possible, so that 
the Polaris replacement programme can gather momentum; and 
we want to get the President firmly and formally committed sooner 
rather than later; the longer we leave it, the closer we get to the 
United States election, and the greater is likely to become his 
reluctance to commit himself. 229 
Armstrong also worried that the delay offered “the Russians time to try to 
wreck the agreement” and exposed the Prime Minister to domestic pressures. 
Armstrong hence urged Thatcher to seek MISC 7 agreement “that you should 
do all you can to change his mind… [and] agree that you should urge the 
President to accept the earliest possible announcement - preferably soon after 
the House of Commons resumes after the Christmas recess.”230 Thatcher 
however, as Armstrong told her, faced an impossible task:  
However good the argument, we cannot expect that it will persuade 
the President to the sort of timing we want. He clearly regards the 
ratification of SALT II as crucial to his re-election; and he certainly 
will not do anything that he believes or is advised will put that at 
risk. So I fear that we shall have to settle for as firm a private 
commitment as you can get.231  
Even so, the political difficulties the delay would cause the Thatcher 
government meant she had no choice but to “apply pressure… Given the state 
of opinion here, you can hardly leave Washington without making clear what 
we want; or without pressing for a very early answer.”232 
 Also deeply concerned by the news from Washington, a week before 
Thatcher’s trip, Francis Pym gave her “a piece of paper.”233 In this, he detailed 
the problems that delaying an agreement until after ratification could create:  
Ratification could well take until late February (optimistically) 
April (more likely)… Meanwhile, subject increasingly high interest 
and high profile in UK… Inescapable risk of leakage as more people 
come to know, question or guess about decision either taken or 
apparently not taken. This will increase after Prime Minister's visit 
to Washington. Risk of confused position - wide open to critical 
exploitation (next target for Russian propaganda, SALT opponents, 
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anti-nuclear lobby etc [sic])… Perhaps all right until early in New 
Year but increasingly difficult, after Parliament resumes in 
January.234  
Aaron’s frank comments had clearly unleashed an anxiety in the British that 
the relatively mild talk about delay in October had not. They saw that Carter’s 
desire for delay, and his declining public support, created great uncertainty in 
their hopes for Polaris replacement.  
In December 1979, MISC 7 agreed that the best system to replace 
Polaris was Trident C4 MIRV, if they could purchase the missiles from the 
US.235 Thatcher of course knew that they could. In response to US concerns 
about leaks, Robert Armstrong advised Thatcher not to tell the Cabinet what 
MISC 7 had decided on until after her visit to Washington, or even just before 
they were ready to make an announcement.236 Thatcher accepted his advice. 
Subsequently, in a meeting on 13 December, the Prime Minister informed her 
Cabinet:  
She would have a preliminary discussion with President Carter on 
the replacement of the British strategic nuclear deterrent force, for 
which on economic grounds alone American assistance would be 
necessary. The President was unlikely to want to take firm 
decisions on the matter at this stage, and it might be several months 
before agreement was reached.237  
US concerns were not only causing the British anxiety, they were seriously 
influencing Britain’s internal democratic processes.  
 On 15 December, NATO approved a ‘dual-track’ approach; deploying 
Pershing II and cruise missiles while simultaneously seeking to negotiate 
reductions in Theatre Nuclear Forces with the Soviet Union. In his “piece of 
paper” to Thatcher, Francis Pym had expressed his belief that it made sense to 
wait until after this decision was made to make an announcement on Polaris 
replacement, and that this presented, “no great problem… barring unforeseen 
snags, in Brussels this week.”238 However, this viewpoint neglected US worries 
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about the Soviet and European reaction to ‘dual-track’. The decision sparked 
the beginning of the Euromissile crisis. The planned missile deployment was a 
contentious issue across Europe. There was widespread public resistance to 
the stationing of new missiles on Western European soil as the deployment 
demonstrated US willingness to contemplate limited nuclear wars, and 
sparked fears that this aggressive step would escalate tensions. The Soviet 
response to the announcement was not helpful for placating European public 
opinion. The Soviets publicly stated that new NATO deployments would upset 
the present equilibrium, and that their own deployments of the SS-20 and 
Backfire were aimed at redressing a previous unbalance caused by the 
presence in Europe of US forward-based missiles. Moreover, the Soviets had: 
Strongly indicated… that they do not view the European Theater 
Nuclear balance in terms of US and Soviet systems alone. Their 
references to NATO systems include as a minimum, French IRBM's 
and SLBM's as well as British SLBM's and strategic aircraft.239   
Hence, with the ‘dual-track’ announcement, US concerns about a Polaris 
replacement announcement preventing the development of a NATO consensus 
evaporated. However, given public reaction, fears that NATO governments 
might face political trouble that would undermine their commitment to LRTNF 
deployment heightened. Moreover, given the Soviet reaction, the 
administration’s concerns that they might act in a way that would undermine 
SALT ratification was also increased.   
Despite the small chance of success, the situation dictated that Thatcher 
had to try to persuade the President in their meeting to proceed with 
announcing a Polaris successor deal. Subsequently, British officials planned 
Thatcher’s strategy. She would try to obtain during the meeting “his clear-cut 
consent to your specific request, which can be publicly announced thereafter 
within a matter of weeks rather than months.”240 If the President was not 
obliging on this, and if Thatcher judged it appropriate, she would push that the 
“matter should not be allowed to slip beyond February or (if necessary) March 
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at the latest?” If this also proved impossible Thatcher would “reserve the right 
to return to the charge in early 1980, in the light of how slowly SALT 
ratification moves and how quickly domestic pressure for a decision builds up 
in Britain.”241 In the meeting itself the strategy had little effect on Carter’s 
attitude towards finalising an agreement. 
 Thatcher and Carter met to discuss Polaris replacement on 17 
December; coincidentally, the Nassau meeting had taken place from 18 - 21 
December 1962. Unfortunately, for those who like neat coincidences the 
Thatcher and Carter meeting would not be a repeat of the Nassau conference. 
In 1995, Alan Dobson argued, “In December 1979 she [Thatcher] had a most 
successful trip to Washington, and she soon clinched a deal on the sale of 
Trident.”242 However, access to the archival material reveals that Thatcher’s 
trip was not very successful. In the face of UK pressure and arguments, the US 
held firm; any request would have to wait until after the ratification of SALT II. 
The President started by affirming his commitment to give a positive response 
to any request for a successor to Polaris the Prime Minister put to him. 
However, he:  
Hoped… that no such request would be put to him until SALT II had 
been ratified by the Congress. He feared lest, if a request was made 
and answered before then, that would give rise to new Soviet 
demands or conditions for the conclusion of SALT II… He 
understood that the delay could create timing problems for the 
British Government; the United States Government could, he 
thought, alleviate those. In the meantime he hoped that no 
proposals would be put to the British Cabinet. He would wish to be 
in a position to say, if asked, that no request had been received from 
the British Government.243  
The Prime Minister replied by expressing gratitude to the President for his 
“positive commitment”, and that she understood his wish to delay a formal 
request. She then enquired about “whether in the meantime contingency 
planning would proceed on the drafting of the exchange of letters that would 
be required.”244 Brzezinski replied:  
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This would be negotiable, provided that discussion was confined to 
the same restricted group of people as had been involved hitherto. 
It would not, however, be possible for technical discussions to 
proceed without extending the circle of those involved, which the 
President did not wish to do.245 
In response to a question from Lord Carrington, Carter said that, if Congress 
failed to ratify SALT II, “There would then be no obstacle to his agreeing to a 
request from the United Kingdom Government to a successor to Polaris.”246 
The meeting confirmed to the British that SALT had halted their efforts to 
secure a Polaris replacement. It was clear that until Carter had his prized treaty 
ratified, or reason to give up on the process entirely, there would be no Trident 
agreement.  
 As well as halting negotiations at the political level, the President’s 
decision to delay also stalled the technical relationship. As discussed in 
Thatcher and Carter’s meeting, technical discussions could not continue 
without extending the circle of people in the know, which the President’s 
concerns over secrecy precluded. A British memo subsequently commented, 
“Currently planning is stalled… though ‘technical’ relations with the US are 
extremely good… There is an urgent need for detailed technical discussion. We 
are faced with planning blight.”247 Scholars often highlight the continuing 
technical relationship that underpins US-UK nuclear co-operation. This 
relationship is central in its continuation and maintenance. However, as the 
debacle over the timing of the Trident decision demonstrates, one should not 
conflate technical exchanges with political decision-making. As events of 1979 
demonstrate, the technical relationship cannot go ahead without political 
decision-making; whilst these technical relationships underpin and maintain 
co-operation, they do not carry it forward on their own. 
 
Despite Carter’s supposed promises at Guadeloupe, throughout 1979 the 
British continued to face uncertainty about the future of their Polaris 
replacement programme. Even after their long-running concerns over the 
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non-circumvention clause had been resolved, they faced worries over whether 
the political circumstances would allow for a deal, and then whether the US 
would supply a MIRV system. When the President finally promised to supply 
Trident C4, it came with the caveat that any final agreement would be 
postponed to an indeterminate date in the future. Whilst the administration 
supported Polaris replacement, they had matters that were more pressing. The 
administration saw that assisting the British was only “modestly 
advantageous.”248 US-UK nuclear co-operation brought benefits to NATO, 
helped the administration domestically and was financially advantageous. 
However, to derive these benefits an agreement had to occur at the right time. 
An ill-timed deal would be problematic for the administration, and had the 
potential to undermine Carter’s priority: SALT.  
For the Carter administration, 1979 was not the time for any Trident 
agreement, and they subsequently delayed the announcement until after 
ratification of SALT II. This caused deep frustration and concern amongst the 
British as the ratification of SALT became an increasingly unlikely prospect. 
Moreover, the next US election was less than a year away. In December 1979, 
British officials thus feared that, despite their efforts securing the Carter 
administration’s informal agreement, there would be no formal deal with the 
incumbents. In this case, they would have to agree a deal with the next 
administration, and of course, this was no foregone conclusion. For the Trident 
agreement to be finalised the British needed the Carter administration to 
change its priorities immediately. 
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Chapter 4 
 
A Transactional Relationship: The Trident C4 agreement, December 
1979 – July 1980 
 
“It is essential that we establish priorities among our demands on the 
British, since we have been asking much of them in recent months.” 
 
- US briefing paper.1 
 
I 
 
On 24 December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The Politburo 
authorised the invasion in order to shore up the shaky communist government, 
then confronting a resolute Islamist uprising, and because it feared the threat of 
revolutionary fervour spilling over the borders from Iran. As Nancy Mitchell 
persuasively observes, faced with the loss of a neighbouring ally, the Kremlin sent 
troops to Afghanistan “with a sense of deep foreboding… The Soviets were 
propelled by weakness, not adventurism.”2 The US however did not view it as a 
weak move, but rather a determined execution of a coherent strategy to gain 
access to the Persian Gulf and encircle Western oil supplies. It was the death knell 
to the illusion of détente. Facing an election in which he was not even guaranteed 
the nomination of his own party, the increasingly withering assaults of the rising 
conservative movement, and haunted by his failure to resolve the Iranian hostage 
crisis, Carter needed to show strength in the face of Soviet aggression. Carter 
subsequently made every effort to punish the Soviets, including a grain embargo, 
recalling the US ambassador, boycotting the Moscow Olympics, appealing to the 
United Nations and NATO for support, expanding defence spending, and 
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withdrawing SALT II from Senate consideration.3 
 The invasion of Afghanistan also raised British hopes of securing a Trident 
agreement. With the ratification of SALT II now delayed indefinitely, Downing 
Street officials began to probe their White House counterparts on whether the 
British government could now make a request for Trident C4. However, as this 
chapter will discuss, despite the indefinite delay of SALT ratification, the Carter 
administration was still hesitant to begin formal negotiations to supply Trident 
C4 to the UK. In the aftermath of the invasion, Carter’s political problems 
increased, heightening White House concern about potential criticism from the 
sale of Trident C4. With Carter’s potential second presidential term on the line, 
the Trident C4 agreement was not a priority. Indeed, the Carter administration’s 
eventual decision to move ahead with the Trident deal was motivated, in part, due 
to concern about the political damage of the potential British reaction if there was 
further delay. In this way, the Carter administration was consistently stubborn 
about supplying Trident to the UK, and only consented to do so when the situation 
indisputably suited Washington. 
The Carter administration’s obstinate negotiating tactics continued 
throughout the Trident C4 negotiations. The Carter administration’s overall 
foreign policy interests and aims influenced the terms they sought in return for 
Trident. Carter officials were unabashed in their efforts to derive the greatest 
possible benefit from the Trident C4 agreement. In particular, the Carter 
administration utilised the deal in order to gain some of the assistance they 
desired from Britain in their escalation of the Cold War against the Soviets. In this 
way, it is clear that the Carter administration viewed the Trident sale as part of 
the wider US-UK defence partnership.  
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II 
 
 
 
Handwritten note by David Aaron.4 
 
Carter’s need to respond to his growing domestic critics largely dictated his 
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As a result, the invasion was the 
catalyst for a hardening of Carter’s foreign policy. To win re-election Carter 
needed to show himself as strong and capable, and as such, he toughened his 
approach to the Soviets in the aftermath of the invasion. Moreover, he largely 
abandoned what was left of his human rights and nuclear non-proliferation 
policies. This in-turn created, in some ways, a more conducive environment for 
the administration to supply Britain with Trident C4. With the downturn in US-
Soviet relations, the Carter administration was less concerned about the impact 
of the Trident deal on future arms-control negotiations.5 The invasion of 
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Afghanistan made the US rationale for any Trident deal clearer. The invasion 
heightened the Carter administration’s need for robust allies that would 
contribute to the ‘fight’ against communism. Central to US efforts to counter the 
perceived Soviet threat would be the political and military support of NATO. 
British acquisition of Trident, alongside improvements in conventional forces, 
would be a key contribution to this. In this way, the invasion of Afghanistan 
resulted in the resolution of some of the issues preventing the finalisation of the 
Trident deal and clarified the Carter administration’s reasoning for the sale. 
However, at the same time, Carter’s political environment became even more 
hostile, and this in turn, complicated the Trident negotiations. 
Domestically, Carter’s efforts to increase his political standing failed. This 
is not surprising given Carter’s other problems: unemployment and inflation was 
rising, and the Iranian hostage crisis continued. An opinion poll in March 1980 put 
Edward Kennedy three points ahead in the race to secure the democratic 
nomination for the up-coming election. Even if the President won the nomination, 
the Republican front-runner, Ronald Reagan, was ahead of Carter in the opinion 
polls.6 
Internationally, the Carter administration’s response to the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan was widely criticised. The administration faced international 
resistance to their calls for a Soviet grain embargo and boycott of the Moscow 
Olympic Games. Argentina, who annually produced a large grain surplus, refused 
to stop selling to the USSR. After the administration’s criticism of the country’s 
human rights, the White House’s attempts to persuade the Argentinian 
government met with derision: one Argentina official remarked, “Just how does 
the Carter administration expect to get support from us, [when] it practically 
ostracized us during its first three years of office?”7 In addition, key allies, such as 
the UK and France sent athletes to compete in the Moscow Olympics. Indeed, the 
administration only convinced the US team not to attend after it threatened legal 
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action.8  
In particular, the Carter administration’s response to the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan increased transatlantic tensions. Whilst all West European 
governments saw the invasion of Afghanistan as a serious Cold War crisis to which 
the West needed to respond, there were crucial differences with the Carter 
administration on how to do so. Since the 1950s, European leaders had seen the 
reduction in East-West tensions as crucial, caught as they were in the middle of 
the military divide. As John Young notes, the “Europeans did not relish a return to 
the Cold War.”9 West European leaders viewed détente as central to creating a 
more stable East-West relationship, and as a means to undermine the Soviet bloc 
from within, by fostering awareness of the benefits of market economics, 
democracy and openness.10 The differences between the US and their European 
allies over Afghanistan also increased existing tensions over Carter’s response to 
the Iranian hostage crisis.11 Whilst the US’ European allies condemned Iran’s 
hostage taking, they were reluctant to adopt the sanctions the US proposed. The 
FRG and Italy refused. Even the UK was reluctant to support the sanctions.12 
Likewise, the United States’ allies responded to Carter’s request for 
support on Afghanistan according to their own interests and views. Thatcher 
supported the White House’s hardening of policy towards the Soviet Union. As 
such, she was, in Carter’s words, “always helpful.”13 In contrast, France, which 
wished to maintain détente, was the least forthcoming. Meanwhile, the FRG’s 
response “fell somewhere between the policies of France and Britain.”14 The FRG’s 
mixed response to Carter’s demands does not convey Helmut Schmidt’s level of 
animosity towards the administration’s response to Afghanistan. Both Schmidt 
and Giscard d’Estaing judged Carter’s response an overreaction, and concluded 
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that it was primarily an attempt to shore up his political standing at home. Indeed, 
evidence suggests that France and the FRG provided high technology shipments 
to the USSR after the US refused.15 The differences over Afghanistan deepened the 
existing rift in relations between Carter and Helmut Schmidt, who had disagreed 
repeatedly since the President’s election in 1977.16 This rift concerned the Carter 
administration. The US needed to maintain good relations with the FRG due to its 
importance as an ally, and Schmidt’s central role in preserving NATO consensus 
on the ‘dual-track’ decision. Moreover, given Carter’s already difficult domestic 
political position, the international response to his policy on Afghanistan was 
problematic. Any further hints of disputes in transatlantic relations could destroy 
his greatly eroded public standing on foreign policy. This would be detrimental to 
Carter’s hopes for re-election.  
 
With SALT II withdrawn from Senate ratification, Downing Street officials began 
to question their White House counterparts on whether the British government 
could now make a request for Trident C4. In his December meeting with Thatcher, 
Carter had assured the British that if Congress failed to ratify SALT II, “There 
would then be no obstacle to his agreeing to a request from the United Kingdom 
Government to a successor to Polaris.”17 However, despite the potentially 
indefinite delay to SALT ratification, the Carter administration continued to 
hesitate on finalising the Trident C4 agreement. On 15 January 1980, Robert 
Armstrong, John Hunt’s replacement as Cabinet Secretary, met with Zbigniew 
Brzezinski. The British official wanted to secure US agreement to move ahead with 
finalising the Trident deal. As such, he reminded Brzezinski of the problems 
further delay could cause the British. With the decision to defer Congressional 
consideration of SALT II, it could now be a year or more before Congress made a 
ratification decision. Armstrong told Brzezinski the British “could not possibly 
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wait that long for a decision.”18 Such a wait would cause delays for the Polaris 
replacement programme “which could have unacceptable consequences in the 
early 1990s” when the present British submarines came to the “end of their useful 
life.”19 Moreover, there was “considerable interest” in the subject in Britain, as 
such an “extended delay could raise questions both about the British 
Government's intentions and… the United States Government's commitment.”20  
Brzezinski’s reply to Armstrong was amicable but hesitant. He explained 
that since the Soviet invasion, he had yet to discuss the Trident C4 deal with the 
President. Nevertheless, Brzezinski “was at pains to repeat” Carter’s continued 
commitment to the supply of Trident, and that it would be  “unthinkable” for the 
British to wait a year or more until SALT ratification. However, Brzezinski 
emphasised that both sides now faced the “tactical” question “of finding [the] right 
moment (or ‘window’) for the announcement.”21 Brzezinski saw two main factors 
that they needed to take into consideration. Firstly, the next key event for ‘dual-
track’ was the delayed Belgium decision on involvement, due to take place in June. 
Brzezinski was concerned that the Trident decision “should be announced at a 
time when it would be least likely to have adverse effects on the Belgian 
decision.”22 In addition, the Soviets were still observing SALT II. Consequently, 
Brzezinski was “Anxious to make the announcement at a time when it would be 
least likely to change that situation, or to cause the Russians to try to impose new 
conditions for their own confirmation of SALT II.”23 In response, Armstrong 
agreed to inform Brzezinski of British considerations on these “tactical 
consideration at an early date”; thereafter either himself or Wade-Gery would 
visit Washington to discuss matters further. As Armstrong made clear though, the 
British would “want… to pursue this without prolonged delay.”24  
With no clear answer from Brzezinski, on 8 February, whilst in Paris, 
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Robert Wade-Gery questioned David Aaron about Britain’s request for Trident. 
During this talk, it became clear that the administration’s hesitation over any 
announcement went further than ‘technical’ considerations; they were also still 
deeply concerned about the political ramifications. Indeed, the widespread 
criticism of Carter’s response to the invasion of Afghanistan had seemingly 
heightened these concerns. Aaron explained that he had discussed the issue with 
the President, Cyrus Vance, Harold Brown and Brzezinski. The President’s 
commitment to the British “remained total.” All of the members of the meeting 
had accepted that “as things had worked out there could no longer be any link” 
between the timing of the British request and SALT II ratification. However, the 
President and his team still “did not think the present moment was the right one” 
for a British request, due to the “Afghanistan crisis in its present stage.”25 Aaron 
went on to explain: 
The Administration were [sic] already being accused, domestically and 
internationally, of over-reacting to the crisis. If they now announced a 
decision to help us over Polaris replacement, that would be seen as a 
further and extreme example of over-reaction. It might also be divisive 
of the Alliance, which was quite badly enough divided as it was.26 
In response, Wade-Gery refuted the administration’s concerns. The British 
government believed “The present juncture seemed almost ideal for an 
announcement of what many would see as a welcome sign of resolution.”27 They 
believed that the invasion would make it harder for critics both domestically and 
within the alliance, or the Soviet Union to attack the decision convincingly. The 
British had also heard “nothing to suggest that the Alliance would be divided on 
the issue.”28 Wade-Gery then, in the same manner as Armstrong, highlighted the 
problems the delay was causing the British government. Due to these problems, 
Wade-Gery explained, the British “felt strongly” that both the US and UK 
governments “should now be actively seeking to identify the ‘window’ to which 
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Dr Brzezinski had referred.”29 In the face of Wade-Gery’s earnest arguments, 
Aaron only replied whether a fixed date for a British request was “more important 
than an early one.”30 Wade-Gery replied that the British answer “Could only be 
yes. An early date was very important... But a fixed date would be an enormous 
help.” Aaron subsequently promised, “To do his best to get the President to agree 
to a fixed date… as soon as possible.”31  
On 14 February, Brzezinski, Brown and Vance discussed the timing of a 
Trident request during one of their regular working luncheons. Before this 
meeting, Jim Thomson and Robert Blackwell, assistant secretary for maritime 
affairs, wrote to the three men advising that the administration should “move 
swiftly to consummate the US/UK Trident deal… [and] should shoot to finish it in 
a month.”32 They thought the US should ‘move swiftly’ because whilst the Trident 
deal was “bound to hurt in Belgium,” if the decision was announced now “the 
political ramifications would damp-down considerably by June.”33 Moreover, 
Thomson and Blackwell believed that continued delay could cause the British to 
engage in judicious indiscretion. They explained that whilst the British were 
willing “to put up with the prospect of a few months delay” when the 
administration believed SALT II ratification would be finalised by March, with 
SALT II now “delayed indefinitely,” the British were becoming increasingly 
“concerned that election year politics will soon obviate any possibility of a 
decision this year.”34 Subsequently, Blackwell and Thomson warned, “We cannot 
count on continued silence: leaks - including ones damaging to us can be expected 
if the US continue to put the UK off.”35 
Brzezinski, Brown and Vance ignored Blackwell and Thomson’s advice. 
Instead, they decided to “wait for response from Gromyko; then consult with 
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Schmidt and Giscard: Aaron to be in touch with Komer.”36 The minutes of the 
Brzezinski, Brown and Vance meeting remain classified, so it is unclear why the 
three men decided to ignore Blackwell and Thomson’s advice, or indeed, what this 
rather cryptic decision meant. However, because of the decision Aaron did not 
contact the British about whether the President would provide a fixed date, as he 
had promised. This failure to respond occurred despite Armstrong and Wade-
Gery making clear the problems of “continued delay,” and that the British 
government found their present situation “seriously worrying.”37 Instead, when 
British officials had not heard from David Aaron by 28 February, they sent him a 
“reminder.”38 In his reply, Aaron gave no indication that the President had decided 
on a fixed date for a Trident deal, but did propose that Wade-Gery visit 
Washington in mid-March.39 Whilst this was “a slower timetable” than the British 
wanted, they had no real choice but to agree to Aaron’s proposal.40  
As Wade-Gery’s planned trip to Washington approached, the Carter 
administration had yet to decide on when the Trident deal should be finalised. On 
17 March 1980, the SCC met to discuss the issue. During this meeting, most of the 
participants agreed with Vance that the administration should give the British a 
fixed date for the exchange of letters. They also decided that June would be the 
best date, in order to avoid the Trident deal “complicating the Belgian TNF 
decision.”41 However, Brzezinski disagreed, believing it “would be preferable to 
delay until 1981.”42 He thought that the Soviet reaction to the British decision 
“could create political complications” for Carter in the run-up to the election. 
Consequently, Brzezinski suggested that the president should ask Thatcher 
whether “In view of these problems she would be willing to wait until 1981,” and 
if she was not, then the administration “would be prepared to go ahead in June.”43 
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In response, Vance and Brown argued that “The British could not count on a 1981 
commitment and… even asking the British to wait would create serious concerns 
in Britain about our commitment, leading to leaks that would be harmful 
politically and could endanger SALT.”44 The President subsequently agreed with 
Vance and Brown. Finally, the Carter administration had decided to move ahead 
with the Trident deal. Ironically, the argument that swayed the White House was 
the harm the British reaction could do politically to the administration if there 
was further delay. It is also important to note, that it was the ‘hawkish’ Brzezinski 
who wished to further delay the deal; a position that raises questions over the 
importance the Carter administration vested in the Trident C4 agreement as a 
means to ‘deter’ the Soviet Union and ‘fight’ the Cold War. 
 
Following the White House’s decision, late on 23 March, David Aaron confirmed 
that he would be willing to talk to Wade-Gery about Polaris replacement on 25 
March. On the first day of discussions, Aaron outlined the President’s decision that 
the Trident deal should be finalised in June. As Aaron explained, the White House 
had decided upon June due to three political considerations. These factors once 
again displayed the administration’s overt concern about the possible reaction to 
a Trident deal. Firstly, the administration believed that June was “a reasonable 
time after the invasion of Afghanistan, so as to minimise charges of Presidential 
over-reaction.” 45 Secondly, a June date would come after both the United States 
and Soviet governments completed, earlier in the month, a round of dismantling 
under the SALT I agreement. As such, a June date would give the Soviets no 
“excuse for dodging this obligation.”46 Thirdly, finalisation in June would come 
after the deferred Belgian decision on TNF modernisation. The Belgium decision 
had been due to take place in May, it now looked likely to take place in late June. 
Subsequently Wade-Gery enquired, “Whether it would really be vital to wait for 
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the Belgians even if they only decided in late June.”47 Aaron replied that the 
President would “Insist.”48 Once again, the ‘dual-track’ decision superseded the 
Trident deal in the Carter administration’s priorities, as well as a number of new 
political considerations following the invasion of Afghanistan. 
Nevertheless, the British had finally secured a US commitment on an 
approximate date for the finalisation of the Trident agreement. However, Aaron 
made it clear to Wade-Gery that the President’s agreement to provide such a fixed 
date came reluctantly. As Aaron explained, the “President had committed himself 
to the Prime Minister and would honour his commitment. But [he] foresaw ‘plenty 
on the downside politically’ in doing so.”49 At the same time, Aaron “Made it pretty 
clear that the Americans’ main motive for co-operating over our Polaris 
replacement was their fear that that we [Britain] would have otherwise have 
insisted on doing it on our own” thereby leading to a reduction in Britain’s 
conventional forces.50 It was as such clear that White House agreement to finalise 
the Trident deal, and even to supply the system in the first place, had not come 
very willingly. Aaron’s words, suggest that like Brzezinski, the President did not 
see the supply of Trident to the British as a priority in the Cold War. As such, 
Wade-Gery later reflected to MISC 7 about the reasons for the Carter 
administration’s hesitation: “Their essential fear is probably that a new Nassau 
Agreement will be criticised (domestically and internationally) both as damaging 
to arms-control and as encouraging Britain to stay in a nuclear league which is too 
big for her.”51  
Even though the White House had now decided to finalise the Trident 
agreement, Aaron informed Wade-Gery that the President’s concern about any 
negative reaction implied that the agreement should remain confidential “for as 
long as possible.”52 He foresaw that: 
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When the news broke, it would create a major international rumpus. 
The Russians would certainly make a big issue out of it. But the really 
worrying factor would be the reaction of America's allies, and 
particularly Chancellor Schmidt, who would accuse the President of 
doing further wilful damage to detente [sic].53 
In this way, Aaron made it clear that the widespread criticism of Carter’s response 
to the invasion of Afghanistan had sharpened the administration’s concerns about 
the political ramifications of the Trident C4 deal. Indeed, as previously discussed, 
whilst before the invasion the White House had been mainly worried about the 
French reaction, this concern now focused on Helmut Schmidt. Moreover, Carter’s 
desire to delay the announcement is a clear display of his jitteriness and 
vacillation at this time. The White House had decided upon June in the belief that 
it provided the ‘window of opportunity’ for the announcement. Nevertheless, 
Carter still wished to delay the announcement. However, as Wade-Gery 
highlighted in his reply, such a delay between the agreement and the 
announcement would be problematic. Any interval between exchange and 
publication would put Carter and Thatcher in an “impossible situation…. If they 
wanted to avoid leaks they would have to tell direct lies in answer to questions 
about where the matter stood.”54 At breakfast the next day, Aaron told Wade-Gery 
that in his conversation with the President earlier that morning, Carter had 
“accepted the need for publication to take place ‘within a few days’ of the 
Exchange.”55 This meant that over a year after Callaghan’s conversation with 
Carter in Guadeloupe, the British had secured confirmation that the US was 
prepared to supply Trident C4, and, crucially, that they would complete the deal 
before the end of their term in office. However, given the extent of the Carter 
White House’s concern over the possible political ramifications of the deal, it 
would be reasonable to question Carter’s sincerity if he had not already promised 
to supply the missile system.  
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During their two days of discussion, Wade-Gery and Aaron also deliberated on the 
terms of the Trident exchange. As a result, British officials’ concern about the price 
of Trident superseded their worries about when the deal would be finalised. As 
Wade-Gery reported to Downing Street the Trident agreement looked likely to be 
“more expensive, financially and politically, than we [the British] had hoped.”56 
 Aaron informed Wade-Gery that the Carter administration was not 
prepared to accept the Polaris Sales agreement as the terms of sale for Trident. 
The administration planned to charge the British a Research and Development 
(R&D) levy on a pro-rata basis, rather than the 5 percent charge in the PSA. The 
Carter administration believed that a five percent levy was “inequitable… and 
likely to raise the issue of a sweetheart deal on the Hill.”57 Moreover, the increased 
R&D charge was in line with US law. Since 1976, US law required that the 
government charge a pro-rata share of R&D costs. However, the President had the 
discretion to waive some of this amount, if he believed it was in the US interest to 
do so. Over the course of the discussions, Aaron made clear that to secure such a 
reduction the British would have to re-draft the exchange of letters between 
Carter and Thatcher, which would formalise the deal, to include a promise that 
the British would spend the money saved, thanks to US co-operation, on 
strengthening their conventional forces. More controversially, the British would 
also have to agree to a “number of suggestions for defence co-operation” that 
Ambassador Robert Komer, US Under-Secretary of Defence for policy, had been 
seeking MOD agreement too. Aaron made clear that the administration would give 
the British a reduction in the R&D levy “To the extent that we [The British] do 
what Ambassador Komer wants.”58 If the British could “meet enough,” of Komer’s 
requests the R&D bill would be $100 million, if they could “meet none of them,” it 
would be $400 million, and if the British could “go some of the way”, it would be 
between the two figures. Aaron also stressed that British assistance with the 
                                                          
56 Ibid. 
57 Agenda Paper, ‘Meeting of the PD-46 Steering Committee, Strategic Nuclear Cooperation with 
Britain and France’,  Circa 29 May 1980, Meetings - Muskie/Brown/Brzezinski 5/80 - 6/80, Box 
23, Subject File, Brzezinski Collection, JCL. 
58 Wade-Gery to Armstrong, ‘Polaris Replacement’, 27 March 1980, PREM 19/159, TNA. 
A Transactional Relationship 
171 
‘Komer projects’ would “score Brownie points twice over.”59 As well as securing a 
reduction on the R&D levy, it would also “make the Americans less exigent as 
regards… [Britain’s] conventional forces.”60   
Komer wanted three main things; first, the British provision of personnel 
for Rapier defences on US bases in the UK; second, United States GLCMs in the 
United Kingdom to be based in one location or the British to bear the extra costs 
of spreading the missiles; and a third request that is currently redacted within the 
British archives, but which I believe was agreement to the US plans for Diego 
Garcia.61 
My research in the British archives and, particularly, the Jimmy Carter 
library reveals, in greater detail than previously known, the link between the 
Trident C4 agreement and the Thatcher government granting the US greater 
access to the island of Diego Garcia.62 For example, David Aaron scribbled a note 
to Jim Thomson, towards the end of the Trident negotiations, which stated: “Jim: 
We need a book with all the draft letters, commitments, etc., on Diego and 
everything – in other words, a Bible.”63  
 Since the early 1970s, the UK-controlled Diego Garcia had become an 
island of great strategic importance to the US due to its military base there. 
Between 1968 and 1973, the United States and Britain exiled all 1500 – 2000 
residents from the island in order to create a US military base.64 In 1973, the US 
began to maintain a larger military presence in the northwest Indian Ocean due 
to the importance of oil tanker lanes from the Persian Gulf and the increasing 
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naval and air presence of the Soviet Union.65 The US military base on Diego Garcia 
was vital to support these deployments. 
Upon assuming office, the Carter administration began a review of US 
policy in the Persian Gulf. The administration viewed countering the “projection 
of Soviet power and influence into the region” as a “first priority strategic task.”66 
The administration also believed that the region’s power and leverage over the US 
was increasing due to “the effects of the Arab-Israel war of 1973, the oil embargo, 
increased oil prices… [the] greater importance of oil production by the Gulf states” 
and “the increased political and economic influence of the Gulf states on the 
regional and international issues.”67 In addition, the Carter White House feared 
that “revolutionary Arab nationalism” would undermine the relative stability that 
had existed in the Gulf since British withdrawal.68  
In response, the Carter White House planned to increase the presence of 
their forces in the Middle East. To do this, the administration wanted their 
European allies to “take up the slack on the NATO front” so that the US could 
allocate greater resources “to the security of the Persian Gulf in the event of a 
simultaneous crisis there.”69 Diego Garcia was the only US military facility capable 
of supporting these extra US deployments.70 The development of Diego would also 
improve US access along the Atlantic route to Southwest Asia; this would ensure 
that the US could also support operations in this region, which was another area 
of concern for the Carter administration.71 Subsequently, by December 1979 
several discussions had taken place between the US and UK governments over the 
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issue of the US being granted greater access to Diego. However, the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan accelerated the United States programme of enhancing its 
military capability in the Indian Ocean and Gulf area, including improvements to 
Diego Garcia.72  
In January 1980, US officials informed their British counterparts that they 
wanted “maximum flexibility over the long haul in the use of the facilities” on 
Diego Garcia.73 There were two parts to the administration’s planned 
developments. Firstly, the construction in 1980-81 of additional facilities which 
would support the 2000 US military personnel and current levels of operation on 
the island. Secondly, a more extensive development of facilities between 1982 and 
1985, which would support about 3000 US military personnel and mean that the 
US used nearly all the island’s 7000 acres, rather than the 3000 they currently 
occupied.74  
 It was in the interests of the Thatcher government for the US to expand its 
facilities on Diego Garcia. The US proposals were essential for the rapid 
deployment of US forces to the area “in defence of general Western interests 
particularly, oil supplies from the Gulf.”75 With the Thatcher government’s 
concern about perceived Soviet expansionism, it was logical that they would wish 
to assist the US in their efforts to temper the ‘threat’. 
 Nevertheless, the proposed developments could cause political difficulties 
for the Thatcher government. The 1982-1985 developments would “alter the 
character of Diego Garcia.”76 The British would no longer be able to maintain their 
current line that the island was a US naval support facility.77 The extensive 
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development of the island would make apparent the importance of Diego Garcia 
as a US strategic base for its operations in the Gulf and Indian Ocean. In light of 
the United States and Britain’s clearing of Diego Garcia’s native population, as well 
as what some would see as Britain giving up its ‘ownership,’ the further 
development of the island would likely bring criticism in Parliament from right 
and left. Furthermore, Britain’s agreement to the US request for greater access 
would likely bring “intense criticism from some of the Indian Ocean Littoral States 
notably India and Sri Lanka.”78 
Subsequently, on 26 January, the British government accepted “the general 
course of action” for expansion on the island during 1981-84, but informed their 
US counterparts that further discussion would be required “to get firmer 
agreement on the FY [Fiscal Year] 81-84 upgrade and more information on the 
larger plan and freer US use.”79 Subsequently the blueprint for implementation of 
the President's State of the Union message stated:  
We have begun discussions with the British on expansion of our 
facilities… The British are generally inclined to be helpful but we will 
have to work further with them in the next two or three months so we 
can revise the FY 81-84 Diego Garcia plan now before Congress.80  
Next to the last sentence, Carter wrote, “expedite.”81 The Carter administration 
utilised the Trident agreement as a means to secure British agreement to their 
plans for Diego Garcia. As will be further discussed, by the end of May, there 
remained “two major substantive issues” in the Trident negotiations: “the 
financial terms of the sale (the R&D costs) and Diego Garcia.”82 As such, it appears 
beyond reasonable doubt that Komer’s third request was British agreement to the 
US plans for Diego Garcia. 
In justifying the administration’s demands, Aaron stressed that Komer’s 
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three requests would be important for Congressional approval of the Trident 
deal.83 However, my research in the US archives suggests that this was not the 
whole truth. Komer’s three requests correspond with a list of key priorities for 
British policy that the administration drew up in the wake of Afghanistan. The 
Thatcher government “strongly approve[ed]” of the Carter administration’s 
position on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, in January 1980 US 
officials reflected they were asking a lot of their key ally in response:  
It is essential that we establish priorities among our demands on the 
British, since we have been asking much of them in recent months. In 
the defense field, we have asked for GLCM basing in the UK, future 
basing for B-52s and U-2s, enhanced transit and staging arrangements 
in the UK for U.S. forces, and an expansion of our facilities on Diego 
Garcia and less restricted access to them. While we have been 
responsive to the British in strategic nuclear cooperation we clearly 
have disappointed them on transatlantic defense trade (e.g. advanced 
Harrier development and Rapier SAMs [Surface-to-Air Missiles]).84  
The key priorities that US officials determined were remarkably similar to the 
ones that they now sought to obtain through the Trident negotiations:  
Our top priorities with the British should include: -- Enhancing 
military cooperation against the USSR, outside the NATO area. The 
British can assist us… by allowing us to enhance our facilities on Diego 
Garcia and giving us freer access to those facilities…. We will not get 
far by asking the British to increase their defense spending or commit 
more forces to NATO, since they are more than meeting the spending 
target and are cutting public expenditure. However, the British can 
help by continuing to modernize their forces and by providing more or 
enhanced facilities for U.S. forces committed to NATO, such as GLCM 
and aircraft.85  
Therefore, it is clear that the Carter administration viewed US-UK nuclear co-
operation as part of a wider transactional defence relationship. In this way, the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan both eased and complicated Britain’s efforts to 
secure a Trident deal.  
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Finally, Aaron and Wade-Gery’s discussion turned to the administration’s 
paranoia about informing their NATO allies of the Trident agreement and their 
accompanying concern to prevent any leaks. In light of the current difficulties in 
the US-FRG relationship, the White House was particularly concerned about the 
reaction of Helmut Schmidt. They thought that whilst, “there would be no question 
of the Chancellor (or anyone else) being offered a veto… he [Schmidt] would need 
‘lots of stroking.’”86 The British were sceptical that Schmidt would react in such a 
way. An unnamed official in a scribbled note to Margaret Thatcher observed: “I 
wonder whether they are not over doing Chancellor Schmidt's likely reaction: he 
has always been in favour of the Polaris deterrent.”87 Despite Schmidt’s supposed 
support of Polaris, given the current difficulties in the US-FRG relationship the 
White House was clearly jittery about his potential reaction. As such, the president 
believed that before the exchange the US and UK should send a personal emissary 
to Schmidt to inform him of the Trident decision. The administration was “much 
less worried” about the reaction of President Giscard, but agreed with the British 
position that it would “be essential to treat him no less well than the Chancellor.”88 
Concurrently, Aaron stressed that the White House still insisted that all 
communications on the subject should be between the White House and 10 
Downing Street and the Cabinet Office, with no additions to be made to this 
privileged circle.89 
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III 
 
 
Handwritten note by Margaret Thatcher 90 
 
British officials were deeply unhappy with the stance that the Carter 
administration had taken on the price of Trident. Thatcher was clearly disgruntled 
when she read the brief of Wade-Gery’s meeting with Aaron, writing over the top 
“I have read these papers with dismay. We should never have trusted the 
assurances we were given. I am not prepared to negotiate on this basis.”91 In 
notably repellent language, Wade-Gery remarked in his report, “We have long 
suspected that Ambassador Komer was the nigger in this particular American 
woodpile.”92 The approach of the Carter administration towards Britain’s R&D 
payment was not congenial nor particularly in keeping with the supposed ‘special 
relationship.’ Aaron had made clear that the Carter administration was prepared 
to act in a blatant manner in order to extract certain commitments. As Armstrong 
outlined to Thatcher, in his report on the Aaron-Wade-Gery talks, the US sought a 
transactional deal: “The United States Government is… looking to us for favours; 
but they are favours from which we shall benefit in terms of a reduction of the 
Trident price tag.”93 Indeed, Armstrong described the requests of the Carter 
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administration to Thatcher as “Komer’s shopping list.”94 
 Some of Komer’s requests would bring difficulties for the British 
government. The British provision of personnel for Rapier defences on US bases 
in the UK was the easiest for the British to agree on. In Armstrong’s view the issue 
was already “basically settled.”95 The Carter administration had agreed to buy the 
Rapier system from Britain in order to defend US air bases in the UK. The purchase 
was also in response to British concerns that transatlantic defence trade had 
become a one-way street.96 The British had already agreed to provide personnel 
for the Rapier defences, and to meet the costs of this, “on the understanding that 
they [the US] will offset that cost somewhere else (e.g. In the Trident 
programme).”97 As such, all that the Thatcher government needed to agree with 
the Carter administration was the extent of the reduction the administration 
would give on the costs of Trident in return.  
Armstrong thought that agreement on Komer’s second item, the number 
of bases for GLCMs in the United Kingdom, would be more problematic. The 
British government had agreed to base 160 US GLCMs in the UK as part of the 
‘dual-track’ decision. The Carter administration wished to base all the missiles in 
one location, as it would cost more to have them deployed over several bases. 
However, Francis Pym believed it was likely to be “politically impossible to put all 
the missiles in one base.”98 The Carter administration was now prepared to utilise 
the Trident negotiations as a means to secure the Thatcher government’s 
agreement that the UK would bear the extra costs if they insisted on spreading the 
missiles over more than one site. This position of the US suggests that they did not 
particularly care about the political problems the Thatcher government could face 
due to growing public concern over the basing of cruise missiles in Britain.99  
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Unfortunately, Armstrong’s reaction to the third item on the US ‘shopping 
list’ is currently classified. However, if the demand was greater access to Diego 
Garcia, as the author believes, the Thatcher government’s agreement would lead 
to criticism from Parliament and states surrounding the island. Moreover, if news 
of a Trident-Diego deal became public knowledge, it would be extremely 
controversial given the obvious distastefulness of such an exchange, and with the 
Chagos islanders challenging the UK’s sovereignty of the island. 
The Carter administration planned to justify the Trident sale to Congress 
by arguing that its supply meant the British government would not divert 
spending from conventional forces. However, such a justification also held the 
potential to create difficulties for the Thatcher government. Thatcher, Pym and 
Carrington believed that to support their argument, the Carter administration 
would need “tangible evidence of UK expenditure on conventional weapons 
systems.”100 However, such tangible evidence could prove difficult to supply. 
Britain’s defence budget was overstretched. The situation was, in the words of 
Carrington, one of “unrelieved gloom.”101 The budget pressures meant it was 
likely the British would have to cut their forces in the Eastern Atlantic and/or the 
FRG. This, as David Gilmore, head of the defence department at the Foreign Office, 
told John Weston, also in the defence department, was “about the worst possible 
background against which to make decisions on a Polaris successor.”102 The 
budget problems would “make it harder than ever… to argue convincingly that, in 
spite of Trident C4, we [Britain] shall be able to continue to sustain our 
capabilities across the full spectrum.”103 As such, British officials were even more 
keen “to get the Polaris successor tied up very soon,” before any news of the 
British problems reached Washington.104 
Nevertheless, as problematic as some of Komer’s demands were, the 
British government’s primary complaint was that the administration was 
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prepared to make them in the first place. On 14 April, Thatcher, Pym and 
Carrington met to discuss the outcome of the Aaron-Wade-Gery discussions. 
Thatcher told Pym and Carrington that she was “unhappy” about Carter’s 
demands. She thought, “It was as much in the interests of the American 
Government as of HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] that we should have the 
Trident.”105 Moreover, Thatcher felt betrayed: “President Carter had given her no 
hint during their talks in Washington before Christmas that he wished to attach 
conditions of the kind now envisaged to the sale.”106 Thatcher, Pym and 
Carrington understood the administration’s need to impose some conditions on 
the sale of Trident. They thought Congress might “make difficulties” if the Carter 
administration had not extracted a quid pro quo from the British, “particularly in 
the context of present problems on other fronts.”107 However, more cynically, 
ministers also thought, “Ambassador Komer had a personal interest in securing 
concessions from HMG in the areas proposed for discussion by the Americans.”108 
Consequently, Thatcher told Frank Cooper, Permanent Under Secretary at the 
MOD, that in his discussions with Komer he “should drive a very hard bargain.” 
Her ideal outcome of the negotiations, “however it was dressed up,” was that 
British government only paid the “net cost” of Trident C4.109 The British now 
needed to wait until mid-April when Komer would visit London for negotiations 
to see how successful such a strategy would be, as well as what Komer would 
constitute ‘enough’ to secure reductions in the R&D levy. 
 
On 16 April, Frank Cooper and Robert Wade-Gery met with Robert Komer. 
Immediately, Komer endeavoured to drive a very hard bargain, and was even 
more forthright than Aaron a few weeks earlier. Initially, Komer stated that the 
Carter administration believed their co-operation on the Polaris successor would 
save the British “perhaps $4 billion ie [sic] the cost of developing… MIRV 
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capability.”110 The administration wanted three commitments from the British in 
return; the first was a “satisfactory sentence” in Thatcher’s formal letter to Carter 
requesting Trident C4, that the saving would be spent on “strengthening” Britain’s 
conventional forces; the second demand is currently redacted from the archive 
document, but I believe Komer requested greater access to Diego Garcia; and the 
third demand was “hard offset” in return for a reduction in the R&D levy.  
Komer’s demand for “hard offset” dominated much of the subsequent 
discussion. If the US applied the pro-rata principle strictly to the purchase of 
Trident C4, the British would have to pay an R&D levy of about $400 million. In 
comparison, if the British were charged five percent, as they were for Polaris, the 
cost would be about $100 million. For Komer there could be no compromise: “the 
United States Government could reduce this $400 million charge only to the 
extent that they were compensated elsewhere in hard cash.”111 Komer thought 
that British provision of personnel for the US Rapier defences in Britain would 
generate “about $200 million of such compensation.” Komer believed there were 
“no other candidates for ‘hard offset’” and that the problems over the number of 
GLCM bases could be resolved through other means.112 As such, under Komer’s 
plan the British would have to pay a R&D levy of $200 million in cash. In reply, 
Cooper and Wade-Gery queried Komer’s assertion that only ‘hard offset’ could 
secure a reduction. The British understood that the President could approve a 
reduction in the R&D charge if he saw this to be in the wider interests of the US. 
Komer was extremely dismissive of such a suggestion. He stressed that whilst the 
US government did have the power to waive the R&D charges, “they only did so, 
for projects which were strategically imperative for the Alliance. A British 
replacement for Polaris did not come into this category. Indeed they were those 
in Washington who regarded it as positively undesirable.”113 Once again, a 
representative of the Carter administration adopted an attitude that was not 
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particularly in keeping with a supposed ‘special relationship,’ nor indeed one that 
displayed much believe in the utility of a British ‘deterrent’ in the Cold War.114 
In light of Komer’s uncompromising position, the British were resolute in 
their reply to the US demands. Indeed, their arguments focused on the damage the 
US approach could do to NATO, which, as discussed, was an area of particular 
concern to the White House at that moment. Cooper and Wade-Gery stressed that 
Thatcher had been “appalled” by the terms that Aaron had laid out for the supply 
of Trident a month earlier. Indeed, Thatcher felt betrayed, she had been 
approaching Polaris replacement:  
[A]nd other issues on the basis that maximum co-operation was the 
order of the day where the major security requirements of the Alliance 
were involved. Hence her robust political support on so many key 
issues; her willingness in the TNF context to accept an extra 16 GLCMs 
at almost no notice.115  
The Prime Minister had believed “that the President’s approach was the same… 
But none of this was compatible with the sort of haggling now being suggested by 
Mr Aaron and Mr Komer.”116 In this way, Cooper and Wade-Gery made clear the 
damage the Carter administration’s position could have on the US-UK alliance and 
future British support for US and NATO policy. 
Cooper and Wade-Gery also argued that the administration’s demands 
could adversely damage NATO and thus US interests. The British government saw 
the demands as inequitable. If the British “had to think in ‘offset’ terms,” Cooper 
and Wade-Gery believed Komer’s classified demand “was by itself more than 
enough to counter-balance the $400 million R&D charge for Trident missiles, 
which should accordingly be waived in full.” In addition, Cooper and Wade-Gery 
highlighted that the British purchase of Trident would give about $2 billion worth 
of work to US industry, “at a time when the procurement balance was already far 
too heavily weighted in the Americans’ favour.” They also stressed that the 
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supposed $4 billion they would save “was not extra money. It was money from 
within future defence budgets which could have been spent either… on MIRV 
development, with considerable emasculation of our [Britain’s] Conventional 
forces… or… on maintaining and strengthening those conventional forces.”117 Due 
to the Carter administration’s agreement to supply Trident, the money would now 
be spent on conventional forces, “and the whole Alliance would gain.” However, 
as Cooper and Wade-Gery stressed, if the Carter administration “now started 
loading the bill for Trident,” Britain and therefore NATO’s “conventional 
strength… would suffer.”118  
The robust British arguments “clearly took Mr Komer considerably 
aback.”119 In light of the British rebuff of the US demands Komer promised to 
report the British arguments to the White House and see that Downing Street 
received a “considered reply.” However, Komer believed the British attitude 
“would call the whole deal into question.”120 The decision to charge Britain $400 
million for R&D in hard offset “had been the President’s personally.” As such, the 
British “would be most unwise to press for it to be waived totally… if we were 
difficult over R&D, we might find less co-operation over special nuclear 
materials.”121 Komer also suggested, in his “final comeback,” that the British 
attitude “might… cause the June date for the crucial exchange of letters to slip to 
the other side of the election.”122 Again, the British were resolute in their 
response, stating that such a delay would “likely… be most unsatisfactory, for both 
parties.” Moreover, they highlighted that it “would be equally unsatisfactory all 
around if there were to be slippage” on Komer’s classified demand “to which he 
had publicly attached very great importance.”123 The meeting as such ended with 
no real progress on the terms of the Trident agreement, but evidently increased 
bad feeling between the Carter administration and the Thatcher government. 
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Throughout the discussions, Komer “was at pains to suggest” that the 
White House and Department of State were “less sympathetic” to the British cause 
than himself. Cooper and Wade-Gery did not believe this. As such, Cooper and 
Wade-Gery thought it best to circumvent Komer in their follow-up and instead 
send a personal message to David Aaron. This message would contain two 
possible compromises that the British hoped would resolve, “What is after all a 
relatively minor disagreement about R and D… we are arguing about £150-200 
million in total, out of a 10 year programme costing around £5 billion.”124 In the 
first, the British would pay $100 million for R&D, rather than their present offer 
of nothing, and the US would still owe the British the costs for Rapier manning, 
which the British government would arrange compensation for in another 
context. The second offer would be that the British would pay nothing for R&D, 
but in return would agree to waive their $187 million claim for Rapier manning, 
“this is a fairly bogus 20 year figure anyway, which probably deserves substantial 
discounting.”125 Thatcher subsequently agreed to this approach.126 However, 
Britain’s efforts to extract such terms would fail. 
 
Discussions on the terms of exchange continued throughout May. On 5 May, after 
their meeting at the White House, Brzezinski “drew… Carrington aside” to discuss 
the Trident agreement.127 Brzezinski told Carrington that he hoped they could 
settle the Trident issue by the end of June. However, Brzezinski stressed that “the 
deal would… have to be a package, including something on research and 
development costs.”128 Wade-Gery and Cooper’s robust arguments had had 
seemingly little effect on White House thinking. In reply, Carrington “refrained 
from comment, except to express the hope that early progress could be made.”129 
Through a series of exchanges, by the end of May the two sides had reached 
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a “basic agreement on the structure of the exchange.”130 This included that “the 
framework of the Polaris Sales Agreement” would form the basis of the technical 
and financial details of the Trident agreement.131 The two sides also reached 
agreement on the wording of Britain’s commitment to conventional forces in 
Thatcher’s formal letter of request for Trident C4. Originally, the Carter 
administration had wished for Thatcher’s letter to include a commitment “to use 
the savings created by the co-operation of the United States Government… to 
expand its efforts to upgrade the United Kingdom's conventional forces.”132 
British officials told their US counterparts that this wording was not acceptable to 
them because it suggested that Britain could increase its conventional defence 
spending. In response, US officials told the British that they “would strongly prefer 
to keep the language they originally proposed.”133 Their reasons were political, 
and an attempt to placate perceived US opposition to the agreement. US officials 
explained that they did not intend for Britain to make “a binding commitment 
about the size and allocation of defence funds far into the future.” Instead, the 
sentence was:  
A political statement of importance to them and to their public, which 
would demonstrate forcefully to the Congress, and to any potential 
critics, one of the reasons why it is in the interests of the United States 
to co-operate in the modernisation of the British nuclear force.134   
The White House though would be “reluctantly prepared to agree” to a British 
commitment “to take advantage of the savings created by the co-operation of the 
United States… in order to expand its efforts to upgrade its conventional forces 
[emphasis added].”135 However, because of the continued use of ‘expand,’ British 
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officials still found this new formulation “unacceptable.”136 In mid-May, 
Armstrong wrote to Brzezinski, to inform him that the Carter administration’s 
alternative wording could be made “bearable” by substituting “economies made 
possible” for “savings created” and “reinforce” for “expand.”137 The Carter White 
House agreed to this changed wording. Despite the compromise, US officials felt 
they had been “successful in obtaining a reasonably strong statement from the 
Prime Minister concerning British conventional force improvements.”138 
Nevertheless, the sentence extracted no real commitment from the British on 
conventional force spending. However, the protracted discussions over such a 
sentence demonstrated the level of the administration’s unease over possible US 
public and Congressional reaction to the deal. 
 
By the end of May, there remained “two major substantive issues...: the financial 
terms of the sale (the R&D costs) and Diego Garcia.”139 Subsequently, on 29 May, 
Edmund Muskie, Vance’s replacement as Secretary of State following his 
resignation, Harold Brown and Zbigniew Brzezinski met to decide upon Brown’s 
strategy in his upcoming meeting with Thatcher.  
 With regards the R&D issue, despite British protestations and Thatcher’s 
expressed ‘annoyance’, Carter still wanted the British to pay the full pro-rata 
share, or “offset part of those expenses by military cooperation of direct financial 
benefit” to the US.140 As discussed, the White House proposed that the British 
provide personnel for the US Rapier system in the UK, at an approximate value to 
the US of $190 million over 20 years, and “pay cash to make up the remainder of 
the $400 million.”141 From the start of negotiations, White House officials had told 
the British that a five percent charge was “inequitable… and likely to raise the 
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issue of a sweetheart deal on the Hill.”142 As discussed, the British had ignored 
these arguments.143 Originally, British officials argued that the US should waive 
the entire $400 million, “in view of all they [the British] are doing for us and the 
fact that our R&D costs are already sunk.”144 When US officials rejected this, the 
British government then “indicated willingness either to pay a 5 percent 
surcharge… along the lines of the PSA or to pick up the costs of manning 
RAPIER.”145 Again, the White House rejected the British proposal.146 Throughout 
these negotiations, US officials had “stood firm… awaiting a more forthcoming 
British proposal to put to the President “because they felt they had the major 
leverage (Trident).”147 
 With regards to the issue of Diego Garcia, US officials had informed the 
British that “the President” wanted “consultations on Diego Garcia wrapped up” 
before the exchange of letters.148 Presumably, given British classification of one of 
the US demands, Aaron and Komer informed Downing Street officials of this in 
their meetings in March and April. The Carter White House wanted the British to 
agree to their plans for expansion of US facilities in 1980-1981, and 1982-1985. 
However, British officials had “temporized” over these requests, and told US 
officials that with a “comprehensive review of Diego policy underway” the 13 June 
was their “earliest possible reply.”149 Such a wait concerned US officials:  “If the 
June 13 reply is not satisfactory, we could find ourselves in an eleventh-hour 
negotiation over Diego issues prior to the briefing of the Allied leaders at Venice. 
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We need a British reply now.”150  
In addition, the British were again attempting to “link Diego to the financial 
issue,” much to the chagrin of US officials.151 In a conversation with Aaron in May, 
Armstrong had “returned to their [Britain’s] original position that all R&D costs 
should be waived, on the grounds that Diego Garcia is enough to warrant a 
waiver.”152 US officials had rejected these attempts “to link Diego to the R&D issue 
on the grounds that our [US] activities there are in their [British] interest and that 
we are not asking them to pay the more than $1B cost of expansion.”153 However, 
despite this refusal US officials feared: 
The British may reckon that they have the major leverage now (Diego) 
because of the political flap surrounding US use of Diego in the hostage 
rescue attempt and because of a calculation that the President cannot 
politically afford a row with our closest Ally over a defense issue. They 
may feel that by standing firm on Diego they can force a last-minute 
concession from us on the R&D issue154  
This is indeed what the British strategy may have been. In May 1980, Wade-Gery 
remarked to Thatcher that it was in their interests to decide upon the R&D levy 
before the Trident announcement because, “We cannot avoid playing the Diego 
Garcia card pretty soon. To get full value for it we need first to reach agreement 
on the R and D levy.”155 Unfortunately, greater clarity on British strategy will have 
to wait until further declassification of material.  
Despite these concerns over who held the ‘major leverage’ in negotiations, 
Jim Thomson advised Muskie, Brown and Brzezinski, that Brown should “give the 
British no daylight” on the R&D levy in his  meeting with Thatcher. Instead Brown 
should “stand firm” on the current US position of the full $400 million, whilst he 
awaited “a more forthcoming UK proposal.”156 The proposal that the US would 
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accept as a compromise was a British offer to pay a five percent surcharge and 
provide personnel for the Rapier system. Aaron had already suggested this to the 
British as a “reasonable compromise” in May, although he made it clear “that he 
had no authority to offer” such a proposal.157 Thomson also advised that Brown 
should “stand firm on the President’s insistence that the Diego consultations must 
be wrapped up before the Trident letter exchange.”158 Muskie, Brown and 
Brzezinski adhered to Thomson’s advice; Brown in his upcoming meeting with 
Thatcher would “insist on a solution to the Diego Garcia problem, and… has the 
flexibility to negotiate the R&D issue on the basis of a 5% surcharge plus the costs 
of manning the Rapier system force.”159  
 
On 2 June 1980, MISC 7 met for their first meeting since December. In another 
questionable display of ‘democratic’ decision-making, the meeting finally brought 
William Whitelaw, Home Secretary, and Geoffrey Howe, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, into the “circle of those in the know,” despite on-going discussions 
since March on the terms of sale of Trident.160 MISC 7 agreed to Aaron’s suggested 
compromise on the R&D levy; that the British would pay a five percent surcharge 
and provide personnel for the Rapier system. This “could be accommodated 
within the Defence Budget.”161 With both sides now finally prepared to 
compromise on the R&D it looked likely that at least one of the remaining ‘major 
substantive issues’ could be resolved in Thatcher and Brown’s meeting.  
On the afternoon of 2 June, Harold Brown met with Margaret Thatcher. 
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They first discussed the disputed R&D levy, with Thatcher, once more, repeating 
the British government’s desire to purchase the Trident C4 missile on the same 
terms as Polaris, i.e. a five percent levy. In reply, Brown repeated the Carter 
administration’s position from the outset that they “could not agree to this 
arrangement” as it had been severely criticised in Congress. However, Brown then 
proposed that they would accept payment of a five percent levy and the British 
provision of personnel for US Rapier systems based in the UK. With MISC 7’s 
earlier agreement to such an arrangement, Thatcher was free to inform Brown 
that this compromise “would be acceptable to the British Government.”162 Finally, 
the US and UK governments had agreed on the R&D levy.  
The Trident deal was still not finalised though. Following the agreement 
on the R&D levy, Brown told Thatcher:  
That it would be necessary for the two Governments to reach 
agreement on the United States plans for extending their facilities in 
Diego Garcia in 1982-85, and on any changes in the arrangements for 
joint decisions about the use of Diego Garcia which the British 
Government might require, before the Exchange of Letters on Polaris 
replacement could take place.163  
In this way, Brown made clear that the White House was standing firm on their 
demand that the British had to agree to their plans on Diego Garcia before any 
formal agreement of the Trident deal. Despite British protestations, the Carter 
administration still clearly viewed US-UK nuclear co-operation in transactional 
terms and indeed their conduct suggests that they saw relatively little benefit in 
the supply of Trident C4 itself, bar the financial assistance with the missile’s 
development costs.  
 
On 4 June, David Aaron and Robert Wade-Gery met in Paris to discuss the matters 
outstanding on the agreement.164 During this discussion, the administration’s 
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continued concern about the political difficulties the deal could cause became 
apparent. The White House expected to be criticised over the Trident C4 deal “on 
the grounds… that it damages détente and… it will divert British defence 
expenditure away from conventional forces.”165 In particular, the administration 
was concerned that Helmut Schmidt would be “unsympathetic” and could utilise 
the US-UK deal “as a reason for going back on his commitment to TNF 
modernisation.”166 This concern reflected the Carter administration’s fear that 
Schmidt’s continuing talks with Moscow on LRTNF was an attempt to renege on 
his commitment to deploy GLCMs as part of the ‘dual-track’ decision.167 With this 
in mind, the White House now wished to publish the exchange of letters on 3 July, 
as Schmidt would be in Moscow on the currently proposed date of 1 July. The 
White House thought that if the Trident announcement took place at the same 
time as Schmidt’s trip to Moscow, this would put the Chancellor in a difficult 
position with the Soviets. Wade-Gery expected Thatcher would agree to this new 
date for the announcement.168 However, Aaron then demonstrated the White 
House’s angst over Schmidt’s reaction, as he told Wade-Gery that they were 
unable to decide whether it “would be worse to tell… Schmidt just before he went 
to Moscow, or just after. They were inclined to tell him just after, as the lesser 
evil.”169 Wade-Gery replied that the British favoured telling Schmidt before his 
visit to Moscow as “he would feel that we had been holding out on him if we waited 
till after.”170 Aaron “seemed to agree” but said he would need to consult the 
President.171   
On 10-11 June, US and UK officials met at the White House once more to 
discuss the Trident C4 deal. The meeting largely finalised the outstanding issues, 
ready for a public announcement of the agreement. The two sides agreed that the 
                                                          
165 Cabinet Office briefing, ‘Prime Minister's Meeting with President Carter - June 1980’, 20 June 
1980, PREM 19/417, TNA. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Kaufman, Plans Unraveled, 214.  
168 Wade-Gery, 5 June 1980, PREM 19/159, TNA. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
A Transactional Relationship 
192 
British provision of personnel for Rapier would be included in a separate letter 
from Harold Brown to Francis Pym, which would be delivered at the same time as 
the President’s letter. US officials would then draw on this letter in order to 
answer Congressional criticism that the R&D charge was too low.  
The two sides had previously agreed that detailed technical and financial 
negotiations would follow publication of the exchange of letters. However, in the 
previous week’s discussions, Wade-Gery had requested some “general 
reassurances relating to charges.”172 This was because the British government 
“needed to be able to deal with potential parliamentary and public criticism that 
we had put ourselves over a barrel by agreeing to purchase something without 
knowing its approximate price.”173 In response, “the Americans were pretty 
forthcoming.”174 The US officials confirmed British “calculations about the broad 
order of likely dollar costs” and that the PSA would “except in the special case of 
the R&D deal… be taken as the general pattern.”175 Of course, US assurances 
provided the British with no absolute guarantee on the terms of the Trident C4 
sale. As such, the British foresaw that settling details after “agreeing in principle” 
on terms could “in theory leave us [Britain] vulnerable to American attempts to 
load the price against us.” However, “in practice” the British saw that their “main 
safeguard” was “American awareness that the more we [Britain] have to spend on 
Trident I [C4] the less we shall be able to contribute to the Alliance’s conventional 
defence effort.”176 As such, after receiving these US assurances, UK Treasury 
officials agreed that the British government had secured everything it “could 
reasonably want under this head, in advance of the detailed negotiations.”177  
  Wade-Gery now thought that the only remaining difficulty was the 
timetable of the announcement. The White House wished for a short delay to the 
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Trident announcement due to the “great importance” they attached to Helmut 
Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing being briefed “some days ahead of the 
publication day.”178 The US were “wholly unwilling” for Schmidt to be briefed 
before his visit to Moscow from 30 June - 1 July. Whilst they would have been 
willing to make the announcement the following week, this was impossible 
because of Giscard’s visit to West Germany from 7-12 July: the US were 
“understandably reluctant to choose a publication date which would seem to 
symbolise the division between the Washington-London and Bonn-Paris axes.”179 
As such, the White House now wished the announcement to take place on 17 July. 
Wade-Gery deemed that US reasons for this later date were “fortuitous but 
convincing,” and that “it was pretty clear during my negotiations that the 
Americans do genuinely want to get this issue settled and are not just stringing us 
along.”180 Nonetheless, the new date was “tiresomely later than we [the British] 
had hoped.”181 With the upcoming election, the British wanted the Trident deal 
finalised. As Wade-Gery reported to Thatcher, in light of the Carter 
administrations repeated vacillations on the Polaris successor, the British could 
not “wholly discount the danger that some major twist in world events could panic 
them into seeking even further delay.”182 Such a delay would be problematic. 
Congress would have to ratify any Trident deal. The administration did not expect 
any problems in gaining Congressional agreement, however, by law the US 
administration had to notify Congress of the President's agreement to supply 
Trident fifty days before the deal could become effective. With estimates that 
Congress would rise on 11 October 1980 before the elections, any Trident deal 
had to be finalised by late July.183 Despite this risk, as Wade-Gery told Thatcher, 
there was “not in practice… much alternative” to the British accepting the new 
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date.184   
With the conclusion of the 10-11 June talks, much of the Trident deal had 
been finalised. However, “the double link with the Diego Garcia negotiations” 
remained unresolved.185 As Brown outlined to Thatcher on 2 June, without 
resolution on this issue there would be no Trident announcement. On 2 June, 
presumably after her meeting with Brown, Thatcher agreed to the Carter 
administration’s plans for the 1980-1981 phase of development on Diego 
Garcia.186 This left British agreement to the US development plans for 1982-1985 
outstanding. On their way to Venice in June 1980, Thatcher and Carrington 
provided UK negotiators with “revised instructions.”187 Based on these 
instructions, Wade-Gery expected US and UK officials on 13 June to “reach 
satisfactory agreement… on new rules for usage of the island.”188 Provided 
Thatcher, Pym and Carrington approved this agreement, UK officials would then 
“be in a position to tell the Americans that the Diego Garcia deal is approved - 
which we shall of course only do if we are also ready to say snap on the Polaris 
replacement deal… Negotiations will then be complete.”189 Thatcher did approve 
the terms of the Trident C4 agreement and the result of the discussions with the 
US on Diego Garcia.190 Subsequently, British officials informed the Carter 
administration that their government “accepted all US proposals for FY82-85 
expansion and greater flexibility in using island” and that Thatcher would give her 
“formal agreement to President at Venice.”191 Carter’s notes from the Venice 
summit noted, "US proposal on announcement of nuclear agreement is okay.”192 
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As a US official reflected the “Diego-Trident package [was] now in place.”193  
The US and UK government would deny in public any such notion of a 
‘Diego-Trident package’. The two governments planned to respond to any 
question on whether there was a link between the two with, “there was no linkage 
except that both the Trident arrangement and the Diego Garcia arrangement were 
examples of fruitful security cooperation.”194 Subsequently, in her biography 
Margaret Thatcher denied any link between Trident and Diego Garcia: “I also 
agreed with the objective of extending and increasing US use of the base at Diego 
Garcia; but this made sense on its own merits and had nothing to do with the 
Trident decision.”195 In this way, the British government would not reveal the full 
costs of the Trident C4 agreement to the public. Indeed, the British government’s 
continued classification of much of the information on the Diego-Trident link 
suggests that today’s government is also reluctant for the public to know the full 
price of the Trident system. Nevertheless, with this ‘exchange’ the Carter 
administration and the Thatcher government had finally reached agreement on 
the Trident C4 sale, ready for a public announcement on 17 July.  
 
IV 
 
On the evening of 14 July, David Aaron informed Robert Armstrong that news of 
the Trident decision had leaked and The New York Times planned an article for 
the following day. David Aaron pressed for the announcement to be brought 
“forward… by 48 hours.”196 Thatcher agreed to the request. Subsequently, on 15 
July 1980, Francis Pym announced the Trident C4 agreement in the House of 
Commons.197 At the same time, the British published the formal exchange of 
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letters, alongside an open government document explaining the rationale behind 
the adoption of Trident C4. Thatcher’s letter to Carter stated that they would 
assign the Trident system to NATO, like Polaris, “except where the United 
Kingdom Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake.”198 
This clause meant, under the provisions of the 1962 Nassau agreement and 1963 
Polaris Sales Agreement, that Britain could use the system independently if 
necessary. As agreed, Thatcher’s letter to Carter included a commitment that the 
United Kingdom would use the savings from US supply of Trident C4 “to reinforce 
its efforts to upgrade its conventional forces.”199 Carter’s reply stressed the 
importance of US-UK nuclear co-operation with NATO through the assignment of 
the Polaris successor and enabling Britain to “reinforce… efforts to upgrade the 
United Kingdom’s conventional forces.”200 
 In the end, there was no story on Trident in The New York Times on 15 
July. The British later learnt that the correspondent, thinking the announcement 
would be on 17 July, decided to publish on 16 July. This development did not quell 
British frustration that the Carter administration had panicked. As Armstrong 
later remarked to Thatcher “We have never received a satisfactory explanation 
from the Americans as to why they panicked.”201 The US reaction frustrated the 
British even more in light of White House’s repeated hesitation and vacillation. An 
unnamed British official’s scribbled note reveals the level of frustration: “This 
doesn't increase my respect for D. Aaron. He was stampeded by a story. It would 
have been possible not to comment and to say that an announcement would be 
made at the appropriate time, rather than to advance everything by 48 hrs.”202 
This frustration with the Carter White House was particularly marked 
because of the difficulties the advancement of the announcement created for the 
British government. The decision ensured that involvement in decision-making 
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remained restricted to a small group of ministers rather than opened up to 
Cabinet debate. Thatcher had planned to tell her Cabinet of the Trident C4 
decision on the morning of 17 July. This of course was a questionable practice, as 
it presumed Cabinet agreement. Nonetheless, it was better than what did take 
place. The decision to make the announcement two days earlier resulted in the 
Cabinet being informed of the Trident agreement by letter.203 Such procedure 
meant, “The Cabinet could not fail to recognise that their consent had been taken 
for granted if they are only asked to give it on the day on which a clearly pre-
arranged announcement is made in both London and Washington.”204 This left 
many members of Cabinet disgruntled, including the future Defence Secretary 
John Nott.205 
British officials were particularly annoyed with the advancement of the 
decision, and the resultant political difficulties, because it soon became apparent 
that the leak came from the Carter administration. British enquiries revealed that 
the Carter administration “chose to brief senior Congressional leaders six days 
before you [Thatcher] were due to tell Cabinet and did so without consulting 
us.”206 Subsequently, Armstrong commented to Thatcher: “We have successfully 
and scrupulously complied with this requirement of secrecy, and so until this 
week have the Americans: it is ironic that this leak, at the eleventh hour, should 
have come on the American side, and apparently at a political level.”207 The British 
had adhered to the Carter administration’s desire to keep information about the 
Trident C4 deal to a very small circle for as long as possible, and in the process 
undermined their own ‘democratic’ procedures. The Carter White House 
seemingly did not think the same rule of discretion should apply to themselves.  
 In the end, the Carter administration’s concern over the reaction to the 
Trident agreement was largely unnecessary. Parliament’s response to the 
announcement was “mixed but more muted” than the US embassy in London had 
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expected. William Rodgers, Labour’s Shadow Defence Secretary, “challenged the 
decision on procedural and cost grounds, emphasising that Parliament had been 
denied the opportunity to debate the decision, however, there was no official 
Labour opposition.”208 Congress also did not criticise the agreement and the 
ratification process proceeded without difficulty. Indeed, the chair of the House of 
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs wrote to Nicholas Henderson, 
British ambassador to the US, to welcome the “considerable progress” that US-UK 
endeavours were making in the “enhancement of NATO's nuclear capability.”209 
Even the Soviet reaction was relatively muted, rather than “one of injured 
outrage” as had been the case with the ‘dual-track’ announcement. British officials 
believed this was because “the [Soviet] leadership had for several months 
considered it a foregone conclusion and a decision taken with firm resolve. It was 
therefore unlike the Soviet reaction to the planned Theatre Nuclear Forces 
modernisation.”210 Most notably, after all the Carter administration’s angst, 
Helmut Schmidt approved of the Trident C4 agreement. Schmidt wrote to 
Thatcher to welcome the contribution Britain’s acquisition of Trident would make 
“towards maintaining the balance of forces.” He also expressed his appreciation 
that a solution had been found that “On the one hand meets the technological 
requirements of the coming century and, on the other, keeps within an economic 
scope that will prevent any weakening of the conventional forces of the United 
Kingdom and hence of the alliance.”211 
 
Following the exchange of letters, detailed financial and technical discussions 
took place on the terms of the Trident C4 sale. The Thatcher government had 
already agreed to the US suggestion before the exchange that they would use the 
PSA as the basis of the Trident C4 agreement. It soon became clear that the US 
wished for this to be as easy a process as possible. In July, US officials, after 
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consulting with lawyers, concluded that they could adapt the PSA “easily by an 
exchange of diplomatic notes.”212 The British thought that the new Trident 
agreement would in fact be a “major reinterpretation of the existing Polaris Sales 
agreement.”213 Nevertheless, they agreed to the US plan, as it was extremely 
advantageous to them. British officials saw that “it is much in our interest to agree 
the American proposal that the Polaris Sales Agreement, which has stood the test 
of time and is highly favourable from our point of view, should apply to Trident 
with minimal change.”214 Moreover, the US plan would also better allow the 
British government to present the purchase of Trident as the ‘modernisation’ of 
the Polaris system rather than the reality: the UK purchase of a new system, which 
would heighten its nuclear capability. British officials saw that there were “strong 
pressures to minimise the amendments required to the existing Agreement so as 
to emphasise wherever possible the continuity of US/UK collaboration.”215 
Subsequently, on 30 September 1980 Nicholas Henderson and Warren 
Christopher, US Deputy Secretary of State, exchanged letters, which agreed on the 
sale of Trident to occur under the terms of the PSA.216 
 
The financial terms of the Trident C4 agreement were harsher than the Polaris 
Sales agreement due to an increased R&D levy. The PSA included a five percent 
R&D charge. If Britain had acquired the same deal for Trident C4, they would have 
paid roughly $199 million.217 After pro-longed negotiation, the Carter 
administration secured British agreement to pay a five percent surcharge and 
provide personnel for US Rapier missile systems based in Britain.218 David Aaron 
thus speculated, “For obvious reasons, the British are likely to play this aspect of 
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the deal down in London. We will be giving it more play in Washington.”219 In 
addition, the White House placed a political price tag on the Trident deal by 
demanding a commitment on conventional force spending, and, more 
substantially, by utilising their leverage on Trident to ensure British agreement to 
their plans for Diego Garcia.  
Despite the commitments the US drew from the British, it would be a 
mistake to think that the US derived greater benefit from the deal. The agreement 
was a reciprocal one and benefited both sides. The British saw their own nuclear 
system as essential.220 A deal with the US was by far the cheapest way of 
modernising these nuclear weapons. After the disagreements over the R&D levy, 
the British only paid about an extra $200 million on what they would have done 
had they been charged five percent. In the larger scheme of the huge costs of the 
Trident system, this was a relatively small sum. In addition, US development of 
Diego Garcia, despite its political controversy, was in the overall strategic 
interests of the British. Concurrently, UK officials felt they had gained “a very good 
deal from the US (although we have to be careful not to stress this too much in 
public in case it causes embarrassment for the US administration in Congress).”221 
British officials were also bound to look favourably upon the deal because they 
had finally secured Carter’s definite agreement to supply Trident C4 with MIRV. 
Up until this point, there was no guarantee that the Carter White House would 
sign the agreement. Hesitation and delay had marred negotiations on the Trident 
C4 due to the Carter administration’s fears that its supply could hinder their 
‘priority’ policies. With Carter’s faltering domestic position, British officials were 
aware that another problematic world event could panic the administration into 
seeking further delay until after the upcoming US election. The signing of the 
agreement finally removed this risk. 
 Nevertheless, some uncertainty remained. In December 1978, a primary 
reason for the Duff-Mason report’s recommendation that the British should 
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purchase Trident C4 was the lessons of Chevaline and the need to maintain 
commonality. However, by the conclusion of the Trident C4 agreement there were 
questions over how long the system would remain in US service. In May 1980, 
Walter Slocombe, of the US Department of Defense (DOD), told the British that the 
Trident D5 was in the pre-engineering development stage. This new missile would 
have greater accuracy and a longer range than the C4. The US government did not 
plan to take a further decision on the D5 until 1983. If “they then decided to go full 
steam ahead”, the Trident D5 would enter operation in 1989. This would mean 
that by the mid-1990s all the US Ohio boats would be fully equipped with D5, 
leaving Trident C4 only in the ex-Poseidon boats, which would be thirty years old 
in 1997. This was the “‘worst case’ for C4 life.”222 As such, the C4 could go out of 
US operation shortly after it entered British service. The Trident C4 agreement 
did hold open the possibility of the British purchase of Trident D5.223 
Nevertheless, this did not mean that any future US government would allow for 
its provision on the same terms as the C4, or even that they would agree to supply 
the far more advanced D5. As British officials later reflected, as they negotiated on 
the Trident D5, the attitude of the Carter administration towards the replacement 
of Polaris highlighted the level of contingency that is innate in US-UK nuclear co-
operation: 
The present Administration is particularly well disposed to the 
concept of helping us prolong the life of the British deterrent. It would 
be unwise to assume that future US Administrations will necessarily 
take quite so positive an attitude. We have heard since he left office, 
even more clearly than we did at the time, that the 1980 agreement 
was concluded only after serious doubts on the part of President 
Carter himself had, with considerable difficulty, been overcome.224 
In addition, the British could not guarantee that the US would make a decision on 
the development of Trident D5 before their procurement of C4 had advanced too 
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far for a change of system. In July 1980, Francis Pym subsequently remarked, “The 
US Government… is not expected to decide for another two or three years whether 
to proceed with Trident II [D5]. Our own choice now could be made dependent on 
uncertain possibilities like this.”225 Moreover, the US would not necessarily 
consider British interests as they developed the D5. Indeed, when the British 
government asked the US Navy to brief them on the D5, the Navy was reluctant to 
do so as they did not want their final choice on configuration influenced by the 
‘Chevaline imperative’.226 In this way, despite the finalisation of the Trident C4 
agreement some uncertainty remained over what would happen next. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Wait for a D5 Decision: The Reagan administration and the US-
UK nuclear relationship, January - September 1981 
 
“If you were going to approach the Russians with a dove of peace 
in one hand, you had to have a sword in the other.” 
 
- Ronald Reagan. 1 
 
I 
 
On 4 November 1980, Ronald Reagan won the US presidential election. His 
victory over Carter delighted Margaret Thatcher. Upon hearing the news at 
three o’clock in the morning, Thatcher immediately sent an effusive message 
of congratulations.2 Despite their frosty beginning, Thatcher and Carter did 
come to hold one another in a certain respectful regard.3 However, Thatcher’s 
overall assessment of his presidency was negative. Thatcher later recalled that 
Carter was “inclined to drift,” he was “over-influenced by the doctrines… 
gaining ground in the Democratic Party that the threat from communism had 
been exaggerated,” and “in general he had no large vision of America’s future.”4 
Thatcher believed that the new President lacked no such vision; moreover it 
was one that aligned with her own. Thatcher was a long-time admirer of 
Reagan’s ideas, and the two had established the beginnings of a firm friendship 
in meetings before the President’s election. Thatcher and Reagan first met in 
April 1975, following Thatcher’s election as leader of the Conservative party, 
and as the former California governor prepared to run for the Republican 
presidential nomination in 1976. Reagan’s meeting with Thatcher, planned for 
forty-five minutes, went on for an hour and a half.5 Reagan later recalled, “I 
liked her [Thatcher] immediately – she was warm, feminine, gracious, and 
intelligent – and it was evident from our first words that we were soul mates 
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when it came to reducing government and expanding economic freedom.”6 
This friendship deepened during their years as head of governments, and 
indeed Nancy Reagan invited Thatcher to speak at her husband’s funeral in 
1994, and accompany her on the Air Force jet to California for the interment.7  
Subsequently, some historians view the close rapport between 
Thatcher and Reagan as the cause of a flourishing US-UK relationship, 
including nuclear co-operation; the Trident D5 agreement of March 1982 is 
seen as an example of this.8 However, whilst the rapport between Reagan and 
Thatcher did undoubtedly ease diplomatic exchanges during this time, their 
friendship is largely incidental to understanding the US-UK nuclear 
relationship. Assessments that view the Reagan-Thatcher relationship as 
central to the Trident D5 deal seemingly overlook the Trident C4 agreement 
reached between the Thatcher government and Carter administration, albeit 
not on such favourable terms. Moreover, it was the shared outlook and 
subsequent convergence of interests between the Thatcher and Reagan 
governments that strengthened the US-UK relationship during this time, and, 
as the following two chapters will discuss, enabled the British to procure 
Trident D5 at a substantially reduced price. As Geoffrey Smith writes, Thatcher 
and Reagan were “two highly ideological politicians who found themselves 
sharing the same broad philosophy.”9 As Richard Allen told Reagan, during 
preparations for Thatcher’s visit to Washington in February 1981:  
Your reunion with… Thatcher… will dramatise something rare in 
the exchanges between U.S. and West European leaders these past 
few years: a meeting of minds which encompasses not only 
philosophical affinities, similar economic outlooks, and a common 
allegiance to the idea of revitalized defense efforts, but also a tough, 
pragmatic determination to do something about them.10  
However, the Reagan-Thatcher relationship was, in part, public relations. The 
pair consciously promoted their deep rapport throughout their time in office. 
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In reality, the Thatcher and Reagan friendship was often less congenial than 
the media portrayed, and when US-UK interests did not converge, such as over 
the sanctions the US imposed on the Soviet Union at the end of 1981, the 
relationship became strained.11 Richard Aldous subsequently surmises, “Their 
presentation masked the reality of a complex, even fractious alliance.”12 
However, defence policy formed a key area of shared outlook between 
the Reagan and Thatcher governments. Throughout the election campaign, 
Reagan had explicitly cautioned against the continuation of SALT II, détente 
and the strategic efficacy of cordial relations with the Soviet Union.13 Instead, 
Reagan argued that the US needed to strengthen its conventional forces and 
modernise US strategic weapons in order to counter the growing threat of the 
Soviet Union, and to obtain Soviet adherence to arms-control.14 As Reagan 
later remarked “It was obvious that if we were ever going to get anywhere with 
the Russians in persuading them to reduce armaments, we had to bargain with 
them from strength, not weakness.”15 As had been demonstrated by Thatcher’s 
support of Carter’s hardening of policy towards the Soviet Union following the 
invasion of Afghanistan, Thatcher was supportive of such confrontational 
approaches to Cold War disagreements. Although budget restraints limited the 
Thatcher government’s ability to strengthen the UK’s armed forces, they 
nonetheless prioritised Polaris replacement. Reagan’s concurrent belief in the 
need to strengthen Western forces provided the administration with an 
implicit rationale to support the Thatcher government’s endeavours. 
Accordingly, during Thatcher’s first visit to the Reagan White House in 
February 1981, US officials reaffirmed their support for British nuclear testing 
“particularly in support of their Trident program.”16 However, a convergence 
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of interests and support for respective policies does not equate to harmony. 
This was the case with the Reagan administration’s endeavours to strengthen 
US nuclear and conventional forces, and the Thatcher government’s efforts to 
replace Polaris.  
In the summer of 1980, the Thatcher government believed they had 
made their final decision on Polaris replacement; however, this was not the 
case. In October 1981 as part of his aim to strengthen US strategic forces, 
Reagan announced that the larger and more accurate Trident D5 missile would 
replace the Trident C4 by 1989.17 This decision forced the British government 
to reassess their plans for Polaris replacement. Moreover, it required them to 
make a difficult decision about whether to settle for the C4 or upgrade to the 
D5. Underlying the British government’s reassessment, the lessons of 
Chevaline was a key consideration: if the US switched to Trident D5 whilst the 
UK kept with C4, it would entail a loss of commonality with the US when they 
phased the C4 out of service, in all likelihood only a few years after British 
deployment of the new system. The Chevaline project had starkly 
demonstrated the huge additional expenditure that would result from such a 
loss of commonality. However, there were also drawbacks to choosing the D5 
missile. Whilst the D5 offered better range, accuracy and warheads than the 
C4, this more advanced system came with an increased price tag. With the D5 
still in the early stages of research, the extent of these extra costs was 
unpredictable. Furthermore, the D5’s capabilities were entirely 
disproportionate to Britain’s defence requirements. Subsequently, the 
proposed acquisition of such a costly weapon would fuel the arguments of 
those opposed to C4. Nonetheless, following deliberations British ministers 
eventually opted for the D5 system. In March 1982, following the Reagan 
administration’s agreement to sell the system on extremely favourable terms, 
the British government signed the Trident D5 agreement with the United 
States.  
Given that archival material has only recently become available, there 
is currently no detailed analysis of the Reagan administration’s role in the 
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formulation of the Trident D5 agreement. This omission significantly limits 
understanding of the agreement. Within much of the historiography, analysis 
of the US role is limited to discussion of the aggressive stance of the Reagan 
administration towards the Soviet Union and the Reagan-Thatcher 
friendship.18 These analyses focus predominantly on the final D5 agreement, 
and infer, from aforementioned contrived reasoning, an explanation for the 
favourable terms. Additionally, some accounts ignore the US perspective 
almost entirely.19 Such approaches implicitly suggest that the United States 
will provide nuclear assistance to Britain when requested to do so, on the 
terms the British government desire.  
  Subsequently much of the existing literature portrays the US supply of 
Trident D5, at a substantially reduced price, as a near certainty. For example, 
Richard Aldous, referring to the Reagan administration’s adoption of the D5 
system states: “Certainly this was not a repeat of the situation in 1962 when a 
similar change of technology - from Skybolt to Polaris - almost left the British 
without a nuclear weapons system. Now there was no question of Britain not 
being offered the new weapons.”20 Whilst Geoffrey Smith emphasises the role 
of the Reagan and Thatcher friendship in the conclusion of the Trident D5 
agreement: 
The atmosphere of the discussions between the American and 
British teams was very different from the hard bargaining that 
characterises most international deals… There was a special reason 
for that. The American team… knew that the President expected 
them to reach an amicable settlement.21  
In a similar vein, John Dumbrell asserts that Thatcher was able to negotiate a 
deal for the D5 on more generous terms than the C4 by, “exploiting Reagan’s 
good opinion of her.”22 In addition, some scholars, by focusing primarily on the 
favourable terms of the final D5 deal rather than the process of its negotiation, 
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have viewed the agreement as representing a ‘renewal’ of the US-UK ‘special’ 
relationship. Again, Richard Aldous states, “The offer to share the new D-5 
system reinforced the ‘special nature’ of the defence relationship between 
Britain and the United States in nuclear technology, and by extension that 
between the president and the prime minister.”23 
However, as the following two chapters will demonstrate, the Trident 
D5 agreement was not a foregone conclusion, nor did it represent the ‘renewal’ 
of the US-UK nuclear relationship. The following two chapters examine 
preliminary discussions between the Thatcher government and the Reagan 
administration about a possible British D5 upgrade and the subsequent 
Trident D5 negotiations. The two chapters place these US-UK discussions 
within the context of the Reagan administration’s aims and interests, in order 
to gain a deeper understanding of the timing and shape of the Trident D5 
agreement. Together the two chapters highlight how the D5 agreement was 
not a foregone conclusion, but rather a continuation of the close but not 
foreordained nature of US-UK nuclear co-operation, one that had been 
renegotiated, according to the varying interests of both parties continually 
over its existence.  
Upon Reagan’s election, the British faced a difficult period of unease as 
they waited for the administration to make a decision on whether to upgrade 
to the Trident D5 system. The British government was fortunate that the 
Reagan administration made a decision on their strategic modernisation 
programme earlier than expected. Subsequently, in September 1981 the 
British government received a formal confirmation that the US would upgrade 
to the D5 and that it would be available to them. However, this guarantee to 
sell Trident D5 did not come with a reassurance that they would sell it at a 
reduced price. The British could not begin discussion on the price of D5, or 
make a decision on whether to upgrade, until Reagan announced his strategic 
modernisation programme in October 1981. Subsequently, throughout most 
of 1981 British decision-making on Polaris replacement was at a standstill. 
This ‘Wait for a D5 Decision’ will be discussed in this chapter.  
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II 
 
 
 
 
The Reagan administration’s primary aim in its policy towards the Soviet 
Union was to “blunt and contain Soviet imperialism.”24 To do this the 
administration believed that the United States needed to engage in strenuous 
military, political and economic competition with the USSR. Subsequently, 
from 1981-1983, the Reagan administration adopted a highly confrontational 
policy towards the Soviet Union.25 The administration’s fundamental 
assumptions about the Soviets shaped not only the Reagan administration’s 
basic posture towards the USSR, it largely determined their strategies and 
policy goals. As Richard Allen, Reagan’s National Security Advisor, told the 
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President, “East-West relations will form the basis of our entire foreign 
policy.”26 In this vein, unlike much of the Carter administration, supplying 
Trident to the British would be conducive to the overall foreign policy and 
defence aims of the Reagan administration.  
The election of Ronald Reagan brought a hardening in US foreign policy 
towards the Soviet Union. In some ways, Reagan’s campaign rhetoric 
resembled Carter’s after he had hardened his approach towards the Soviet 
Union following its invasion of Afghanistan. However, Reagan had repeatedly 
warned about the communist threat to US security for many years, and long 
before Carter’s reappraisal. He believed, in contrast to many US policy-makers 
before him, that the Soviet Union could not be contained. Reagan believed that 
due to their adherence to a communist ideology, the Kremlin sought to 
overthrow democratic governments throughout the world and to replace 
them with communist systems. Only when the Soviets moved away from a 
communist system would the USSR’s threat to the United States be 
neutralised.27 Reagan maintained that it was imperative for the West to 
overcome communism, before communists overthrew the West: “The West 
won’t contain communism, it will transcend communism… it will dismiss it as 
some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being 
written,” Reagan asserted during a 1981 commencement address.28  
The increase in Soviet military strength in the preceding decade 
supported the Reagan administration’s hypothesis. By the early 1970s, the 
Soviets had achieved strategic parity with the United States. The Soviet Union 
now had numerical advantages in land-based ICBMs and SLBMs. Reagan 
deplored what he perceived to be the loss of US strategic superiority; he 
considered it the ultimate guarantor of national security. Increased Soviet 
conventional forces, particularly naval strength, also alarmed him. He warned 
that these new conventional capabilities supported a Soviet “drive for 
dominance in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, Africa and the South Atlantic” 
                                                     
26 Allen to Reagan, ‘National Security Council Meeting September 15 1981 - 4:00 - 5:00 PM’, 14 
September 1981, NSC00021 15 Sept 1981, Box 3, NSC: Meeting Files, RRL. 
27 Fischer, The Reagan reversal, 18. 
28 Reagan, ‘Commencement Address at Notre Dame’, 17 May 1981, The Public Papers of 
President Ronald W. Reagan, RRL, accessed 28 January 2015, 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/51781a.html. 
The Wait for a D5 Decision 
212 
 
and threatened the “political independence of our allies and access for them, 
and us, to raw materials and the freedom of the seas.”29 Moscow repeatedly 
rejected Reagan’s “questionable charge” that the Soviets had military 
superiority.30 Indeed, the size of the Soviet military efforts and the purpose of 
this vast expansion of military capabilities divided US intelligence 
professionals.31 Nevertheless, Reagan asserted that the Soviet Union had been 
engaging in “the greatest military build-up in the history of man” and that it 
was “plainly… offensive in nature.”32 
The new president believed that whilst the Soviet’s had been building 
up their capabilities, the West had shown weakening resolve. Reagan 
maintained that Jimmy Carter had “sacrifice[d] our technological lead” by 
cancelling some advanced weapons, such as the neutron bomb and cutting the 
funding, and delaying the deployment of others, such as the MX missile and the 
Trident submarine. He was particularly critical of Carter’s decision in 1977 to 
halt production of the B1 bomber.33 Reagan’s criticisms of Carter were 
unsurprising: every presidential candidate distances themselves from their 
opponent. However, Reagan also condemned the détente policies of his 
Republican predecessors, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford.34 Reagan believed 
that the Soviets were using détente to lull the United States into self-restraint, 
whilst the Soviets forged ahead. In particular, Reagan asserted that the policies 
of the late 1960s and 1970s, in particular the SALT negotiations, had enabled 
the Soviet Union to gain military superiority over the US, most crucially in the 
area of nuclear arms.35 Reagan believed that US nuclear superiority provided 
the strongest guarantee of security. He feared that Soviet leaders thought they 
could emerge victorious from an all-out nuclear exchange.36 As such, instead 
of the policies of détente and Mutually Assured Destruction, Reagan argued 
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that the United States should aggressively compete against the Soviet Union, 
particularly in the overall military balance.37 
The Reagan administration saw the restoration of a “satisfactory 
military balance” with the Soviet Union as an imperative.38 Demonstrating this 
importance, in March 1981, the White House proposed the largest military 
budget in US history. Defence expenditure would consume more than 30 
percent of the federal budget between 1981 and 1985.39 This money would be 
spent redressing the ‘imbalance’ in nuclear forces through a comprehensive 
modernisation programme, and modernising conventional forces “in order to 
respond to Soviet actions throughout the world without necessarily having to 
resort to nuclear weapons.”40 This priority of the Reagan administration 
meant that it looked likely they would take the decision to replace the Trident 
C4 with the D5. Moreover, at face value, the supply of Trident D5 to the British 
would aid the administration’s efforts to respond to the Soviet ‘threat’. British 
acquisition of the advanced system would bolster the West’s strategic nuclear 
strength, whilst the savings that the British made by purchasing the US system 
could be used on the UK’s conventional forces.  
In addition, the Reagan administration’s approach to arms-control also 
suggested that the supply of Trident D5 to the British would be readily 
forthcoming, in contrast to the early Carter administration. In 1981, the 
Reagan White House viewed arms-control issues as a low priority. Throughout 
his election campaign, Reagan said he would reject the SALT II treaty, arguing 
that it only bolstered the military imbalance. Instead, he planned to restore US 
defences in order to negotiate from a position of strength, and then seek deep 
reductions in nuclear arsenals.41 Reagan believed that in the meantime US 
arms-control policy should seek to enhance “national security by limiting 
Soviet systems most threatening to the US.”42 Such an approach made 
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agreements with the Soviets in the near future unlikely: indeed, in September 
1981, Allen told Reagan “Do not expect near term agreements.”43 
Subsequently, from 1981-1983, the Reagan administration’s approach to 
arms-control stymied progress. Instead of SALT II, in November 1981, the 
administration proposed the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). The 
purported purpose of the talks was to reduce the overall number of strategic 
weapons in the superpowers’ arsenals. However, Reagan refused to begin 
negotiations until June 1982. Moreover, the administration proposed a cap on 
land-based warheads that would have required the Soviets to destroy more 
than half of their arsenal, whilst allowing the US to increase its numbers. As 
Moscow relied primarily on land-based missiles for its ‘deterrent’, reducing 
them by half would have weakened its position vis-à-vis the West.44 Given the 
administration’s confrontational rhetoric and military build-up, the one-sided 
proposal appeared disingenuous. Understandably, the Soviets rejected the 
proposal, calling it a “propaganda ploy.”45 With such an approach on arms-
control, the Reagan administration was unlikely to be concerned about the 
affect the supply of the D5 to the British on US-Soviet arms-control efforts.  
 
The administration also viewed strengthening the Western alliance as 
essential to countering the Soviet threat. As Secretary of State Alexander Haig 
told Reagan, in April 1981, “Rebuilding Alliance solidarity is a precondition for 
redressing the East-West military imbalance and for constraining Soviet 
international behavior.”46 However, as Haig went on to tell Reagan, repairing 
the alliance would be “no easy task.”47 Indeed, following Reagan’s election the 
difficulties that had beset US-West European relations during the Carter years 
only continued. These differences mainly arose for two reasons: firstly, many 
of Reagan’s NATO allies could not subscribe to Reagan’s approach due to the 
financial and political constraints they faced, and secondly, many NATO 
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governments simply did not agree with the tactics that the Reagan 
administration was proposing.   
In the early 1980s, many West European governments faced economic 
and political difficulties that hindered their ability to strengthen defence forces 
in the way the Reagan administration wished. In most European countries the 
problems that had beset the global economy during the 1970s continued, with 
unemployment remaining high, alongside low, or non-existent, economic 
growth. This contrasted with the renewed growth of the US economy. As Piers 
Ludlow notes, “It may have been ‘morning in America,’ but on the other side of 
the Atlantic, dawn showed no sign of breaking.”48 Consequently, the US 
attempt to impede Western European companies from supplying components 
to the gas pipeline running from the Soviet Union to West Europe, met with 
considerable opposition from European governments. This outcry was partly 
because of the resultant painful economic costs of the White House’s policy, as 
much as not agreeing with such crude means for demonstrating Western 
disapproval of Soviet actions in Poland. European countries needed to increase 
their foreign trade outlets, not reduce them. With Western European countries 
having built more substantial commercial ties with Eastern Europe than the 
United States, the FRG, France and Britain had far more to lose from using 
economic sanctions as a blunt tool in levering pressure on the Soviet Union.49  
Many NATO allies also faced difficult political circumstances, with left-
wing politics resurgent across Western Europe. As Haig told Reagan: 
“American and European politics are largely out of phase, with 
environmentalism, anti-nuclear sentiment, and a hunger for disarmament on 
the rise in many Allied countries.”50 Following the NATO ‘dual-track’ decision 
of December 1979, the peace movement had grown rapidly, with mass 
demonstrations across Europe. Whilst these protests were left-wing in nature, 
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those involved could not be dismissed as “apologists for Communism.”51 
Participants were predominantly middle-class liberals, genuinely concerned 
about the possibility of nuclear war. As David Holloway rightly observes, “Very 
large numbers of people found it hard to believe that the addition of new 
nuclear-armed missiles would lessen the danger of war in a continent where 
many thousands of nuclear weapons were already deployed.”52 In these 
testing circumstances, European leaders found it difficult to respond 
favourably to the administration’s urgings that their governments should 
adopt a hard-line stance in the Cold War. The policies that the Reagan 
administration proposed would be extremely financially and politically costly 
to their European allies. Given the economic situation within Europe, it would 
be difficult for NATO governments to afford, let alone justify, a sustained 
military build-up. Moreover, given the anti-nuclear sentiment that existed, 
NATO rearmament would come at a high political price. As Haig told Reagan, 
European leaders had to take into account their political and economic 
situations “not only to maintain support for U.S. and Alliance policies but also 
to survive and to keep their parties from collapsing.”53 
However, at the heart of tensions in transatlantic relations during the 
early Reagan years were differences in tactics. These divergences did not 
emerge because West European leaders did not perceive a rise in East-West 
tensions during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Helmut Schmidt had initially 
pushed for a NATO response to the threat of Soviet SS-20s, a move supported 
by his fellow European leaders. Moreover, all Western European governments 
saw the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and events in Poland during the winter 
of 1981, as serious Cold War crises to which the West needed to respond. The 
divergences arose in deciding how to respond, in large part due to differing 
political outlooks. In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration was adopting 
a forceful and confrontational stance towards the Soviet Union, even as this 
fuelled increases in East-West tensions. As previously discussed, the 
remarkable rise of the conservative right in the US, alongside increased US-
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USSR tensions over Soviet adventurism in the ‘third world’, meant that 
Reagan’s move away from détente was widely supported in his homeland. 
Within Europe, there had been less of a backlash against détente. Willy 
Brandt’s policy of Ostpolitik had brought successes through normalising 
relations between the FRG and Eastern Europe, whilst the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was still held in high prestige. In 
addition, many Europeans viewed the disarmament component of the ‘dual-
track’ decision as immensely important, especially given the mass protests 
against LRTNF deployment. Subsequently, unlike Reagan, European leaders 
were under pressure to continue direct dialogue with the Soviets.54  
Different political outlooks between the US and its key NATO allies 
aggravated these divergences in Cold War tactics: The US and Britain moved 
to the right, well before Germany. At the same time, France swung to the left, 
with the Presidential election of François Mitterand, leader of the Parti 
Socialiste, in May 1981. The replacement of the centrist Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing, described by Schmidt as the "most pro-American French leader 
since World War II," with a socialist-led coalition, that included some 
Communist minsters in Cabinet, was “bound to complicate transatlantic 
relations.”55 Indeed, Hubert Védrine, Mitterand’s diplomatic advisor in the 
1980s, later recalled, “The attitude and the policy of François Mitterand 
towards the United States can be summarised as ‘Friend, Allied, not aligned.’”56 
In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration subsequently faced a NATO 
alliance that was, overall, unlikely to adopt a hard-line approach to the Soviet 
Union and build up their defence forces as the White House wished. 
The Thatcher government was a key exception to this lack of support 
from European capitals for Reagan’s military build-up and confrontational 
approach to the Soviet Union. Margaret Thatcher was vehemently anti-Soviet, 
and desired a strong US-UK relationship. Subsequently, in briefing the 
President for Thatcher’s State visit to Washington in February 1981, 
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Alexander Haig described Britain as the United States’ “most reliable ally.”57 
However, as Haig also acknowledged, whilst Thatcher was strongly committed 
to improving alliance defence, Britain’s economic troubles and Thatcher’s 
subsequent political difficulties limited her ability to do so.58 
Margaret Thatcher had been elected in 1979 promising a fresh start for 
Britain’s troubled economy. The UK during the late 1970s had seen double-
digit inflation, which provoked social unrest. This culminated in the infamous 
‘winter of discontent’ and the downfall of the Callaghan government. Thatcher 
promised radical changes to the British economy and the end of the Keynesian 
consensus. The principle aim of Thatcher’s economic policy was to bring 
inflation under control, even if this meant a rise in unemployment. In 
Thatcher’s view, the end would justify the means. However, as Geoffrey Howe 
conceded, “There was a danger that unemployment could be ‘unpalatable’ and 
[it] was likely to cause ‘social strain’.”59 This happened. By the time of Reagan’s 
election, many were judging the economic policies of the Thatcher government 
a disaster. Unemployment had soared to ten percent of the workforce, workers 
in the public sector were threatening to strike and the problems of inflation 
persisted.60  
By January 1981, Thatcher’s political popularity had eroded. Whilst 
Thatcher enjoyed a substantial parliamentary majority, her political future 
looked uncertain due to the failure of her neoliberal monetarist policy. Critics, 
both inside and outside the Conservative party, were calling for a U-turn on 
economic policy. With the next election due by May 1984, Political 
commentators predicted that if there was no reversal in the economic 
downturn by late 1982 or 1983, Thatcher’s leadership of the Conservatives 
would be challenged. Consequently, when Thatcher visited Reagan in 
February 1981, it generated strong media interest, not only because of her 
perceived closeness to the new President, but also the political difficulties that 
her belief in free-market economics had wrought. The Economist published a 
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front-page depicting caricatures of Thatcher and Reagan at the seaside, with 
an unflinching Prime Minister beckoning an uncertain looking President into 
the water, with the line “Come in, it’s freezing.”61  
Throughout the spring of 1981, Thatcher’s problems only deepened, 
and in the summer, arguments over Thatcher’s economic direction came to a 
vehement, and violent, head. In March 1981, Thatcher and Geoffrey Howe 
identified the budget deficit as the key factor preventing economic growth. 
Having failed to cut public spending, Howe took what he saw as the only option 
to get the deficit under control: tax rises. The result, as Richard Aldous 
succinctly writes, “Was a primal scream of national outrage.”62 Howe’s policy 
broke post-1930s economic thinking on what to do at a time of recession and 
high unemployment. 364 leading economists sent a letter to The Times 
denouncing government policy. Over the summer, a series of riots erupted 
across Britain, and the subsequent frightening images of violence, looting, and 
burning dominated the news. Racial tensions and insensitive policing helped 
fan the flames. However, with unemployment verging on twelve percent, and 
with a heavy concentration of this outside the prosperous ‘home counties’ of 
Southeast England, Britain was dangerously divided. Thatcher, with Britain 
close behind, seemed to be heading towards serious crisis.63 
Thatcher’s political situation deeply concerned the Reagan 
administration. At the end of July, the US ambassador to Britain, John Louis, 
compiled a detailed report on Britain’s political troubles. Demonstrating the 
importance the administration placed on the viability of Britain as an ally, 
Richard Allen believed the report “important enough to bring to the 
President’s personal attention.”64 Louis’s report must have made alarming 
reading for the President: Thatcher’s weakened position made both her ability 
to support US policy and her re-election hopes increasingly precarious. 
According to Louis, the Thatcher government had “visibly lost its grip on the 
rudder in recent weeks,” and the centre swing-vote, which had won the May 
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1979 election for Thatcher, was “deserting the Tories.”65 Thatcher’s precarious 
political situation would inevitably affect her government’s ability to offer its 
usual unwavering support for US policy. Louis subsequently warned that the 
administration, “Must prepare… for a period in which we shall have difficulty 
counting fully on our usually staunchest ally, even as Thatcher will be clutching 
our coattails.”66  
Moreover, Thatcher’s political woes worried the White House because 
it meant that a Labour victory or a Labour led coalition in the next election 
looked increasingly likely – a result that would not be conducive to the 
administration’s interests. Following its 1979 election defeat, Labour became 
embroiled in a bitter left-right struggle over policies and control of the party 
itself. Following Callaghan’s resignation as Labour leader in 1980, the left wing 
Michael Foot won the leadership election, after winning the support of some 
centre-ground Labour MPs who concluded that he would be the best 
compromise candidate. Foot though was not successful at promoting party 
unity and the battle for control of the party continued. In January 1981, Labour 
held a special conference to decide new rules for electing the party leader. In a 
victory for the ‘radical’ left, the conference voted for a system whereby MPs 
and party members would have 30 percent of the Electoral College each, with 
the remaining 40 percent assigned to trade unions. The decision was the final 
straw for many moderates in the party. Due to the issue of some trade union 
leaders’ voting, without consulting their membership, former Cabinet 
minister, Shirley Williams, declared that the decision meant “four trade unions 
barons in a smoke filled room” would elect the next Labour Prime Minister.67 
The next day, David Owen, Shirley Williams, Roy Jenkins and William Rodgers 
relinquished their Labour membership, and in March 1981 started a new 
party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP). 
These developments had serious ramifications for the direction of 
Labour’s defence policies. The party had yet to decide its foreign and defence 
manifesto commitments for the next election. However, many within the party, 
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especially on the left, had strong reservations about the UK purchase of 
Trident, opposed US cruise missiles based in Britain, and favoured cuts in 
defence spending, arguing that the country could not afford the Thatcher 
government’s plans.68 With many on the centre-left of the Labour party now 
defecting to the SDP and the ‘radical’ left in ascendance, it seemed likely that a 
Labour government would adopt defence policies that were antithetical of the 
Reagan administration’s aims.  
The Reagan administration was deeply concerned that the election of 
Labour would seriously undermine their efforts to strengthen NATO. As 
Richard Allen told the Vice President George Bush, in February 1981, “The 
policies being expounded [by Labour] are clearly at odds with US interest in 
an important British contribution to Alliance security…. We are concerned that 
a Labour mandate in 1984 could well pose significant problems in US-UK 
relations.”69 Similarly, Alexander Haig told Reagan, “The policies being 
expounded by the [Labour] left, which is ascendant, would seriously detract 
from the UK's role in NATO.”70 The chances of a Labour party securing a 
Parliamentary majority with such an ideological programme as the one the 
administration feared were doubtful; such policies would be “hard for some in 
the party to swallow, let alone the wider public.”71 However, even as a minority 
the Labour party presented a threat to the Reagan administration’s foreign 
policy interests, “capable of touching off a European slide down the anti-
nuclear chute.”72  
Subsequently, due to the foreign policy aims of the early Reagan 
administration, the Thatcher government faced favourable circumstances in 
their efforts to secure assistance from the White House for Polaris 
replacement, even if that meant, due to changes in the US strategic nuclear 
programme, a new agreement. In addition, faced with reluctant allies in 
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Europe and a troublesome opposition in Britain, the Reagan administration 
had a deep interest in aiding the Thatcher government’s efforts to strengthen 
Britain’s defence forces by offering assistance with their economic troubles. 
However, despite this convergence of interests in early 1981, the British 
government still faced considerable uncertainty in its efforts to finalise Polaris 
replacement, as they waited for the US to make a decision on their strategic 
nuclear programme.  
 
III 
 
On 11 March 1981, Caspar Weinberger, Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, 
reassured his British counterpart, John Nott, that the administration would 
“make available to the UK whatever Trident missile option” they selected as a 
follow-on to Trident C4.73 Weinberger’s commitment was, as David Gilmore, a 
senior civil servant within the Foreign Office, remarked “surprisingly forth-
coming.”74 The assurance came after Nott mentioned, during a meeting on 
other matters, the difficulties that would arise for the UK if they continued 
procurement of Trident C4 whilst the US moved to the adoption of D5.75 
Without prompting, Weinberger offered his reassurance. As one British official 
remarked, Weinberger, “was answering a question which our side had not 
actually asked him.”76  
The history of US uncertainty over the supply of MIRV systems to the 
British made Weinberger’s forthcoming assurance even more remarkable. The 
follow-on to Trident C4 was the D5 missile system. The Trident D5 was “not 
just a modernised C4” but “a completely new missile.”77 Alongside the MX 
missile, the D5 was at the forefront of US ICBM technology. It could be MIRVed 
to 14 re-entry vehicles per missiles; the limit permitted by the provisions 
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negotiated in SALT II.78 Consequently, the D5 system would provide the British 
with far greater operational capability than the C4.79 Weinberger’s 
forthcoming attitude about the provision of such an advanced MIRV system 
was in marked contrast to the Carter administration’s reservations over the 
provision of C4, and doubts that the US would supply Poseidon in the 1970s. 
This contrast is not surprising given the administration’s attitude towards 
arms-control: Reagan had campaigned on the need to strengthen the West’s 
nuclear forces and defer strategic arms-control negotiations. However, as 
remarkable as Weinberger’s assurance was, the British government remained 
uncertain about the future of Polaris replacement.  
Weinberger’s assurance was no guarantee that the administration 
would supply the D5 to the British on the same terms as C4. As Gilmore 
remarked to Antony Acland, a senior British diplomat:  
Weinberger's remarks to Mr Nott were no guarantee that the US 
government as a whole would agree to a simple amendment of the 
Trident I Agreement in the way suggested. We certainly should not 
bank on American readiness to supply us with Trident II/D-5 on 
exactly the same terms as Trident I.80  
Moreover, Weinberger’s commitment was not a firm guarantee that the 
Reagan administration would be willing to supply D5. As an unnamed official 
reminded Nott, whilst Weinberger’s comments provided “as clear an 
indication” as the British “could reasonably wish for of DOD’s full support,” a 
firm commitment could only come from Reagan himself.81 It soon became clear 
that little thought had been given to the possibility of a British Trident D5 
outside of the Pentagon. In early 1981, Ron Mason had “come close to giving 
the impression” to State Department officials that if the US were greatly to 
accelerate the D5 programme, the British government might want to procure 
this system rather than the C4. This, alongside Nott’s conversation with 
Weinberger, provoked confusion amongst US State Department officials about 
the British government’s policy on Trident. Subsequently, two officials from 
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the State Department, Robert Blackwill and Jim Dobbins, made enquiries to 
John Weston, a senior Foreign Office official, in order to ascertain whether 
these “intimations… were a reflection simply of MOD thinking… or whether 
there lay behind this a more formed position on the part of HMG?”82 The 
officials needed to know because if their “were any disposition to alter the 
preferred British course, the State Department would wish to put a 
memorandum to Haig soon.”83 As forthcoming as Weinberger’s assurance was, 
it was not a formal guarantee that the administration would supply D5 to the 
British.  
Uncertainty about how central a role the DOD would have in obtaining 
the President’s agreement to supply D5, and any subsequent Trident 
negotiations, further undermined the solidity of Weinberger’s assurance. The 
National Security Council, under the directorship of David Aaron, Brzezinski’s 
deputy, had led the Trident C4 negotiations. Indeed, Brzezinski and Aaron 
played central roles throughout the preliminary discussions on Polaris 
replacement, and in the formulation of the eventual C4 agreement. In 1981, it 
seemed unlikely that the NSC would have the same influence in any Trident D5 
agreement. Upon entering office, the Reagan administration created a new 
position, the White House Counsellor, who would oversee both foreign and 
domestic policy. Due to having a small staff, budget, and no real operational 
capabilities, the NSC derived almost all their bureaucratic power from a close 
working relationship with the President. With Richard Allen having little 
standing with the President anyway, the creation of this new role severely 
reduced the influence of the National Security Adviser.84 
 Concurrently, Alexander Haig was making a strong effort “to become 
the ‘vicar’ of foreign policy and indeed to control the entire conduct of 
American international relations.”85 On 6 January 1981, during his first real 
discussion with the President-elect, Haig set forth views that there needed to 
be a single manager of foreign policy, co-ordinating the different elements and 
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serving as the administration’s spokesman. Haig noted in his memoir that 
Reagan “nodded after each point and agreed.”86 Haig subsequently believed 
that he had been given exclusive responsibility for foreign policy. On the day 
of Reagan’s inauguration, Haig submitted to the President, through his 
Counsellor Edwin Meese, the draft of a proposed directive National Security 
Decision Directive (NSDD)-1. This directive assigned responsibilities in the 
field of national security. Haig, after consulting with Weinberger, Allen, and the 
Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, had worked out the respective 
responsibilities of each, and a structure for foreign policy decision-making that 
confirmed his dominant role. White House officials did not pass the directive 
onto the President for approval. Meese, and his associates in the White House 
Staff, believed that Haig was making a “powerplay” by attempting to push a 
new President into making a premature decision that would give too much 
authority to senior Cabinet officials at the expense of the President and White 
House Staff.87 NSSD-1 was not issued until a year later, and then in a 
considerably modified form.  
 In the meantime, the State Department vied to exert their lead over US 
foreign policy and the US-UK nuclear relationship with it. Under the previous 
administration, there had been a single channel of communication on matters 
relating to US/UK nuclear co-operation through the NSC at the White House. 
However, as Blackwill reminded Weston, during their meeting in March 1981, 
“responsibility for these matters had now been transferred to the State 
Department.”88 Blackwill saw Weinberger’s March assurances that the 
administration would supply D5 as an intrusion on this, and subsequently 
expressed his belief that there was “a case for tightening the lines of 
communication. It would help the Americans to avoid misperceptions or 
misunderstandings if there could be one single source of information for the 
subject matter in question.”89 Of course, he and his colleagues believed that 
this single line of communication should be with the State Department. 
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Therefore, despite Weinberger’s extremely forthcoming assurance, the British 
could not view it as a guarantee that the D5 system would be made available 
to them. With the NSC side-lined, and the State Department wrestling for 
control of US-UK nuclear co-operation, it looked likely that Haig’s, presently 
unknown, opinion would be decisive in whether the British would be offered 
D5. 
 
In the spring of 1981, in order to negate the problems that a change of missile 
system could cause for the Polaris replacement programme, the British 
government needed to make a decision in the near future on whether to stay 
with Trident C4 or switch to Trident D5. If the British were to keep the 
programme on schedule, they needed to make a decision on the hull design of 
the submarine by July. Such a decision would be difficult without knowing 
whether the submarines would be fitted with the C4 or D5 system, as the latter 
would require a larger hull. In addition, the British had already committed 
money on long-lead items for C4, if there was later a switch to D5, this would 
be wasted expenditure.90 To make a decision between C4 or D5 the British 
government first needed to know if the Reagan administration was willing to 
supply the Trident D5 and, if so, on what terms. As Nott told Thatcher in mid-
July: “We cannot take it formally for granted that the US would accede to a UK 
request for D.5, nor that the terms (eg [sic] on R&D levy) would be the same 
as for C.4. These matters would be for Presidential decision.”91  
To negate the problems that US indecision caused the Polaris 
replacement programme, particularly the risk of nugatory spending on the C4 
system, MOD officials in procurement thought the best way forward was for 
the British to extract a “commitment to supply the UK with whatever system 
the US chooses for its own forces.”92 However, senior Civil Servants, David 
Gilmore and Robert Hastie-Smith, disagreed strongly with the idea, believing 
it “out of the question.”93 A firm commitment, as the MOD had in mind, could 
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only be obtained from the President. With Reagan yet to make a firm decision 
on whether the US would replace the C4 with the D5 missile system, even if the 
British obtained a firm commitment, it would mean putting the whole problem 
to UK ministers “on a purely hypothetical basis” since they would “not know 
which way the Americans would jump.”94 
For the British to get a firm commitment from the Reagan 
administration on supply of the D5 system, they first needed the White House 
to take a decision on their strategic modernisation programme. In the spring 
of 1981, it seemed unlikely that the administration would make a decision in 
the near future, and indeed, there was a possibility that it could take a year or 
two. As Gilmore told Acland in May 1981, there was “no chance” of the Reagan 
administration reaching a decision by July, and cautioned that this “may not 
happen until next year or even later.”95  
The administration’s dilemma over MX missile deployment was the 
main reason for the delay. In 1979, the Carter administration announced that 
they would build a mobile system that shuttled MX missiles among many 
possible launch sites. The Carter administration had not come to this decision 
lightly or quickly. However, even in the restricted form that they eventually 
endorsed, this basing system was highly controversial, as it required 
considerable tracts of land in Utah and Nevada. In 1980, Reagan had 
unequivocally campaigned against the plan, in part to placate the Republican 
constituents who, by merit of their proximity to the MX bases, were at risk 
from the Soviet attack and would suffer the economic and social disruptions 
that base construction would bring. However, as James Lebovic observes, “By 
rejecting the Carter alternative, the Reagan administration had painted itself 
into a corner.”96 The Reagan administration wanted to respond quickly to the 
Soviet ‘threat’. Reagan saw the MX, a missile that could carry ten 
independently targeted warheads, as essential to closing ‘the window of 
vulnerability’: the fear that when the Soviets fully deployed their new MIRVed 
                                                     
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 James Lebovic, Flawed Logics: Strategic nuclear arms control from Truman to Obama 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2013), 134; Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The 
Role of a Lifetime (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), 137. 
The Wait for a D5 Decision 
228 
 
systems (SS-18s and SS-19s), they would be able to carry out a disarming first 
strike against US land-based missiles. The effectiveness of the MX in closing 
the alleged window depended on basing it so it would be less vulnerable than 
the Minuteman missiles, located in fixed silos, which the MX would replace. 
The underlying logic of the Carter proposal was simple: if the US could not 
compete with the number of Soviet missiles, it could create decoy silos that 
would absorb Soviet missiles. The Reagan administration, having rejected such 
a basing system due to the strong political opposition in Republican states, 
now faced limited options. Tasked with finding the solution, Weinberger 
considered several other possibilities, including one with the unfortunate 
acronym DUMB (Deep Underground Missile Basing). With pressure mounting 
for a decision, Weinberger eventually decided on limited deployment of MX 
missiles in existing fixed silos and further studies of alternative basing 
systems. Reagan approved Weinberger’s plan on 28 September 1981.97 
However in the summer of 1981, Britain, with its technical dependence on the 
US, needed the Reagan administration to make a timely decision on strategic 
modernisation. Without this, and in spite of the MOD and Pentagon’s eagerness 
for a British D5 upgrade, Polaris replacement was at a standstill.   
 
IV 
 
By August 1981, the British government desperately needed a firm decision 
from the Reagan administration on whether or not they would upgrade their 
Trident system to D5, and then, if this was the case, a commitment that the 
British could purchase this advanced system rather than the C4. The British 
had already paid $120 million towards the C4 system. A further instalment was 
due on 1 September 1981, of which about $60 million was specific to C4.98 US 
officials were insistent on the British paying this money, telling them that: 
Failure to commit sums for the advance procurement of key 
materials and components would lead to discontinuation of 
essential production in the US and the need to requalify 
manufacturers and components at our [British] expense, which 
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would be very considerable.99  
However, if the British paid the next instalment on 1 September and then 
decided to upgrade to the D5 system, this would lead to $180 million of wasted 
expenditure on C4; a particularly painful figure given the government’s 
economic woes.  
 After receiving hints from the Pentagon, Nott was hopeful that Britain’s 
uncertainty about the availability of the D5 could be resolved in the near 
future. As previously discussed, in the spring it seemed the White House might 
not make a decision on D5 until late 1982 or even 1983. By August, the 
pressure the administration faced over MX basing meant the administration 
was considering an earlier decision. Indeed, seemingly demonstrating the 
esteem the new administration held for the Thatcher government, Nott had 
received indications from the Pentagon that “A UK push in this direction would 
not be ill received.”100 Nott subsequently suggested to Thatcher that it would 
be useful for her to, politely, push for a decision when she next saw Reagan in 
Ottawa: “It would not be necessary or appropriate to say firmly now that we 
wanted D.5, still less to get into questions of terms. We need simply to register 
the point that we are much interested in their decision on the future of D.5, and 
hope it will be taken soon.”101 Shortly after Nott’s message to Thatcher, the 
Pentagon sent further indications to British officials that the administration 
was edging towards a nuclear modernisation decision. At a meeting on 20 July, 
Frank Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense, told Acland that he and 
Weinberger “were pretty well convinced of the case in favour of the D-5 
missile. A final decision had not yet been made, but that was the way things 
were heading.”102 Seemingly, it would require only a small ‘push’ from the 
British for the US to make a decision.  
 It soon became apparent, though, that there had been limited thinking 
on a possible British Trident D5 outside of the Pentagon, and subsequently 
British attempts to push for a decision on D5 were not initially as successful as 
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Nott had hoped. Thatcher did not have the opportunity to speak with Reagan 
about Trident during their time in Ottawa, instead she asked Robert 
Armstrong “to have a word” with Edwin Meese.103 On 21 July, Armstrong did 
so, informing Meese that the British had “considerable interest” in the 
administration’s decision on whether to go for D5, as they would then have to 
decide whether to do the same.104 Armstrong also explained that, as current 
British spending on C4 would be nugatory if they chose to adopt D5, his 
government “had an interest in the… decision being taken soon.”105 Clearly 
unprepared to speak on the topic, in response Meese “took note of these points 
and promised to be in touch in due course.”106 
Armstrong’s enquiries did, though, prompt Weinberger to seek the 
President’s permission to talk to the British in more detail about the D5 issue. 
On 21 July, Weinberger wrote to Reagan recommending he “approve a more 
extensive dialogue with the United Kingdom on US nuclear weapon 
designs.”107 The provisions of Executive Order 10956 required the President’s 
approval, as dialogue would “entail communication of certain restricted 
data.”108 Seeing such discussions as important to enhancing the British nuclear 
deterrent, Richard Allen urged the President to give his approval: “The British 
Government has recently displayed a more active interest in its nuclear forces, 
and closer cooperation on weapon designs will enhance the British nuclear 
deterrent. It is in the interest of both the US and the UK for this cooperation to 
be encouraged.”109 On 8 August 1981, Reagan gave Weinberger the required 
permission.110 The approval of Weinberger’s request, as well as Allen’s 
effusive backing, indicates widespread administration support of Britain’s 
nuclear programme. However, the exchanges raised questions about the 
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assurance Weinberger provided to Nott in March – most significantly, that the 
President had not authorised this offer. 
Over the course of the next month, the British secured the firm 
presidential agreement on supply of D5 that they needed. The Pentagon played 
a pivotal role in securing this commitment for the British, due to their wish to 
see both a British Trident D5 and to limit the impact the affair was having on 
Britain’s defence budget. In mid-August, Frank Carlucci told a British official 
that in their upcoming meeting, Weinberger may be in a position to tell John 
Nott, “The final D-5 decision and will certainly want to discuss this and the 
budgetary implications for us [the British] in the short and the longer term.”111 
Subsequently, Frank Cooper urged John Nott to use his meeting with 
Weinberger to push for a solution. Weinberger had already been told about 
British concerns over “building up nugatory expenditure on C4,” and in 
response had “expressed a general willingness” to help the British with their 
“short term cash proposals.”112 With the next tranche of money for C4 due in 
two weeks, the British now needed to push Weinberger to provide such 
assistance. The administration’s uncertainty about their nuclear forces could 
create severe financial difficulties for the British. Therefore, Cooper suggested 
that Nott put to Weinberger the, “radical proposal that until the US make up 
their own mind on the D5 programme, they themselves should bear the cost of 
any C4 specific advance procurement that may be necessary for our 
purposes.”113 Due to the indications already given by Pentagon officials, 
Cooper believed that the administration “may be open to persuasion that it is 
in their own interests to bear these costs.”114 If the administration was 
unprepared to assist to this extent, Cooper told Nott:  
It will be even more critical, to search out the US policy and timing 
on D5. The crucial issue will be to assess the probability of the US 
taking an early decision to procure D5, and the arguments for our 
following them, are sufficiently strong to justify ceasing further 
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commitments on C4.115  
 On 21 August 1981, John Nott met Caspar Weinberger. In this meeting, 
Nott successfully obtained a resolution to Britain’s short-term expenditure 
problems, and prompted Weinberger to secure a presidential commitment on 
the supply of D5. Weinberger told Nott that he expected President Reagan to 
make an announcement on the US strategic nuclear decisions in early 
September. Following recent discussions with the President, he believed “that 
a decision in favour of the Trident D5 system, as opposed to C4, was about 98% 
certain with an in Service date of 1989 or sooner if possible.”116 In reply, Nott 
expressed his personal belief that there was “an overwhelming case” for the 
UK to also adopt the D5, and whilst he had not yet discussed it with Cabinet, 
he “did not anticipate any disagreement.”117 Nott went on to explain that the 
“main immediate problem” was the threat of “nugatory expenditure on C4,” 
due to the further tranche of money for C4 due on 1 September. 118 If the British 
subsequently chose to adopt the D5, “this large sum of money would be 
completely wasted,” something they “could not afford.”119 Weinberger replied 
that he had not been aware of the September payment, and that he wanted to 
help resolve this budgetary difficulty. Weinberger was again extremely 
forthcoming, suggesting, “One possibility… would be for… Reagan to send a 
confidential letter to the Prime Minister before 1 September confirming that 
an announcement about D5 would be made shortly and that, in these changed 
circumstances the United States, would be ready to supply the UK with D5 
missiles on broadly the same general terms as had been agreed by his 
predecessor for the provision of C4.”120 Weinberger was “virtually positive Mr 
Reagan would go for this.”121 John Nott replied that such a letter would be 
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“most helpful.”122 It would provide the presidential agreement on provision of 
D5 that the British needed, and “might be an adequate basis on which the MOD 
could take the risk of cancelling the planned expenditure of $150 million on C4 
by 1 September.”123  
Aware of the tight deadline Britain faced, Weinberger subsequently 
secured a final decision on D5 and a commitment to supply the system to the 
British from the President.124 On 24 August, Weinberger wrote to Margaret 
Thatcher informing her of the President’s decision.125 The President’s 
commitment to supply D5 resolved some of the problems the British faced 
about the future of their Trident programme. The assurance enabled British 
ministers to examine the case for a D5 upgrade, without it being a purely 
hypothetical situation. In addition, the commitment removed the risk of 
further nugatory expenditure with Thatcher now able to agree to stall the next 
instalment for C4 due on 1 September.126  
Weinberger’s action again demonstrated the Defense Secretary’s 
support of the UK’s nuclear programme, alongside his concern to lessen the 
strain on Britain’s defence budget. The events also demonstrate Reagan’s firm 
support of the UK’s nuclear programme. His agreement was clearly swift, if not 
immediate; only four days after his meeting with Nott, on 24 August, 
Weinberger was able to write to Margaret Thatcher to inform her of the 
decision.127 Weinberger wrote this letter at Reagan’s personal behest; he 
informed Nott, “I am sending a letter which the President specifically asked me 
to send to the Prime Minister.”128 It is reasonable to assume that Reagan 
decided Weinberger should write the letter because this would be quicker to 
send and authorise than one from himself. In addition, the President and 
Weinberger were prepared to risk possible leaks to tell the British their 
decision to upgrade to D5 missiles, despite the fact it would be some weeks 
before a public announcement. The contrast with the paranoia and hesitancy 
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of the Carter administration is stark. However, Weinberger and Reagan’s 
proactive approach was not only due to their support of Britain’s nuclear 
‘deterrent’; a key consideration was concern about the implications of delay 
for Britain’s finances. This concern is clear in the opening line of Weinberger’s 
letter to Thatcher; “I understand that an early decision by the U.S. on the D-5 
missile for our Trident submarines would greatly assist the budgetary 
planning for Her Majesty’s Government.”129 However, despite the 
administration’s concern over Britain’s finances, Weinberger’s letter to 
Thatcher did not mention that the administration would be prepared to sell 
D5 on broadly the same terms as agreed for C4, despite the Secretary of 
Defense’s suggestion to Nott during their August meeting that he would also 
seek such a commitment from the President.130 This meant that whilst the 
British could now be certain that the US were going to adopt D5, and that it 
would be made available to them, they still faced uncertainty on the terms that 
D5 would be supplied. 
  
V 
 
Only a few days after Nott’s very helpful discussion with Weinberger, clear 
indications emerged that whilst the administration, and particularly Pentagon 
officials, were inclined to reduce British costs for Trident, they wanted certain 
commitments from the British in return. Whilst Thatcher, like Reagan, 
believed in ‘strong defence’, unlike the President, her government could not 
afford to invest heavily in both conventional and nuclear forces. In January 
1981, Thatcher appointed John Nott as Minister of Defence. Nott immediately 
set out to bring Britain’s “Defence programme in line with economic 
resources.”131 Subsequently, on 25 June 1981, the Thatcher government 
announced extensive cost cutting and restructuring of Britain’s military forces, 
which would reduce the Army, Navy and Civilian Defence work force, and 
reshape the Royal Navy. The Thatcher government did not view these changes 
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as cutting Britain’s defence spending but rather, faced with increased costs, the 
necessary reallocating of spending to key strategic areas. As Richard Vinen 
notes, “the defence review was largely about the relative allocation of defence 
spending rather than its overall size.”132 The Trident programme was one of 
the key strategic areas for which the Thatcher government wished to find 
funding. The overall objective of the cuts, as Nott told Parliament a month later, 
was to cover the cost of buying Trident missiles as a replacement to the Polaris 
system.133  
Despite it being a means to raise funds for Trident, news of the British 
defence review provoked US concern. Whilst the British saw the defence 
review and subsequent ‘cuts’ as necessary to fund the Trident programme, the 
administration did not view Polaris replacement as the only key strategic area 
for the UK’s defence budget. Reagan officials believed that in order to meet the 
global challenge of the Soviet Union, the Western alliance needed to build both 
strategic and conventional capabilities. In particular, Weinberger saw that, in 
order to limit Soviet incursions, nuclear strength was no substitute for 
conventional forces in vital regions, such as the Persian Gulf.134 As previously 
discussed, in order to restore the conventional and nuclear balance with the 
Soviet Union, the Reagan administration adopted a federal budget wherein 
defence expenditure would consume more than thirty percent. At the same 
time, they slashed spending in all other government sectors, and cut taxes.135 
These cuts were part of the administration’s efforts to tackle high inflation, 
interest rates and unemployment by changing the “whole approach to fiscal 
and economic questions that had dominated Washington thinking for more 
than a generation.”136 Subsequently, despite the large increase to their own 
defence budget, the White House did not want the US to have to spend even 
more on defence because of their allies withdrawing from key strategic areas. 
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Moreover, such withdrawals would be politically costly, raising as they would 
feelings that the United States was fighting the Cold War alone. Subsequently, 
the administration saw ensuring Britain’s continued commitment to 
strengthening both their nuclear and conventional defence as a strategic, 
political and economic imperative.   
Subsequently, having heard about possible serious cuts to conventional 
forces and, in particular, the British Navy, Weinberger was “anxious to get the 
full story from John Nott.”137 Following completion of his review, Nott 
informed Weinberger that the UK would increase its defence budget in full 
implementation of the NATO three percent aim, for the next four years. The UK 
would proceed with its Trident programme, improve its air defence and 
ground force capabilities for the defence of the UK home base, and keep their 
Army in Germany at 55,000. The main changes would be in the British Naval 
role in the Eastern Atlantic and the Channel; Here the British would “keep only 
two of the new Anti-Submarine Warfare carriers in service, instead of the 
three, and… reduce the number of destroyers and frigates committed to NATO 
from at least 59 to about 50.”138  
In reply, Weinberger expressed concern about some of the proposals. 
However, he also understood the budget constraints the British faced. 
Subsequently, keen to ensure that Britain developed both their nuclear and 
conventional forces, Weinberger suggested several ideas that might ease 
Britain’s financial pressures, and therefore limit the need for conventional 
cuts. These included, “greater US support for the Trident program, the 
possibility of purchasing one of their ASW [Anti-Submarine Warfare] carriers, 
and even the tentative idea of purchasing a long-term lease on Diego 
Garcia.”139 Weinberger saw that this last option could also be useful protecting 
US interests in the event of a Labour victory.140 Weinberger and Nott agreed 
that a US-UK working group should be set up to discuss these ideas, and other 
areas where the US could ease the UK’s defence budget issues. Weinberger’s 
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forthcoming nature on assisting with the defence review stemmed from his 
concern that British cuts could damage the administration’s efforts to 
strengthen the Atlantic alliance, and the political ramifications of this both at 
home and abroad. As he later told Reagan:  
We would like to work with the British so that they can better keep 
their NATO commitment in the Atlantic. In particular, we must 
prevent the British Naval cuts from becoming an excuse for other 
Allies for defense cuts and from creating problems for us on the 
Hill.141  
On 25-26 August, the first working group on US/UK Defence Co-
operation met. With regards to Trident, the group discussed “a number of 
areas” where the US could offer the British “substantial savings.”142 These 
included, “US basing/ support for British SSBNs [Ballistic Missile Submarines], 
reductions in the Trident R&D levy and the free transfer to the UK of surplus 
Polaris hardware.”143 The administration though were looking for certain 
commitments in return for these savings on Britain’s nuclear programme. The 
US wanted British commitments on deployment outside of the NATO area. As 
US officials explained to their British counter-parts, the administration was 
concerned that Britain’s planned reductions in surface fleet strength could 
lead to reduced activity, and this was an issue of political significance to 
Congress. Subsequently, US officials expressed “that to the extent that the UK 
was relieved of financial burdens (whether on Trident or elsewhere), they 
hoped the relief would be applied to remedying the gaps they foresaw might 
open in our naval capability in consequence of our defence review.”144   
However, DOD officials went further than just trying to find savings on 
Trident and elsewhere in order to be helpful to the British, and thereby limit 
the cuts in the UK’s naval capability. Over the course of the meeting, US officials 
attempted to use potential savings on Trident as a lever to shape Britain’s 
wider defence policy. Reporting on the talks, B. Watkins, a civil servant at the 
Foreign office, told Gilmore that:  
Throughout both days, the Americans came back again and again, 
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using every conceivable peg for doing so, to their main concerns. 
The first of these was greater availability in time and ships of the 
stand by squadron. They recognised the important manpower and 
financial implications for us of this, but made clear that in their 
view these should be offset by savings on the Trident programme 
or elsewhere as a result of American assistance. Secondly they said 
bluntly that they did not agree with the strategy implicit in the 
recent White Paper with its emphasis on maritime air and SSN's 
[fleet submarines].145 
The leader of the British delegation fought back against these attempts and 
“made quite clear that the objective of the exercise was to try to identify ways 
in which, through co-operation, money could be saved… The UK was not going 
to change its defence programme or its strategy simply because American 
ideas differed from our own.”146 The leader of the US delegation, Dov Zakheim, 
accepted these points. However, Watkins still surmised that: 
There is no doubt that what the Americans are engaged in is an 
attempt to introduce alterations into the defence programme… in 
exchange for financial savings in the Trident programme and 
elsewhere… and to ensure a continued RN [Royal Navy] presence 
in areas important to the US.147  
Like the C4 agreement, any reductions in price for Trident D5 would clearly 
come with a political price tag, and it seemed likely at this point that the US 
demand would be some kind of British commitment to maintain naval 
deployment in areas of key strategic importance to the US. 
 
The US/UK Defence Co-operation working group provided British officials 
with a good indication of the Pentagon’s views on the supply of D5: they would 
be willing to offer a reduced price for Trident D5 in order to secure some 
conventional commitments from the British. However, with the State 
Department still vying to ensure that they led any Trident negotiations, it 
seemed increasingly unlikely that Weinberger would play the lead role in 
deciding the terms of supply. The State Department had been excluded from 
Weinberger’s August efforts to gain presidential approval on offering the D5 
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system to the British. State officials only found out about the letter and the 
“Presidential decisions it embodied after its despatch.”148 This lack of 
consultation “enraged” the State Department.149 They believed they were in 
charge of US-UK nuclear co-operation on the American side. Subsequently, Bud 
McFarlane, Counsellor to the Department of State, instructed Blackwill to meet 
with Wade-Gery, in order to ensure that any Trident D5 negotiations were not 
a repeat of this “deplorable lack of coordination.”150 Blackwill informed Wade-
Gery that the State Department, rather than the NSC as last time would lead 
any Trident negotiations. In an attempt to ensure that the Reagan 
administration adhered to the State Department’s plan, Blackwill told Wade-
Gery that a letter from the Prime Minister to the President, requesting 
negotiations, “would be procedurally unsatisfactory-at the Washington end: 
the White House would send it to the Pentagon, whence State would have to 
retrieve it.”151 As such, Blackwill requested that Wade-Gery send any British 
request for D5 to McFarlane. In response, Wade-Gery, wishing “to avoid taking 
sides in the Washington turf fight,” told Blackwill, Thatcher would wish to 
report the British decision on which system to adopt herself. Following further 
discussion, Blackwill eventually accepted, “as a tolerable pis-aller,” Wade-
Gery’s suggestion that at the same time as the Prime Minister’s message went 
to the President, Robert Armstrong would send McFarlane a message drawing 
attention to it and saying that he “looked forward to hearing from him about 
the modalities.”152  
The State Department’s concerted efforts to lead the Trident D5 
negotiations meant that British officials could be less certain about receiving a 
reduced price for D5, than if the DOD led. Reagan’s Cabinet members and top 
White House staff were of no single persuasion on international policy. The 
administration was composed of conservative ideologues, including Caspar 
Weinberger, Assistant Secretary for Defense for International Security Policy 
Richard Perle, and Richard Allen, and pragmatists like Chief of Staff James A. 
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Baker III and Alexander Haig.153 These divisions, as Samuel Wells notes, 
proved “a complicating factor for US allies.”154 The debate over Britain’s D5 
upgrade is a good example of this.  
Alexander Haig and many of his fellow officials in the State Department 
believed in waging “a vigorous competition focused on containing and 
countering direct or indirect Soviet expansion beyond the Soviet bloc in 
Eastern Europe, but not to carry the challenge to Soviet rule in the Soviet Union 
or the bloc.”155 This continued the approach taken by Nixon and Kissinger, and 
largely, although less consistently, by Carter and Brzezinski. Whilst, US-UK 
nuclear co-operation conformed with this containment approach, it did not, as 
the various up and downs during the Nixon and Carter years demonstrated, 
necessarily pre-ordain its continuation. On the other hand, leading officials in 
the Pentagon and the NSC staff, wished to mount a more direct challenge to the 
Soviet leaders. As well as containing Soviet expansionism, they wished to ‘roll 
back’ communism, by pressing “political and economic competition into 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself even more vigorously.”156 As 
Garthoff observes, those advocating such an approach: 
Had little, or even negative, interest in negotiation; they believed 
the Soviet Union should be isolated, rather than brought into a 
network of interdependent ties with the West. And they were less 
interested in negotiating arms control, even negotiating from 
strength; they wished to put pressure on the Soviet Union through 
an intensified arms competition and retain and exercise American 
freedom to expand its military capabilities and options, with the 
aim of reasserting American primacy.157  
Assisting the British with upgrading to the more advanced D5 system clearly 
fitted with this more aggressive approach to the Soviet Union; within such 
thinking it did not matter that provision of the D5 system would likely 
undermine any ongoing arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union.  
At the same time, the State Department did not appear as congenial to 
British interests on the D5 upgrade as Weinberger and his fellow officials at 
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the Pentagon. At the end of his talk with Wade-Gery, Blackwill “Made two 
characteristically barbed comments.” Firstly, that the administration had 
made no decision that the D5 “would be made available to Britain on 
specifically favourable terms.” Secondly, that public reaction to the C4 
agreement had been “more muted than expected.” The Thatcher and Reagan 
governments “might not be so lucky next time. Anglo-American strategic 
nuclear cooperation had plenty of enemies, not least in the US. The larger the 
weapon system that was involved, the stronger the criticism was likely to 
become.”158 
 
Within these circumstances of uncertainty about the costs of D5, British 
ministers needed to decide whether to switch to the more expensive and 
advanced D5 system, or stick with the C4 and lose, eventually over the lifetime 
of the missile system, commonality with the US.159 The decision affected the 
viability of Britain’s future nuclear ‘deterrent’, the country’s long-term budget, 
and could potentially trigger problematic domestic and foreign policy 
ramifications.  
John Nott believed that Britain should adopt the D5 system due to the 
possibility of cost-savings, relaying Britain’s short-term defence expenditure 
problems, and maintaining commonality. In September 1981, Nott outlined his 
arguments to Thatcher. He estimated that the D5 would cost no more than 
£500 million extra than the C4 over 15 years, and that “given the major 
advantages of commonality,” the D5 “could prove even cheaper in the end.”160 
However, in recent months, the strain on Britain’s nuclear budget had 
increased further. As Nott told Thatcher, the D5 decision had been made more 
complicated “by the discovery,” several months before, that the British had 
“little choice but to ‘re-motor’ the existing Polaris rocket motors” following 
test-firing failures.161 This meant that the already stretched defence budget 
needed to stretch further. To help accommodate the extra cost of the D5, and 
to fit the cost of re-motoring Polaris within the existing defence budget, Nott 
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suggested that they “slip the date for the deployment of Trident by one or two 
years.”162 With Chevaline and the re-motoring of the existing Polaris missiles, 
Nott assessed that the British could “retain a viable strategic deterrent over a 
short extension of this kind.”163 The D5 provided this option, as the British 
would not be at the end of the US production line. Summarising his arguments, 
Nott asserted, “It looks as if the choice of D5 is pretty overwhelming.”164 Nott’s 
unequivocal support of a D5 switch was representative of, as Weston reflected 
to Gilmore, the “considerable head of steam… building up in the Ministry of 
Defence in favour of changing to the D5 missile.”165 
Nott’s arguments primarily addressed “cost, commonality and 
operational capability.”166 However, the decision British ministers faced was 
more complicated than this. Subsequently, outside of the MOD many British 
officials held reservations about a switch to the D5 system. In September 1981, 
Geoffrey Howe wrote to Thatcher and Nott, telling them that whilst he was “not 
opposed in principle to D5,” he was concerned about the costs. His concern 
centred on the “significantly larger initial capital expenditure” that choosing 
the larger D5 missiles and submarine would cause. He believed that the 
resulting expenditure would exceed the £5000 million (at summer 1980 
prices) that had been the upper limit of the range envisaged when ministers 
had taken the decision to opt for the C4 two years before. Moreover, Howe saw 
that as the D5 had yet to be developed, “estimates of its cost must be uncertain 
and may escalate significantly.”167 Despite these concerns, because of the 
lessons of Chevaline, Howe still believed the D5 would be the best choice: 
“Despite all these points, my instinct is that a move to D5 would be right: to be 
stuck with a system no longer in service with the Americans could in the end 
prove very expensive - as the Chevaline experience shows.”168  
Understandably, following the recent US-UK working group meeting, 
some British officials were also concerned about what ‘political price tag’ the 
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administration might impose in return for reducing the costs of D5. In early 
September, whilst on a brief stopover in Washington, David Gilmore met with 
Robin Renwick, a British diplomat. During their discussion, Gilmore stressed 
that “We [the British] should not be deluded into thinking that the helpful 
attitude of Weinberger and the Pentagon on Trident… is a demonstration of 
pure and undiluted generosity.”169 Renwick “very much agreed with this” and 
believed the British “could expect some form of bill from the Americans before 
long.”170 Indeed, such was Renwick’s concern about possible US demands, he 
later wrote to Gilmore, “to strongly endorse” his comments in Washington. In 
this letter, Renwick stressed that whilst Weinberger had expressed 
willingness to find ways to help the British with the Trident programme and 
their conventional defence efforts: 
It is no use imagining that we are going to get anything in this area 
for nothing… One is bound to be sceptical as to whether it will be 
easy for Weinberger to propose to the President additional 
measures to help us e.g. in relation to naval support and the Trident 
programme, which would entail some… additional costs for the 
Americans, if he is not at the same time able to indicate that some 
account has been taken of the anxieties they have been expressing 
in the bilateral consultations about conventional naval 
capabilities.171  
Gilmore subsequently forwarded this warning to other British officials, along 
with his own stark counsel: “As I think you agree, we clearly need to be 
extremely cautious lest at the end of the day we find the Americans making 
some pretty excessive demands of us as a quid pro quo.”172 
Some British officials were also concerned that switching to the D5 
could create political difficulties for the British. The existing defence budget 
had to accommodate all costs for the Trident programme.173 Any increase in 
the costs of Trident would therefore likely impact Britain’s conventional 
forces, as the justification for the Defence Review demonstrated. 
Subsequently, Foreign office officials warned that a switch to D5 “must be 
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expected to stir new doubts in the Alliance and elsewhere about the 
opportunity cost of Trident in relation to our other defence 
responsibilities.”174  
In addition, some British officials were concerned about the domestic 
ramifications of a switch to D5. The government argued that Britain’s need to 
maintain a ‘credible nuclear deterrent’ justified the huge expense of Britain’s 
nuclear programme. Some British officials worried that reopening the Trident 
issue and the delayed deployment of the D5 system, alongside the decision to 
re-motor the Polaris missiles, and “lingering uncertainties about the viability 
of Chevaline,” risked “undermining the public credibility of the government’s 
position.”175 Whilst alleviating Britain’s short-term budget problems, a switch 
to D5 could make “the whole future of the UK deterrent more vulnerable to 
Party political assault by the Opposition over the next few years.”176  
 
By September 1981, the British had secured confirmation that the Reagan 
administration would switch their submarine missile system to the Trident 
D5, and that this advanced system would be available to them. However, even 
with this D5 commitment British uncertainty about the future of Polaris 
replacement remained. Despite aligned interests, the Reagan administration 
had not given the Thatcher government assurance that they would provide the 
system at a reduced price. Instead, there were clear indications that the 
administration would want some form of quid pro quo in return for a 
reduction. Moreover, the State Department, who was heavily lobbying to lead 
the Trident negotiations, was at the same time sending mixed signals about 
their support for a British upgrade to Trident D5. Clearly, any D5 deal would 
be contingent on further negotiation. 
For the moment, British officials could only speculate about what price 
they would have to pay, financially and politically, for D5. With no decision yet 
made on MX basing, Reagan delayed his announcement on strategic 
modernisation until early October. Until this announcement, and the risk of 
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premature leaks removed, the British could not have the follow-up detailed 
discussions with the US they required to gain information about their options, 
nor could ministers meet to discuss it.177 For the time being, the UK’s 
dependency on US missile systems paralysed Polaris replacement, causing 
difficulties and uncertainty for the British government.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Red Threat: The Reagan administration and the United Kingdom’s 
D5 upgrade, October 1981 – March 1982 
 
“We wanted the Trident deal to be struck. It was one more arrow 
in the quiver. Britain was the lynchpin to NATO and more 
important than any other single power.” 
 
- Richard Perle.1 
 
I 
 
On 2 October 1981, President Reagan publicly declared his plans to modernise 
the US nuclear triad, subject to Congressional authorisation and financing. 
Reagan announced they would base the new MX missile in existing silos, which 
would be hardened. The President resurrected the B-1 bomber, cancelled by 
Carter, and announced plans to build at least one hundred.2 Reagan also 
announced that the US would build at least one Trident submarine every year, 
and the larger and more accurate Trident D5 would replace the submarine’s 
Trident C4 missiles by 1989.3  
  The Reagan administration’s strategic modernisation decision forced 
the British government to reassess their plans for Polaris replacement. The 
Thatcher government now had to decide whether to stick with Trident C4 or 
upgrade to the D5 system. As previously discussed, Reagan’s belief in the need 
for the West to strengthen its nuclear and conventional capability provided an 
implicit rationale for the administration’s sale of Trident D5 to the British. 
Reagan believed modernising the United States nuclear triad was essential to 
counter the threat of the Soviet Union. In his letter informing Thatcher of his 
announcement, Reagan restated his belief that arms reductions and peace 
could only be achieved by increasing the strength of the West:  
This comprehensive program will correct deficiencies that have 
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resulted from the rapid expansion of Soviet military power… It is 
important to recognize that without such a program there would 
be no incentive for the Soviets seriously to negotiate meaningful 
and substantial arms reductions, a course to which my Government 
remains fully committed.4 
Due to a shared belief in the need to counter the supposed threat of the Soviet 
Union, the Thatcher government supported Reagan’s modernisation 
programme.  
 In March 1982, the Reagan administration agreed to sell the D5 system 
to Britain on favourable terms, and subsequently the US and UK signed the 
Trident D5 agreement. However, despite the convergence of US-UK defence 
policy interests and the Reagan-Thatcher friendship, the US supply of Trident 
D5, at a substantially reduced price, was not a foregone conclusion. As this 
chapter will discuss, whilst the British wait for the Reagan administration to 
take a decision on the D5 and offer the system was now over, the uncertainty 
British policy-makers felt about the future of their Polaris replacement 
programme continued. Due to Britain’s technical dependence on the US for its 
nuclear missiles, the Thatcher government “pretty much had to take or leave 
whatever the United States offered.”5 This dependence left the Thatcher 
government with two less-than-ideal options. If the British chose to stay with 
the C4, they risked spending huge sums on maintaining the system as the US 
switched to Trident D5. The astronomical costs of the Chevaline programme, 
as well as the recent need to re-motor Polaris missiles, had provided British 
ministers with stark evidence of the potential costs of losing commonality with 
the US. However, the Reagan administration’s offer of the D5 missile also came 
with drawbacks. When making their offer, the administration had not offered 
a reassurance that the D5 sale would be on the same terms as the C4 
agreement, or even that they would sell D5 at a reduced price. As a more 
advanced system, the full price tag of the D5 system was beyond the UK’s 
budget, and these costs could escalate further as the missile was still in 
development. Furthermore, the D5’s capabilities were out of proportion to 
Britain’s defence requirements. As such, British acquisition of the D5 missile 
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would likely increase public opposition to the Trident programme. The Reagan 
administration’s decision to upgrade to D5, left British ministers in a catch-22 
situation. Reflective of this, in November 1981 when MISC 7 met to deliberate 
whether Britain should adopt Trident D5, ministers’ concerns about costs and 
the concurrent political ramifications meant they were unable to make a 
decision. Only in January 1982, buoyed by their overriding belief that Britain 
should retain an ‘independent strategic deterrent’, did MISC 7 decide to adopt 
D5. However, this decision was subject to the proviso that they would take a 
final decision after negotiations with the US had determined the broad terms 
of sale for the D5 system.  
The final price of the D5 was contingent on complex negotiations. The 
Reagan administration’s overall foreign policy interests and aims influenced 
the terms they sought in return for Trident. The British received a favourable 
deal due to the convergence of US-UK interests. The administration’s eventual 
offer to sell Trident D5 at a reduced price was in their interests: the sale aided 
the administration’s efforts to strengthen western nuclear and conventional 
forces in order to counter the perceived threat of the Soviet Union. In addition, 
the substantial reduction, and thereby the maintenance of Britain’s 
conventional forces, helped alleviate opposition in NATO to the sale, and 
negated some of the anti-nuclear left’s criticism of the deal. However, even 
within this conducive environment, US officials still drove a hard bargain with 
the British, in order to extract the greatest benefit possible. In this way, the D5 
deal was not a foregone conclusion, but a negotiation in which genuine stakes 
were involved.  
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II 
 
 
Police arrest a protester during a demonstration against the installation of US Pershing 
missiles in Ramstein, West Germany. 
 
 
In contrast with the Carter administration, the Reagan White House was not 
concerned about the Soviet reaction to a Trident deal. As previously discussed, 
the early Reagan administration viewed arms-control as a low priority, often 
seeming completely uninterested. Reagan had ran against Ford (in the 1976 
primaries) and Carter (in the 1980 presidential election) emphasising the 
dangerous nuclear concessions that had been granted to the Soviets through 
détente. Following on from NATO’s ‘dual-track’ decision, on 23 September 
1981, the US and Soviet Union finally reached agreement to begin formal talks 
on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). Subsequently, in November 
1981, Reagan proposed the so-called ‘zero option’. This proposal called for the 
elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. Such a scheme 
would mean the removal of all Soviet SS-20s, in return for US agreement not 
to deploy their cruise missiles and Pershing IIs. As the US missiles were still on 
the production line, no one, least of all the Reagan administration, was 
surprised when the Soviets rejected the inequitable offer, calling it a 
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“propaganda ploy.”6 Reagan had proposed the ‘zero option’ more as a means 
to ensure NATO deployment of LRTNF than as a serious attempt to secure 
reductions in INFs in Europe. The Reagan administration saw Western 
countries’ hesitation on LRTNF deployment as detrimental to NATO’s 
credibility and the arms-control process. As he proposed the ‘zero option’ to 
Reagan, Weinberger argued, that, if the Soviets rejected the policy after the US 
was seen to give it a “good try,” the Europeans would be “in a position where 
they would really have no alternative to modernisation.”7 This argument won 
Reagan’s support for the proposal.8 
Subsequently, the Reagan administration was not concerned about the 
impact of a Trident D5 sale on the INF talks. When the INF negotiations began, 
the “cornerstone of the Soviet position” was “the demand that British and 
French nuclear forces be ‘taken into account.’”9 Like the Carter White House, 
the Reagan administration was determined to keep British and French 
systems out of arms negotiations. Both administrations saw that it was not in 
US interests to trade off their own systems against their allies. Both 
governments believed that putting Soviet Union nuclear forces against all 
Western allied forces, and Soviet superiority over any other power, would 
undercut the US ‘deterrent’. They also feared that the inclusion of British and 
French systems could lead to non-nuclear allies developing their own 
capabilities due to doubts in the nuclear umbrella. However, unlike the Carter 
administration, concerns about the Soviet reaction played no part in their 
consideration of whether to supply D5 to the British. This is despite D5 being 
a more advanced system, which lessened US negotiators ability to argue that 
British forces were insignificant. A 4-boat D5 system with 16 tubes per 
submarine would be capable of delivering as many as 896 warheads, though it 
was not intended to deploy more than 480; for comparison, four C4 boats 
could deliver 512 warheads, and the Polaris/Chevaline force 128.10 Not 
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surprisingly, in November 1983, following the administration’s refusal to 
include British and French delivery systems, the INF talks were suspended. 
However, it is important to note that the Reagan administration’s lack 
of concern about the effect of a D5 sale on US-Soviet relations was primarily 
due to their conception of US interests and how to ‘win’ the Cold War, rather 
than support for Britain’s nuclear programme per se. The events of Reykjavik 
five years later viscerally demonstrate this hierarchy. On 11 October 1986, 
Reagan met Mikhail Gorbachev, then Soviet leader, for the Reykjavik summit. 
Gorbachev opened negotiations with a bold proposal: offering fifty percent 
cuts in nuclear arsenals and the elimination of US and Soviet intermediate-
range missiles in Europe, while permitting British and French missiles to 
remain.11 As the talks continued, the proposals grew even bolder. Reagan and 
Gorbachev eventually agreed to get rid of all their strategic nuclear weapons. 
The only sticking point was Gorbachev’s insistence that the US confine the 
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) to a laboratory research programme, and 
Reagan’s refusal. Much to the disappointment of Soviet and US officials, the 
talks collapsed.12 This near move by Reagan to abandon all US strategic nuclear 
weapons angered Thatcher. Michael Jopling, a Cabinet minister who was with 
her when she was briefed about the summit, “never saw her more 
incandescent.”13 Reagan had come close to abandoning the system of nuclear 
‘deterrence,’ a system Thatcher firmly believed “had kept the peace for forty 
years.”14 Moreover though, if Reagan and Gorbachev had agreed to eliminate 
all strategic nuclear weapons, this would “have effectively killed off the Trident 
missile” forcing Britain to acquire a non-US system if they were to keep an 
independent nuclear programme.15 In 1981 though, the Reagan 
administration’s approach to arms-control meant they were likely to assist the 
British Polaris replacement programme, more-so than the Carter 
administration prior to the invasion of Afghanistan. However, Reagan’s 
rhetoric on nuclear weapons heightened political tensions in Europe, and 
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thereby made the environment for a British D5 announcement more 
problematic.  
Reagan’s declarations during his election campaign that he would defer 
arms-control and strengthen the West’s nuclear forces, invoked fear amongst 
European leaders that his presidency would heighten political sensitivity 
about nuclear weapons in Western Europe. After Reagan’s election, his 
administration confirmed their insensitivity to the political tensions that 
dominated Europe. In September 1981, the President warned in a speech that 
the US was ready to pursue a nuclear arms-race. Then in November, Reagan 
made a statement that nuclear war in Europe need not lead to a strategic 
exchange. Such comments heightened European fears that their security took 
second place in the eyes of the Reagan administration.16 With the impending 
deployment of INF missiles in Western Europe, Reagan’s remarks fuelled the 
anti-nuclear demonstrations of October and November 1981.17 Many of these 
protests were of unprecedented size and intensity. For example in Britain, the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) organised an antinuclear rally in 
London’s Hyde Park that attracted 250,000 people.18 Subsequently, West 
European officials expressed their dismay to the White House about their in-
sensitive comments, and asked for assistance in winning public support for the 
planned INF deployment on their territory.19  
 By stoking anti-nuclear sentiment, the Reagan administration 
heightened the risk of an adverse reaction in Britain to a switch to Trident D5. 
Amongst the British public, their government’s agreement to base INF missiles 
in the country was extremely controversial. According to opinion polls a 
majority of the country, ranging from 48 percent to 61 percent, opposed 
deployment.20 Much of the opposition to the government’s nuclear policy 
focused on the decision to station US cruise missiles in the UK rather than the 
acquisition of Trident C4. The public saw the cruise missiles as “a new and 
substantial addition to Western nuclear capability”21; whilst they viewed 
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Trident as a “continuation of the existing British four-boat deterrent force.”22 
However, with the greater capability of the D5, opposition to it amongst the 
British public was more likely, particularly due to the rise in anti-nuclear 
sentiment. Moreover, if the Thatcher government did not secure a 
substantially reduced price for the D5, it would be difficult for them to present 
the upgrade as a necessary cost-saving choice. Instead, opponents to Trident 
could more forcefully argue that the government took the decision in order to 
increase the country’s nuclear capability. If the British public viewed the 
acquisition of D5 as an increase in capability rather than the ‘modernisation’ 
of Polaris, this would fuel opposition to Trident modernisation and cruise 
missile deployment, as well as boost support for Labour’s disarmament 
policies. The domestic political situation of the autumn of 1981 made it crucial 
that the Thatcher government secured a reduced price for Trident D5. At the 
same time, the administration’s wider foreign policy aims and concurrent 
concerns about the growth of anti-nuclear sentiment in Britain made the offer 
of a reduced price for D5 more likely. However, despite this conducive 
environment, in the aftermath of Reagan’s announcement of the 
modernisation of the US nuclear triad, US officials provided the British with 
very little reassurance about the cost of the D5 system. 
 
III 
 
With Reagan’s public announcement on the upgrade to Trident D5 missiles, 
British ministers could now consider whether to follow suit. With some 
ministers away from London, MISC 7 were not able to meet until several weeks 
after Reagan’s announcement.23 In the interim, British concerns about the 
potential costs of the D5 system further increased.  
On 5-6 October, the US/UK Defence Co-operation working group met 
for the second time. In these talks, participants discussed the potential R&D 
charge the US would ask Britain to pay for D5. As with the Trident C4, the 
overall price of the D5 system was comprised of different charges. As well as 
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the basic missile costs, the British would have to pay a charge for facilities and 
overheads, as well as a payment towards US research and development costs. 
Since 1976, US regulations stipulated that the R&D charge should be on a pro-
rata basis. Strict application of the pro-rata principle to a D5 purchase would 
result in a charge to the British of about $900 million. However, the President 
could approve a reduction in the R&D charge if he saw this to be in the wider 
interests of the US. In 1980, the Carter administration agreed to maintain the 
levy for Trident C4 at the same level as Polaris, a five percent surcharge, in 
exchange for British agreement to operate US Rapier systems based in the UK. 
Subsequently, when estimating the costs of the D5 missile, British officials had 
“assumed that the 5% charge would be applicable.”24 This would mean R&D 
charges for the D5 of about $150 million. Some British officials were hopeful 
that the UK could secure an even lower rate, due to discussions between Nott 
and Weinberger, at the first US/UK Defence Co-operation working group, that 
the administration might reduce or waiver the R&D charge in order to transfer 
resources to the Royal Navy surface fleet and reduce the “direct cost of Trident 
to the UK.”25  
The second US/UK Defence Co-operation working group raised doubts 
about these hopes, and the accuracy of British calculations based on a five 
percent R&D charge for D5. In the meeting, it became clear that the DOD 
officials present had not calculated a pro-rata R&D charge, with the figure of 
$900 million “a surprise to senior officials.”26 However, they made clear that 
this oversight was not because they were using a five percent charge as the 
base for their calculations. DOD officials emphasised that they had yet to 
decide the R&D levy for D5 and the pro-rata rule would be the starting point 
for their calculations. The administration viewed the five percent charge for 
Trident C4 “as a significant concession.”27 The members of the DOD 
subsequently emphasised that whilst the final R&D charge could be well below 
$900 million, “It would be higher than a simple 5% charge.”28 With no firm 
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decision yet taken by the administration on the R&D levy, DOD officials 
“undertook to seek direction from Mr Weinberger.”29 
The talks provoked mixed reactions amongst British officials. Given 
repeated indications from DOD officials that they would offer reductions on 
the price of D5 if the UK government responded to their concerns about 
reductions in conventional forces, some British officials remained optimistic 
about the prospect of obtaining a reduced price for D5. For example, Robin 
Renwick told Wade-Gery, “Weinberger is likely to try to be helpful over Trident 
costs, particularly if we are able to make some moves to meet US concerns… in 
other areas; and there is no reason we should not seek to take advantage of 
this.”30 However, the second working group discussions provoked concern 
amongst other British officials. Pentagon officials had been the most 
forthcoming US department on provision of Trident D5. However, the hard-
headed manner of the DOD officials during the second working group raised 
questions about how accommodating they would be to the British on the price 
of D5, particularly if the British were unable to meet their ‘concerns’ in other 
areas. Subsequently, John Weston remarked:  
The latest round of UK/US defence cooperation talks in Washington 
do not leave one with the impression that officials in America are 
falling over themselves to supply us with D5, Mr Weinberger’s 
message to the Prime Minister on behalf of President Reagan 
notwithstanding.31  
In this way, the second US-UK working group increased uncertainty 
amongst British officials about how forthcoming the Reagan administration 
would be on the D5 terms of sale. The talks raised questions about the 
reliability of MOD calculations of the cost of D5, based upon the terms of the 
C4 agreement. Moreover, the talks reemphasised to British officials how the 
price of the D5 would be contingent on further negotiation. Subsequently, 
British officials were unhappy that the working group had discussed the 
potential R&D levy for Trident D5. Such discussions pre-empted negotiations 
that would take place if ministers decided to pursue the D5 option. As had been 
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demonstrated in both the Polaris and Trident C4 negotiations, skilful British 
diplomacy would be central to securing reductions. As such, the British did not 
want the administration to decide on a figure privately. Subsequently, shortly 
after the second working group, British officials made it clear to Weinberger’s 
office that they were “not asking for an immediate reply on the question of 
R&D costs.”32  
Subsequently, in October 1981, Robert Armstrong told Thomas 
Trenchard, Minister of State for Defence Procurement, not to discuss the 
possible price of D5 in his discussions with Frank Carlucci. Armstrong believed 
such discussion would be:  
Premature and possibly counter-productive for our relations with 
the Americans on this subject…. if we do go for D5, we shall need to 
conduct with the Americans a negotiation which will be no less 
delicate than its predecessor in 1979-80… fence rushing and wire-
crossing should clearly be avoided.33 
Despite these clear instructions, Trenchard did make enquiries about the 
potential cost of Trident D5. So much so, that an unnamed but clearly 
frustrated reader, scribbled on a record of the meeting: “So much for the 
comment the subject just ‘came up.’ It looks as if they talked about little else.”34 
In response to Trenchard’s enquiries about whether the administration had 
thought more about what help it might provide Britain on the costs of Trident 
given the pressures on the defence budget, Carlucci provided a vague but 
promising response.35 He “thought it was a little premature to comment in 
detail.” However, Carlucci went on to say the question the administration faced 
was how the United States recouped its non-recurring costs. They were aware 
that the “amounts at issue… were… very large.” As such, “the Administration 
would look at the question as sympathetically as possible. They did not wish 
to see any trade-off of conventional forces against Trident.”36 Carlucci, had 
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again confirmed, that at least the Pentagon was disposed to reduce the price of 
Trident, in order to protect Britain’s conventional forces, but he offered no 
indication of what this reduction might be or what commitments the 
administration expected the British to make in return.  
 
On 24 November 1981, MISC 7 met to make a decision on whether the 
successor to Polaris should be the Trident D5 rather than C4. As they 
considered their choice, ministers still did not know on what terms the US 
would supply the D5 system, whether the US would offer them a reduction in 
the R&D charge, or what commitments the US would expect from the British 
in return.  
Nonetheless, John Nott remained seemingly impervious to any doubt 
about D5 acquisition. To begin the meeting, Nott expressed his belief that 
Reagan’s decision to cease deployment of Trident C4 as early as 1998, “meant 
that it would no longer be sensible for the United Kingdom to acquire the C4, 
since it would become unique to the United Kingdom almost from the outset 
of its deployment on British boats in 1994.”37 Instead, Nott recommended that 
the British procure a Trident D5 4-boat force. He estimated that this would 
cost £7500 million at current exchange rates. This was equivalent to £5900 
million on the same exchange rate basis as used in the 1980 announcement 
that the government would acquire the C4 missile at a cost of about £5000 
million.38 Due to this increase in costs, Nott “had examined again all the 
alternative options for maintaining a national strategic deterrent.”39 He had 
concluded that the Trident system remained the “best choice… and indeed the 
only credible strategic deterrent,” and that the D5 system should be chosen as 
it “would be cheaper than C4 up to 1987-88, and would probably be cheaper 
over its entire life because of the logistic penalties of running a C4 system 
unique to the United Kingdom.”40 
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 As Nott’s memorandum to MISC 7 on his D5 proposal acknowledged, 
until the British undertook “detailed discussions… with the US authorities” it 
would be “impossible to predict with precise accuracy what a UK D5 system 
would cost.”41 However, Nott was optimistic. He believed that the Reagan 
administration would be willing to provide D5 at a reduced price, and even 
that the British could secure a R&D levy of less than five percent:  
The attitude of this US Administration, and in particular their 
willingness to help us overcome some of the difficulties thrown up 
by the recent defence programme review, suggests that the re-
negotiation of the Polaris Sales Agreement which will be necessary 
with a switch to D5 might result in the US being willing to take 
special steps to minimise the cost of the programme to us. Mr 
Weinberger has made several encouraging remarks in this respect. 
This could result in their agreement either to waive completely or 
at least to reduce such US Government charges to us as the R&D 
levy, which is currently estimated at some £80M, although we must 
not discount the possibility of an adverse reaction by the 
Congressional Committees to this.42 
 However, Nott’s optimistic assessment overlooked many of the 
difficulties the British government faced in their choice between D5 and C4. As 
Robert Armstrong highlighted to Thatcher, Nott’s proposal glossed over the 
“very great uncertainties in the costings of a D5 force.”43 Even if the British 
were able to secure reductions from the administration, they still faced the risk 
of a huge escalation in eventual costs. The estimates of the C4 programme had 
already increased in real terms by 20 percent since MISC 7 had taken the 
decision to purchase the missile.44 These increases had occurred despite the 
missile being at an advanced stage of development. With the D5 system still in 
the early stages of development, the ultimate costs were unknown, but there 
clearly was a distinct potential for cost escalation far beyond Nott’s 
estimates.45 Given the increase in the costs of Trident to “increasingly 
formidable proportions,” MOD financial staff and even the Chiefs of Staff were 
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“increasingly restive about the potential impact of Trident for other parts of 
the defence programme.”46 
The increased costs of the D5 system, compared to the C4, would also 
likely have problematic political ramifications for the Thatcher government. 
At this moment in time, the cost of Britain’s nuclear programme was 
particularly contentious after Francis Pym, Nott’s predecessor, revealed the 
existence of the secret Chevaline programme with an estimated cost of about 
£1000 million to Parliament on 24 January 1980.47 The increased capability 
and costs of D5 would likely embolden the opposition Labour party and a 
growing antinuclear movement to aggressively campaign against a perceived 
expensive modernisation of Britain’s nuclear forces, beyond Britain’s need, 
while the country’s post-war welfare state faced severe cuts. As Gilmore had 
reflected in July:  
The Trident decision has already been criticised on the grounds 
that it provides us a capability far in excess of our requirements. A 
change of horses now for the D5 will fuel this criticism; and there 
will undoubtedly be suggestions that the UK is aiming at a 
counterforce capability.48  
A decision to upgrade to D5 could also fuel opposition from those on the right, 
traditionally supportive of Britain’s nuclear programme, who might argue that 
the increased costs of D5 would “cause further detriment to the UK’s 
conventional forces.”49  
Furthermore, sticking with the C4 would also create political problems. 
US-UK renegotiation of the C4 agreement was now necessary as a result of the 
cost increases of the system, due to Reagan’s strategic modernisation decision 
and exchange rate movements. The subsequent public announcement would 
draw attention to the system’s higher price than originally stated. Whilst, the 
inevitable chattering defence analysts would make the tricky public 
presentation of a new C4 deal more difficult by highlighting  the costs were 
likely to increase further due to the loss of commonality with the US. Once 
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again, all this would contribute to anti-Trident sentiment in sections of the 
British public.  
Subsequently, all ministers present at the MISC 7 meeting, bar John 
Nott, expressed uncertainty about the D5 due to fears about the financial and 
political costs. Francis Pym, Lord President of the Council, “worried that the 
proposed switch from C4 to the even more powerful D5 missile would 
adversely affect both public opinion today and the attitude of whatever 
Government emerges from the next elections.”50 Lord Carrington, Foreign 
Secretary, “shared these worries, and was also concerned at the greater 
difficulty of keeping a D5 force out of future arms-control negotiations.”51 As 
such, Carrington favoured staying with C4 for the moment, and switching to 
the D5 later. Geoffrey Howe, Chancellor of the Exchequer, supported adoption 
of the D5 but preferred only 12 missiles tubes per boat, despite the small 
saving. Thatcher, reflecting Armstrong’s earlier comments, “felt that the costs 
of D5 were uncertain and likely to escalate well beyond the present 
estimate.”52 Finally, and most dramatically, William Whitelaw, Home 
Secretary, “accepted the case for D5 against the other alternatives, but felt that 
the choice with which Ministers were faced raised a still more fundamental 
question: whether the United Kingdom could afford to continue to maintain an 
independent strategic nuclear deterrent.”53  
 Ministers saw themselves in a catch-22, constrained by economic, 
political and strategic factors on all sides. Despite worries about the costs of 
D5, the C4 option appeared even less attractive. The lessons of Chevaline 
permeated the discussion: an unnamed discussant highlighted that 
“experience had shown that there was a much lower risk of cost escalation in 
buying a weapon system from the American production line than in 
developing it nationally.”54 However, Ministers also saw the D5 option as 
highly contentious and problematic. The D5 system, even by the MOD’s 
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present estimates, would cost over £800 million a year by the end of the 
decade, and “[Britain] could not… afford to carry indefinitely a burden of 
defence expenditure proportionately higher than her European allies.”55 This 
high financial price tag provided “a deterrent greatly in excess of Britain's 
needs,” at the same time as creating political difficulties.56 A British Trident D5 
system, with its increased capability, would likely make the Soviet Union’s 
arguments that the UK’s forces be included in arms-control negotiations more 
vehement. Given US, British and French opposition to the inclusion of the UK 
and French nuclear forces, the Soviet Union would then be more likely to 
refuse to participate. This could have difficult ramifications for anti-TNF 
sentiment within Europe: “Opinion in continental Europe might well develop 
even further in favour of moving towards the removal of theatre nuclear 
weapons from the area, and public morale would suffer if Soviet opposition 
made it clear that this could not be achieved.”57 In addition, the Thatcher 
government would take these economic and political risks, with no guarantee 
of Trident’s long-term future: “There was no support for the Trident 
programme among any of the Opposition parties. For electoral reasons… the 
programme's continuity was uncertain.”58 Nevertheless, ministers believed 
Britain’s nuclear ‘deterrent’ essential: “Europe’s increasing need to rely for her 
security on American willingness to use strategic nuclear weapons only served 
to underline the importance of the national deterrents possessed by both 
Britain and France.”59 
 After this extensive discussion about the problematic choice British 
ministers faced, the meeting ran out of time, and with no clear solution to the 
predicament, the discussion finished on a cliff hanger: “Despite the enormous 
difficulties involved it might become necessary to consider the possibility of 
Britain ceasing to be a nuclear power.”60 With no time to consider this 
dramatic statement, Thatcher wrapped up the meeting: Due to “insufficient 
time on this occasion for Ministers to take any decision”, Thatcher suggested, 
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“A whole day should be devoted to collective ministerial consideration.”61 The 
uncertainty about the costs of the D5 system had impeded MISC 7’s decision-
making. This hesitation by MISC 7 over the future of Britain’s nuclear 
programme, and indeed its future as a nuclear power, was remarkable. In May 
1979, when MISC 7 first met to discuss the successor to Polaris there had been 
no discussion on whether the system should be replaced.62 This reflected the 
British elites’ belief in the necessity of an independent deterrent since the end 
of the Second World War.63 
In order to solve their dilemma over the future of the Trident 
programme, the British government needed the Reagan administration to 
offer a very favourable price for the D5. A substantial reduction in price would 
help mitigate the associated political risks MISC 7 ministers foresaw in opting 
for the expensive system. As an unnamed minister highlighted during the MISC 
7 discussion:  
“If arrangements were made with the Americans similar to those 
covering the present agreement to purchase C4 missiles, Britain 
would be protected from escalation in development costs, since the 
research and development levy payable would not be more than a 
fixed percentage of the production costs of the missiles bought.”64  
Currently though, ministers had no guarantee that the Reagan administration 
would offer a deal similar to the C4. Moreover, such a deal, due to the increased 
price of D5, would still leave Britain paying a higher price than they originally 
planned in July 1980. British ministers needed Nott’s hope - that the 
administration might be persuaded to waive the R&D levy altogether - to 
become reality. For the moment, with a lack of any assurance from the US 
about the price of D5, British ministers remained uncertain about the costs, 
thus delaying the Polaris replacement programme. Underpinning the problem 
was Britain’s dependence on the US for the provision of their nuclear 
capability; they had to take or leave whatever the United States offered, and 
this uncertainty could make decision-making, as in this case, very difficult.  
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In the interim before the next MISC 7 meeting, British officials received 
confusing signals about the Reagan administration’s support for a British 
Trident D5. On 3 December, David Gilmore met Richard Burt, a senior official 
in the US State Department. Their discussion left British officials concerned 
about the State Department’s support for British D5. Burt informed Gilmore 
that:  
There was a strong feeling at senior official level in the State 
Department (including MacFarlane [sic]) that D5 would be the 
wrong decision for the UK… State Department officials were 
concerned that decisions might be taken, not only here but in 
Washington, without adequate consideration of the 
consequences.65  
Burt stressed that this thinking “was based on the premise that it was strongly 
in the US interest that the UK should maintain its independent nuclear 
capability as a major contribution to overall deterrence and Alliance stability.” 
However, officials within the State Department were concerned:  
That a decision in favour of D5 at this juncture would be a perilous 
hostage to future fortune… The State Department did not believe 
that a decision now to go for D5 would survive any likely successor 
to the present Government in the United Kingdom. In their view to 
stick with C4 was the right answer, both for this and other 
reasons.66  
In response to Gilmore’s subsequent enquiry about whether Alexander Haig 
shared these views, Burt replied Haig’s “views were similar to those of his 
officials.” However, Haig, according to Burt, “Would probably be reluctant to 
take issue strongly with Mr Weinberger if, in the face of a decision in favour of 
D5 by British Ministers, the Department of Defence insisted that the US 
Government should acquiesce.”67 
Burt made clear throughout the discussion that the State Department 
saw it in US interests for the UK to maintain a nuclear capability. Nevertheless, 
his words provoked alarm for British officials. As Gilmore told Antony Acland, 
this was “the clearest indication… so far of a divergence of views within the US 
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Administration about a Polaris successor.”68 Such divides mattered. The State 
Department wished to lead the negotiations, and if they did not think the D5 
was the best option for the British they might not consider it necessary to 
provide the system at a substantially reduced cost. Furthermore, Robert 
McFarlane, named by Burt as an opponent to a British D5, looked likely to 
become National Security Advisor, a possibly influential position during 
negotiations, due to an ongoing scandal that had embroiled Richard Allen.69          
Subsequently, British officials made enquiries about Burt’s claims. 
Shortly after Burt’s meeting with Gilmore, Robert Hastie-Smith discussed the 
claims about the State Department’s attitudes with Richard Perle of the 
Pentagon. Reassuringly, Perle told Hastie-Smith that, “He was doubtful 
whether the State Department were well informed in regard to the precise UK 
position.”70 Perle assumed that three considerations were central to the State 
Department’s thinking that the British should stick with C4; firstly, that the C4 
would be cheaper than D5 and therefore have less of an impact on Britain’s 
conventional force levels; secondly, with the C4 decision already announced, 
it would create less difficulty for the forthcoming START talks; and finally, the 
availability of the C4 meant that the Thatcher government could get further 
ahead with the Polaris replacement programme than with D5, and this would 
make it more difficult for a successor government to cancel the programme.  
Perle then reaffirmed the Pentagon’s support for a British Trident D5. 
Unlike the State Department, the DOD thought that:  
The avoidance of uniqueness was an argument of overwhelming 
strength in favour of the UK deciding to follow the American 
decision to go for D5 earlier, and that in the long run thus was likely 
to turn out to be not merely the cheapest but the only practicable 
option for the UK.71  
Perle also offered reassurance that Weinberger was “now persuaded that if the 
UK decided to go for D5… [Britain] should be expected to pay an R&D levy no 
larger in total terms than we had already agreed to pay in respect of C4.” 
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Though concurrently Perle stressed that this reduction “would be forthcoming 
more readily if the DOD could demonstrate that part of the sum saved by the 
UK… was being devoted to the improvement of our conventional forces.”72 
In mid-December, Alexander Haig, himself, reassured the British. When 
Terrence Lewin, the Chief of Defence Staff, met with Alexander Haig in 
Brussels, he took the opportunity to enquire about the Secretary’s thoughts on 
a British D5. In response, Haig was, “quite clear that he supported the UK 
having a strategic nuclear deterrent and specifically that it should be D5.”73 
Subsequently, with this clear demonstration of support from Haig, and in light 
of the concern Burt’s comments had provoked, a clearly rankled Frank Cooper, 
permanent under-secretary at the MOD, displayed his frustration with some 
members of the administration in his report on Lewin’s Intel:  
This tends to confirm a view I have held for some time that there is 
a good deal of bureaucratic in-fighting in Washington and that Mac 
Farlane [sic] is not one of our more helpful allies. Rick Burt has 
always seemed to me to be more of a trendy strategic journalist 
than a serious politician. Moreover - all of this seems to show a 
regrettable tendency - long apparent- in the US Embassy here — to 
second guess the British political future.74 
 However, John Weston urged his fellow officials not to dismiss Burt’s 
comment in light of the contradictory intelligence. Weston had managed to get 
hold of a US paper on Britain’s options from the Pentagon. This paper 
suggested that the Reagan administration did not share the MOD’s views that 
the original plan to procure the C4 missiles was “a dead letter.” Instead, the 
paper continued, “to present the procurement of new C4 missiles as an option 
enjoying equal status with the others.”75 The paper laid out that the acquisition 
of C4 missiles would increase the UK’s short terms outlays “sharply,” because 
of the need to start buying the missiles four years earlier than originally 
planned. However, the assumed forty percent per annum increase in the C4 
system was not “over the lifetime of the system,” but from the point when the 
US phased out the C4 force. John Nott based his arguments on US withdrawal 
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of Trident C4 by 1998. Yet, the US paper highlighted that this phase-out was 
“tentatively planned” for the mid to late 1990s and the actual date that it would 
occur was unknown.76 Moreover, Weston highlighted, in a manner clearly 
frustrated with Nott’s and the MOD’s attempts to ‘steam-roll’ a D5 decision on 
the British that: 
Given the history of delays in the Trident II [D5] development so 
far, we would obviously be rash to exclude the possibility of some 
ten years commonality with the US C4 system, assuming an in-
service date of 1992 for the first UK boats (this assumption is at 
least as realistic as some of the others underlying the debate).77  
Due to the US paper’s focus on the short-term budgetary impact of a C4 
decision, rather than the necessity to maintain commonality, Weston viewed 
the State Department’s apparent belief that the C4 remained a legitimate 
option as understandable.78 Weston saw, “no inconsistency in Haig’s closest 
advisors taking the view on C4” which Burt put to David Gilmore.79 In addition, 
Weston asserted that there was no “FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office] 
consensus that one should ‘dismiss the possibility’ that Haig holds similar 
views (if only because we have been told specifically that he does).”80   
 
On 12 January, MISC 7 met again to decide on the successor to Polaris. This 
time the ministers met for an entire day owing to the uncertainties expressed 
during the last meeting about whether or not the British could afford to 
continue with its nuclear programme. To help with decision-making, the 
regular MISC 7 membership was reinforced by: Lord Hallisham, the Lord 
Chancellor; Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for Industry; and Cecil Parkinson, 
the Paymaster General.81 Since the previous meeting, the Reagan 
administration had given the British mixed messages about their attitude 
towards the supply of D5 at a reduced price. Nevertheless, despite this 
continued uncertainty, Armstrong told Thatcher, before the January meeting, 
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that he did not think ministers would decide to give up Britain’s nuclear 
weapons: “The political as well as the military implications of coming out are 
so tremendous that your colleagues are likely to conclude that we should stay 
in.”82  
Armstrong was right, the British elites’ belief in the necessity of a bomb 
with a Union flag on it, again won out. Once the formal MISC 7 discussion 
began, there was general agreement that Britain should continue to maintain 
an independent nuclear ‘deterrent’.83 Ministers then agreed that the Trident 
D5 should be the successor to Polaris, due to the “lessons of the Chevaline 
project.”84 However, many of the MISC 7 ministers were still concerned about 
the potential costs of the D5. As such, they decided that its procurement should 
be “subject to three provisos.” These provisos were: that negotiations should 
be undertaken with the US to “determine the broad terms on which the new 
system could be procured”; then Cabinet would take a final decision; and that 
the choice between a four of three boat force be “left open for the time being.”85 
This last proviso was because ministers saw it as “a matter for concern that 
the likely cost of the Trident project had already risen sharply in real terms 
since its inception in 1980 and that the price might well rise further in the 
future because of American decisions over which Britain would have no 
control.”86  
Subsequently, on 21 January Thatcher outlined MISC 7’s decision to 
Cabinet. In a marked difference to the lack of information provided to Cabinet 
following the C4 decision, due in part to the Carter administration’s paranoia 
about leaks, Thatcher told Cabinet that the Secretary of State for Defence 
would be prepared to arrange a full briefing for any member of the Cabinet 
who wished.87 However, like all British nuclear policy-making before it, the 
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decision remained the preserve of a small British elite, who were determined 
to maintain Britain’s nuclear force in spite of their fears that the cost, both 
financially and politically, was beyond Britain’s means. 
On 21 January 1982, Thatcher sent a request to Reagan for a British 
team to visit Washington in order to discuss the terms of sale for the Trident 
D5 missile. On January 26, Reagan sent his agreement to the talks.88 However, 
the Reagan administration had yet to agree who would lead the negotiations 
on their side. On 27 January 1982, Weinberger wrote to William Clark to lobby 
the DOD to take the lead on negotiations in order to maintain the link with the 
US/UK working group. As Weinberger told Clark, officials from the MOD and 
DOD had led the group, with some participation from the State Department. 
The group had “discussed potential savings that might be realized from British 
acquisition of Trident II [D5] and a concomitant reduction of research and 
development and other charges that would be assessed to the UK as a 
consequence of the Trident II purchase.”89 Weinberger was concerned that if 
the State Department led the Trident negotiations, “The work and purpose of 
the… Group, which has already identified significant savings that could be 
applied to UK programs… [would] be diluted as a result of a completely 
separate set of negotiations on Trident, outside the DoD/MoD framework.” As 
such, Weinberger urged Clark to agree that the “DoD should retain the lead on 
the Trident negotiation… so as to realize as fully as possible the defense 
benefits that will accrue to both the US and the UK as a result of the British 
purchase.”90 The DOD told British officials that they were lobbying for 
negotiations between the MOD and the Pentagon, in order to secure the best 
terms for the UK.91 However, as his letter to Clark makes clear, Weinberger 
also desired that his officials take the lead in order to secure the conventional 
commitments they desired from the British.   
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Officials in Downing Street were not so keen on Weinberger’s 
proposals. Armstrong foresaw that such a setup “would run the risk of mixing 
us up in internal Administration politics and perhaps alienating the State 
Department, whose support we shall need as well as the Pentagon's.” 
Armstrong thus advised Thatcher, “In order to avoid this danger, I think it 
would be best that we should propose to the Americans to follow the pattern 
of the earlier negotiations to acquire the Trident C4 missile.”92 
 Clark decided on such a compromise. The Reagan team would have a 
similar make-up to the Carter’s C4 team with representatives from the DOD, 
State Department, and the National Security Council. Robert McFarlane, now 
Clark's Deputy at the National Security Council but previously former 
Counsellor of the State Department, and an official that Burt had named as an 
opponent of a British D5 upgrade, would lead the negotiations. The set-up 
concurred with British wishes and helped them navigate the divisions within 
the Reagan administration. However, Clark’s decision also created greater 
unpredictability about what terms the US would offer the British on D5, due to 
uncertainty on the views of officials outside of the Pentagon. 
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IV 
 
 
Mock-up film poster designed for The Socialist Worker. 
 
In early February, the final Chevaline tests took place. The tests were “wholly 
successful.”93 With the negotiations for Trident D5 about to commence, this 
was an opportune time for the successful completion of the Chevaline 
development programme. The successful tests eased the British government’s 
concerns about the future viability of Britain’s nuclear programme, and short-
term budgetary issues. Engineering problems during the submarine trials of 
the system in November 1980 had raised doubts about the future of the 
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Chevaline programme.94 As such when MISC 7 met in January, there were still 
“worries about the viability of Chevaline” and therefore whether Britain would 
be able to maintain a credible deterrent until the introduction of Trident.95 The 
successful completion of these final tests, eradicated such concerns. The 
British could now delay deployment of the Trident programme, an option 
provided by the D5 but not the C4 missile, and thereby ease Britain’s short-
term budgetary problems created by the need to re-motor Polaris missiles.  
In addition, the successful development of Chevaline provided a 
visceral reminder to the Reagan administration of Britain’s commitment and 
contribution to shared defence, as well as technical abilities. Chevaline was a 
remarkable technical achievement. As a British official who attended the final 
launch informed Armstrong, the system was “probably in technical terms the 
most difficult weapon system development ever undertaken by the UK.” 
Subsequently “There is no doubt that the US people associated with the 
programme - both service and civilian, including some of their senior 
engineers - have been immensely impressed with our technical 
achievement.”96 Nevertheless, this achievement had come at a high price, with 
the programme an enormous drain on Britain’s defence budget. Despite the 
eventual ‘success’ of Chevaline, the programme’s completion as negotiations 
for Trident D5 began, was a timely reminder to both British and US officials 
that they did not want a repeat of such an independent and costly programme. 
 
As they planned for the Trident D5 negotiations, MOD officials were optimistic 
that the British government could secure a reduced price for Trident D5, even 
hoping that they “may be able to achieve an even better deal” than the already 
“advantageous” Polaris Sales Agreement.97 Their optimism arose from the 
Reagan administration’s indications that they wished Britain to remain “In the 
strategic deterrent business in view of the general political benefits to the 
West, and to the US in particular.”98 As well as the concerns of officials in the 
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Pentagon that, “Following the UK's recent defence review… expenditure on a 
UK strategic deterrent should not lead to further reductions in our 
conventional forces.”99 Indeed, the Reagan administration’s desire to improve 
the West’s nuclear and conventional forces provided a conducive environment 
for the British to secure a reduced price for Trident D5. It was not in the 
administration’s interests to levy too high a charge for D5, this would divert 
funds from conventional forces, and in the worst-case scenario cause a 
Chevaline programme mark II. Moreover, too high a charge would strengthen 
anti-Trident sentiment in Britain, and could increase support for the Labour 
party’s disarmament policies.  
Nevertheless, this conducive environment for the British did not mean 
that the Reagan team did not engage in hard bargaining, and US officials 
planned their strategy carefully from the outset. The Reagan administration 
would not simply give the British a discount on D5 without something in 
return. On 6 February 1982, Haig and Carlucci wrote to Reagan to inform him 
about the agreed United States opening negotiation strategy. The strategy they 
outlined was very similar to the line proposed to the British during the US-UK 
defence co-operation working group meetings. US negotiators would seek a 
reciprocal deal, where in return for providing the British with a cut-price 
missile system; they would ask the British to make commitments in geo-
strategic areas of concern. The R&D charge would again form the primary area 
of negotiation. Carlucci and Haig told Reagan that they believed it to be in the 
US interests to waive some of this charge, as was the President’s 
prerogative.100 The Reagan team intended to firstly offer an arrangement 
similar to the C4 agreement, where the US would forego 25 percent of the R&D, 
be paid about 25 percent in cash, and receive 50 percent in the form of offsets. 
Haig and Carlucci told Reagan that, “The effect of this would be to 
approximately double both what the UK will pay for R&D, and what we will 
forgive.”101 In this way, like the Carter White House before them, the Reagan 
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team, despite their greater support for Britain’s Polaris replacement, still 
planned to utilise British technical dependence to extract a series of quid pro 
quos, or ‘offsets’, in exchange for reducing British costs. Indeed, one of the five 
sections that the Department of Defense wrote for a paper preparing for the 
negotiations was devoted entirely to “Quids.”102 The ‘offsets’ that the US 
negotiators sought would: 
Fall in two important areas in which the British are cutting forces 
and we would otherwise have to take up the slack: Maintaining 
surface naval forces in the North Atlantic, and peacetime presence 
in the Indian Ocean. If the British agree to do more than they had 
planned in these two areas, it will save the U.S. Government money 
and bolster Western defenses.103  
Haig and Carlucci’s strategy clearly displays that the Reagan administration 
saw it in US interests to reduce British costs in order to ensure the UK’s 
commitment to Western conventional and strategic defence. However, they 
also saw the need to balance this requirement against the utilisation of US-UK 
nuclear co-operation to extract British commitments that would address their 
areas of concern with regards present UK defence planning. In this way, US 
officials would, once again, take a hard-nosed approach to negotiations on 
Trident in order to shape Britain’s  defence strategy to their benefit as much 
as possible, without conversely damaging the wider benefits that the US 
derived from the nuclear relationship; namely British contributions to NATO 
and Western defence. 
 
On the 8-9 February 1982, the first round of the Trident D5 negotiations took 
place. Robert McFarlane and Robert Wade-Gery led the talks, with 
representatives from the MOD, FCO, State Department and DOD.104 Unlike the 
C4 negotiations, the D5 talks did not devote much time to revealing the 
decision to their NATO allies. Subsequently, Robert Wade-Gery noted, “By 
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contrast with 1980 the Americans seem reasonably relaxed over the whole 
issue of presenting the new deal to our various allies.”105 However, like the C4 
negotiations, US officials drove a hard bargain, and did not give the British 
reductions on the R&D charge freely or easily. Indeed, Wade-Gery, who was a 
central figure in both Trident negotiations, later recalled that the Reagan 
administration was more preoccupied with the quid pro quos than the Carter 
White House: 
What struck us at the time… was how totally different it was from 
negotiating with the Carter White House. We went out, 
remembering… the previous negotiation, fully prepared with a 
whole raft of arguments about the moral issue and how it was 
perfectly all right to let Britain have this missile. We found the 
Reagan White House wholly uninterested in the moral argument. 
They brushed all that aside and said, “Don’t give us all that crap. 
Don’t worry about that. What are you going to pay for these, and 
what are you going to do in return? How’s your policy going to be 
different, because, you know, if we’re doing this for you, we want to 
be paid cash and in kind.” It was a good old-fashioned haggle about 
how much we would pay and what we would do in return. 106  
The British opened discussion’s by making it clear that the 
administration’s strategic modernisation decision had left them with a difficult 
dilemma. The British government now faced a choice between “two 
unattractive alternatives”; the C4 that “would have all the penalties of 
uniqueness”; or the D5, which would be “better and costlier” than they needed, 
and “would involve the financial risks of an untried system, and… increase the 
dollar content of the overall programme.”107 The British then reminded the 
Reagan administration that their wider concerns over the UK’s defence 
spending and domestic instability were interrelated to the terms of any D5 
agreement: “If we were to switch to D.5… we would need to minimise the cost 
of doing so, in order to avoid damaging our conventional defence effort and 
stirring up domestic controversy.”108 However, despite these warnings from 
the British on the extent that the price of D5 would affect wider US concerns, 
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the first round of talks did not go as well as British officials had hoped, with 
the Reagan team taking a harder line on the R&D levy than they expected.  
 Reflective of the administration’s concern not to increase anti-nuclear 
sentiment in Britain, US negotiators were, from the off, forthcoming on the 
British request for ‘offsets’. British officials wished for counter-trade as a form 
of defence offset, in order to compensate, to some extent, the UK arms industry 
for the purchase of the US missile system. Following the C4 agreement, 
members of the British industry had criticised the government’s failure to 
obtain any offset from the United States, and expressed fears that given the 
cost of Trident orders for ‘conventional’ defence equipment would 
decrease.109 British officials foresaw that the purchase of Trident D5 would 
magnify these criticisms, due to the increased cost of the system and a higher 
proportion of expenditure in the United States.110 John Nott had previously 
informed US officials “It would be politically impossible for him to decide in 
favor of costly US systems, even when they are the most cost effective, unless 
he can point to significant US purchases of British systems.”111 US officials 
were “receptive” to the British idea that if they purchased D5, UK “firms should 
be given a fair crack of the whip as regards sub-contracts from within the 
whole United States Trident programme.”112 Furthermore, in demonstration 
of their wish to help dampen criticism to the purchase of D5, US officials 
suggested that they might be able, “To spend part of the proceeds of our 
payments under the overheads charge… on setting up a liaison office in 
London for the purpose of educating relevant British firms in the requirements 
of this highly complex market.”113 
US negotiators were also forthcoming on two of the surcharges the 
British were liable to pay. With regards overheads, US officials said, as the 
British expected, that they could waive the minimum charge, which they 
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estimated to be at 1982 prices, $106 million. On the facilities charge, the US 
negotiators said they were “Prepared to contemplate waiving the facilities 
charge, which they put at $51 million.”114 The British viewed these concessions 
as “satisfactory.”115 
However, Robert Wade-Gery reported to the British government that 
the US thinking on the third surcharge, R&D, was, “less forthcoming than we 
had hoped.”116 The US officials told their British counterparts, that they started 
from their legal obligation to calculate the levy on a pro-rata basis. Calculated 
at 1981 prices, this would amount to $685 million. About half that amount the 
Reagan team regarded as “eligible to be offset against costs incurred by us [the 
British] on their behalf in other areas.”117 Reagan officials had calculated that 
the US did gain almost that amount under the 1980 agreement to pay 
personnel costs for US Rapier systems in Britain, a commitment that would 
still stand.118 However, the Rapier deal still left $342 million unpaid. US 
officials said they would be willing to waive $120 million, with the British 
paying $222 million.119 On hearing this offer, British officials: 
Made clear that this basis for R&D calculations would be wholly 
unacceptable in London. Under the deal struck publicly in July 
1980, we undertook to pay their Rapier manning costs; and we 
were abiding by that. In return, they undertook to fix the Trident 
R&D levy not at a pro rata level but on a 5 per cent basis (as with 
Polaris). On their own figures, 5 per cent for D.5 would currently 
come to $128 million (or $116 million for C.4). This was therefore 
our starting figure; and it was this which we were now asking them 
to waive, in order to help minimise the cost of a switch to D.5.120  
 
Discussions on the R&D levy dominated the second day of discussion, and by 
the day’s end, there were “outlines of a possible settlement.”121 Subsequently, 
Wade-Gery reported to London that he believed the British could persuade the 
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administration for a five percent levy on the lines agreed for Polaris and C4. 
However, he also highlighted that US negotiators had made it clear that for 
such a reduction the British would have to make conventional commitments, 
due to the need to consider Congressional reaction. US officials explained that 
this was because the administration would have to seek the agreement of 
Congress for any Trident deal, which did not charge a pro-rata levy. Therefore, 
if the administration offered the British a reduction on the R&D levy, “their 
basic approach to Congress” would need to be that money the British were “not 
forced to pay for R&D will be money available for… [their] conventional 
defence effort.”122 In particular, US officials told their British counterparts that 
“It would lend force to this argument if they could point to specific British 
deployment decisions in conventional sectors of importance to United States 
opinion which… [Britain] might have made public in the period shortly before 
a D-5 deal was announced.”123 Kristan Stoddart subsequently emphasises that 
this need to appease congress was why the R&D levy was the “big sticking 
point.”124 
 However, whilst US negotiators stressed to British officials that these 
‘quids’ were to appease Congress, my research in the US archives suggests that 
this was not the whole truth; the Reagan White House also sought these ‘quids’ 
in order to gain, at least some, assistance with their own areas of interest, 
namely naval deployment. As previously discussed, when Haig and Carlucci 
informed Reagan of their planned strategy they told the President that they 
wished for offsets in “important areas” where, otherwise, the US would “have 
to take up the slack.”125 Subsequently, after the first round of talks, Stoessel 
and Carlucci told Reagan that they believed their relatively tough approach 
meant the British would now consider the quid pro quos that the US desired:  
We offered the British an arrangement for the purchase of the 
missiles similar to that agreed two years ago for the TRIDENT (C-
4) missile. Predictably, they told us the price we offered was higher 
than they wished to pay. However, they agreed to propose to us 
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additional offsets (i.e., increases in their own defense posture in 
areas where we would otherwise have to assume responsibility 
ourselves) which could make up at least some of the difference.126  
In pushing for these offsets, US negotiators took advantage of Britain’s 
weak hand in the negotiations, as they had “no real option except to go for 
D.5.”127 These tactics were not because the administration did not see a 
favourable deal to the British as in their interests. Rather they also saw the 
negotiations as an opportunity to get as much assistance as possible in their 
areas of concern. The US side saw negotiation as a key part of any final 
agreement, and indeed, as previously discussed, this renegotiation has always 
been a central element in the US-UK nuclear relationship. As Haig and Carlucci 
told Reagan before negotiations began, they expected US and UK officials to 
hammer out a reciprocal deal through compromise: “We do not anticipate that 
we will be able to complete the negotiations at next week’s session. We will 
make our first offer, the British will make theirs, followed by some clarifying 
discussions.”128 As such, the Reagan team planned to push the British on the 
R&D levy as much as possible, in order to extract reasonable commitments 
from the British. Subsequently, the US officials were happy with the first round 
of negotiations. They were “optimistic” that in the next round, two weeks 
away, “that we [the US] can bridge the differences between us.”129 
Overall, after the first round of negotiations, Robert Wade-Gery was 
also hopeful that the British government would secure the deal they needed. 
He believed the US officials gave, “The impression of being under instructions 
to reach an amicable settlement, provided that this did not leave the President 
too exposed to Congressional attack.”130 Nevertheless, due to “the Americans 
negotiating toughly, particularly on the R&D levy,” Robert Wade-Gery 
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suggested that in the next round the British be prepared to up the ante by 
telling US officials that the:  
Prime Minister is personally very disturbed by their current 
suggestions on and [sic] R and D levy. A message on this subject 
from her to the President may yet be necessary to clinch the final 
deal; and the implicit threat of it may serve to concentrate the 
minds of the President’s advisers.131 
Indeed, Thatcher was disturbed, and agreed to this course of action.132  
In the interim between the two rounds of discussion of D5, MOD 
officials began “considering urgently what limited adjustments to the 
conventional defence programme” the British could offer to secure reductions 
on the R&D levy. The British needed to create something out of relatively little, 
as Wade-Gery told Coles: “They would need to be compatible with British 
interests; and of course self-balancing, since our available resources are 
already fully committed.”133 In the next round of talks, the British planned to 
show the US negotiators a list of these possible adjustments and make clear 
that their ability to announce some or all of these changes was dependent on 
how much the US helped with Trident surcharges. The British would use this 
approach to “confirm waiver of the D-5 facilities charge; to accept that 
consideration of the level of R and D levy should start from the basis of a 5 per 
cent levy…; to move downwards from there; and to end up with a fixed rather 
than a percentage figure.”134 The British expected to succeed in at least the first 
two of these aims, and if the US officials were unwilling or unable to give the 
final two, the British would limit the extent of their conventional adjustments. 
Such a strategy, Robert Wade-Gery believed would enable the British “To 
establish the real limits of what they think they can get through Congress.”135 
 
On 24-25 February 1982, the second round of negotiations took place. By the 
end of the first day, the two sides had agreed everything except the elusive 
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R&D figure.136 During the course of the day, US negotiators were again, in most 
areas, inclined to be helpful and negate any political problems that a Trident 
D5 deal would cause the Thatcher government. Throughout discussions on 
surcharges, US officials were conscious of the need to give the British a 
presentable deal that would provoke as little political trouble as possible. On 
the overheads charge, which for legal reasons had to remain a percentage on 
the same basis as in the Polaris and C4 agreements, US officials were “Content 
to follow precedent and not mention this in the published exchanges.”137 Once 
again, the US and UK government would not reveal the full price of Britain’s 
nuclear programme to the public. US officials also confirmed the waiver of the 
facilities charge. Moreover, US officials also agreed that the R&D levy would be 
a fixed sum rather than a sliding percentage. This vital concession would 
protect the British from possible escalation in the costs of the D5 system, with 
the US instead absorbing all cost increases. This would greatly assist with 
presenting the new Trident agreement to the public, and would help ensure 
the future viability of Britain’s nuclear and conventional forces by minimising 
the risk of escalation in costs. 
The reductions given by the Reagan administration on these surcharges 
demonstrated their clear support for Britain’s nuclear and conventional 
forces, as well as an attempt to suppress domestic opposition in Britain, and in 
NATO, to the deal. In this way, the Reagan White House bolstered the Thatcher 
Conservative government. Nevertheless, the US negotiators continued to play 
hardball over the extent of the fixed R&D levy. In response to the British list of 
possible adjustments to their conventional defence programme, US officials 
expressed their dissatisfaction; they “rightly perceived” that most of these 
‘additional’ deployments were, “No more than we [the British] could have been 
assumed to be planning to do anyway.”138 US negotiators then began to press 
“strongly for some additional commitments in areas that would respond to 
current congressional preoccupations.”139 With the British seemingly ‘on the 
back foot,’ US officials now laid out their desire for Britain to retain HMS 
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Invincible and delay its military departure from Belize.140 Whilst these specific 
‘quids’ had not been mentioned before in the negotiations, they were of the 
type that Carlucci and Haig had told Reagan they aimed to secure, before 
negotiations began.  
 In response to the US request to retain Invincible, Robert Wade-Gery 
told the US officials that they expected the Australian government to announce 
their plans to purchase the aircraft carrier the next day; there was “no way” 
the British “could now dishonour that offer.”141 US officials “regretfully 
accepted this.”142 Wade-Gery then revealed the possibility of a British decision 
to reprieve HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid. This, US officials replied “was the 
sort of thing they were looking for.”143 US officials explained they would wish 
for a private message, from Nott to Weinberger, on how long the British 
planned to retain the ships in service, and “how much of their time they might 
be expected to spend on out of Area deployment,” followed by a public 
announcement on the retaining of the ships before the Trident exchange of 
letters.144 They would not publish Nott’s message, but show it “to certain key 
persons in Congress, as evidence of UK efforts towards enhancement of 
conventional forces.”145  
 The Reagan administration’s efforts to ensure that Britain retained 
Navy vessels was not only to appease Congress, but it was also in response to 
the administration’s and US Navy’s concerns about reductions in the United 
Kingdom’s surface strength. As previously discussed, Weinberger had spoken 
to Nott about these concerns during their meeting in August.146 By requesting 
that Britain retain its naval vessels, the administration sought to use the 
Trident negotiations as a means to influence British policy in this area. The US 
request that the British maintain a regular naval presence in the Caribbean 
also formed part of these efforts. The requests were another example of long-
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standing attempts by US administrations’ to stem Britain’s retreat ‘East of 
Suez’. A Department of State briefing paper from February 1982 stated:  
We should encourage British interests in restoring their 
capabilities to act East of Suez, including the Persian Gulf and 
Indian Ocean… The UK's record over the past decade is one of 
consistent retrenchment East of Suez, and there is no assurance 
that new resources budgeted in that direction would not be cut in 
the future.147  
The Trident negotiations provided the administration with a conducive 
environment for such ‘encouragement’.  
On Belize, US officials asked that the British retain all, or at least some, 
of their existing combat forces in the South-American state for a further five 
years.148 Wade-Gery gave the proposal short shrift, telling the US team “They 
should not… be under any mis-apprehension about our room for manoeuvre. 
A decision to station British combat forces for a prolonged period in a third 
world country would be a major departure in policy. I saw little chance of this 
being acceptable.”149 However, in his attempts to reach a compromise, Wade-
Gery raised “two less far-reaching possibilities.”150 The first was the expansion 
of the training programme that the British planned to provide to the Belize 
defence forces after the withdrawal of British combat forces. The second was 
a short extension, by a matter of a few months, in the length of time that British 
combat forces would remain in Belize. Unknown to the US officials, the British 
were already considering this second possibility. As Wade-Gery later reported, 
“The Americans are aware of our plans to withdraw in June, but they gave no 
indication that they knew of Price’s [Prime Minister of Belize] request for a 
three-month extension.”151 These suggestions produced a mixed response 
from the Americans; McFarlane replied that there might be “promise” in the 
first option, but “he gave no sign” that the second option would be of 
interest.152 US negotiators then, “Pressed for an assurance that a regular 
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British naval presence (e.g. one frigate) would be maintained in the Caribbean 
for the next five years.”153 In response, Wade-Gery, explained, “That ship 
deployments are not normally planned in such detail so far ahead, but 
undertook to have the point considered as sympathetically as possible.”154  
The Reagan administration’s efforts to ensure a British commitment to 
Belize and the Caribbean was also not only to appease Congress; the 
administration was concerned about the future stability of Belize, as well as 
the ‘threat’ of communism spreading throughout this part of South America. 
As part of the Thatcher government’s efforts to end the financial burden of its 
remaining colonies, they had decided to grant Belize independence by the end 
of 1981.155 The British consequently planned to withdraw all combat forces.156 
The British had taken this decision despite Guatemala’s claim to Belize, and 
this concerned the Reagan administration. US officials feared that “failure to 
settle the dispute now could lead to tensions between Guatemala and Belize, 
invite Cuban intervention and contribute to regional destabilisation.”157 They 
therefore believed “It… essential that the UK do everything possible to reach 
an agreement with Guatemala and retain a garrison in Belize after 
Independence.”158 In addition, the Reagan administration’s anxiety that the 
British maintain a military presence also stemmed from their efforts to 
suppress a perceived communist threat in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and their 
concurrent fear of contagion across Latin America.159 Subsequently, the 
administration utilised the negotiations as the means to encourage Britain’s 
retention of forces on Belize.    
With no firm agreement on ‘additional’ British deployments, the first 
day of the second round of negotiations ended with the final amount of the 
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R&D levy still unresolved. The issue would “be hammered out in hard 
bargaining” the next day in light of Britain’s final position on deployment. As 
such, after the day’s discussions Wade-Gery sent an urgent telegraph to John 
Nott. Wade-Gery told Nott that “In order to negotiate the lowest possible R&D 
figure tomorrow,” he needed to say “as much as possible” in response to the 
specific requests made by the US officials. Wade-Gery subsequently asked John 
Nott if he could say they agreed to the desired US procedure on retention of 
Fearless and Intrepid, and if they could offer any private reassurances about 
how long they would retain them. Wade-Gery also enquired if there was 
anything they could offer the Americans on Belize that could “be at least 
dressed up as an addition to current plans.”160 Finally, Wade-Gery enquired 
about the likely level of British naval presence in the Caribbean over the next 
five years. Wade-Gery acknowledged the flurry of activity that his telegram 
would provoke, but he saw a response as essential to the British achieving a 
good deal on the D5: “I well realize how difficult this will be and that short-
notice consultation between Ministers may be needed… but anything that can 
be done while the iron is hot here will clearly be reflected in the deal we 
strike.”161         
The following day, the two sides reached an agreement. The final deal 
was extremely favourable to the British, more so than the Trident C4 
agreement. Britain would have to pay an overheads charge on the same 
percentage basis as the C4 agreement, something Wade-Gery acknowledged 
“was practically unavoidable under US law.”162 However, the US would use 
part of this payment to set up a project liaison office that would advise British 
companies on how to tender for contracts. The administration waived the 
facilities charge, estimated at $51 million, which was part of the C4 deal. US 
officials were also “reasonably forthcoming” in response to British concerns 
about offsets.163 In addition to “helpful language” in the main exchange letters, 
the US negotiators also offered a further side letter from Weinberger, which 
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whilst not for publication, “would not be confidential and could be freely 
drawn on in public e.g. in briefing British industrialists.”164 The two documents 
would make clear that competitive British firms were eligible for sub-
contracts across the whole Trident programme. The Reagan administration 
also agreed to change some of the Buy American Act provisions, and set up a 
liaison office in London in order to advise British industry on how they could 
compete for sub-contracts for the D5 programme as a whole, including the US 
programme.165 Therefore, this deal would negate the arguments of some 
potential opponents to Trident D5 who would argue that the system was too 
costly and would take valuable jobs away from British manufacturing. 
Moreover, with the possibility of lucrative contracts for British industry, the 
Reagan administration’s offer made the deal much harder for any future 
Labour government to cancel. The Reagan administration also agreed to 
Britain paying a fixed R&D levy equivalent to $116 million in fiscal 1982 
dollars. This fixed amount insulated Britain from any escalation in the 
development costs of the D5. Moreover, the sum of $116 million was an 
extraordinary concession from the administration. The charge was limited to 
what the old five percent formula would have cost the British if they had stayed 
with the C4, and was below the $128 million that the same formula would have 
charged if applied to a D5 deal. Wade-Gery subsequently saw these 
concessions as “a significant improvement on the terms of the C4 
agreement.”166 
The British negotiators achieved this deal without, in the end, much 
extra commitment on their side. The “lever” that secured the concession on the 
R&D levy was the decision to reprieve the naval assault ships Fearless and 
Intrepid, as well as the offer of a private letter from Nott to Weinberger, that 
administration officials could show to members of Congress. This letter would 
make clear the British “intention of retaining the ships until the end of the 
decade and deploying them at intervals outside the NATO area.”167 British 
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officials did not tell their US counterparts that they had already taken the 
decision to retain these vessels on other grounds.168 Although Wade-Gery later 
contradicted this assertion: 
I remember one of the things we were bullied into undertaking in 
return, was to keep in commission a couple of landing craft which 
the Americans thought would enhance NATO’s capability and 
which the Ministry of Defence thought we ought to decommission 
because they were expensive. They were kept in commission and 
turned out to be extremely useful in the Falkland’s War which came 
along later. So it was an ill wind, as they say. But we were very 
reluctant to keep these in commission.169 
Clarity on whether the British had already made a firm decision to retain the 
ships or if they were pushed towards this by the need to secure reductions on 
Trident will hopefully come with further  archival releases and historical 
research. Nevertheless, in the end the exchange was fortuitous for the British. 
The retention of Fearless and Intrepid was vital to the British in the Falklands 
War. Britain’s ‘victory’ greatly assisted Thatcher’s electoral landslide in 1983, 
and thereby the future of the Trident programme.   
UK and US officials agreed that the link between the retention of 
Fearless and Intrepid and the sale of Trident D5 would not be discussed in 
public. As with the C4 agreement and the secret Diego Garcia deal, the 
transactional elements of the relationship would remain secret. In the public 
exchange of letters the waiver of all charges in excess of $116 million was 
justified by the United Kingdom agreeing to man the Rapier air defence of 
United States Air Force bases in the UK, as well as an understanding, “that the 
United Kingdom will employ additional savings represented by the remainder 
of the United States waiver to reinforce its efforts to upgrade its conventional 
forces.”170 
The British also secured the reduction on the R&D levy without much 
commitment on the administration’s other areas of concern. The British made 
“no promises” in response to US officials expressing they were “particularly 
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keen on annual deployments to the Indian Ocean, and would welcome 
anything… [the British] could say on that.”171 Similarly, with regards Britain’s 
military posture in Belize and naval presence in the Caribbean, “It was clear 
that the Americans would much value anything… [the British] were willing to 
say under either head.” However, again, British negotiators, by describing their 
training plans in more detail, “were able to avoid offering specific 
commitments.”172 However, the British did provide a vague commitment to 
deployment in Nott’s letter to Weinberger. In this letter, Nott stressed that the 
retention of Fearless and Intrepid would help Britain “Preserve our existing 
methods for early amphibious reinforcement of North Norway and other key 
NATO areas, and also our ability to operate with these ships and Royal Marines 
outside the NATO area including the Indian Ocean and Caribbean.”173 
Conversely, despite the British government’s efforts to resist the Reagan 
administration’s request on Belize, the increase in bellicose statements from 
the Guatemalan government, in response to the Falkland’s crisis, led the 
Thatcher government to decide to maintain the Belize garrison for a further 
three months.174 In the end, the Thatcher government retained a substantial 
force in Belize throughout the 1980s.175  
British negotiators were adept at using their limited resources – 
alongside the Reagan administration’s concerns about their defence budget 
and the political instability of the Thatcher government – to secure this 
favourable deal. British officials also saw Thatcher’s personal relationship 
with the President as central to securing the eventual deal:  
Your personal concern over the outcome was known to the 
American negotiators throughout; they made clear that they were 
keeping the President carefully informed; and we have little doubt 
that he wanted - and that they knew he wanted - his eventual 
agreement with you to be satisfactory from your point of view.176  
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However, the skill of British negotiators or the Thatcher-Reagan relationship 
does not fully explain the eventual deal. The US officials were also clearly good 
negotiators, and they had a clear strategy from the outset to secure a series of 
‘quids’ from the British in their areas of concern. Whether or not the British 
planned to retain Fearless and Intrepid, that they did so meant the Reagan 
administration largely achieved their aims. However, given their concurrent 
concern with building the conventional and nuclear forces of the West, as well 
as their fear of the growth of the anti-nuclear left in Britain and the Labour 
party, the administration was never going to extort the Thatcher government 
in exchange for reductions. Moreover, the contribution the Reagan 
administration wished for was far more important politically than financially. 
As Richard Perle later remarked, given the Reagan administration’s waiver of 
the Trident R&D costs in exchange for the British promise to keep more of its 
surface ships “One could say that we [the US] ended up subsidizing the Royal 
Navy.”177 
The deal demonstrated the financial price the Reagan administration 
was willing to pay for the political and military support of a Conservative 
Britain. The deal was an inducement from the administration to bolster 
Britain’s nuclear and conventional forces, secure the forces long-term future, 
and attempt to limit the commitment’s effect on Britain’s wider economic 
situation, thus stemming one aspect of the left’s criticism of the deal. Once 
again, a US administration had viewed the US-UK nuclear relationship as a tool 
to secure the wider defence interests of the US and the Western alliance. 
Moreover, the Reagan administration utilised the relationship as a means to 
further their ideological aim to counter the perceived ‘red threat’ of the Soviet 
Union and a vocal left in Europe. The Thatcher government and Reagan 
administration had now reached an agreement, ready for ministerial approval 
and public announcement.       
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V 
 
On 4 March, MISC 7 met to discuss the outcome of the negotiations. The 
ministers agreed that the “terms negotiated with the Americans were 
advantageous and would be particularly helpful in presenting a purchase of 
the D5 missile to industry and to the government’s supporters.”178 MISC 7 
subsequently agreed that a ‘recommendation’ be put to Cabinet that Britain 
purchase the Trident D5 system, and build four submarines, each with 16 
missile tubes, with a view to the first boat entering service in 1994.179  
Thatcher decided to inform the Cabinet orally about the D5 decision the 
week before the public announcement on 11 March, with a formal Cabinet 
decision then made on the day.180 The fear of leaks largely dictated this 
timetable. The timetable also presumed Cabinet agreement. Nevertheless, this 
procedure was still far more democratic than the one followed for the Trident 
C4 agreement. Unlike in 1980, the Cabinet had already received briefings on 
the D5 choice following their earlier discussion of the subject on 21 January.181 
Moreover, in July 1980, the original plan was to inform Cabinet of the decision 
on the day of the announcement. However, after a leak in Washington, the 
Carter and Thatcher governments decided to announce the Trident C4 
decision two days earlier, with the Cabinet informed by correspondence. As 
discussed, this left many members of Cabinet disgruntled. This time Downing 
Street was careful not to show such lack of concern for Cabinet opinion. The 
more helpful attitude of the Reagan administration partly made this possible. 
They were not as paranoid about leaks as the Carter administration, and did 
not insist on the Thatcher government keeping news of the C4 discussions to 
an extremely small elite circle up until the last minute. Moreover, the Reagan 
administration gave permission for senior British officials to brief Cabinet 
about how much the US and UK knew about Soviet capabilities in the briefing 
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they received on the D5 choice.182 On 4 March, the Cabinet agreed, “Trident 2 
[D5] missiles for a four-boat British force should be acquired from the United 
States on the terms suggested.”183 
On 11 March 1982, John Nott announced the Trident D5 decision in the 
House of Commons.184 At the same time, the British published the formal 
exchange of letters, alongside an open government document explaining the 
rationale behind the adoption of D5. The exchange of letters was virtually 
identical to the 1980 C4 agreement and again contained the ‘supreme national 
interests’ clause, which meant under the provisions of the 1962 Nassau 
agreement and 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement that Britain could use the system 
independently if necessary.185 Like the C4 agreement, Thatcher’s letter to 
Reagan also included a commitment that the United Kingdom would use the 
savings from US supply of Trident D5, “to reinforce the United Kingdom 
Government's continuing efforts to upgrade their conventional forces.”186 
Once again, the US reply argued that US-UK nuclear co-operation was 
important to NATO; Reagan’s letter stressed the improvement of Britain’s 
nuclear and conventional forces, which were of “the highest priority for 
NATO's security,” that US-UK nuclear co-operation enabled.187  
  In the ensuing debate following Nott’s parliamentary announcement, 
the Shadow Defence Secretary, John Silken, gave the expected Labour reply to 
the Trident D5 decision: 
Labour will cancel the Trident project. We shall do so for three 
basic reasons. First, this programme escalates the arms race, 
particularly in the light of the Geneva talks and the United Nations 
special session on disarmament… Secondly, the project breaks the 
spirit if not the letter of the non-proliferation treaty… Thirdly, 
despite all that the Secretary of State says, the expense will have an 
effect upon our conventional forces which will destroy the security 
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of these islands.188 
Subsequently, on 29 March, the Conservative government defeated an 
opposition censure motion in Parliament criticising the decision to spend 13 
billion dollars on the Trident D5 missile system. The government convincingly 
defeated the motion by 301 to 215 in the House of Commons.189 However, the 
Thatcher government and the Reagan administration still faced the risk that a 
Labour victory in the 1983 election could result in the cancellation of the 
Trident programme. Modest economic recovery meant the Conservatives 
ratings had been continuously improving since their low in the autumn of 
1981, nevertheless, a Conservative majority in the next election still looked 
uncertain. Opinion polls at this time put Labour, the SDP and the Conservatives 
all but tied.190 On 2 April 1982, news came through to London that the 
Argentinians had seized the Falkland Islands. The Thatcher government’s 
‘victory’ in the ensuing Falklands war, helped in no small part by the retention 
of HMS Fearless and Intrepid, boosted the Conservative’s electoral fortunes. In 
October 1981, a Gallup poll had put Thatcher’s approval rating at 24 percent, 
up until then, the lowest ever recorded for a Prime Minister. The Falklands 
“transformed” Thatcher into the Conservative’s “electoral asset.”191 In the 
British general election of June 1983, the Conservative party swept to a 
landslide victory, and thus secured the future of the Trident D5 programme.  
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Conclusion 
 
“The US has never sought to exploit our procurement relationship in 
this area as a means to influence UK foreign policy.” 
 
- UK Government White Paper, 20061 
 
For over thirty years, the British government has poured money into its Trident 
SLBM system. Yet the story of the US-UK negotiations on the British purchase of 
Trident has remained largely obscured. Only recently has it become possible to 
write a detailed account of the Trident agreements based upon archival material. 
This thesis provides the first discrete study of the Trident C4 and D5 negotiations. 
This account is inevitably incomplete and provisional; it is a starting point, not the 
final word. Due to the continued operation of the Trident system and the limited 
budgets of the US archives, a notable amount of archival material remains 
classified. Nevertheless, by using available material from the British and American 
archives this thesis provides both a coherent account of the complex Trident 
negotiations and the essentials of an interesting story.  
The US provision of Trident was not inevitable. Close analysis of the history 
of US-UK nuclear co-operation, as chapter one demonstrated, reveals the 
relationship at its core is one that is driven by a hard-headed calculation of 
interests, not unstinting devotion. Moreover, analysis of the relationship since its 
beginnings highlights the frequent renegotiation that has taken place. The US is 
clearly the ‘senior’ partner in US-UK nuclear co-operation and therefore its 
interests, whether strategic, political or economic, heavily shaped, and will 
continue to, this renegotiation. Given this history of the US-UK nuclear 
relationship, the premise of this thesis is that the American role in the formulation 
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of the Trident agreements warrants close attention. As such, the overarching 
theme is the role that self-interest in the Reagan and Carter administration played 
in influencing and shaping the Trident negotiations and agreements. The second, 
interrelated, story is the ways in which the UK’s technical dependence on the US 
has influenced British decision-making; leading to a narrowing of options and the 
seeking – as was the case with Chevaline – of some measure of autonomy. This 
focus reveals a complex story behind the Trident agreements. It is a tale of 
contingency, uncertainty, tough negotiations, and secret deals, which reveals that 
the Trident agreements formed part of a US-UK transactional defence relationship 
influenced by the dynamics of US geostrategic interests and domestic politics.  
 
Thus far, this study has treated the two US administrations separately. A 
conclusion is a timely place to draw some tentative comparisons and broader 
reflections. Both the Carter and Reagan administrations were consistently 
rational and unemotional about supplying Trident to the UK, and only consented 
to do so when the situation suited Washington. Nevertheless, British officials 
encountered more uncertainty in their negotiations with the Carter 
administration over Trident C4, than in their discussions with the Reagan 
administration over the supply of Trident D5. This was because there existed 
greater convergence between the supply of Trident and the Reagan 
administration’s foreign policy interests than was present with the Carter White 
House. Indeed, upon his election, Carter wished to reach agreement with the 
Soviets on significant nuclear reductions. If successful, this new approach to the 
US-Soviet arms-race would have restricted US-UK nuclear co-operation. However, 
only a couple of months after Carter’s election the Soviets resolutely rejected his 
‘deep cuts’ proposal. Despite this, the British government remained concerned 
that Carter’s continued commitment to the arms-control process could limit their 
options for the successor to Polaris. Thankfully, for the British government, a 
combination of shared NATO concerns over the SALT process and a hardening of 
the White House’s approach to the Soviet Union nullified the Carter 
administration’s aim of nuclear reductions. Soviet adventurism in the Horn of 
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Africa and its decision to invade Afghanistan re-ignited the Cold War, but these 
decisions clearly redounded to Britain’s nuclear advantage. It created a more 
hospitable environment for a US-UK Polaris replacement deal. However, these 
developments only made US agreement to the supply of Trident C4 more likely, 
not a foregone conclusion.  
At the Guadeloupe summit in January 1979, Jim Callaghan secured Carter’s 
agreement to consider the supply of Trident C4 with MIRV to the UK. However, 
despite Carter’s forthcoming response, throughout 1979 and early 1980 the 
British government remained uncertain that an eventual Trident agreement 
would come to fruition. In contrast to Carter’s assurances in Guadeloupe, in 
August 1979, US officials told the British that they had yet to make a decision on 
whether to transfer MIRV. Then in October 1979, the President promised to 
supply Trident C4 with MIRV - but at the same time, requested the delay of a 
formal agreement until after the announcement of a NATO ‘dual-track’ decision. 
However, the Carter administration continued to delay the finalisation of the 
Trident sale after NATO reached agreement on ‘dual-track’ in December 1979. On 
4 November 1979, Iranian militants took sixty-six Americans hostage. The Carter 
administration’s failure to secure their release damaged the President’s already 
eroded domestic position. Carter’s desperate need for a foreign policy success 
increased the administration’s sensitivity to the potential political impact of a 
Trident deal on SALT ratification. As such, in December 1979, Carter informed 
Thatcher that finalisation of the Trident sale would have to wait until after the 
indeterminate ratification of SALT II. Nevertheless, the Carter administration 
remained reluctant to finalise the Trident sale after the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and the subsequent withdrawal of SALT II from Senate consideration. 
This was because in the aftermath of the invasion, Carter’s political problems 
increased. Accordingly so did the White House’s paranoia about potential 
criticism of the Trident sale. With Carter’s potential second presidential term on 
the line, the Trident C4 agreement was not a priority. Indeed, when in late March 
1980, the Carter administration decided to finalise the Trident deal it was largely 
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due to the political damage the potential British reaction could cause if there was 
further delay.  
 As such, it is clear that whilst the Carter administration supported, to an 
extent, the replacement of Polaris, they did not see the supply of Trident C4 as a 
priority. This was particularly the case in their first few years in office when the 
administration largely placed priority on arms-control and human rights, not 
strengthening the nuclear forces of an ailing ally. As such, the administration did 
not believe that the replacement of Polaris would assist their efforts to change the 
dynamic of the Cold War, build the administration’s legacy, or win vital votes at 
home. However, the Carter administration’s misgivings continued even after the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was the final catalyst in the ‘hardening’ of 
Carter’s foreign policy. This lingering hesitation demonstrates that the Carter 
White House did not believe that the supply of Trident C4 missiles was necessary 
in itself to bolster western nuclear ‘deterrence’. Instead, the Carter administration 
mainly saw benefit in the wider gains of the Trident C4 supply: the deal bolstered 
NATO, in particular by protecting British spending on conventional forces; 
reinforced Carter’s image domestically by providing another demonstration of 
‘strength’ in the face of Soviet ‘aggression’; and was financially advantageous as it 
contributed extra money to a missile programme the US was developing anyway. 
However, to derive these benefits an agreement had to occur at the right time. An 
ill-timed deal would be extremely problematic for the administration, and had the 
potential to damage Carter’s already fragile hopes for re-election. Subsequently, 
Carter’s domestic problems marred preliminary negotiations on the Trident C4.  
 The convergence of US-UK defence policy interests meant that the Reagan 
administration was more amenable to supplying Trident D5 than the Carter 
administration had been with Trident C4. Nevertheless, in the first year of the 
Reagan White House, British policy-makers still felt uncertain about the future of 
the Polaris replacement. In 1981, Britain’s technical dependency on the US left its 
Polaris replacement programme in limbo as its government waited for the new 
Reagan administration to decide on whether to upgrade to the Trident D5 system. 
By September 1981, the British had secured confirmation that the Reagan 
Conclusion 
296 
administration would switch their submarine missile system to the Trident D5, 
and that this advanced system would be available to them. The British 
government was fortunate that the Reagan administration made their strategic 
modernisation decision earlier than originally expected, due mainly to the 
controversy over MX basing. Once Reagan had decided that the D5 missile would 
replace the C4 by 1989, he did not hesitate to agree that the British could purchase 
it.  
 This swift agreement was a clear demonstration of Reagan’s support for 
the UK nuclear programme. However, this decisiveness also chimed with the 
administration’s wider foreign policy goals as well as belief in the utility of 
Britain’s nuclear force. A key consideration in the president’s swift offer of the 
Trident D5 was the risk of British nugatory spending on the C4, as well as a belief 
within the US government, particularly the Pentagon, of the need for Britain to 
maintain commonality with the US. Protracted delay on agreeing to supply the D5, 
or indeed refusing to supply it, would have increased British expenditure on its 
nuclear programme at the expense of its conventional forces. This was not in the 
interests of the Reagan administration. Reagan officials believed that in order to 
meet the global challenge of the Soviet Union, the Western alliance needed to build 
both nuclear and conventional capabilities. Moreover, alongside the Reagan 
administration’s aggressive approach to the Soviet Union they concurrently 
viewed arms-control as a low priority; within such thinking it did not matter that 
provision of the D5 system would likely undermine any ongoing arms-control 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. Concern over the impact of a Trident sale on 
arms-control efforts had been a major reason for the Carter administration’s 
vacillation. With different priorities in their approach to the Cold War, the Reagan 
administration did not face such political constraints. As such, the greater 
convergence between US-UK nuclear co-operation and the Reagan 
administration’s foreign policy interests facilitated the supply of Trident D5 more 
than Carter’s sale of Trident C4. 
By the time the Trident C4 negotiations took place, Carter’s move toward 
a foreign policy confrontation with Moscow meant that there was greater 
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convergence between US defence interests and the logic for a Trident sale than in 
the early days of the administration. Likewise, throughout the Trident D5 
negotiations, supply of the system at a reduced price aligned strongly with US 
defence interests. Nevertheless, during both the C4 and D5 negotiations, US 
officials drove a hard bargain in order to derive the greatest possible benefit from 
the negotiation, and did not give the British reductions on the R&D charge freely 
or easily. Both the final C4 and D5 deals were contingent on complex negotiations. 
Moreover, the aims and interests of the Carter and Reagan administrations 
influenced the terms of both Trident sales. 
 The Carter administration was particularly forthright in its attempts to 
secure a substantive quid pro quo for the supply of Trident C4. The Carter White 
House demanded a British commitment to use the ‘savings’ from US-UK nuclear 
co-operation on their conventional forces, the payment of the full pro-rata R&D 
levy or provide offsets, and agreement to their plans to extend US facilities on 
Diego Garcia. After protracted negotiations, the British agreed to a watered down 
commitment on conventional force spending, to pay a five percent R&D levy in 
addition to operating US Rapier systems in Britain, and the US plans for Diego 
Garcia. In real terms, these demands were not onerous for the British, particularly 
in light of the savings the purchase of Trident afforded compared to the other 
options for the replacement of Polaris. Like the Reagan administration, it was not 
in the Carter administration’s interest for the British to spend an amount on their 
nuclear programme that would be detrimental to the rest of their defence budget. 
Instead, the Carter administration sought commitments that would benefit their 
wider foreign and domestic policy aims but not financially harm the British. 
Nevertheless, whilst both sides saw the eventual deal as beneficial, the process of 
coming to an agreement was not congenial nor particularly in keeping with a 
supposed ‘special relationship’. In particular, US officials openly discussed 
utilising Trident as ‘leverage’ in order to secure British agreement to their plans 
for Diego Garcia. In this way, the Carter White House treated the US-UK nuclear 
relationship as coolly transactional in nature.  
 Whilst the Reagan administration was more subtle in its effort to secure 
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commitments from London, it also endeavoured to derive certain benefits from 
the Trident sale. As a more advanced system, the full price tag of the D5 system 
was beyond the UK’s means. However, the administration’s offer of the missile did 
not come with a reassurance that they would provide it on similar terms to the 
Trident C4. Instead, the Reagan administration told the British that they would 
expect a quid pro quo in return for a reduction in the price. British acquisition of 
the D5 system at a higher cost than the C4 would likely have problematic political 
ramifications for the Thatcher government. The increased capability and costs of 
D5 could provoke increased public opposition to the Trident programme. In 
addition, British officials were concerned about if the increased costs could be 
absorbed within the already strained defence budget. Subsequently, in November 
1981, when MISC 7 met to deliberate on whether to adopt Trident D5, minister’s 
concerns about costs and the political ramifications meant they did not agree on 
a decision. Only in January 1982, buoyed by their overriding belief that Britain 
should retain an ‘independent strategic deterrent’, did MISC 7 decide to adopt D5, 
subject to negotiations on price with the Reagan administration.  
 The Reagan White House continued to drive a hard bargain up until the 
final day of the Trident negotiations as they pushed for British commitments, 
primarily on naval deployments, in return for a reduction in the price of the D5. 
In the end, the British received an extremely favourable deal, more so than in the 
Trident C4 agreements. This deal included a fixed R&D levy equivalent to $116 
million, which was an extraordinary concession by the administration. The British 
secured this deal by promising to reprieve the naval assault ships Fearless and 
Intrepid. As such, the British eventually secured a reduction in the R&D levy 
without much extra commitment in real terms on their part; they had already 
decided to reverse their decision to decommission the two ships. Nevertheless, it 
is important to note that the remarkable terms of the Trident D5 agreement also 
benefitted the Reagan administration. Indeed, the British received an extremely 
favourable deal because of the convergence of US-UK interests. The sale aided US 
efforts to strengthen western nuclear and conventional forces, in order to counter 
the ‘threat’ of the Soviet Union, and the favourable terms helped negate some 
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leftist criticism of the Trident D5 sale, and thus bolstered the ailing Thatcher 
government. The deal demonstrated the financial price the Reagan administration 
was willing to pay for the political and military support of a Conservative Britain. 
In this way, the party political preferences of the US government once again 
influenced the US-UK relationship.2  
 It is clear that the Reagan administration viewed the US-UK nuclear 
relationship as a tool to secure the wider defence interests of the US and the 
Western alliance. Richard Perle later remarked that the Reagan administration 
saw the Trident D5 agreement as “one more arrow in the quiver.”3 However, the 
Reagan administration wanted this ‘quiver’ to take a certain form. As such, at the 
same time as wishing to strike a favourable deal with the British, the Reagan 
administration concurrently saw the negotiations as an opportunity to get as 
much assistance as possible in their particular areas of concern. Like the Carter 
administration before, Reagan officials bargained hard in order to exploit the 
greatest advantage possible and viewed US-UK nuclear co-operation 
unemotionally as part of a wider defence relationship.  
 
This thesis has presented a multi-faceted account of the Trident agreements, 
which demonstrates their nuances and complexity. There is currently little 
archival research on the US-UK nuclear relationship in the late 1970s – early 
1980s.4 As such, by providing the first discrete study of the Trident negotiations, 
this thesis helps to move understanding of the US-UK nuclear relationship 
chronologically forward. However, by eschewing the Anglo-centric framework 
that too often dominates studies of the US-UK nuclear relationship, the thesis also 
elucidates the inter-connection between US-UK nuclear co-operation and other 
elements of American foreign policy.  
 Britain, as the junior partner, gained the most from the Trident 
                                                     
2 See Dobson, “Labour or Conservative.” 
3 Moore, Margaret Thatcher, 573. 
4 Works on the 1970s – 1980s include: Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield; Stoddart, Facing Down 
the Soviet Union; Parr, “The British Decision”; Baylis and Stoddart, “Britain and the Chevaline 
Project”; Robb, “Antelope, Poseidon or a Hybrid.” 
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agreements. Nevertheless, Britain’s technical dependency created a clear 
asymmetry within the US-UK relationship that accorded the Carter and Reagan 
administrations significant leverage, which they used to derive certain 
commitments. This resulted in political price tags being placed on the Trident 
agreements that were in turn hidden from the public. In this way, the actions of 
the Carter and Reagan administrations undermined the British government’s 
assertion in a 2006 White Paper that the US has never used Britain’s technical 
dependency “to influence UK Foreign Policy.”5  Nevertheless, from the perspective 
of the British government, it is understandable that they would wish to hide these 
terms. To be seen to be coveting deals on weapons of mass destruction from a 
position of weakness would not have helped the public presentation of the 
Trident agreements. In addition, public knowledge that the US had such political 
leverage over the British would undermine the government’s calls that the 
purchase of Trident ensured the continuation of Britain’s ‘independent deterrent’. 
Moreover, public knowledge of these price tags would have highlighted, that for 
the US, the supply of Trident missiles was not to ensure the continuation of 
Britain’s nuclear ‘deterrent’ per se, and thereby undermined the British 
government’s argument of its necessity. 
 Both administrations viewed the continuation of the US-UK nuclear 
relationship as of benefit to the wider defence interests of the US and the Western 
alliance. However, they differed on the extent they thought the supply of Trident, 
in itself, was of benefit. Reagan clearly saw utility in assisting with the 
replacement of Britain’s strategic system and the subsequent strengthening of 
NATO’s nuclear forces. In contrast, Carter prevaricated on this issue and the 
available evidence suggests that, whilst he supported the maintenance of the UK’s 
nuclear capability, he was less sure about the supply of Trident C4 with MIRV due 
to its increased capability compared to Polaris. Carter indicated his support for 
Britain’s nuclear programme in a number of ways: he endorsed the maintenance 
                                                     
5 UK Government White Paper, “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent.”  
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of the UK’s nuclear capability through Kingman Brewster; authorised British 
warhead testing for the successor system; and was forthcoming in response to 
Callaghan’s enquiries at the Guadeloupe summit over whether he would consider 
the supply of Trident C4. However, at the same time, the actions of the Carter 
administration indicated a reluctance to supply Trident C4: the administration 
hesitated over the supply of MIRV; overtly worried about the criticism they would 
face over the sale’s damage to arms-control; and informed the British that their 
primary motive for the Trident sale was to prevent cuts in Britain’s conventional 
forces. In particular, the Carter administration’s willingness to delay the 
agreement raises questions over the utility they saw in Britain’s nuclear 
‘deterrent’. It is difficult to assess, given that many of the relevant documents at 
the Carter library remain classified, whether the administration’s hesitation to 
supply Trident was due only to Carter’s concern over the political ramifications of 
supplying an advanced system, or whether the supply itself of an advanced 
nuclear capability also troubled him. Nevertheless, it is clear that Carter saw less 
utility in the supply of Trident than Reagan due to the inherent problems it could 
cause for an arms-control process in which he was vested.  
 Carter’s hesitant attitude towards Trident is representative of the dilemma 
he faced in tackling the problems of strategic parity at an international and 
European level. At the NATO level, the supply of Trident ensured the continuation 
of a ‘second-centre of decision-making’ on nuclear use, which was helpful in 
stemming Western European fears over US ‘de-coupling’ from Europe due to 
strategic parity. However, the Carter administration also believed that the supply 
of Trident C4 could damage their arms-control efforts at the international level. 
This dilemma helps to explain Carter’s complex and hesitant attitude towards the 
supply of Trident. Reagan faced no such dilemma due to his belief that 
strengthening nuclear and conventional forces, not arms-control, was the solution 
to strategic parity. In this way, the Carter and Reagan administration differed over 
the utility they saw in Britain’s nuclear force, due to their diverging views over 
strategy in the Cold War. 
 However, both the Carter and Reagan administrations believed that the 
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Trident agreements were important to maintain NATO’s conventional forces. 
Behind this lay the belief that the British government would decide to replace 
Polaris with or without US help. As discussed, it was not in US interests for the 
British to arm unilaterally. The huge costs involved would be detrimental to 
Britain’s wider defence contributions, which were politically important to the US. 
In contrast, through the supply of Trident, both the Reagan and Carter 
administrations were able to bolster NATO, in a relatively cheap way, by ensuring 
the maintenance of Britain’s conventional and nuclear forces. However, as well as 
the benefits to NATO, both administrations also viewed US-UK nuclear co-
operation as important due to its place in the wider defence relationship. As part 
of this, both US administrations used their political advantage over the British to 
derive certain commitments relating to their wider interests. In this way, the US 
harnessed the Trident agreements to reinforce the existing security architecture 
of the Cold War. As such, the US supply of Trident was not about ensuring that 
Britain stayed in the nuclear game per se but rather it concerned the 
modernisation of Britain’s nuclear and conventional forces to strengthen NATO 
as part of a transactional US-UK defence relationship.  
 However, it is important to clarify that, even though the Trident 
agreements were to the benefit of the US and helped to reinforce a security 
architecture that was very much in their interests, this did not mean that the 
Trident agreements were a foregone conclusion. As discussed, the British felt 
uncertain about the possible results of the Trident negotiations throughout their 
discussions with the Carter and Reagan administrations. In a distinct change since 
the Skybolt crisis and the resulting Polaris sale, this uncertainty was, overall, not 
the result of a reluctance to supply a nuclear system to the British. Instead, much 
of the uncertainty was because the Trident agreements would only be of modest 
advantage to the US. In the conduct of the Carter and Reagan administrations, it is 
evident that the British could have the system they wanted, as long as it did not 
interfere with the main policy priorities of the US government. Overall, both 
administration’s attitude towards the US-UK nuclear relationship was one of 
support, or at least acquiescence. However, both administrations felt no 
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compunction about criticising London when they felt the British government was 
diverting money to its nuclear programme at the expense of other vital areas of 
defence, or if they felt the sale of Trident could undermine their other interests. 
This was particularly shown by the attitude of the Carter administration.  
 On the other hand, if co-operation was particularly helpful to US interests 
then the respective administration was more forthcoming; this was particularly 
the case with the Reagan administration. In this way, it is clear that both 
administrations viewed it as helpful to assist the British with replacing Polaris, 
when it coalesced with their overall aims and interests. However, if a Polaris 
replacement clashed with the priorities of the administration, they brushed aside 
the interests of the British. In this way, Britain’s demonstrable position as the 
junior partner in US-UK nuclear co-operation implied that contingency was innate 
throughout the British government’s endeavours to replace Polaris. As such, the 
Trident agreements were not a foregone conclusion, owing to long-standing 
nuclear co-operation or the reductive logic of ‘deterrence’ in the Cold War era. 
Instead, the Trident agreements were a continuation of the close but not 
preordained nature of US-UK defence co-operation, one that has been 
renegotiated, according to the varying political, strategic and economic interests 
of both parties continually over its existence. 
 
The previously opaque story of the Trident negotiations contained within this 
thesis also makes an important contribution to current debates on Trident 
renewal. It demonstrates that there is an entrenched belief amongst the British 
political elite that an ‘independent deterrent’ is necessary for Britain’s security. 
Accordingly, owing to Britain’s inferiority in nuclear R&D, this creates a 
dependency on the US to supply the system. Combined, these two aspects of 
British nuclear policy led to far greater US influence over British defence policy, 
through the Trident agreements, than the historiography has previously 
acknowledged. Specifically, the thesis highlights two particularly problematic 
areas of influence.  
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 Firstly, Britain’s technical dependence and the need to maintain 
‘commonality’ with the US restricted its choice of system. Therefore, Britain opted 
to purchase Trident D5; a system that far exceeded the nation’s needs. The 
suitability of this system is particularly questionable given that the US supply of 
Trident was not to ensure the continuation of Britain’s nuclear ‘deterrent’ per se 
but rather the wider defence benefits that the US gained from US-UK nuclear co-
operation. The result of the agreement between the Thatcher and Reagan 
governments was the unnecessary escalation of British nuclear capability, which 
in-turn arguably undermined global non-proliferation efforts.  
 The second problematic area is the political leverage the US held over 
Britain’s defence policy on the issue of technical dependency. Unquestionably, 
both the Reagan and Carter administrations used the sale of Trident to influence 
British defence policy. This was particularly problematic given the marked 
democratic deficit evident in British nuclear decision-making. In the name of 
‘national security’, the British government obscured the deals that complimented 
the Trident agreements. Indeed, decision-making on whether to accept the terms 
of the US was limited to a very small elite circle, with Cabinet only ever asked to 
rubber-stamp the Trident decisions. Moreover, as demonstrated by the continued 
redaction of much of the material within the British archives, the UK government 
remain reluctant to open their past nuclear decision-making to the process of 
accountability; this is reputedly a hallmark of democracy. 
 This US ‘influence’ in British nuclear decision-making is important to note 
when considering the future of US-UK nuclear co-operation. The Trident 
agreements reinforced British reliance upon the US. Therefore, the superior 
geostrategic and domestic interests of the United States will invariably condition 
the British government’s policy on the renewal of Trident. As such, this study 
provides a stark warning to policy-makers, and the interested public alike: the US 
will expect substantial influence for any assistance with Britain’s attempts to 
replace Trident. Moreover, given the British governments conception’s of 
‘national security’, democratic accountability will once more be bypassed as any 
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‘influence’ the US has in the Trident renewal decision will remain clouded in 
secrecy for the next thirty years or more.   
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